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KANSAS OPEN BOOKS FOREWORD

I

t is wonderful that the University Press of Kansas with funding from the National Endowment for the Humanities and the Andrew W. Mellon
Foundation have arranged to release this digital edition
of O. Gene Clanton’s Kansas Populism: Ideas and Men as
part of the NEH-Mellon Humanities Open Books Program. Through the work of scholars like Clanton, Populism—the reform-oriented social and political movement
that spawned the Farmers’ Alliance and People’s Party of
the late nineteenth century—is now a quintessential Kansas history topic, and, as William C. Pratt, a distinguished
scholar of American labor radicalism observed, “If a person were to read only one book on Kansas Populism, this
should be it.”1
Orval Gene Clanton was born September 14, 1934,
in Pittsburg, Kansas. After three semesters at the Kansas
State College of Pittsburg (now known as Pittsburg State
University), he served in the U.S. Army from 1954 to 1957.
He returned to Pittsburg after his military service and
earned a bachelor’s degree in education in 1959 and a master’s degree in history in 1962. He taught secondary school
in Lamar, Colorado, from 1960 to 1962 before returning
to the Sunflower State and doctoral studies in history at
the University of Kansas. He taught at Texas A&M University, then completed his dissertation and received his Ph.D.
from KU in 1967. After spending the summer of 1968 as
a visiting professor of history at Georgia State College in
Atlanta, he commenced a long career at Washington State
University that fall. He received promotion to full professor in 1978 and retired with the rank of emeritus professor
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in 1997. Clanton died October 8, 2017, at the home of his
daughter and son-in-law in Charlotte, North Carolina.
Kansas Populism is a revision of Clanton’s dissertation. Donald R. McCoy, a historian of American politics,
served as Clanton’s advisor. Clanton credited Robert F. LaForte—a fellow southeast Kansan and KU history Ph.D.—
with suggesting Kansas Populism as a subject. Clanton
also acknowledged the earlier work on Kansas Populism
by Raymond Miller and Walter T. K. Nugent. In deference
to Miller and Nugent, Clanton avoided assessing the economic origins of Kansas Populism as analyzed by Miller in
the 1920s and the charges of anti-Semitism and nativism
leveled against the Populists refuted by Nugent earlier in
the 1960s.2
The Populists of the late nineteenth century enjoyed
favorable treatment among early twentieth century scholars. Influenced by Frederick Jackson Turner’s frontier thesis, progressive historians Solon J. Buck and John D. Hicks
viewed the Populists with sympathy and as the predecessors of twentieth-century reformers.3 The Populists’ reputation, however, received steady criticism from historians
in the twenty years before Clanton published Kansas Populism. In The Age of Reform: From Bryan to F.D.R., Richard Hofstadter presented the Populists as the harbingers of
twentieth-century conspiracy theorists, nativists, and antiSemites.4 Hofstadter prompted generations of revisionists—including Nugent and Clanton. Whereas Hofstadter
relied almost exclusively on published sources, Clanton
and his peers conducted extensive archival research.
Inspired by the studies of progressive leaders by
George E. Mowry, Alfred D. Chandler, Otis L. Graham Jr.,
and others, Clanton believed a similar analysis of Populist
leadership would illuminate the historiographical debate.
He also saw the need for additional local studies of Populism; Kansas Populism, therefore, combines leadership
analysis with a narrative history of Populism in the state.5
Clanton places Kansas Populism within the context
of the Gilded Age calls for reform by farmers and indus-
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trial workers and an ongoing national struggle between
the values of anti-monopolism and individualism. He connects the Populists to traditional American democratic
values of equality, freedom, and equal opportunity. “The
history of Kansas during the Gilded Age was more than
just a pale reflection of the frenetic activities that affected
the nation at large,” he writes. “In a sense, the state served
as a stage upon which the rest of the nation acted out its
antagonisms, hopes, and frustrations.”6 After examining
Populist leadership, Clanton presents a narrative history of
the rise and fall of the People’s Party.
Clanton’s prosopography includes eighty-nine
Kansas Populist leaders such as “elected administrative
officials, congressmen, prominent leaders in the state legislature, party officials, prominent lecturers and part workers, and writers and editors of leading Populist papers.”7
The composite picture of a Populist leader that he presents
contrasts with the clodhopper caricatures favored by their
contemporary opponents or the conspiratorial hayseeds
depicted by midcentury scholars like Hofstadter. Clanton’s
composite Kansas Populist leader was about forty-six, from
the Middle West, New York, or Pennsylvania, and had arrived in Kansas in the 1870s. Only a few of Clanton’s Populist leaders engaged exclusively in farming. They worked
in a variety of middle-class professions including law and
teaching. More than half of the Populist leaders graduated
from college. The majority adhered to one of a variety of
Protestant denominations, with a few spiritualists and agnostics among their number. They rejected social Darwinism and supported the state and federal government acting
on behalf of the people.
On the national level, a near partisan equilibrium
existed during the last twenty-five years of the nineteenth
century. The Republican Party won the presidency in
three of the five elections between 1876 and 1892 despite
never gaining a majority of the popular vote. The Republican Party, however, dominated Kansas politics from 1862
until 1880, when a division within the Republican Party
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led to the election of a Democratic governor in 1882. The
Republicans regained the governorship in 1884 and the
Democrats would not hold it again until 1912. Every U.S.
senator elected from statehood until 1891 was a Republican. During this prolonged period of Republican rule, Kansas saw its population and miles of railroad track rapidly
increase. Most of the new population and railroads served
its commercial agriculture industry and, thus, favored Republican candidates with close ties to business. Public and
private indebtedness grew throughout the post–Civil War
boom. Although the majority of Kansans remained true
to the Republican Party, a few critics started question the
concentration of wealth in the hands of the rich and urged
the state and federal government to support farmers and
laborers.
Kansas Populism connects the People’s Party to earlier
third-party movements in the state, observing “practically
all the demands of the 1890 Populist platform had been
called for by earlier third-party movements.”8 Reform agitation in Kansas began in 1872 when a faction of Republicans
cooperated with Democrats to offer a Liberal-Republican
ticket. An Independent Reform Party contested the 1874
and 1876 campaigns. The Greenback Party emerged in
1878 and continued as the Greenback-Labor Party in 1880,
1882, and 1884. The Prohibition Party arrived in 1886 and
the Union-Labor Party in 1888. Clanton finds that many
of those who would become leaders in the Kansas Populist
movement were leaders in these parties in the years leading
up to the formation of the People’s Party.
The Kansas boom ended in 1887–1888. Its greatest
excesses had occurred in the middle tier of counties, “from
Marshall to Phillips in the north, and from Chautauqua
to Comanche in the south.” These counties along with extreme southeastern Kansas provided the core of support
for the Populists. The state’s western counties—filled with
recent arrivals—saw many of the bankrupt newcomers
depart, thus diminishing the region’s potential Populist
base. Seven counties in extreme northwest Kansas—set-
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tled about the same time as the middle tier—backed the
Populists.
The bust prompted those Kansas farmers with
enough means to stay and fight to join the Farmers’ Alliance and reassess their political priorities. Leaders with
business connections, the “bloody shirt” of sectional loyalty, and the battles over the tariff seemed less important
in the face of foreclosure. The first Kansas chapter affiliated with the northern Farmers’ Alliance had organized
in about 1881. The order grew slowly until 1888; however,
by 1889, the more radical southern alliance dominated the
state. The two state alliance organizations consolidated
August 14, 1889, at Newton, with Benjamin H. Clover of
Cowley County as president. Sixty-eight county alliance
presidents gathered on March 25, 1890, at Topeka, called
for third-party political action, and created the People’s
State Committee. On April 30, 1890, William Peffer, publisher of the influential Kansas Farmer, pledged to “put the
Alliance before party” and, on May 14, announced opposition to Republican senator John J. Ingalls’s reelection. The
first People’s Party state convention gathered at Topeka on
August 13, 1890.
The formation of the People’s Party changed the pattern of Kansas politics. During the 1890s, Kansas Populists
elected numerous congressmen, two US senators, two governors, and the chief justice of the Kansas Supreme Court.
The dynamic personalities that shaped the movement in
Kansas were central to the rise and fall of the People’s Party
at the national level. Clanton identifies renewed prosperity
and internal ideological divisions—particularly the debate
over whether to prioritize the inflation of the currency
through the coinage of silver and endorse the People’s Party’s 1896 nomination of Democrat William Jennings Bryan
for president—as the causes of the Populist collapse. “The
cement of economic discontent had crumbled,” he writes:
Ideological conflicts that had existed within the
reform ranks from the very beginning in more or
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less subdued tones were now magnified to fatal
proportions. Actually, the failure of the great silver
crusade had signaled the beginning of the end; with
Bryan’s defeat the partisans of reform had reached
the parting of the ways, and the parting created an
even more interesting dialogue than that which had
characterized their union.9

Clanton refutes those scholars that viewed Kansas
Populism as a failure because of the People's Party's fleeting electoral success by listing the Populists’ extensive legislative successes on behalf of laborers, farmers, and the
general public. According to Clanton, Kansas Populists
passed the reform spirit to Roosevelt insurgents, socialists,
and progressives within the Republican and Democratic
Parties. Clanton rates prominent Kansas Populists high in
leadership abilities and ability to diagnose societal ills and
propose cures. Their greatest shortcoming, he writes, was
their inability to reconcile internal differences. Reviewers—including John D. Hicks—responded to Kansas Pop ulism with measured praise.10
Clanton devoted the rest of his long career to the
continued study of Populism. He published two additional
monographs—Populism: The Humane Preference in America, 1890–1900 and Congressional Populism and the Crisis
of the 1890s. 11 Clanton reflected on his career in a 2000 letter to the Journal of American History written in response
to a review of Congressional Populism. He writes, “From
the beginning of my involvement with this subject I have
attempted to restore some balance in our understanding of
the movement by means of extensive original research that
began at the county level, then moved on to the state, regional, and finally the national level of Populist activity:'12
In 2004, Clanton published a revised version of Kansas Populism. In A Common Humanity: Kansas Populism
and the Battle for Justice and Equality, 1854–1903, Clanton
reconciles his earlier work with some of the scholarship
published in the intervening thirty-five years-including
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his own—and offers his opinion on some of the subsequent
studies. Yet the revision falls short of Clanton’s promise of
a “thorough revision and updating” of the 1969 work.13 In
response to scholars questioning the use of the Gilded Age
as useful periodization, Clanton added two new chapters
to the beginning of his work on the origins of the era’s economic conflict. The rest of the 2004 book mirrors the organization of Kansas Populism, and the revision received
critical reviews.14
In both Kansas Populism and A Common Humanity,
Clanton presents the Populists’ 1892 Omaha platform as
“the culmination of a third-party campaign that had been
under way [sic] since the mid-1870s, and it enshrined the
Alliance demands as they had been perfected since 1886.
Its program of economic reforms was designed to rescue
an older, predominantly agrarian America from the onslaught of urban-industrial America.”15 This view of the
Populists clinging to an agrarian past contrasts with the
interpretation of the Populists as forward-looking modernizers presented a few years after Clanton’s revision by
Charles Postel in The Populist Vision (2007).16
Numerous scholars have assessed various aspects of
Kansas Populism since the initial appearance of Clanton’s
work; however, a reappraisal of Kansas Populism is overdue in light of developments within the historical profession—including race, class, and gender analyses and new
interpretations of Populism advanced by Charles Postel
and others—and in Kansas politics.17 Until a new synthesis
is published, Kansas Populism remains the most thorough
account of the subject.
Jeff Wells
Kearney, Nebraska
March 2020
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"NOTHING SUCCEEDS LIKE SUCCESS":
Kansas Populism's Gilded-Age Background

A
-

s the last decade of the
nineteenth century opened, vast numbers of Kansans would
pr-obably have been amused to learn that they were participants
in an era later to be called the "Gay Nineties." Gaiety was in short
supply. But whatever else it promised to be, the new decade gave
every indication of being anything but dull. Kansas was in great
ferment. Disenchanted farmers and townspeople were organizing
for political action throughout the state. Undeniably, the masses
were agitated in an unprecedented manner. The battle cry was
reform; reform, they insisted, in the interest of the working classes
of farm and factory. By June, 1890, this ferment in Kansas had
produced a new political organization called the People's party
(soon to be known more popularly as the Populist party), which
would challenge the Kansas governmental establishment as it had
never been challenged before.
Naturally, individuals who were fiercely attached to this
establishment were alarmed by the ominous signs of impending
storm. Some, of course, launched a bitter counterattack, utilizing
the formidable antireform rationale of the Gilded Age. On May
14, 1890, the Topeka Advocate, then emerging as the leading
journalistic voice of Kansas Populism, published a letter of one of
those individuals. Using the pseudonym Justicus, the correspondent minced no words in appraising the reform movement and
American society. "Hayseed and manual labor," the writer
averred, "has been compelled to step down and out to make room
for those who by birth and education and wealth are fitted to
guide this nation onward and upward. This inexorable law of the
survival of the fittest is fully exemplified in the position occupied
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to-day by the various classes; it is a natural result, and all your
labor organizations and gas cannot alter it." The writer went on
to assert that the laboring man's problems were not caused by any
injustice on the part of "the ruling class," but were "directly traceable to the socialists and many reformers whom no condition
could satisfy, but are ever seeking to stir up the common people,
who otherwise would be content in the comfortable position they
now occupy." Turning to the demands of the new movement, the
writer then stated: "The mad projects now talked of by these
self-styled reformers would be enough to drive a Plato mad with
envy; government ownership of railroads; government warehouses, for the farmers to stow away their crop of pumpkins;
government loaning money to the laboring men; now that is rich .
. . . these things will never be." The real punch line of the letter
was: "Because you have not the brains to get rich, you raise a hue
and cry that those who are rich made it at your expense, when it
was the natural result of their energy and superiority." 1
The question "If you're so damn smart, why aren't you
rich?" had a special meaning for Americans who lived through
that exciting and dynamic period in American history labeled the
Gilded Age. The adjectives exciting and dynamic may seem inappropriate to those who recall Vernon L. Parrington's portrayal
of that era of American history. To Parrington, the period between the Civil War and the Spanish-American War was openly
and crassly materialistic, a colossal national feast labeled "the
Great Barbecue." "With no social conscience, no concern for
civilization, no heed for the future of democracy it talked so much
about," he wrote, "the Gilded Age threw itself into the business of
money-getting." 2 The end result was a period representing an interregnum of waste, corruption, and inefficiency.3
Although interpretations of the Gilded Age are still quite
polarized, its analysts more and more have recognized it for what
it was, an extremely complex and critical transition period in the
development of American society. True, all periods in history are
transitional, but the Gilded Age was influenced profoundly by an
entirely unique factor-the emergence of industrial capitalism.
Most Americans interested in reviewing the period between
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the inauguration of Andrew Jackson in 1829 and that of Rutherford Hayes in 1877 have focused their primary attention upon the
issues relevant to the corning of the Civil War and its aftermathas did the participants in the drama. In doing so they have failed
to note fully the extent to which some rather fundamental social
values were being altered. One of the most significant of these
involved the role of government relative to the economic order.
The politico-economic system being challenged was that known
rather ambiguously as laissez faire.
In the United States, laissez-faire thought began to take
root in the wake of the Revolution, if not earlier, but it was not
until the age of Jackson that it became a pervasive force. After
having said this, though, it must also be emphasized, as Arthur W.
Thompson has written, that during the Jacksonian era "advocates
of economic individualism were far less concerned with laissez
faire than with attacking existing monopolies, real or imagined, in
their pursuit of a freer and more genuinely competitive brand of
enterprise." For some of those Jacksonian enthusiasts who joined
in the assault on "state-chartered monopolies" the objective was
the achievement of "particular economic goals." For others, the
struggle against monopolies "was part of a broader onslaught
against special privilege-corporate or otherwise-and directed toward the goal of creating a democratic society in which all individuals would be equal in the exercise of rights." 4 With a great
assist from this diverse influence, therefore, the period between
Andrew Jackson's inauguration and the Civil War provided fertile ground for two potent forces-democracy and industrialism.
In this period, however, as Thompson noted, "many small, struggling Jacksonian entrepreneurs developed into relatively large and
powerful industrial capitalists." Ironically enough, within a decade or so after the Civil War "they had contributed also to the
appearance of corporate monopoly and restricted competition, the
very evils against which they had fought." But that was not all,
for it was not just "the Jacksonian persuasion against economic
privilege" that was "undermined," "new and cynical political
spoilsmen also appeared to challenge the successful operation of
popular government."~
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Unwittingly, the real revolutionaries at work within American society were the captains of industry who fashioned the new
corporate structure, and not "the socialists and many reformers" as
Justicus believed. The large corporation was the culprit. There
simply was no place for this gigantic form of enterprise within the
old system of American values. The institutions and values prevalent in the United States were founded upon the social and political ideal of the free individual. Essentially an inheritance from
the late eighteenth century, the free individual was by birthright
entitled to the natural rights of "life, liberty, and property." In a
state of nature the free individual was responsible only to the law
of nature or nature's God. When the individual became a member
of society he did not surrender his natural rights but merely consented to certain restrictions upon his freedom for the good of
society. The ideology was of course predicated upon a static conception of the cosmos that took for granted, as historian John
Tipple has phrased it, the "constancy of nature in moral as well as
physical operations, and the universal efficacy of its laws." 6 It was
to such a conception of the cosmos that Adam Smith had attached
his natural economic laws. But unlike the British setting where
the growth of industrialism proceeded in advance of democratic
ideas, in America the ideas of free competition and equal opportunity held a revered place within the ideology.
Within a closed system of this sort the large industrial
corporation was indeed incongruous, since it was neither an individual nor accounted among the phenomena of nature. Obviously,
the corporate body enjoyed considerable advantages over the individual. Relatively free of mortal limitations, the corporation was
capable of growing to irresistible size and power upon "the accumulated lifetimes and earnings of many individuals." Even worse,
it was generally considered to be devoid of natural reason and
consequently not inherently responsive to the governance of
nature. Ideologically, then, the modern corporation was, as Tipple
has stated, "an outlaw to the society which spawned it." 7
At least as early as the age of Jackson there were Americans
who were ready to revamp the old ideology to accord a place to
the newly emerging corporate structure.8 Their task was formi-

"NOTHING SUCCEEDS LIKE SUCCESS"

5
dable, since changes in the structure of social ideas seem to wait on
general changes in economic and political life.9 But then, although
the old system of values provided no ready place for the large
corporation, it became increasingly obvious that prevailing ideology provided no great obstacle to the consolidation of economic
triumphs. 10 To many it became obvious that the ideology could
in fact be put to good use in its defense. The Civil War and an
English philosopher, in their own individual ways, were to make
this course quite popular.
Whether the Civil War actually accelerated industrial development in terms of production figures, it did enhance, in the
long run, the social and political atmosphere in which it operated,
making it much easier for American entrepreneurs to apply the
nation's vast resources to the best advantage to produce revolutionary results.11 Charles Francis Adams, for one, noted the great
change that had come over America when he returned from his
diplomatic post in England following the Civil War. The "most
noticeable" change, he pointed out in his well-known article for
the North American Review, was "perhaps to be found in a
greatly enlarged grasp of enterprise and increased facility of combination." The many-sided experiences of the war, he was sure,
taught "lessons not likely to be lost on men quick to receive and
to apply all new ideas." 12
Industrial leaders were indeed "quick to receive and to
apply" new ideas, but as Thomas C. Cochran and William Miller
have demonstrated: "Neither secession nor Civil War had called
businessmen to national leadership; both events only marked
their ascension. When the southern states seceded from the Union
they left with the conviction that the reign of agrarianism was
over. That conviction proved correct." As is now apparent,
"Businessmen had developed their plants, refined their techniques
in the fifties. In 1860, aided by northwestern farmers, they had
captured political power. By 1865, they had strengthened their
control beyond agrarian recall."13
By means of political alliances, mainly but not entirely
within the Republican party, industrial businessmen fortified their
position. With the removal of a South unsympathetic to northern
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economic interests they occupied the place of "a pampered only
child"; and congress, spurred on by the necessities of war,
showered them with unprecedented gifts in land, protective tariffs,
and favorable banking laws. Then with northern economic supremacy assured by the outcome of the Civil War in 1865, that
position was fortified further by the process of radical Republican
Reconstruction. Corporation lawyers persuaded the supreme court
to define a corporation as a person within the meaning of the
Fourteenth Amendment, thus affording the corporation the protection of the prevailing ideology of the free individual and vastly
reducing the regulatory power of the states and subsequently the
national government.14
General Ulysses S. Grant's two terms in the presidency
from 1869 to 1877, backed as he was by the leaders of the emerging
industrial order, served to secure politically the cause of northern
business interests. Business strategy was indeed eminently successful in this period, although the effort was mainly a holding action
that was aimed at retaining benefits that were secured almost
fortuitously during the Civil War and Reconstruction, or to blocking legislation it did not desire.15
The background of the settlement of the disputed presidential election of 1876, moreover, seemed to demonstrate that
southern political leaders had learned the lesson of industrial
power and were ready to defend Yankee economic interests with
as much alacrity as the northerner himself. 16 Within the confines
of this apparent paradise, private profits were sacrosanct. In 1870
the inheritance tax had terminated. Two years later, the income
tax expired. Corporate or excess profits taxes were nonexistent,
and by 1890 most of the revenue of the national government came
from import taxes and excises on liquor and tobacco, the burden
of which fell heavily on the nation's consumers. Amid such favorable conditions, industrial capital practically doubled itself every
decade.17 Needless to say, private fortunes of colossal proportions
were amassed, and the chasm separating the rich and the poor
opened immensely and threateningly.
That American society between 1860 and 1900 assisted so
well in the rise of industrialism, however, was hardly the result
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of a monumental conspiracy. This state of affairs was created by
a special set of historical circumstances. The post-Civil War generation was afflicted with a kind of myopia left over from all the
bitterness generated by years of sectional conflict and four years
of bloody warfare, and the issues of Reconstruction intensified the
condition. The Republican party emerged from the war with vast
moral assets that it was quick to exploit. The party could present
itself as the savior of the Union, while portraying Democrats as
traitors to the flag. This fixation on war issues tended to push
aside discussion of other critical issues of the period.
It should be noted, moreover, that the last twenty-five years
of the nineteenth century was not a period of Republican supremacy. Nationally, the two great parties fought each other to a
standstill. It was an era of stalemate and equilibrium in party
politics characterized by a bitter fight for control of the government. In the presidential contests from 1876 to 1892 the Republican party failed in each to win a majority of the popular vote, even
though the party did win three of the five contests. This struggle
was also reflected in congress. From 1877 to 1897 the Republicans
controlled the presidency and congress concurrently only four
years, from 1881-83 and again from 1889-91. The Democrats, on
the other hand, commanded both only two years, 1893-95.18
The unique circumstances created by the emergence of
industrial capitalism were in themselves a problem of no small
dimensions for both their apologists and their critics. As Vincent
P. De Santis has observed, "The men who served in the presidency and congress in the post-Reconstruction years knew little, if
anything, about the major problem of their time-the adjustment
of American politics to the great economic and social changes that
came to the United States with the rise of industrial capitalism
and urbanism." Measured by today's standards of politicoeconomic relationships, wrote De Santis, "the Republican leaders
of the Gilded Age were conservatives. They believed governmental interference with economic natural laws impeded progress;
thus government regulation should be limited to the barest minimum." From their point of view, however, and from the point
of view of many of their contemporaries, "they were not conserva-
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tives. They were not committed to lessening federal power. They
did not oppose spending public money for special interests, as
their support of national subsidy programs shows, especially the
protective tariff." 19
Business was dominant in this age of enterprise, but the
values of the captain of industry, if not the values of the vast
majority of Americans, were at least not significantly at variance
with those values. The concept of the free individual lent itself
well during the Gilded Age to a reformulation of the Gospel of
Wealth. Andrew Carnegie's 1889 article in the North American
Review provided the title, but, as Ralph Henry Gabriel has written, "he merely formulated a philosophy as universal in the
United States as smoke in Pittsburgh."20 "It was an elaboration of
the doctrine of the free individual of the American democratic
faith," wrote Gabriel, "and was a result of the discovery that this
tenet had important utilities in the new industrial capitalism."21
Having both a religious and a secular base, the Gospel of Wealth
reduced to its most simple formulation was a popular faith in
material success, one that equated wealth and morality. It contained within it the idea that the American economy should be
controlled by a natural aristocracy brought to the top through the
competitive struggle of the marketplace; the idea that the state
should confine itself strictly to the role of protecting property
(which had divine sanction within the gospel) and maintaining
order; that poverty was a natural result of inferior abilities, or sin,
or both; and that the rich were obligated to do good with the
riches they accumulated.22
In noblesse oblige fashion, the Gospel of Wealth recognized
the social obligations of riches, but it vied with another point of
view that was devoid of altruistic pretensions. Adherents of this
latter viewpoint represented what Thorstein Veblen later designated as the "hawk influence of pecuniary competition," and
Ralph H. Gabriel has called their faith the "gospel of grab and
hold."23 However they are called, the adherents of both viewpoints
were quite receptive to ideas that strengthened their positionespecially as the conflict between rampant economic individualism
and expanding political democracy became more obvious.24 For
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those who were committed intellectually to laissez-faire individualism and to those who espoused an ambiguous form of laissez
faire ( no governmental intervention in the economy except to aid
their particular interests), Herbert Spencer's special use of Charles
Darwin's evolutionary hypotheses provided a splendid new rationale that appeared to harmonize magnificently with prevailing
thought.
The captains of industry were indeed fortunate to have
begun their great work at a time when Charles Darwin had
shocked a quasi-religious age with his Origin of Species (1859)
and Herbert Spencer had begun to popularize his rendition of the
social counterpart to the biological processes in evolution (late
1860s). It may well be, as Edward C. Kirkland has written, that
the Spencerian rationale did "no more for the business community
than to furnish a new terminology for old ideas," for the record
demonstrates that industrial leaders were eminently pragmatic
and always ready to exploit the main chance without reference to
ideals. 25 However that may be, Spencer's thought was, for the
business community, rationalization not philosophy, and its adoption, as such, was clearly within the scope of the pragmatic business mind. Darwinism not only undermined the fixed conception
of the cosmos upon which the doctrine of the free individual
rested, thereby further reducing its effectiveness as a weapon for
democracy, but Spencer provided a rationale that facilitated the
appropriation of much of the doctrine itself to be used in defense
of the shiny new order.
Later labeled social Darwinism, Herbert Spencer's synthesis
presented a many-faceted picture of society, embracing the whole
of man's past, present, and future history. He contended that history demonstrated evolutionary progress towards perfection, but
that this progress took place only under conditions that allowed
the economic struggle for existence and the survival of the fittest
to work itself out within a system of unrestrained free enterprise.
The "fit" had to be left utterly free to overcome the "unfit." The
massing of wealth or the attainment of power and success demonstrated "fitness," while disease, poverty, and failure to improve
one's status in society were evidence of "unfitness." It followed
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that governmental efforts to ameliorate the condition of the weak
and to defend the poor against the rich, the unsuccessful against
the successful, were a violation of "scientific law" and detrimental
to progress. Men were born unequal, and any effort to equalize
them by governmental action was contrary to the laws of nature.26
The Spencerian synthesis rapidly won converts and spokesmen in America-some who accepted it as philosophical explanation and others who recognized its utilitarian values. As a
rationale, it was tailor-made for the times. As Richard Hofstadter
has written, "It offered a comprehensive world-view, uniting
under one generalization everything in nature from protozoa to
politics.... Moreover it was not a technical creed for professionals.
Presented in language that tyros in philosophy could understand,
it made Spencer the metaphysician of the homemade intellectual,
and the prophet of the cracker-barrel agnostic." 27
Significantly, England gave Spencer's ideas a rather unenthusiastic hearing. The Industrial Revolution had proceeded a
considerable distance in England by the 1860s. Her industrial
leaders had already enjoyed their halcyon days, and Englishmen
were beginning to deal seriously with the problems that followed
in its wake. 28 The United States, on the other hand, had just
entered the period of its most feverish industrial activity, and
Spencer enjoyed a fantastic vogue in the United States over the
last three decades of the nineteenth century .29
The ideas of Herbert Spencer did not go unopposed, of
course; criticism of social Darwinism was registered continually
throughout the period by many individuals. The critics, however,
wern by no means as popular as Spencer, whose ideas filled a great
intellectual vacuum. 30 The alternative to social Darwinism, moreover, developed in just that manner-as an alternative. Henry
George, Lester Frank Ward, Richard T. Ely, Thorstein Veblen,
Edward A. Ross, Henry D. Lloyd, the adherents of the Social
Gospel, and numerous unsung reformers launched a veritable gale
of criticism against social Darwinism, which would in time, along
with the extended development of an urban-industrial society,
seriously weaken its hold on the American mind; but until the
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end of the nineteenth century, if not longer, the Spencerian
rationale carried the day.31
The popularization of social Darwinism blended with,
strengthened, and added new dimensions to that indigenous
American doctrine Carnegie had tagged with the label Gospel of
Wealth. It especially operated to make political action less desirable. Politicians, it was argued, were after all not subject to
rigorous natural selection and therefore could not be trusted to the
same degree as the leaders of the business world. And, for those
who sought to make the democratic process more effective, it became necessary to overcome the presumption that even the peaceful implementation of majority will was contrary to science,
progress, and morality.
Within this social and political atmosphere industrial development in the United States proceeded with giant strides.
Production statistics fail to reveal the whole meaning of the great
changes occurring in industry, but they do provide some indication of their magnitude. The growth rate was most rapid in the
ante-bellum period when the more fundamental alterations in
production techniques and transportation facilities occurred. In
the five decades before the Civil War the output of American
industry increased tenfold in value, rising from about $200 million
to almost $2 billion. The rate of growth slowed after the Civil
War with maturation, but absolute growth continued on a grand
scale. By 1899 the value of manufactured goods had risen to $13
billion. This development was quite impressive in comparison
with the growth of other countries. On the eve of the Civil War
the United States trailed the United Kingdom, France, and Germany in the value of manufactures; by 1894 she came close to
equaling the value of manufactures in all three combined.32
The distribution of industrial resources throughout the
nation was just as significant as the growth of industry nationally,
for it was basic to the varied response to industrialism. The
manufacturing center of the nation in the ante-bellum period was
clearly in the Northeast. In 1860 the value of manufactured products of the New England and the Middle Atlantic states was
double that of all the other states and territories combined. This
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geographic pattern altered little in the post-Civil War decades,
even though the Midwest and the South spawned some important
industries. As the nineteenth century closed, the Northeast still
reigned as the manufacturing center, producing over half of the
nation's manufactured goods. Three-fourths of American industry
was confined to a relatively narrow manufacturing area north of
the Ohio River and the Mason-Dixon line and east of the Mississippi River. 33
One aspect of this industrial revolution was not confined to
the Northeast. The phenomenal expansion of American railroads
over the last half of the nineteenth century was a development
that affected the lives of Americans throughout the nation. At the
end of the Civil War 35,000 miles of track were in use. Then came
the era of great expansion. By 1873 over 30,000 miles of new track
had been opened; by 1893 the total had reached 150,000 miles; and
by 1915 the figure had climbed to 250,000 miles.34 Progress could
be, and indeed was, measured in terms of the extension of railroad
facilities. The rapid extension of railroads, itself partly a result of
a social and political atmosphere ripe for speculative business
enterprise, encouraged speculative ventures embracing the whole
of American economic life. Undeniably, the development of railroad transportation assisted immensely in the alteration of American society, creating additional opportunities and improvements
of incalculable value, but the nature of the modern railroad corporation and the manner in which it had risen to prominence
assisted greatly in the creation of problems that increasingly disturbed American society as this dramatic enterprise consolidated
its achievements over the latter half of the nineteenth century.35
Improved transportation facilities, especially as represented
in the railroads, in conjunction with the growth of manufacture
worked an equally significant change in American agriculture.
Farming became increasingly mechanized and commercialized in
the post-Civil War decades. Business agriculture, of course, existed
long before the Civil War. Southern planters and truck farmers
near large towns, among others, had engaged in agricultural pursuits for profit, even in the colonial period, but the extension of
the railroad after the Civil War made possible a vast extension of
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business agriculture in the older settled regions and into the new
western areas. Consequently, the trend away from local selfsufficiency to specialization and distant marketing intensified
significant!y.36
In commercializing his activities and specializing in cash
crops, the farmer enhanced his standard of living; at the same
time he heightened his dependence upon decisions and policies
originating largely from urban centers remote from his base of
operation. He increased his vulnerability to fluctuations in the
market and became more susceptible to the capriciousness of the
weather. With an abundance of land, moreover, especially in the
West, the farmer was encouraged to practice extensive agricultural
methods, which provided further inducement for the use of machinery. To buy machinery and the land for its use he generally
found it necessary to go into debt. At the same time, the individual farmer's position within the evolving competitive structurenever very strong-was weakening significantly. He simply lacked
the market power of those with whom he was forced to deal. The
system he operated in lauded competition but denied the principle
by practical action. In fact, the farmer rem,ined one of the few
real competitors in a business world that was becoming less and
less competitive. Ironically, the farmer's reverence for the ideal of
free competition and his commercialization even assisted in the
triumph of industry over agriculture-especially in the early phase
of industrialization.37
Machinery, science, and vast new markets, then, changed
American agriculture from a relatively simple operation, demanding small capital investment and a modicum of knowledge, into a
complex operation, requiring increasing amounts of capital, equipment, scientific information, and closer attention to markets. "The
farmer now was irrevocably entwined in the complex industrial
system," writes Samuel P. Hays. "Not as a Jack-of-all-trades, but
only as a calculating, alert, and informed businessman, could he
survi ve."38
The drive to create wealth, which was behind these revolutionary changes in industry and in agriculture, also pervaded
political institutions. Politics and government were expected to
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assist in the creation of wealth, and government on all levels was
more than generous in performing this task. Most spectacular, of
course, was the assistance given to the nation's railroads. Beginning in 1850 the federal government initiated the granting of land
to railroad corporations which by 1871 amounted to more than
170,000,000 acres-roughly equivalent to the area of Texas-of
which some thirty-five million acres were later declared forfeit
because the roads failed to fulfill the conditions of the grants. In
1862 the federal government also voted public assistance to agriculture in the Homestead Act and the Morrill Act. Public assistance to agriculture was significant and far-reaching in its effect,
but railroad construction became the major investment opportunity and the nation's economy came to be intimately related to the
growth and stability of railroad enterprise.39
It was truly an era of rapid economic advance, and this
advance occurred in an atmosphere of speculation, waste, and disorder. Seemingly convinced that America's resources were inexhaustible, those who participated in the drive for wealth gave
little thought to preserving those resources, or for that matter,
little thought to the great changes in American society their
actions were producing. As never before, property-holders became
speculators, and the promoters had a field day, while unbounded
confidence as to the future prompted enterprisers everywhere to
pay generously those who promised to create an economic
advance.40
In this atmosphere, it was not surpnsmg that economic
freebooters of both small and large caliber, on the national and
local scene, were able to operate on a scale previously unmatched
in American history. The exploits of Jim Fisk, Jay Gould, Daniel
Drew, the swindles of Credit Mobilier, the wars between powerful bands of railroad buccaneers, the exploitation of the defenseless immigrant laborer, and countless other infamous episodes
were emulated throughout American society and form a part of
that history that was the Gilded Age.
But what of the voice of reform in the Gilded Age? Until
the formation of the Populist party in the 1890s-and not entirely
even then-social and economic critics failed to constitute a solid
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phalanx of consistent opinion. Prior to Populism the voice of reform was by no means mute, however, even though it was frustrated, discordant, and ostracized. It could hardly have been any
other way, given the complexity of the problem reformers were
up against. The unique manifestations brought about by the
revolutionary changes in agriculture and industry were just as
perplexing to those who styled themselves reformers as they were
for the rest of society. The idea of reform itself was up for grabs.
Reform, in its more general sense, can be considered as an
assertion of a determination to make the actual society, as the reformer views it, conform to the ideal, wherein the ideal is accorded
a positive ethical value. Obviously, reform to the reformer is an
upward movement, an effort to realize the good society. To the
extent that the individual has some meaningful conception of the
good society and attempts to make it a reality that person is a
reformer.
Traditionally, however, within American society the ideal
of the reformer has drawn heavily upon the humanistic values of
the democratic faith-equality, freedom, and equal opportunity
being especially high on the list. This trilogy of democratic concepts was firmly rooted in preindustrial, late eighteenth- and
early nineteenth-century American society. Representing the aspirations, principally, of the American middle class of the period,
the ideals of equality, freedom, and equal opportunity were closely
associated with the idea of laissez-faire individualism. The methods of the reformer were of course conditioned by his belief in
laissez faire. He might consider joining like-minded individuals
in formal association to accomplish a particular end, but few considered government seriously as an agency through which reform
could be or should be achieved in the ante-bellum period. As
Arthur Bestor has written, "Individualism is commonly thought
of today as a conservative doctrine. In the late eighteenth century,
however, it figured rather as an attack upon than a defense of the
established order in government, economics, and even religion."41
The reformist implications of individualism were still influential in the first half of the nineteenth century when a rather
uneasy adjustment was made between the ideals of equality,
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freedom, and equal opportunity and an industrial system just on
the verge of a great expansion. Considering the extensive opportunities available in this formative period of industry, this adjustment was not illogical nor incompatible with the furtherance of
those ideals, representing and enhancing as it did the aspirations
of the middle class of the period. But as industry consolidated its
achievements between 1850 and 1890 the accommodation of
democratic ideals with the emerging industrial order became increasingly precarious. The advance in industry, in addition to
remarkable economic achievements, created a new kind of urban
society, which was plagued with problems for which there were
no ready solutions. The growth of industry also meant an evergrowing laboring class largely denied by circumstances a share in
the aspirations that made life more endurable for the middle class.
Poverty as well as progress, both in unprecedented magnitude,
were a part of the industrial advance.
It must also be emphasized that the negative side of industrial growth was not as readily seen as its positive side-in time
sequence the former generally followed the latter. Industry was
the coming thing and there was hope that the problems that came
in its wake would remedy themselves. The predominant economic
theory of the period promised just such an occurrence, and laissezfaire economics were further bolstered by the popularization of
social Darwinism.
As Richard Hofstadter has noted, "Acceptance of the
Spencerian philosophy brought with it a paralysis of the will to
reform." 42 In addition to this great obstacle, the reformer ( especially those reformers who were firmly rooted in the agrarian
tradition) had to reckon with two serious handicaps: he first had
to make an effective and rational appraisal of what was essentially
a novel development; he then had to overcome an ingrained aversion to the use of government as an agency of reform, not only in
others but within himself. The great power commanded by business enterprise in its modern form, unintentionally of course,
made the exercise of governmental power essential for any effort
to regulate that power. Many reformers in the 1870-1890 period
failed to make a rational analysis of the problem and were unable

"NOTHING SUCCEEDS LIKE SUCCESS"

17
to offer effective remedies. Their failure was understandable, given
the set of historical circumstances operative at that point in time.
The use of national power to control industry in its modern
form (an increasingly obvious step to the agrarian reformer in the
case of the railroads) was an especially troublesome issue. Not
only were reform elements divided and hesitant on the desirability
of such a step, but institutionally no such apparatus existed that
was capable of performing the task. There was, moreover, a good
deal of antipathy built into the institutional structure of the national government (particularly as evidenced in the supreme
court) that stood in the way of such a development.43
Constitutionally, the Civil War had signified a marked
centralization of authority in the national government. The party
championing national sovereignty and centralized authority was
of course the Republican party, the Democratic party holding to
its traditional states' rights position. National governmental power
during the period of Republican dominance (1861-1876) was used
most effectively to promote private enterprise, but the use of that
power to regulate enterprise was not seriously considered. As a
matter of fact it was consciously avoided. The Democratic party
was by its own antipathy to the use of national power encouraged
to resist efforts by Republicans to assist industry, but it was likewise unable to entertain the idea of giving the national government regulatory powers.44 Reformers who were able to countenance the use of federal power to regulate industry were thus
confronted with the fact that the party that had demonstrated the
greatest facility for the use of national power was closely allied
with the very interests they wished to regulate.
To complicate the task of the reformer even more, the real
change-makers in the two decades before the Populist revolt were
the leaders of the industrial advance. If one were to ascribe to a
definition of reform as simply "the reshaping of society," then the
captains of industry were the true reformers of the period. A good
many people, laboring under the influence of social Darwinism
and the Gospel of Wealth, believed that to be the case. The promise of the captain of industry was no "pie in the sky"; his ideal of
an industrial America was rapidly being converted into reality.
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Considerable time elapsed before a significant number of Americans became alarmed by that reality and began to view the leaders
of industry simply as change-makers, for the Gilded Age was an
age that could readily agree that "nothing succeeds like success."
The history of Kansas during the Gilded Age was more
than just a pale reflection of the frenetic activities that affected the
nation at large. In a sense, the state served as a stage upon which
the rest of the nation acted out its antagonisms, hopes, and frustrations. Enactment of the Kansas-Nebraska Act had focused the
sectional conflict on the territory, stimulating a movement of as
determined and self-righteous a group of people to the area as
existed in the nation. The resultant struggle that occurred there
was never merely the product of opposing views on slavery. The
conflict between the two great sections was of course never that
simple, and the people, representing both North and South, who
rushed to that frontier territory carried with them all the divergent views motivating those on both sides of the Mason-Dixon
line. As it turned out, the entrance of Kansas into the Union as a
Free State was as much a victory for railroad promoters, political
speculators, and land sharks as it was a victory for Free-Soilers and
antislaveryites.45
Destined to remain an agricultural area far into the future,
Kansas was ushered onto the national stage in 1861 as a junior
partner of the rapidly industrializing North in her war to save the
Union from the machinations of a slave-holding, agrarian South.
But if ambitions provide any guidelines Kansas was never just a
junior partner. The struggle from 1854 to 1865 served to identify
the state solidly with the Republican party, the Union cause, and
the wave of the future-business enterprise.
The key to the growth of industry and commercial agriculture in Kansas was clearly the development of railroad transportation. Kansans in all walks of life recognized this, and practically
everybody became, in one way or another, railroad promoters. The
need being immense and the recognition of that need being all
but universal, it was hardly surprising that railroad builders found
fertile ground upon which to operate. Even before the territorial
period had drawn to a close, fifty-four incorporation charters had
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been granted by the legislature.46 Most of these early projects
never got beyond the charter stage. The dream of making Kansas
the commercial hub of the nation was deferred for a time as the
great energies of the state and nation were absorbed by four years
of Civil War. The year the war ended Kansans could boast of
only seventy-one miles of single track. This was quickly remedied.
Five years later they could speak of almost 1,234 miles of track;
the next ten years saw this figure more than doubled to 3,104
miles. By 1890 Kansas was ranked second in the nation with 8,797
miles of track. The pace of railroad construction actually reached
its height in the late eighties, and the twenty-year period following
1890 would result in only about a hundred added miles of track
within the state, while in the same period the national expansion
of railroads continued at an accelerated rate.47
The speed with which the Kansas prairies were bedecked
with rails was matched by remarkable expansion in other ways.
In 1860 the population of the state was just over 100,000; by 1870
it had surpassed the 360,000 mark; by 1880, over 990,000; and by
1890 the Kansas populace had increased to more than 1,420,000.
As in the case of railroad expansion, a population plateau was
reached in the late eighties, as the population of Kansas remained
virtually stationary through the last decade of the century. The
greatest increase came in the seventies when over 630,000 people
were added to the census rolls. The period from 1870 to 1890
represented an impressive increase of more than 1,060,000. The
overwhelming majority of these newcomers were natives of the
states carved from the Northwest Territory, although Iowa and
Missouri also contributed their share to this movement of humanity between 1860 and 1890.48
Most of these settlers were lured out to the Kansas plains to
take advantage of her highly publicized resources. For the majority this meant agricultural pursuits. 4 ~ Those who survived the
periodic droughts and grasshopper plagues and who managed to
make the necessary adjustment for farming the plains soon created an abundant agriculture in Kansas. Wheat and corn were
the principal crops. In 1878 the State Board of Agriculture reported that Kansas had advanced from twenty-fourth to nearly
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first in the production of wheat and from twenty-fifth to fourth in
the production of corn since 1866.50 Other crops were grown with
some success, and stock raising flourished on an excellently suited
terrain; but these could not compete with corn and wheat as
Kansas farmers rushed headlong into business agriculture.
As the westward-moving migrants spread out over the
prairies, preceding or following the rapid extension of the railroads, and began to farm her virgin soils, they were also faced
with the task of creating all the other accessories of organized
society. Riding the wave of spirited optimism characteristic of the
Gilded Age, these matters were dealt with in short order. By 1870
sixty-one counties were established in Kansas. The next eighteen
years saw this number swell to 106. Towns sprang up all over the
state. Municipal, township, and county governments were set in
motion. In short, these pioneers, with the assistance of Eastern
capital, converted a barren territory into a thriving state with such
rapidity that many were awed by the accomplishment.51
Throughout the period of great expansion from 1870-1887
there were those who continually advised circumspection and who
insisted that all was not right with the world, but the great
majority of Kansans who surveyed the scene, particularly in the
early 1880s, were convinced that the work was good. Politically,
all this "good work" was credited to the Republican party. Nationally the party may not have been as dominant as it was once
thought, but in Kansas the Republican party was supreme. Kansans voted just as they had shot in the Civil War. Party regularity
was a matter of great pride throughout most of the period. In the
nine state elections from 1862 through 1880, Republican gubernatorial candidates carried ninety percent of the counties. The
year 1882 saw the election of the first and only Democratic governor until 1912. The anomaly of the 1882 election-largely a result
of a serious split in Republican ranks-was redeemed in 1884, and
the next three gubernatorial contests saw the party recapture its
former supremacy. The three contests from 1884 through 1888
saw Republican gubernatorial candidates carry ninety-four percent of the counties.52
Although the era from 1862 to 1890 was a period of Repub-
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lican party dominance in Kansas politics, it should be noted that
it was also an era of steady decline in Republican strength generally. This was evident in the percentage of the vote cast for
Republican presidential candidates in the state from 1864 to 1888.
Beginning with just over seventy-eight percent of the popular vote
in 1864, the party saw its strength diminished gradually to just
over fifty-five percent in 1888.53
The margin of victory had decreased over the years, but it
was still substantial. Throughout the period Kansans were led,
through the mechanism of the Republican organization, by a
group of men who were by residence, occupation, and background
closely associated with business enterprise. Of the eleven elected
governors between 1862 and 1893, all save one were Republicans.
Most had served in the Union Army. All were residents of the
eastern third of the state. Eight of the eleven actually came from
residences no farther west than Lawrence or Garnett, both towns
less than forty miles from the eastern boundary. Occupationally,
six lawyers, two editors, one merchant, one physician, and one
surveyor-farmer provided the nominal leadership for this young
but ambitious agrarian state. In addition, every United States
senator from 1861 to 1891 was a Republican. Eight men represented Kansas in the senate during the period; six of the eight
were residents of Lawrence, Leavenworth, or Atchison. All were
intimately associated with the Kansas business community.54 It
had been their task to promote the economic growth of the state,
and by close attention to the construction of railroad transportation, more than anything else, they had assisted in the creation of
an economic boom.
Numerous Kansans, and probably the Republican leadership to a man, recognized the importance of the railroad to their
state and to the West in general. Unquestionably, settlement of
the West was expedited by the rapid extension of the rails, but the
acceleration process was not an unmixed blessing. Civilization
carried forward in great haste led quite naturally to great waste,
and, as this wave of settlement into an agricultural domain was
spearheaded by the railroads ( the earliest and more obvious representative of the modern corporation), the ingredients were there
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to produce a serious reappraisal of the course American society
had taken since the inauguration of the age of enterprise. Edwin
L. Godkin, the famous New York editor, noted contemporaneously that devotion to material pursuits became "absorbing in a
country like the West, by the richness of the prizes which are
offered to shrewd speculation and successful industry. Where
possible or even pr@bable gains are so great, the whole community
gives itself up to the chase of them with an eagerness which is not
democratic, but human." 55 By bringing out the worst in the system, then, as well as by bringing an older agrarian world and the
new industrial world into sharp relief, the West could indeed become a crucible of contention and reexamination. This reappraisal
could even assume the shape of a full-scale political revolt if the
forward progress of the nation, or even a segment of the nation,
were seriously checked.
As long as the prospect for advancement remained real or
seemed realizable, however, momentary economic setbacks, challenges to democratic institutions, and even revelations of political
corruption could be overlooked or minimized. If worst were to
come to worst, moreover, there was always that useful socialDarwinian rationale to supply the badly needed touch of innocence to society's bold new course.
Kansas was served a rather large portion of the problems
that affiicted the era. The hustling, bustling, scheming, frantic,
heartbreaking, and hopeful years from 1870 to 1890 were years of
great vitality, years that were characterized more by their dynamism than by their ethics. Most of the participants were just too
busy to view closely what was taking place. As one student of the
era so aptly put it, "Greedy manipulators, routine politicians, conscientious Kansas leaders, and possibly a statesman or two are all
found there-but one searches a long time to locate any of the
latter."56
The great speed with which local government was fashioned throughout the state was adequate tribute to the acceleration
process, although not always complimentary. The difficulties inherent in rapid state-building, demonstrated with emphasis in the
first sixteen years of Kansas' experience, were reemphasized in the
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eighteen years following 1870 in the central and western thirds of
the state as her political borders were filled in with an additional
forty-five counties. Every new county went through, to a greater
or lesser degree, the usual building and growing pains associated
with new communities struggling to create at least a semblance of
organized society. Most were successful and managed to establish
viable communities; some encountered extraordinary difficulties
and began under serious handicaps.
Occasionally, eager promoters of local government, at times
out-and-out swindlers, took advantage of Kansas settlement to
line their pockets. Officials of Barber County issued over $200,000
in warrants and bonds for the construction of a courthouse,
bridges, and a railroad that were never built. In 1873 six men
from Topeka concocted a scheme and netted $72,000 by traveling
to what was to become Comanche County, copying names from a
Missouri city directory, holding a "special election," and voting
a bond issue to that amount. The state legislature, ever alert not
to "scare away capital," later upheld the bond issue as having been
legally issued by a de facto government. The purchasers of the
securities subsequently sued for payment, and the legally organized county of Comanche was held accountable for the debt. 57
Fraudulent activity of this kind was by no means the rule,
but it was repeated in various parts of the state and on various
levels of government. There were those, too, who managed to
reap handsome profits by staying within the letter of a system of
laws that quite clearly lagged behind accumulating and unprecedented opportunities for money-making.
Problems of this sort were not restricted to the local scene,
for the state administration, from the beginning, had trouble
maintaining an unblemished reputation. To shape a state government against a background of civil strife, civil war, and reconstruction would have been difficult enough, but the men who
guided Kansas politics in the early years did so amid fierce competition generated by the rich prizes to be had in connection with
the distribution of lands and the location of railroads and state
institutions. It was a time when politician-promoters were in great
demand, and few influential souls indeed looked with disfavor
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upon those who used their position or wealth to enlarge their
fortune or to influence a decision. 58
The corrupt and ambitious intrigues of Senator James H.
Lane and his rivalry with Kansas' first governor, Charles Robinson, attracted greatest attention in the early years. Rancorous
intraparty struggles revolving around one political leader or another continued to plague the Republican party, and charges of
malfeasance-many of which were politically inspired-were
standard political fare as the warring factions competed for favors,
position, or monetary rewards. They accomplished much, for
themselves and for the state in the process; their actions also contributed to the creation of an image of corruption and political
intrigue-real and imagined-which would subsequently provide
substance to the wrath of a perturbed populace.
Certainly the record of men representing Kansas in the
United States senate in the early period fell short of being illustrious. Senator Lane ended his stormy career in 1866 by committing suicide. After Senator Edmund G. Ross was denied reelection
in 1871 (chiefly because of his vote for President Andrew Johnson's acquittal), he was replaced in the senate by Alexander Caldwell, who had spent $60,000 to obtain the seat. Senator Caldwell
resigned following an investigation by the United States senate
and the Kansas legislature. Shortly thereafter Samuel C. Pomeroy,
United States senator from 1861 to 1873, with a long history of
questionable deals behind him, was charged with bribery and denied a third term by the Kansas legislature.50
The Pomeroy episode earned for itself a place in Mark
Twain's and Charles Dudley Warner's The Gilded Age, but there
were other occurrences that attracted less attention. In 1872 the
state auditor stole $4,550 in addition to registering bonds for three
nonexistent cities. In 1874 the state treasurer resigned in the face
of impeachment proceedings. In 1876 the holder of that office, one
Samuel Lappin by name, took flight to South America, after a
series of actions that saw him resigning, breaking jail, and hiding
in Chicago, rather than confront charges involving the issuance of
bogus school bonds in four Kansas counties.60
Who could become alarmed over such occurrences? or why
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should one be alarmed? Kansas was booming and the future
appeared unlimited. Throughout the 1870s and well into the 1880s
Kansas settlement and economic expansion were carried forward
on an ever-growing wave of optimism. After a brief slump in the
early seventies, the price of wheat rose steadily, reaching its high
point for the period in 1881-1882; and just as the price of wheat
began a steady decline, not to be checked until well into the next
decade, increasing prices for meat products created a greater demand for corn, taking up some of the slack temporarily. 61 The
population of the state was increasing at a truly remarkable rate.
Railroad lines had fanned out all over the state. The majority of
Kansans could appreciate the crude poetry of the editor of the
Pittsburg Kansan when he wrote:
Come millionaires and scholars,
Bring your wisdom and your dollars,
To Pittsburg, Crawford county, State of
Kansas, U.S. A.
Bring your money bags and learning,
Your translucent, deep discerning,
And when you plant your shinners, we
will label U. 0. K. 6 2

If all that glittered was not gold, who would or could dispel
the illusion? The visible signs of a marked advance were irrefutable facts. That the advance had come at a high price, and was
dependent largely upon factors beyond the control of the Kansas
citizen, was scarcely considered. The important thing was that the
myth of the Great American Desert had been laid to rest, and in
its place had been raised the vision of limitless agricultural and
industrial progress. 63 Kansas, as advertised by railroad agents,
Eastern moneylenders, and Kansans in all walks of life, was the
land of milk and honey.
Not all Kansans were so complacent. There were those of
course who refused to acquiesce, individuals who were usually
identified in contemporary literature as croakers, failures, demagogues, anarchists, or communists; or at times the label Democrat
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by itself was deemed sufficient to cover their alleged iniquities.
The course and character of Kansas growth created a number of
issues that readily lent themselves to exploitation by dissatisfied
elements. Such issues as currency contraction, unequal distribution
of the tax burden, political corruption, distribution of public lands
to the railroads, and the insecurity of settlers on the public lands,
not to mention the difficulties experienced by Kansas farmers resulting from the whims of nature, the rise and fall of the market,
mounting surpluses, and their utter dependence on railroad transportation, and more, virtually assured the rise of parties seeking
immediate relief.
Significant reform agitation in Kansas began with the 1872
election, when a faction of reform-minded Republicans joined
with Democrats to present a Liberal-Republican slate. Defeatmeasured simply in terms of offices won or lost-was the fate of
the 1872 Liberal Republican-Democratic effort, as was the case of
the national movement of which it was a part, but reform agitation continued without cessation and with similar results. Between
1872 and 1890 Kansas had a multiplicity of reform parties. The
rise and fall of these organizations was adequate testimony to the
complexity of the situation confronting those who actively sought
political change in the period. The Independent Reform party
followed the Liberal Republican-Democratic coalition and waged
two campaigns before it went out of existence, challenging the
Republicans in 1874 and both major parties in 1876. The Greenback party entered the contest in 1878 to battle the Democrats and
the Republicans. In the three contests between 1880 and 1884, the
Greenback-Labor party carried the reform banner. In 1886 the
Prohibition party continued the agitation, and it was joined by
the Union-Labor party in 1888. There were, in addition, a number
of splinter groups active in several of the campaigns.64
With few exceptions, all post-Civil War reform proposals
in Kansas politics were introduced by the third parties rather than
the two major parties.65 These reforms embraced a wide variety
of changes involving economic, political, and social life. 66 In fact,
practically all the demands of the 1890 Populist platform had been
called for by earlier third-party movements. 67 Occasionally, one
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of these proposals found its way into the platforms of one major
party or the other, and, even more rarely, an occasional demand
was enacted into law. 68 Much of the reform legislation demanded
by the third parties and by the two major parties, however, required support and action by the national government, and on
that level the matter was even further beyond the control of
Kansas parties.
Reform politics was not the great concern of the vast
majority of Kansas citizens. Actually, the advocates of reform
came as close to victory in the 1874 election as they would in any
contest up to 1890. Even with the support of the Democratic party
in that election, the Independent Reform party was able to muster
only about forty percent of the vote for its gubernatorial candidate
-more than thirteen thousand votes short of victory .69 After 1874
farmers recovered from the relatively dismal years of the first half
of the decade, and the state entered into a truly spectacular period
of boom settlement; in the process, political dissent became an
unpatriotic profession, as the majority of Kansans busily concerned
themselves with other matters. It was this trend that pulled the
rug from under the Greenback party.
Like their contemporaries throughout the nation, many
Kansans gambled heavily on the future. The land, they assumed,
was there to be conquered, and the earlier the conquest could be
completed the better. Whatever assisted in accomplishing that end
was adjudged wise and good and right; whatever stood in the
way was considered an obstacle to progress. Railroads received
the blessing from the beginning. Kansans beckoned and they
came-at times it was the railroads that did the beckoning. The
roads were financed largely by grants of aid from the nation and
state, and from the county, township, and municipality through
which they passed. The national government gave land grants in
the state which at the average sale price of $3.50 an acre gave to
the railroads well over $32,000,000. Between 1870 and 1890 municipalities contributed over $16,500,000, of which over $8,500,000
were given in 1887-88.70 The state contributed 500,000 acres of its
internal-improvement lands, and underwrote the payment of
mortgage bonds of over $27,000,000. Altogether, assistance to the

KANSAS POPULISM

28
railroads came to about $85,000,000, or approximately $10,000 per
mile, which should have satisfied a significant portion of the real
costs of building the rickety roads on the Kansas prairie.71 In total
acreage, including about two million acres of Indian land, the
railroads came into possession of over ten million acres of Kansas
soil, or about one-fifth of the total acreage of the state.72
Railroad expansion proceeded simultaneously with municipal, township, and county improvements of all kinds. Bond
issues came in excess. At the same time, the Kansas farmer made
the necessary but expensive adjustment required for the mechanized and extensive agriculture of the plains. Debts were piled
on top of debts with reckless abandon. 73
In the 1880s the public debt of all Kansas governmental
units rose from $15,000,000 to $41,000,000, which was the largest
increase of any state, and with the exception of four slightly populated states in the far West, was the largest per capita public
debt. 74
Private indebtedness, especially among farmers, increased
markedly at the height of the boom between 1883 and 1887. By
1890 over sixty percent of the taxable acres of the state were burdened with mortgage, a figure exceeded by no other state. According to Raymond Miller, "There was one mortgage for every two
adults, which means more than one for every family; and the per
capita private debt, counting adults alone, was over $347, about
four times that of the Union as a whole. Mortgages on lands
equalled more than one-fourth of the actual value of the real estate
of Kansas." 75
Before the boom collapsed in 1887-1888, land values soared
to unbelievable heights. In some cases the increase amounted to as
much as four hundred percent above the original purchase price.76
The timing of the boom and collapse was such, moreover, that the
distribution of gains and losses was clearly sectional within Kansas. The older settled counties of northeastern Kansas, in particular, and to a lesser degree the counties of eastern Kansas,
generally, within a zone extending west approximately sixty miles,
were in the enviable position.77 Eastern Kansans not only arrived
early enough to reap some of the profits of the great expansion,
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they were, by early arrival, better able to survive the collapse. The
majority of farms in the area had been purchased prior to the
advance in price, and the subsequent decline in values affected the
owners, for the most part, only to the extent it affected their plans
for resale. Existing mortgages on eastern Kansas farms, moreover,
having been contracted at an earlier date, were, by 1890 at least,
only small remainders of the original sum. 78 Once Kansas discontent was translated into political revolt, this area became the
citadel of antireform politics.
It was in the middle counties of Kansas, from Marshall to
Phillips in the north, and from Chautauqua to Comanche in the
south, that the boom attained its most reckless proportions. Between 1881 and 1887 more than 220,000 people settled in the area,
approximately 100,000 of these between 1885 and 1887. In this area
mortgages were the rule. There were counties in 1890 with threefourths of the farms encumbered, and practically all counties had
more than sixty percent of their farms mortgaged. These settlers
came as land values were rising and paid higher prices for their
lands than had earlier settlers. In addition, municipal improvements and railroad projects tended to soak up whatever excess
capital existed locally, and many of these newcomers were therefore forced to pay more dearly for the loans they obtained.70 These
middle counties, plus several extreme southeastern Kansas counties, provided the Populist party the bulk of its rank and file.
That portion of the state lying west of the one-hundredth
meridian, roughly the western third of the state, felt the tragic
impact of the collapse first. This, the more arid part of the state,
was the least suitable for small-scale farming. Most of the inhabitants had just arrived on the eve of the boom's abrupt end. Many
were forced immediately to vacate the land, leaving the section to
those who resided there before the inflation, and to those few who
were able to make the difficult adjustment. Such laconic phrases
as "In God We Trusted, in Kansas We Busted" were common
parting words as the discontented were swept away. With the
important exception of seven counties in the extreme northwest
corner, which were settled at about the same time as the middle
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counties, the Populist party subsequently drew little support from
the area.80
This boom-and-bust cycle that affected extensive areas of
the West as well as Kansas has too often been written off, almost
entirely, as the product of the shortsightedness of the people who
participated in the westward movement. Westerners and Kansans shared the same hopes and aspirations of Americans generally. By the same token they shared the same limitations. What
happened in Kansas in the 1880s was not unrelated to the great
industrial changes that came over the United States in the period.
Newspapers, railroads, local bond-assisted projects, or even the
unlimited wealth of Kansas enthusiasm could not have produced
the boom unassisted. Eastern capital flowed to the state in a steady
stream, providing the means whereby the inflation could be maintained. The picture is not completed either by emphasizing the
revolutionary changes in an agrarian way-of-life. Indeed there
were changes, and few farmers were able to comprehend fully the
significance these changes held for them. As a result, their reaction
to hard times was occasionally irrational. It must be emphasized
that the circumstances were unique. The farmer's middle-class,
city cousin in the West and in the East was likewise befuddled by
the great changes accompanying the industrial advance.
Kansans, like Americans generally, had placed the leadership of their state into the hands of men who viewed government
primarily as an instrument of material progress, men who were
effective spokesmen of business enterprise but who were unable to
guide and promote Kansas growth while at the same time checking abuses and offering constructive proposals to solve the unique
problems confronting an agrarian state operating within a rapidly
industrializing system. These men could no more escape a share
in the responsibility for the course of Kansas development than
could the mass of her citizens who acquiesced as long as the future
appeared bright. For years the Kansan had been taught that
Kansas was the land of beauty and unexcelled opportunities, and
when his world came tumbling down upon him it was difficult to
swallow the argument that his woes were the sole result of his
own stupidity or the whims of nature.
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The disillusioned were more inclined to remember they had
paid too much heed to Civil War-inspired oratory. The "bloody
shirt" all of a sudden seemed quite moot. They recalled they had
not taken a very lively interest in politics, but they did remember
the regularity with which they had cast a Republican ballot. They
vaguely remembered too the more sensational revelations of political corruption within and without the state. Most had quite
real reminders of the high rate of interest they were required to
pay on the public and private debt they had contracted. They
were reminded of the taxes they were required to pay also. The
tax on land seemed somewhat out of proportion. All of a sudden
they were convinced railroads were evading their share of the tax
load.81 This seemed less than fair, considering the generosity that
had been shown the railroads by all governmental units. They
remembered too that the railroads had been rather demanding in
their rates. The state had finally created a Board of Railroad
Commissioners in 1883 but they now saw this as a fa~ade, for its
powers were generally advisory. After all, the representatives of
railroad interests occupied seats close to the power center of the
state.82
All the fuss that had been made over the tariff suddenly
appeared quite silly, if not misleading, to many farmers who were
having a difficult time making ends meet. It became clear that
they bought their goods in a protected market and sold their crops
in an unprotected market. At the same time, the farmer became
aware as never before that the very fact of his isolation made his
bargaining position frightfully impotent, and although few were
clear as to why, they were convinced something was radically
wrong with the credit and money system of the nation. Somehow
the system needed to be more flexible. 83
Although it was by no means the only consideration, there
can be little doubt that it was mainly economic discontent that
provided the decisive stimulant that agitated Kansas citizens and
spurred them on to the formation of a political party that would
seriously challenge the normal pattern of Kansas politics. It was
the disillusionment of shattered dreams that caused them to view
society as they had never viewed it before. A good many of those,
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perhaps even a majority, who sang "Good-Bye, My Party, GoodBye" between 1889 and 1890 as they gathered under the banner of
the People's party, were committed to the reform cause in no
greater depth than the mortgage that hung over their heads. Much
of their criticism of the existing system was exaggerated and unfair and occasionally irrational-especially true considering they
had shared in the responsibility for what had happened to them.
In spite of all that, the reappraisal of American society made possible by that wave of discontent was no less meaningful and
instructive.
The superficial commitment of much of the rank and file
to the reform cause was to prove a real handicap to the fortunes of
the Populist party; a brighter future could deplete the ranks almost as quickly as a dismal one could fill them. The realization
that the actions of many of the rank and file were not founded
upon a profound understanding of what was happening to their
world, however, should come as a shock to no one. When or
where has this not been the case of any large political movement?
It has not been recognized to the extent that it should, on the other
hand, that the leadership of the Populist party in Kansas was
provided by a group of individuals the majority of whom had
been committed to reform long before the Kansas boom collapsed.
Their reasons for dissent were varied: most were progressive,
some were retrogressive, and some were contradictory, but they
were seldom superficial.
On the whole, Populism in Kansas, especially as revealed in
the thought and actions of the individuals who led the movement,
was a constructive response to the technological achievements that
had revolutionized agriculture and industry over the course of the
nineteenth century, a response which was called forth prematurely
by agriculture's peculiar position in the 1880s and 1890s. It was
premature in the sense that prevailing American thought was not
ready to accord its spokesmen a fair hearing. Rising as they did on
this wave of agrarian discontent, they were all stigmatized by the
association. The brave new world of the future, revolutionized
or not, was industrial, not agricultural.
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society in the Gilded
Age produced its share of critics. Beginning in the early 1870s,
dissent was registered with increasing frequency and organization. Special attention affixes, however, to the period immediately
preceding the formation of the People's party and to the criticisms
of those individuals who were later influential in the Populist
movement, either as active leaders or as spokesmen in some capacity. The explanation these individuals presented to account for
what ailed society, and the measures they proposed for their solution, are important not only in revealing the quality of dissident
appraisal, they also provided-leaving aside the question of their
validity-the rationale for thousands of Kansans who joined the
movement for third-party action in behalf of reform in 1890.
One subject with instant appeal to a segment of the Kansas
populace was the proposal for relief from money and credit problems. The collapse of the Kansas boom after 1886 would intensify
interest in that issue. In February, 1886, William D. Vincent, a
thirty-four-year-old hardware merchant from Clay Center, Kansas,
who had the ability to express himself in forceful terms, plus a
lively interest in the issues of his time, proposed that the national
government loan money directly to the people. Vincent's destiny
had been linked with Kansas in 1862, when as a boy he made the
journey west with his parents from their home state of Tennessee.
The family had been drawn into reform politics at an early date,
and young William D. Vincent came to play an active role in the
Greenback-Labor party, serving as one of its presidential electors
in 1884. He would later figure prominently in the organization of
the People's party, and during the Populist decade of influence
would serve on the state board of railroad commissioners and in
the United States congress from 1897 to 1899.1
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William Vincent made his loan proposal in a speech delivered before the Clay Center Debating Club. He began with
the premise that "every man has a right to the product of his own
labor." As he saw it, the rule that had been followed in the past
and which was still being followed resulted in the situation
whereby "the man who earns the most gets the least and he who
earns the least gets the most." He then stated that this process
"should be reversed." Probably anticipating the thoughts his proposals might raise in the minds of some of those in his audience,
he then remarked: "it is not asked that there shall be a division of
property. We would not have one dollar of Shylock's ill-gotten
gains taken from him. We only ask that he be restrained from
further robbery." He then stated, "Communism in any form is
bad, but that particular form which takes from the few and gives
to all is certainly no worse than that which takes from the many
and gives to the few."
Vincent then informed his Clay Center audience that he
was aware that "some men will grow rich faster than other men
under a perfect system of law." The more industrious man, he
conceded, should receive a larger share than his "indolent neighbor," but that was not the whole problem as he viewed it. "There
is another class of men," said he, "who will always grow rich
faster than their neighbors-the sharp unprincipled men." Then
in language remarkably devoid of social-Darwinian conclusions,
he added: "But because nature has given them the advantage of
their fellows is no reason why laws should step in and give them
still greater advantages. These are the strong men. They need no
special legislation in their behalf. The object of law is supposed to
be protection of the weak against the oppressions of the strong."
Vincent reasoned that the situation would be improved if
the government were to make a limited amount of money available for loan to the people at a low rate of interest. He suggested
three percent as a desirable rate, with one percent going to the
county where the loan was made, one percent each to the state and
national governments to cover the costs of handling the program.
For those who were shocked by such heresy, he argued that the
national government had already been in the loan business for a
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quarter of a century, during which time it had "loaned out to
National bankers over $300,000,000 at one per cent a year." 2
Undoubtedly, William Vincent's Clay Center speech would
have been attacked bitterly had it been circulated freely. It would
subsequently seem less heretical to Kansans who were in desperate
search of an answer to their money problems, and the Populist
state committee would distribute the speech as campaign material.
In 1886 the situation was quite different. Kansas papers were
filled with much talk of "anarchists," "bomb-throwers," and "communists." The nation was affiicted with a rash of labor strikes and
violence. In April Kansas experienced some violence of its own
during a strike of railroad workers against the Missouri Pacific.
Railroad property was destroyed at several points in the state, and
a few people were killed. At the height of the turmoil, a regiment
of the Kansas national guard was sent to Parsons in southeastern
Kansas to restore order. 3 Then on May 4 the Chicago Haymarket
Square violence made the issue of anarchism headline news. Radical causes and the champions of radical causes were clearly suspect.
In September, 1886, Republican Governor John A. Martin, normally quite moderate in his rhetoric, referred to the leaders of the
Greenback-Labor party as "those noisy, turbulent, and vicious
demagogues and loafers who muster under the flag of the anarchist and communist." 4
The aging editor of the Junction City Tribune remained
undaunted in the face of the foreboding menace of anarchism.
The editor in fact used the occasion to point out what he regarded
as an even greater danger to society. The editor was John Davis.
Reared in Illinois, where he was born in 1826, Davis had settled in
Kansas in 1872. His interest in political and economic questions
dated back at least to 1850. He became in that year one of the
principal actors in a movement that culminated twelve years later
in the passage of the Morrill Act by the United States congress.
The provision for grants of land for the endowment of state colleges that would devote attention to the agricultural and mechanical arts along with the usual curriculum, made possible by that
act, he regarded as the most noteworthy endeavor with which he
had been associated. He had been a Republican before settling in
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Kansas, but once on Kansas soil he became active in opposition
to the party, which he lamented no longer bore any resemblance to
the party of Lincoln. 5
In 1873 John Davis presided over the first farmers' state
convention held in Kansas and he wrote the message of the convention urging farmers to organize to promote their interests.
Davis nevertheless had no great illusions about the farmer. As
early as 1873 he stressed, "Farmers are just as good as, but no better
than, other people. And their interests are no more to be respected
than any other necessary and important interest, except that they
are larger, and hence more important." Majority interests, he felt,
were vitally affected and threatened by the character of state and
national development. He was convinced in 1873 that the "wise
and timely regulation of the whole management of railroads by
the general government" was imperative for sound national
growth. 6
Always in the forefront of reform activities, Davis had presided over the convention that organized the Independent Reform
party in Kansas in 1874. He helped organize the Greenback party
and ran as its nominee for congress on two occasions. After 1887
he would devote his efforts to the work of the Union Labor party,
and then join in the effort to organize the Populist party in Kansas. As a Populist he would serve two terms in the congress.7
John Davis' article on anarchy, reprinted by William A.
Peffer's widely circulated Kansas Farmer out of Topeka in February, 1887, argued that "the more dangerous forms of anarchy
come from above, from the lawless corporations, who, considering
themselves above law, steal the people's lands and the people's
means of travel, transportation and communication." These same
corporations, he said, "usurp the control of finances, suborn the
law-makers and courts, and then with their stolen prerogatives to
tax, oppress and defy all men and all communities within their
reach." 8
The year 1887, apparently because of the collapse of the
boom, signaled the beginning of an interesting dialogue among a
wide segment of the Kansas populace concerning the formidable
problems of their time, which was far more constructive than has
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been heretofore recognized. Peffer's Kansas Farmer made itself
available to all shades of opinion. In March, 1887, one unidentified
correspondent noted that the great changes produced in society by
the creation of "labor-saving machinery" was nothing short of
miraculous. "Seventy years ago," he wrote, "each community contained the nucleus of an independent empire; there was the hatter,
the tailor, and more independent than any sort, the farmer, who
raised his own food and manufactured most of his own clothing."
At that time "there was no barrier to free exchange, for producer
and consumer lived in the same community. To-day, nearly all of
the above mentioned trades are concentrated in a few great factories, employing thousands of men and representing millions of
capital. And between the producer and consumer is the railway,
upon which both are equally dependent ...." He went on to
write that "no one" would deny the beneficial results of machinery
for mankind, especially the railroads, but "this vast accumulation
of wealth and irresponsible power over the commerce of the country has produced evils which are destroying republican equality
and personal independence of character."9
In April the Farmer published another unsigned letter
containing the lament of what may be seen as an early progressivetype. The writer first expressed his disillusionment with the hope
that all of the "labor-saving machines" that had been introduced
would produce more leisure time and more of the "necessaries"
and "many of the luxuries" for the masses. In his mind "the great
problem of the day is to stop the evils and extend the blessings
before the wronged classes rise in their strength and overturn the
good with the bad ...." He advised that the "present age has
some great questions to settle; every day we read of strikes, riots
or some kind of bomb-throwing or conspiracy, and if the capable
class does not interest themselves in the solution of this question
the other class will be sure to do something, and it may be as bad
as some of the bloody revolutions of history ."10
The editor of the Kansas Farmer was by no means as
appalled by existing evils as were many of his correspondents. In
1887 William Alfred Peffer was fifty-seven years old. He had had
quite a varied and eventful life to that point. Born in Pennsyl-
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vania, he received his elementary education in the Pennsylvania
schools. For a few years he farmed in the summers and taught
school in the winters. He was, almost by birthright, a confirmed
antislaveryite and a protemperance man. After his marriage, he
left his home state to seek his fortune in the West. In 1853 he
settled in Indiana where he engaged in farming. After four years
he moved his family again, this time to Missouri. As the sectional
conflict became heated, Peffer found that he would either have to
suppress his antislavery sentiments or leave the state to avoid conflict with his neighbors; he left. This time he removed to Illinois,
and there enlisted in an Illinois regiment to fight in the Civil War.
During his enlistment he studied law in his spare hours, and
when the war ended he began the practice of law in Clarksville,
Tennessee. While in Tennessee he participated in a minor way in
the reconstruction of that southern state.11
Early in 1870 Peffer made his move to Kansas, opening his
law practice in the little farming community of Fredonia in southeastern Kansas. It was there he became interested in journalism
and purchased the Fredonia Journal. He continued his law practice in conjunction with his editorial work, and as always took a
keen interest in the political questions of his day. In 1874 he was
elected to the state senate as a Republican, the party that had received his loyalty from its inception.12
In 1876 William Peffer was on the move again, this time to
Coffeyville, Kansas, where he published and edited the Coffeyville
Journal and practiced law until he left to take over the editorship
of the Kansas Farmer in Topeka in 1881.13
Not long after becoming editor of the Farmer, Peffer wrote
and published a novel in its columns entitled "Geraldine or What
May Happen." In this novel Peffer obviously drew upon his own
background experiences of the middle seventies as an editor, lawyer, and state senator in the rural community of Fredonia in Wilson County amidst the grave agricultural distress of those years.
He saw those difficulties basically as the natural process of ebb and
flow in the cycle of prosperity. He noted that lands had been
mortgaged at "unconscionable rates of usury," that "extravagance
and fraud" in early county governments had been common, that
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taxes on property ran as high as "eight and ten" percent, that
towns had been built way out of proportion to the surrounding
countryside in development, but he discounted this simply by
stating that "when men are moving with the floodtide they do not
calculate upon the ebb." More significant was his view of the reformer. "Mr. Nimbletongue" was the name he applied to the
character who represented the reformer. To Peffer, the proposals
of Mr. Nimbletongue signified one thing-repudiation of debts.14
Elsewhere in his novel he ridiculed the idea that farmers should
elect only farmers to represent them. "It is open to the objection,"
he wrote, "that if a farmer is a mean man he is as mean as anybody else." He added that some of the same men who had opposed
"Mr. Lycurgus [the main political figure of the novel which may
be read Mr. Peffer] on the ground of his vocation had been caught
with rocks in the hay and sand in the wheat they had hauled to
market ...."15
By 1887 William Peffer's position had altered little. He obviously was trying hard to steer an independent course as editor
of the most important agricultural newspaper in the state. His
middle position was apparent on various issues. 16 After 1887 he
would gradually become more outspoken in behalf of reform; but
he sincerely desired to see the demands of Kansas farmers met
within the two old parties, and he would not abandon that hope
until April, 1890.17 He would then exert his full efforts in behalf
of the Populist party, which would reward him in 1891 by electing
him to the United States senate.
William Peffer's Topeka of the 1880s was also the Topeka
of one Gaspar C. Clemens. Peffer and Clemens both added considerable color to the Topeka scene-Peffer because of a wellgroomed, unusually long, and absolutely unrivaled beard that
distinguished an otherwise bland appearance; Clemens because of
a strong resemblance to Samuel L. Clemens. He had the keen,
piercing eyes, heavy mustache, the strong, rugged features, and, in
later years, the wavy, white hair that distinguished Mark Twain.
It was believed by many in Topeka that he was a cousin of the
famous writer. Clemens apparently made no great effort to kill
the rumor, but there was in fact no close family relationship. 18
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G. C. Clemens, as he liked to be called, was in many respects an extraordinary character in his own right. His life began
in Xenia, Ohio, in 1849. Quite independent from early youth, he
had been compelled to earn his living for a time by working in a
brick-manufacturing plant. He acquired at the same time a
common-school education by studying at night, and as soon as he
was qualified he taught in a rural school near his home. While
teaching he studied law and was admitted to practice before the
supreme court of Ohio in 1869, and subsequently before the
United States supreme court. 19
In 1870 this tall, erect, distinguished young lawyer, with
heavy dark hair and mustache, decided to launch his career in
Topeka. The capital was by no means short on lawyers but
Clemens was determined to establish himself there. He worked
hard and long, improved his mind by reading practically everything he could get his hands on, and by 1880 he had developed a
reputation and a modest practice. He had the gift of expressing
his thoughts in a clear, concise, and lucid manner. Other lawyers
turned to him for help in preparing their cases. He became an
outstanding trial lawyer and expert in keeping a record for the
supreme court of the state, and his knowledge and skill in constitutional law was recognized by the legal profession. 20
As a man, Clemens was generous, kind, and unassuming;
once engaged in a cause to which he was committed, however, he
could be as severe in his criticisms and as unrelenting in his attack as any man could be. He developed a reputation in Topeka
as a champion of the poor and oppressed. He would represent
any person-often without fee-whom he believed falsely accused
or deprived of personal rights. His sympathy for the underprivileged led him quite naturally, it seems, into the public discussion
of the critical issues of his time. By 1885 he was active as a lecturer in Topeka, and on occasion he could be heard in outdoor
gatherings espousing the unpopular cause of the laboring man.21
In 1886 and afterward he scandalized many of his complacent
fellow-townsmen by his outspoken defense of the Haymarket
anarchists, an endeavor that marked him in the minds of many
thereafter as an anarchist himself. In politics, he associated with
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the Anti-Monopoly party in the mid-eighties.22 When the Populist
party was formed he became active in its behalf and served as
legal advisor to Governor Lorenzo D. Lewelling and as reporter
of the state supreme court under Populist domination. After 1897
Clemens, more than anyone else in Kansas, was responsible for
organizing the Socialist party in the state; he ran as its candidate
for governor in 1900.
In 1887, however, Clemens was still searching for an answer
that would satisfy him in meeting society's problems. In that year
he published a pamphlet entitled The Labor Problem, Stated for
the Busy and the Tired. In it he offered no solution but merely
attempted to delineate the problem and evaluate solutions previously suggested. His scope was comprehensive, including urban
and rural, local and state, national and international perspectives.
Clemens was especially disturbed by the magnitude of poverty
amidst increasing abundance. He wrote: "In the midst of the
utmost plenty of everything to make comfortable, luxurious and
happy living possible to every human being in the [world] community, only a few live in comfort, fewer still have homes and the
great majority live constantly in a state of poverty similar to what
would be made possible by partial famine!" 23 This great abundance, he reasoned, had been made possible by the development of
labor-saving machinery. He asked: "Can it be supposed that a
limited few of the human race can, with safety to themselves, lock
up all nature's stores and pile up human food to rot while a
starving world looks on ... ?"24 Obviously, Clemens thought not.
How, then, was the "labor problem" to be resolved? Leaving aside the answer to that question, Clemens then offered the
following commentary on current remedies:
the leading political solutions proposed are proved to be
utterly futile by prominent and existing facts. Free trade
has been urged, but England has long had free trade and
yet "the cry of out-cast London," has been heard all over
the world. A single monetary standard, bi-metallism, unlimited coinage of silver, a paper currency-all these things
have been confidently suggested; yet labor troubles are
equally bad in America; in England; in France, in Ho!-
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land, in Belgium, in Germany and in Italy; and these
countries represent the actual operation of every phase of
the money question. Taxes upon incomes alone, and upon
land alone, are solutions with many advocates; yet in the
various countries afflicted with labor troubles every species
of taxation may be found in actual operation.25
The Clemens response, shared by a number of other significant Populist leaders, eventually would be a modified form of
socialism. Clemens' 1887 discussion of the labor problem, moreover, would be included among the People's party campaign
materials.
Down in the southeastern corner of the state mounting
protest served as a catalyst, prompting Percy Daniels to terminate
a twenty-eight-year affiliation with the Republican party. Born in
Woonsocket, Rhode Island, in 1840, Daniels obtained his education in his native state, where he studied for a career in civil engineering. That career was interrupted in its civil aspects when he
became a member of a Rhode Island contingent in the Civil War.
His war record was impressive. Beginning with the Army of the
Potomac, Daniels participated in several of its major battles and
then was transferred to the southwest in time to take part in the
campaigns of Burnside and Sherman. Early in 1864 he rejoined
the Army of the Potomac and shared in its campaigns until the
war's end. From Sergeant to Colonel, from Fredericksburg to
Vicksburg to the Wilderness Campaign, Percy Daniels could
justly claim to have shared in the making of the nation's Civil
War history. 26
After the war, Daniels joined the westward movement. He
and his young wife settled on a farm a few miles to the northwest
of Girard, Kansas, in 1867. On the eve of the political revolt of
1890 Daniels had maintained a continual residence on that farm
except for a three-year period between 1878 and 1881, when he had
returned to Rhode Island to work as a civil engineer. In Kansas
he farmed and worked as a surveyor for his county and for the
railroads. He also maintained his connection with the military
and rose to the rank of Brigadier General in the Kansas Militia.
Later, 1893-1894, he would hold the rank of Major General com-
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manding the Kansas National Guard. 27 During the same period,
he served as lieutenant governor as a Populist.
It was during the summer of 1888 that Percy Daniels began
to reappraise his Republicanism rather critically. The local Republican organization was considering him for nomination to the
state senate. On learning of this, Daniels announced through the
press that he considered the prospect of election to the senate a
great honor but he wanted the party to know that he could not
accept the nomination unless it approved of the following proposition indorsed by himself: "THE TIME HAS COME WHEN
EVERY INSTINCT OF CHARITY, JUSTICE AND PATRIOTISM DEMANDS THAT THE POWER OF CAPITAL
FOR WRONG AND OPPRESSION BE CURT AILED ...."28
Percy Daniels was not nominated.
Not long after nailing his protest to the party door, Daniels
initiated a lively and revealing exchange of letters with John J.
Ingalls, Kansas' senior Republican senator. Daniels advised Ingalls, "The public is rapidly coming up to the point of asserting
that positive legislation must interfere." Daniels then emphasized,
"Assertions of these wrongs in resolution, nor idle and perfunctory
discussion in legislative bodies, will long suffice to satisfy this
growing conviction."29
Senator Ingalls replied on August 7, 1888, with the followmg:
I belong to the school of politicians who think that
government should interfere as little as possible in the affairs of its citizens. I have no sympathy with the paternal
idea, but believe that the best results are attained when the
people are left to settle the great questions of society by
individual effort. All that legislation can do is to give men
an equal chance in the race of life. We cannot make poor
men rich, or rich men poor, except by making the natural
capacities of all men exactly alike. The difficulties in society
arise from the fact that Providence has established unequal
conditions, making some men wise and others foolish;
some men provident and others thriftless; some men industrious and energetic and others idle and self indulgent. 30
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Obviously somewhat perturbed with what he considered a rather
glib response, Daniels replied on August 12 by writing:
I cannot see that the distribution of wealth is very
closely allied to our individual capacities.
There are men in Kansas that are barely making a
living raising grain, who are as able and unscrupulous as
any of the Wall Street financiers, or the men who divided
a quarter of a billion in the various Pacific Railroad deals.
Opportunity is the larger factor in most of these transactions-lack of integrity taking second place, and capacity
third. You say every man should have the same chance.
Will the government ever give any one again the same
opportunity it gave those men? ...
Again: Your reasoning followed to a conclusion
would make wealth dependent on capacity. Take the
Senators and write down their names in the order of their
Dollars. Would you concede that the man whose name
headed the list, is the ablest Senator, and the second next to
him? If so, Kansas would complain at being represented
by one so near the foot of the list as our acting Vice President [Ingalls was then president pro tempore of the
Senate ].31

Percy Daniels was at that point firmly committed to reform.
He began speaking and writing to promote a number of measures
he thought would have an ameliorative effect, including, among
other things, the Australian ballot and immigration restriction,
but, for Daniels, the sine qua non of reform was his proposal for
a graduated tax on property. All his proposals were designed, as
he admitted, to reinforce "the middle classes from the two cxtremes."32 In a speech delivered before the Grange of Girard in
1889 he stated, "As a nation we are rapidly growing in wealth and
power, but unless this increase in wealth is distributed with some
little relation to our industry and efforts our growth is not a
healthy one." "Over 90 per cent. of our annual increase in wealth,"
he emphasized, goes " .. . into the pockets of less than 5 per cent.
of our people .... "33 It was to correct this situation that Daniels
proposed a tax which as first formulated would require one percent on estates above one million dollars, increasing to eighteen
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percent on estates above one million dollars. The revenue from
the tax, according to the Daniels plan, would be used first to take
care of the claims of war veterans and then for the employment
of "all idle American labor on extensive internal improvements in
every state, in building and improving country roads and waterways, and in constructing and maintaining storage reservoirs and
forest parks ...."34
Obviously, Daniels' proposals involved an expansion of
governmental roles, a decided break with the idea of the negative
state. That was the import, ultimately, of the whole reform agitation, and undoubtedly its most lasting influence. But positive
intervention for what purpose? That was the rub. To restore an
older competitive order, or to bring about some kind of collectivist
society ?-or, to complicate the problem even more, were there not
positions somewhere between the two extremes? Beginning in
1889, these issues came to the forefront of the discussion, bringing
to the surface problems that have in fact plagued American reform movements ever since.
The November 22, 1889, edition of The Advocate, then
published in Meriden, Kansas, but soon to be moved to Topeka to
claim the journalistic leadership of the Kansas Populist movement,
opened the discussion that would reveal this important ideological
conflict in reform thought. The paper carried the address of John
F. Willits, occasioned by his election as president of the Jefferson
County Farmers' Alliance earlier that month. The theme of Willits' address was the virtues of cooperation in American society. It
was a theme he had long supported. Willits was a fifty-six-year-old
native of Indiana who had settled in Kansas in 1864. Almost entirely self-educated, Willits had been a farmer since settling in
Kansas. He had been a Republican, too, until 1873. It was during
his second term in the Kansas house of representatives that he left
the G.O.P. to join the reform movement. Greenbacker, Union
Laborite, Granger (he was state lecturer from 1877 to 1882), and
prominent worker in the Co-operative Association, these were
Willits' credentials before 1889; in 1890 he would receive the gubernatorial nomination of the People's party in its first unsuccessful contest.35
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Willits told his farmer audience in November, 1889, that
the country was experiencing "a mighty social revolution." Organized and practical cooperation, he said, was the "shibboleth of
every successful business enterprise that marks the progress of this
enlightened age." Speaking for his fellow Alliance members,
Willits emphasized that cooperation "means to us more than any
other word in the English language." The message was clear:
farmers needed to emulate the methods of business organization
to succeed, sanctioning, if need be, the same kind of combinations
among farmers as they confronted among business interests.36
The same issue of The Advocate carrying Willits' address
contained a letter from William V. Marshall of Santa Fe, Kansas,
extolling the virtues of competition. Marshall was a logical antimonopolist who claimed Pennsylvania as his native state. He was
forty-three years old in 1889 and had resided in Kansas since 1874,
and before he left the state early in the 1890s he did considerable
writing to champion his antimonopoly views.37 His position was
simple: abolish monopolies "so that competition will become the
regulator of prices instead of erring law-makers whose duty it becomes in case we try to regulate the monopolies ...."38 As for
the cooperative movement among farmers, Marshall later wrote
that
farmers will make a mistake if they attempt to form combinations among themselves, in imitation of the present
monopolists, for the purpose of limiting the supply or controlling the prices of their products. Why? Because, in the
first place, they are not in a position to succeed, and in the
second place, if they did succeed what would become of the
mechanics, laborers and others who could not combine?
Somebody must be the victim of the combinations. No [,)
sir; let us come out and say: "Natural laws are good
enough for us. Competition will do. The provision which
God has created cannot be improved upon; neither can it
be violated without injury to ourselves ... ; consequently
we will suppress that instrument of artificialism and oppression, the combine, and restore to its full function and
force the natural law of competition."39
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To restore competition, as he desired to have it, Marshall became
the sponsor of a graduated tax to be applied to trusts, a proposal
which he set forth in two pamphlets that were later circulated as
Populist campaign material.40
William Marshall's letters extolling competition did not go
unchallenged. On March 20, 1890, The Advocate published a letter from H. H. Hutcheson (otherwise unidentified) which was a
direct response to Marshall. Hutcheson asked if competition ever
allowed sales at "natural prices" if it could avoid it? "We claim
that it does not," he wrote. Hutcheson then offered this commentary: "Yes, 'Natural laws are good enough for us' but is competition any part of Natural law? It may be the law of 'the survival
of the fitest' [sic]; that is if the most cruel, avaricious, cunning
and dishonest are the fitest [sic]." Industrial leaders, said Hutcheson, had recognized the futility of competition and had, "like
sensible men, quit it."
No [concluded Hutcheson]; compeuuon is not good
enough for me; it is a relic of barbarism and we will never
be civilized till we get rid of it; it is every man against his
brother. A scramble to get on top regardless of who is
tramped to death in the struggle, a system that sets a premium on "oneryness," makes millionaires and paupers,
takes the child from school, and the mother from the
cradle of her sick babe, and puts them in the factory at
competition wages and sends the husband away a "tramp,"
an "incompetent," one of the "dangerous class." 41

Hutcheson's substitute for a society supposedly guided by the law
of competition was what he called a "grand co-operative commonwealth."
How far Hutcheson was willing to go to apply the principle
of the grand cooperative commonwealth was not revealed. There
were those in that atmosphere of mounting discontent who were
willing to carry the principle to logical conclusions.42 More palatable to most dissidents, however, was the proposition of James D.
Holden. Holden was vice-president and treasurer of the Emporia
Investment Company by occupation.43 In a work entitled Free
Freight and Government Railways, Holden demonstrated a will-
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ingness to use collectivist methods to strengthen the competitive
system. In this work, which would also become familiar as Populist campaign literature, Holden argued that "indispensable public
agencies should not be 'owned' nor controlled by private corporations or individuals ...." He professed to be a bit perplexed,
however, why the "truth" of that proposition was so slow to take
"root in the minds of men." To his mind, it was "a fact so apparent that it ought not to require elucidation," for "a nation of
people cannot be generally prosperous among whom it is legal for
a few to exercise absolute control over interests or agencies that
are essential to the welfare of all .... "44 Holden was convinced
that "No effectual regulation of railroads is possible-or properunder private ownership. They are public in character, and should
be owned and operated in the public interest."45
The course of Kansas development had indeed produced
some serious reflection as the 1880s came to a close. The bubble of
exhilarating optimism had been punctured, giving way to widespread public malaise. The times were out of joint-at least that
was the opinion of future Populist Congressman John Grant Otis
in a speech delivered before a combined meeting of the Grange
and Farmers' Alliance held in Topeka in January, 1890. "The
farmers of Western Kansas," said Otis, "are burning corn for fuel,
while coal miners and their families in another section of our land,
are famishing for food." Throughout the nation "farm products
are selling below cost of production; and in our large cities men
are out of employment and asking for bread." What were they
going to do about it? 46
Dissident answers to that question offered before 1890 were
decidely a melange, but they had one thing in common-government intervention. In the long run, the exact purpose of government intervention would continue to be a divisive issue; the
important question immediately to be dealt with was how or by
what means was the desired intervention to be achieved? Could
the desired reformation be accomplished through either of the
two old parties or was third-party action demanded by the circumstances?
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decision as to whethet
Kansas discontent would be expressed through the old parties or
through some new political organization depended largely on
farmer organizations, for significant third-party action was not
possible without the support of the great mass of Kansas farmers.
Given the scope of the agricultural depression, the chances for
extraordinary political activity were good, for in Kansas, as elsewhere, the strength of organizations among farmers, as well as
their affinity for political actions, was proportionally related to the
magnitude of economic and social discontent prominent at any
given point.
Since the 1870s the nation's farmers had demonstrated a
tendency toward organization as a means of bettering their positions in society. For a short time the Patrons of Husbandry, or
the Grange, was the most popular farm organization, and its main
political issue was the malpractices of the railroads. This Granger
movement fell short of its major objectives, although it did manage to establish the right in several of the states to regulate to an
extent the business of common carriers.1
The Grange had been introduced in Kansas in 1872, and
once implanted on Kansas soil it grew by leaps and bounds,
reaching its peak in the state in 1874, when Granger lodges, on a
weekly basis, were being chartered by the score. This agrarian
agitation had contributed heavily to the creation of the Independent-Reform party in Kansas, and made the party a force to
be reckoned with in the 1874 election. The reform effort of that
campaign, although significant, failed to unseat the entrenched
Republicans, and within a few years the plight of Kansas farmers
began to ease; this was accompanied by a decline in zeal in agricultural organizations. Indeed, as hard times passed into memory
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the disposition for political action became less intense, establishing
a trend not to be reversed in Kansas until the boom of the 1880s
collapsed.2
The fervor of farm organizations declined but the tendency
toward organization continued. During the late 1870s and early
1880s, an assortment of farm organizations came into being. In the
former Granger strongholds of the Northwest and Middle West,
the National Farmers' Alliance and the Farmers' Mutual Benefit
Association joined the Patrons of Husbandry in competing for the
support of farmers; in the Northwest there was the Farmers'
League; in the South there evolved the National Farmers' Alliance and Industrial Union, the Colored Farmers' Alliance, and
the Agricultural Wheel. 3
Among these organizations, the National Farmers' Alliance
and Industrial Union (Southern Alliance) and the National
Farmers' Alliance (Northern Alliance) were most important.
Both orders got their effective starts at about the same time in the
years 1879-1880.4 The Northern Alliance, which began in Illinois,
was from the beginning a much more loosely knit organization
than the Texas-born Southern Alliance. It was a nonsecret organization, which, until 1887, required no fees or dues from its members; Negroes were eligible to membership, and it held that any
person raised on a farm could join, thus opening the way for the
recruitment of members from the nonagricultural classes. The
Southern Alliance, on the other hand, was a highly centralized
organization for "white" farmers, which specifically excluded
from membership attorneys and all residents of incorporated
cities.6 It was bound together by ties of secrecy, dramatized by
secret meetings, ritual, dues, grips, and passwords. 6 Membership
in both organizations soared in the late 1880s. By 1890 the Southern Alliance claimed anywhere from one to three million members, with another million and a half in a Negro affiliate, while
the Northern Alliance claimed to have over a million. 7
In Kansas the Northern Alliance at first figured to be the
chief agency through which farmers were to advance their interests. The first local group, or suballiance, was established about
1881, but the new order grew quite slowly until 1888. By the latter
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year, Northern affiliated suballiances had been founded in a number of counties, and on August 2, 1888, the first state meeting was
held at Lyons in Rice County.8 The same organization met in
Topeka on February 6, 1889, and elected I. M. Morris as its president.9 Six months later, however, the Northern Alliance had been
all but supplanted in Kansas by the National Farmers' Alliance
and Industrial Union, or the Southern Alliance.
The record is not clear as to how this conversion came
about in so short a time. William F. Rightmire, a prominent
leader of the Kansas Populists, later insisted that it was promoted
by means of the State Reform Association, of which he was president.10 However it was done, the two farm orders were consolidated in Newton, Kansas, on August 14, 1889.11 Benjamin H.
Clover, from Cowley County, who had been president of the
Southern affiliated Alliance in Kansas from its inception early in
1889, was selected as president of the newly consolidated state
Alliance.12
While this consolidation movement was underway in Kansas, a similar effort was being made on the national level. This
resulted in the meeting of the Northern and Southern Alliances in
St. Louis in December, 1889. The St. Louis Convention failed to
produce a consolidation of the national organizations, but the
Kansas order, already having merged the Northern and Southern
affiliates, accepted the invitation for consolidation, as did the
North Dakota and South Dakota Alliances. In St. Louis, also,
both national Alliances adopted a set of reform demands, and in
these there was a unity of purpose that pointed the way to a real
political change. Abolition of the national banking system and
"the substitution of legal tender treasury notes," prohibition of the
alien ownership of land, a graduated income tax, adoption of the
Australian ballot, and government ownership of the means of
communication and transportation highlighted these two forwardlooking platforms.13 As John D. Hicks has written, "there was on
the three fundamental issues of land, transportation, and finance
virtually no North and no South."14
The St. Louis demands were not intended to be a platform
for a new political party. Obviously the Alliance fully expected to
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translate these demands into specific governmental actions, but for
most Alliancemen the means anticipated still included working
within the existing parties.
In Kansas, while the Alliance movement had undergone
this significant transformation, the debate as to how best to obtain
desired reforms intensified as the plight of her citizens became
more serious. Throughout the summer of 1889 Peffer and the
Farmer advised against hasty political moves. Peffer thought there
was little chance a successful third party could be formed. As he
saw it, "it is better for farmers and workers in general to form
associations for the purpose of discussing principles, leaving details
alone for the present ...." "The masses want reform in directions
other than those in which the great parties are going ... ," he
wrote, "but certain leading questions have controlled the elections,
as they always will, and these special reforms which the people
want are kept in the background, and will be until the people in
non-partisan associations bring them forward and demand their
consideration by legislative bodies." 15
Farther south, in Wichita, "Murdock's Rebellion" was the
topic of conversation. In May, 1889, Marshall Murdock, editor of
the influential Wichita Daily Eagle and a prominent Republican,
had blasted the 1889 Kansas legislature. Murdock wanted his
readers to know that he was no anarchist but he believed "Kansas
has grown too much one-sided and revolution is demanded for
the well being of the state." 16 Murdock kept up his attack on
through the summer. In August the editor of the Fort Scott
Monitor took the position that reform had to come through the
Kansas legislature. Murdock reacted to this by writing:
Bah! It would be more sensible to go to the devil for
pointers necessary to a circumspect life. That legislature is
in and of itself one of the most prominent causes for the
Rebellion. For years it has not only proved a disgrace but
rottenness itself. . . . The Rebellion is on, and complete
revolution must follow. The only power to which to look,
the only power from which there can come any relief, is
from the people, and not from a Kansas legislature or from
any of its creatures.17
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Marshall Murdock himself stayed with the Republican
party during the "Rebellion," but many of his fellow Kansans
were willing to follow his reasoning to logical conclusions. One
of those was Stephen McLallin, editor of the Meriden Advocate
in Jefferson County. A native of Pennsylvania, where he was born
in 1837, McLallin had removed to Kansas about 1869. Civil War
service, graduation from New York's Albany Medical School, and
some seventeen years as a practicing physician preceded his association with journalism in the mid-1880s. A "compound of a
Greek philosopher, of the austere, undemonstrative Scotchman,
and the modern socialist"-or so his associate editor and fellow
Populist Annie Diggs later described him-Dr. Stephen McLallin
was above all a genuine humanist.18
Dr. McLallin's paper led the way in the call for third-party
action. On September 21, 1889, he wrote: "It is urged that we
should go into the primaries and by energetic and persistent efforts work out a reformation in the existing parties. We have tried
this for the last twenty years without success. We have the same
class of party leaders that have stood at the head during all these
years and they are still as hungry as though they had never fed at
the public crib ...." "Nothing short of civil revolution," he
wrote, "seems capable of effecting a change in the interest of the
people." The old parties could not be used successfully, for the
bitter memory of past political struggles would not allow their
former opponents to join. What was needed, he suggested, was a
chance for the adherents of reform "to cut loose from their old
moorings without a formal surrender of the colors under which
they have so gallantly struggled heretofore .... " This he felt
would enable men of all parties "to unite upon the issues that are
now supreme, and insure their . .. triumph by overwhelming
majorities." 19 McLallin reasoned that a strictly nonpartisan approach to reform, such as was then being advised by William
Peffer, was self-defeating. In his mind it meant that the Alliance
would continue to be divided on the "old lines, precisely as they
have been divided before they became members of the Order." A
truly nonpartisan effort, to his way of thinking, meant cooperation
with neither old party. 20
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As the year 1889 came to a close the sentiment for thirdparty action intensified; the new disposition of the Alliance, in
fact, pointed logically and persistently in that direction. One of
Ben Clover's first official acts as president of the reorganized
Alliance was to issue a circular letter in November, 1889, directing
all suballiances to submit, by resolution, the platform of the
state Alliance to their congressmen, asking for their indorsement
of the Alliance demands. This was done, and every Kansas representative and Senator John J. Ingalls avoided an answer or responded evasively; only Senator Preston B. Plumb gave unqualified support to the Alliance platform.21
Soon thereafter, state Alliance leaders directed the suballiances to submit their demands to Peffer's Farmer. The deluge
that followed nudged Peffer out of the middle of the road. Beginning in December, he began publishing through the columns of
the Farmer his analysis of contemporary problems, entitled "The
Way Out," and began to lecture, as well, in behalf of the Alliance
platform.22
"The air is full of lightning," or so a Franklin County
Republican leader named William Kibbe had observed a few
months earlier.23 Storm warnings were even more obvious as the
new year and the new decade approached. On the surface, at least,
the official Republican newspaper of the state, the Topeka Daily
Capital, appeared oblivious to the existence of any great ferment.
The readers of the Capital were told that prohibition enforcement
was the primary issue of Kansas politics and that the Republican
party alone stood between them and the menacing reign of John
Barleycorn.24 If any farmers perused the pages of the Capital,
they were informed that "Hard work" was their "Salvation.''2 11
Cold words, indeed. Farmers could find little solace and less support in the chief Republican organ.
The Alliance cause was not without a voice in Topeka,
however; there was William Peffer's Farmer, of course, and on
January 9, 1890, Dr. Stephen McLallin published the first edition
of The Advocate from its new location in the capital. He announced his paper as one which was "devoted to the Interests of
the Farmers' Alliance and Industrial Union and other Kindred
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Organizations." McLallin favored third-party action but was
careful to appear as though he were being led rather than leading;
Peffer had not yet abandoned the hope that Alliance demands
could be met within the two old parties.26
On February 10, 1890, Peffer wrote a letter to Senator
Ingalls, which he published in the Farmer on February 26. He
called upon Ingalls to state his views for publication on the following issues: Ingalls' suggestions, if any, for farm relief; expansion
of the volume of circulating money; the national banking system;
and the free and unlimited coinage of silver. Senator Ingalls wrote
Peffer that his views on the issues would appear in "a few weeks"
but through some other channel than the Farmer.27
Whatever else may be said of the Senator's response, it was
not politic. For years John J. Ingalls had been Mr. Republican in
Kansas politics. He had made some bitter enemies for himself
during that period of time. The Union-Labor party in the state
had even singled out Senator Ingalls for special attention in its
1888 platform, calling him "a traitor unfit to represent the State of
Kansas ...."28 By ignoring the demands of the Alliance, and by
ignoring Peffer's request, Ingalls assisted the cause of his opponents immensely. Senator Ingalls was indeed becoming a major
issue himself. His adversaries were firmly in control of the Alliance movement, and therefore capable of turning the wrath of
that great movement squarely upon him.
On March 3, 1890, Ben Clover made a crucial move in that
direction. Apparently following the advice of the State Reform
Association,29 Clover, as president of the state Alliance, issued a
call for a meeting of the county presidents in Topeka on March
25. The expressed purpose was for "consulting about matters of
vital importance to our order and farmers and laborers in general." Actually, as Dr. McLallin later revealed, the object "was to
take preliminary steps for the organization of a new party ...."
The county presidents, according to McLallin, knew that to be the
purpose of the meeting, although a number of them opposed that
action and believed Clover had exceeded his authority in calling
the meeting.30
However that may be, on March 25, 1890, sixty-eight county
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presidents assembled in Topeka.31 At this meeting, several resolutions were adopted: among them, one denying support to Senator Ingalls for reelection; another which declared, "the speedy
control of the legislative and executive departments of our state
and national government by the industrial classes uniting their
strength at the ballot box is an imperative necessity; and to secure
this result, we most earnestly invite the Knights of Labor, trades
unions, and trades assemblies of all incorporated cities of the state
to unite with us ...."32 Another resolution stated that the Alliance would "no longer divide on party lines, and will only cast
our votes for candidates of the people, for the people, and by the
people."33 The meeting also directed that the president appoint a
member of the Alliance from each congressional district to be
known as "the People's state central committee."34
The Rubicon was crossed. This March 25 meeting of the
county presidents of the Alliance was the decisive turning point in
the move to create a new party; there was no turning back. On
April 5 Clover asked the members of the Alliance, through The
Advocate, to select members from their districts whom they
wanted to represent them on the central committee. The following
month, on May 14, Clover published the official call for a meeting
of this committee in Topeka on the second Tuesday in June.
Included in this call was a suggestion by Clover that the Alliance
send three members from each district; he also suggested that "the
Grange, Farmers' Mutual Benefit Association, Knights of Labor,
and all labor organizations having for their object the betterment
of the laboring classes, send at least one or two delegates in order
that all interests and orders may confer together for the best good
of all."35
In the meantime some rather significant developments continued to influence the course of Kansas politics. Senator Ingalls
entered into public discussion in a controversial way with an interview published in the New York World on April 13 and reprinted
throughout Kansas by all papers sympathetic to the Alliance cause
toward the end of April. Ingalls, reportedly asked by the New
York reporter if "political ends justify the means?" replied:
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The purification of politics is an irridescent dream.
Government is force. Politics is a battle for supremacy.
Parties are the armies. The decalogue and the golden rule
have no place in a political campaign. The object is success. To defeat the antagonist and expel the party in power
is the purpose. The republicans and democrats are as irreconcilably opposed to each other as were Grant and Lee
in the Wilderness. They use ballots instead of guns, but the
struggle is as unrelenting and desperate, and the result
sought for the same. In war it is lawful to deceive the adversary, to hire hessians, to purchase mercenaries, to mutilate, to destroy. The commander who lost a battle through
the activity of his moral nature would be the derision and
jest of history. This modern cant about the corruption of
politics is fatiguing in the extreme. It proceeds from the
tea-custard and syllabub dilettantism, the frivolous and desultory sentimentalism of epicenes like ....36

Ingalls later attempted to explain away this statement by saying
that he was describing how politics was, not how it ought to be,
but to no avail. 37 It rhymed too well with many of his earlier
statements, and it fitted perfectly his opponent's conception of him.
As far as the proponents of reform were concerned, Ingalls' statement was a precise summary of Republican philosophy.
Significantly, on April 30 Peffer announced that he and the
Kansas Farmer "put the Alliance before party, and we advise
friends that in all cases wherein this new party question arises,
they consider what is best for the Alliance ...."38 On May 14
Peffer made this announcement: "Senator Ingalls having declined
to answer our questions, the KANSAS FARMER will not support his claims for re-election, but, on the contrary, will support
the claims of any other competent man upon whom the opposition
shall unite."39
Abandon Senator Ingalls? but what of the grand old party
and the grand old issues? Ben Clover caught the mood of many
Kansans fairly well when he declared in May that "Kansas farmers have learned by sad experience that kinks twisted off the
British lion's tail will not pay mortgages, even though the mortgage may be held in England." True, he admitted, Ingalls was
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the greatest "Democrat skinner" of them all, but Kansas farmers
had learned as well that " 'brigadier' skins are the thinnest clothing a shivering family was ever wrapped up in.''4°
Ben Clover spoke from experience. The fifty-three-year-old
farmer was loaded down with the kind of problems that afflicted
a broad segment of the Kansas population with increasing severity
at that point. This native Ohioan had moved out to Kansas in the
year 1870 and began farming in Cowley County. For a time he
had done rather well for himself, especially in 1874, but by 1890
the farm was encumbered with an $18,000 mortgage, on top of
which was stacked another $1,800 in accrued interest on notes and
renewals. 41
Most farmers probably were not in as deeply as Clover, but
indebtedness, as indicated earlier, was widespread and formidable.
As these debts came due in a period of economic contraction,
intensified by the collapse of the boom and the fall in farm income, the time was indeed ripe for a political revolt. Beginning
in April and May, 1890, county Alliances in various parts of the
state, following the example of Jefferson and Cowley Counties in
the local elections of 1889, began to organize for political action.
On June 12, in response to Clover's call of the preceding month,
forty-one members of the Alliance, twenty-eight Knights of Labor,
ten members of the Farmers' Mutual Benefit Association, seven
Patrons of Husbandry, and four representatives from Single-Tax
Clubs, ninety in all, gathered in Representative Hall in Topeka to
further those political aspirations. Clover was elected to preside
over the meeting, which by resolution voted unanimously to present a full slate of candidates in the upcoming election under the
name People's party. A committee was then organized with John
F. Willits of Jefferson County as chairman, and the responsibility
for summoning a state convention was then assigned to this committee. The committee, in turn, then issued a call for a delegate
state convention to meet in Topeka on August 13.42
As might be expected, considering the timing of this political move, the convention that gathered in Topeka that August
was primarily facilitated by means of the existing Farmers' Alliance structure. Locally, a People's party apparatus was in varying
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stages of formation. Where party organizations did exist, however, they were virtually inseparable from the local Farmers'
Alliance.43
At the convention John F. Willits was nominated for
governor. Although chairman of the state committee, Willits was
little known beyond the boundaries of Jefferson County where he
was president of his County Alliance. Ben Clover, more widely
known because of his Alliance position, had eliminated his name
from consideration. The nomination for chief justice went to
William Franklin Rightmire, who on the preceding day had also
become secretary of the newly organized State Citizens' Alliance.
This organization was to play an important role in the reform
movement thereafter. The first local organization of its kind was
created in Olathe, Kansas, a few months earlier by a former
Greenbacker and Union Laborite named D. C. Zercher, who was
named as president of the State Citizens' Alliance. As a state
organization the Citizens' Alliance was apparently promoted by
the State Reform Association in order to enlist residents of cities
and towns in the reform cause who were ineligible to membership
in the Farmers' Alliance. The State Reform Association, according to Rightmire, dissolved with the formation of the State
Citizens' Alliance, and the latter organization provided the
mechanism whereby non-farmer, urban-oriented reform proponents were able to make their influence felt within the new third
party.44
If only a fraction of his own claims were admitted, W. F.
Rightmire would qualify as one of the most influential figures in
the creation of the People's party. Rightmire later stated the matter this way in a rough autobiographical sketch: "Was nominated
by Union Labor party of Kansas, as Candidate for Attorney General of Kansas in 1888. Was president from 1888 of State Reform
Association of Kansas, (that succeeded Union Labor party in
December 1888) that organized the Farmers' Alliance Movement
in Kansas, and then organized the Peoples Party of Kansas in
1890 ...." 45 Until or unless more material is turned up, however,
the whole story concerning the role of Rightmire and that of the
State Reform Association must remain an enigma of sorts. This
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much is clear: the forty-one-year-old lawyer was intimately involved in the endeavors that culminated in the creation of the
People's party, even though he had resided in Kansas only since
1887. His pre-Kansas background included an academy and seminary education in New York; experience as a teacher, coal miner,
and union organizer in Pennsylvania from 1869 to 1874; teaching
and the practice of law in Iowa from 1874 to 1887. Politically,
Rightmire had been a Republican until the late 1870s, when he
left the party to become a Greenbacker while in Iowa. In Kansas
he had helped organize the Union Labor party, and he was that
party's candidate for attorney general in 1888. His nomination for
chief justice by the 1890 Populist convention was therefore adequate testimony to the success of his reform activities. 46
The remainder of the ticket was composed of decidedly
obscure personalities. John N. Ives, the only former Democrat on
the ticket and a resident of the state for only two years, was nominated for attorney general. The nominee for auditor was a Negro
minister from Topeka by the name of B. F. Foster. Women were
represented by Mrs. Fanny McCormick from Barton County, who
was nominated for state superintendent of public instruction. For
lieutenant governor the convention named Albert C. Shinn, a
forty-eight-year-old stock raiser from Franklin County. Russell
Scott Osborn, a Congregational minister and farmer from Osborne County, was nominated for secretary of state.47
The nominees of the new party undoubtedly reflected its
immaturity, as well as the influence of the idea, prominent in reform circles, that the office should seek the man. About principles,
however, there was more maturity and unanimity. The platform
was simply constructed; it reiterated the 1889 St. Louis demands,
calling for the "abolition of national banks and the substitution of
legal tender treasury notes"; "the free and unlimited coinage of
silver"; congressional "laws as shall effectually prevent the dealing
in futures in all agricultural and mechanical productions"; "laws
prohibiting alien ownership of land," to repossess "land now
owned by aliens and foreign syndicates," and to reclaim land then
"held by railroads and other corporations, in excess of such as are
actually used and needed by them," to be "held for actual settlers";
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and government ownership of "the means of communication and
transportation."
The platform emphasized that its spokesmen would "waste
no time discussing minor matters. The past is gone, the present is
with us, and the future is before us. Old issues are dead. We come
to you with new ones." It then set forth five separate resolutions
in regard to railroads that were requested by the Knights of Labor.
The five had to do with safety devices on railroads, arbitration of
labor disputes, the use of Pinkerton detectives to coerce employees,
and an existing state law that made railroad workers liable to
conspiracy. 48
In this unspectacular manner the stage was set for a decidedly spectacular campaign, which would seriously alter the
conventional pattern of Kansas politics. At the time of its formation, however, there was little reason to believe the new party
posed a serious threat to Republican supremacy. The G.O.P. had
faced this situation on numerous occasions in the past; the People's
party, faithful Republicans believed, would experience the same
fate as had the other third parties which preceded it. There was
about the attitude of its opponents an air of certainty and derision.
The tendency was, in fact, to employ the same rhetoric that had
been used successfully in the past. For the leaders of the new party
there was nothing but contempt. While the party was still in the
making, an opponent, whose letter was published in The Advocate, expressed the attitude precisely when he wrote: "let me say
to the farmers, beware of the reformer. He is either a crank, a
disgruntled democrat or republican, or a demagogue in some
other shape. His modus operandi is to berate all who have sense
enough to see that no profitable action can be had outside the two
great parties." Obviously, "These chronic professional kickers and
croakers are ... aiming to get your support in some form of new
party, not for your benefit, but for their's [sic] ."49
The mood of self-assurance within the Republican party
would soon be shattered but the attitude of derision would, if
anything, be intensified. Undaunted by the repetitious cry that
the party was led by a group of "professional kickers and croak-
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ers," thousands of Kansans joined in singing "Goodbye, My Party,
Goodbye," as they moved to eradicate the "evils" which they believed responsible for their misfortunes.

KANSAS POPULIST LEADERSHIP:

Clodhoppers or Agrarian Iconoclasts?

le

Kansas Republican prn;s
throughout the 1890s constantly labeled the leaders of the Populist
party as "anarchists," "communists," "misfits," "loafers," "cranks,"
and "demagogues." In its efforts to down the party, this opposition
repeatedly invoked the rags-to-riches or self-made-man myth, at
times even the opposing yet parallel myth of rural virtue. 1 Invariably, Populist leaders were caricatured, verbally and pictorially, in
a manner suggesting that they represented the missing link in the
evolutionary chain. All the intellectual equipment of social Darwinism was brought to bear in the assault on the party. The usual
caricature that emerged in the period-especially in Eastern papers
-pictured a weather-beaten old man with distorted features; a
dilapidated hat perched atop a head that was ornamented with a
long but mangy-looking beard; between a set of irregular teeth
dangled a stalk of straw; and a bony frame, after a fashion, was
covered with a tattered set of bib overalls, from which emerged
inevitably a pair of oversized boots recognizable as "clodhoppers."
The facts of the case have been as obscure as the picture
was distorted. In order to clarify the matter, biographical material
was obtained on eighty-nine individuals who made up the major
leadership of the party in Kansas. Included here were all elected
administrative officials, congressmen, prominent leaders in the
state legislature, party officials, prominent lecturers and party
workers, and writers and editors of leading Populist papers.2 The
composite picture that resulted from this analysis revealed that the
Kansas Populist leader was forty-six years old in 1890; he was
most likely born in Ohio, New York, Pennsylvania, Illinois, or
Iowa, and moved to Kansas in 1871; he was, more often than not,
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a lawyer, but a number combined the occupation of farming or
stock raising with that of teacher or editor. Only one in five was
engaged strictly in agricultural pursuits, and many of those had
been lawyers, or teachers, or merchants before becoming farmers.
It should be noted that forty-six was the median age for
seventy-six out of eighty-nine for whom ages could be determined.
The average age was just over forty-four (44.3) and forty-one was
the age of greatest frequency, seven individuals having fallen in
that category. Twenty-five of these Populist leaders (33.8 percent)
were fifty or older, and eight (10.5 percent) were thirty or less.
Actually, forty-one out of seventy-three (56.l percent) were natives of Ohio, New York, Pennsylvania, Illinois, or Iowa. The
states of Indiana, Kentucky, Virginia, West Virginia, and Wisconsin accounted for another fifteen (20.5 percent), and the remainder were divided among nine other states and Canada.
Information as to when these individuals came to Kansas was
obtained in seventy-two of eighty-nine cases. Twenty-eight (38.8
percent) came before 1870 and only fourteen (19.4 percent) came
in 1880 or later. Occupational analysis, based on findings in
seventy-nine of eighty-nine cases, revealed that thirty-one (39.2
percent) had been admitted to the practice of law; twenty-three
(26.4 percent) were teachers by profession or had taught school at
some point in their lives; and seventeen (21.5 percent) were engaged exclusively in farming.
This leadership was, in other words, a middle-class leadershii:r-rural middle class, perhaps, but middle class nonetheless.
More than half had graduated from one or more colleges, and
counting those who had some college education, one arrives at the
impressive discovery that almost two out of three had had some
contact with the college environment. Actually, information revealing the educational background of this leadership group was
available in sixty out of the eighty-nine cases. Thirty-one of these
leaders (51.6 percent) had graduated from one or more colleges;
another eight (13.3 percent) had attended college for varying
periods of time; another seven (11.6 percent) had an academy or
high school education, and fourteen (23.3 percent) were the recipients of only a common-school education. Even if the twenty-
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seven for whom no information was found were all placed in the
common-school category, the percentage of college graduates
would remain unusually high for the nineteenth century-thirtyone of eighty-nine, or 34.8 percent. As might be expected, the
college environment that these people came out of was primarily
that of the Middle West; but Eastern colleges were well represented, and three of the group were graduates of Harvard, Stanford, and Oxford universities.3
The composite Kansas Populist leader had also been active
in reform for some time before 1890. The information pertaining
to previous party affiliation, available for fifty-four o.f the group,
revealed that thirty-two (59.4 percent) of these Populist leaders
were active in the third-party reform movement before 1890. The
usual route traveled had carried them from the Republican party
to the Greenback party, then to the Prohibition party or the
Union-Labor party, and then into the Populist party.
The rhetoric of Kansas Populist leaders was highly moral.
Indeed their approach to reform was such that moral and political
considerations were virtually one and the same. Christian ethics
underlay their appraisal of society, and they were o.ften ready with
an apt Biblical allusion in appropriate situations. But contrary to
what might be supposed, they were not religious fundamentalists.
Of the twenty-two Populists out of eighty-nine whose biographies
indicated a religious affiliation, five were Methodists, three were
Unitarians, three were Quakers, and three were Congregationalists. The Baptist, Lutheran, Presbyterian, and Christian Churches
contributed one each. Included among these were two Spiritualists and two Agnostics.
There was, among these leaders, general agreement and
recognition of the social derivation of evil, a conviction that the
conditions of their world had pitted brother against brother and
man against immoral society in a contest with the cards stacked
devastatingly against society's disadvantaged legions. For this
reason, in religious matters a good many Populist leaders could
agree with Samuel Wood, one of their number, when he wrote
that "God should be spelled with two o's (Good); devil without a
d(evil). In fact, I reject all the dogmas of the church. My religion
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is a sincere desire to do right-to do the most possible good in this
world. I believe sincerely in the 'Fatherhood of God and the
brotherhood of man.' "4 Or with Mary Elizabeth Lease when she
informed religious-minded defenders of the status quo that "it
was not christianity but churchanity that she assailed ...." 5 Or
with Kansas Populist Congressman John Grant Otis when he
declared, "Our civilization demands the recognition of the fatherhood of God and the brotherhood of man, not upon Sunday only,
but upon seven days in the week, and fifty-two weeks in the
year." 6 Some no doubt would have agreed with the message of
John M. Dunsmore, speaker of the Populist house of representatives in 1893, which he left to be read at his funeral. Dunsmore's
"Message of Love," as he called it, stated that he "came into being
with a mind so constituted that blind faith in any creed or dogma
could never satisfy ... [his] desire for knowledge concerning the
mysteries of life and being." He followed this with the statement:
"I have never been able to accept as true the dogmas and creeds of
the so-called Christian system.'' Religion was to him, quoting an
authority with whom he was familiar, " 'The outcome of our ideas
about the universe, our response to all that we know, consciously
or unconsciously, of cosmic law.'" If any hint of a fundamentalist
strain still remained, Dunsmore took care of that by stating: "As
an evolutionist, I looked upon the story of the fall of man as a
myth handed down from dead and forgotten ages, and consequently, the dogma of the atonement to be both illogical and unnecessary.'' But an atheist John Dunsmore was not, and he
demonstrated this by quoting another authority, with whom he
also agreed, who had written that " 'while sin remains in the
universe, God is defeated: and that everlasting punishment involves an everlasting failure; that sin never injured God, except
through man. That it is the God within who is injured, rather
than the God without.' "7
Apparently, quite a few of these leaders were alienated
from the churches, but Christian precepts maintained a strong
hold on their minds. The safest and perhaps the most accurate
generalization that can be made about them is this: if the Populist
leadership shared a common theological outlook it would have to
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be ethical humanitarianism which served as a yardstick by which
they judged their world.
Undoubtedly this element of humanism conditioned their
reaction to the problems they recognized were being created by an
industrialized society-or was it the other way around? Either
way, it is certain that both were an influence in making these
leaders of Kansas Populism critical of the Gospel of Wealth. To
their way of thinking the popularity of the Gospel of Wealth was
merely a measure of the perversion of Christian doctrine to a
selfish and ruthless industrial system. At one point Senator William Peffer stated the leadership's attitude toward the doctrine
rather well: in responding to the attack of a minister who considered the Populists anarchists Peffer stated that the minister "is
not crazy, nor is he ignorant, nor do I believe he is a bad man.
On the other hand, I believe he averages high with the modern
Christian, that he will average well with the modern preacher,
whose philosophy comes to him from the Middle Ages, and whose
ideas of finance come to him through the newspapers which are
edited in the business offices."8
A number of the Kansas Populists, moreover, like the
popular lady-orator and editor Annie Diggs, were in complete
harmony with the Social-Gospel movement; and some, like Kansas Congressman Jerry Botkin, boldly and defiantly proclaimed
themselves Christian socialists.9
By implication of argument or by direct refutation, Kansas
Populist leaders rejected, as well, the so-called philosophy of social
Darwinism. The evidence demonstrating their rejection of the
social-Darwinian point of view is overwhelming, although it has
been largely ignored in the past. Dr. Stephen McLallin, by means
of The Advocate, repeatedly assailed Herbert Spencer's doctrine.
In 1891 McLallin published a letter that fairly represented the
attitude of the leadership on this matter which stated: "There
never was, nor can there be, a more brutal, utterly selfish and
despicable doctrine than the Darwinian 'struggle for existence,'
when applied to the social relations of man. It justifies oppression,
the aggregation of wealth in the hands of those able to grasp it,
the occupation of everything the 'fittest' are able to gain and keep."
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The letter then pointed up, by inference, the tie between the Gospel of Wealth and social Darwinism by indicating that religion
had until recently mitigated the influence of the Spencerian rationale, but "Now this sacred ground is invaded. The pulpit is
infected with the theories of material science, infected with the
crude matter of materialism, which stops short of the halfway
boundary between matter and spirit, and sees in man only an
objectless animal."10
Kansas Populists were among the first to admit that abilities
among men were not equally distributed. They were willing to
concede, as did future Populist Congressman William D. Vincent
on the eve of the party's formation, "that some men will grow rich
faster than other men under a perfect system of law." The more
industrious man, said Vincent, should receive a larger share than
his "indolent neighbor." But what about "the sharp unprincipled
men?" he asked. To Vincent and fellow Populists, it was clear
that strong men needed no special assistance to augment their
natural advantages. "They need no special legislation in their behalf," said Vincent. "The object of law is supposed to be protection of the weak against the oppressions of the strong." 11
Over and over again Populist leaders stressed this view. To
accomplish this purpose they unequivocably supported positive
action by state and national government. In taking this position
they were ridiculed repeatedly as paternalists, but they were
scarcely bothered by the argument. In fact they countered with
the argument that the country had had paternalistic government
for years. As one unidentified Populist put it, "paternalism for the
benefit of the few and powerful at the expense of the masses."
Said he, "Every trust and combine, and every corporation is paternalism for the benefit of a class." 12 Another, also unidentified,
declared that those who were horrified by the paternalistic spector
of government ownership of railroads, telegraph, and telephones
had "no fears of the centralization of power in the hands of a few
irresponsible men resulting from corporate control of the same
franchises, and the absorption of more than one half of the aggregate wealth of the entire country by less than 50,000 people."
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Which was more dangerous to American liberty, he asked, "this
latter paternalism or the paternalism of all the people? " 13
As a group, Kansas Populists gloried in attacking the conventional wisdom-probably because it was employed with such
devastating effect against them. Judge Frank Doster, who was
the intellectual giant of Kansas Populism, more than any other
figure delighted in shocking his more complacent contemporaries.
This character trait earned for Doster quite a reputation in Kansas politics by 1896, and in that year his fame crossed over state
boundaries, as he was the man the Populists had nominated for
chief justice, the "shabby, wild-eyed, rattle-brained fanatic" of
William Allen White's nationally-acclaimed editorial entitled
"What's the Matter with Kansas?" Doster won that race, and
many a conservative reporter clamored at his heels, attempting,
by rather pointed questioning, to gauge the reign of terror they
were sure was close at hand. The reign of terror was not forthcoming, but Doster gave some brash young reporters some pungent copy. In 1897, shortly after assuming office, the judge stated
that he did not "believe in hell fire, nor human slavery, nor high
tariff, nor the gold standard, nor in millionaires, nor in the wage
system." Just as quickly he added: "I do believe in the Ten Commandments and in the Golden Rule, in the initiative and referendum, and evolution and woman suffrage, and I am edging
toward theosophy and Christian science, and open to conviction
in favor of any vagrant fad that nobody will admit believing in
until enough do to make it respectable." 14 On another occasion
Doster told a reporter: "I have been an adherent of socialism all
my life. Socialism is coming about through the socialization of
what we call the public utilities ...." It was his contention that
as quickly as matters "become of sufficient public concern, either
nationally or locally, they will pass into the hands of the general
or local public, and some fine morning, if you live to a good old
age, you will wake up to find yourself living in an almost communistic society, having gotten there by transitions so easy and
natural you didn't realize their occurrence until the job was
done." 15
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G. C. Clemens exceeded Frank Doster in the severity of his
attack on the folklore of his times. In 1894 Clemens wrote that
government, as viewed by those who controlled it, was "an ancient
hand-organ, into which its ante-diluvian manufacturers put certain tunes which must never be changed. It ceaselessly grinds out
the Tariff schottische, the Gold-Silver-and-Parity Waltz, the Revenue polka, the exhilerating [sic] gallop-'Our Foreign Relations,'
and the soothing measures of 'After Us the Deluge.'" Prior to the
Populist movement, continued Clemens, political campaigns had
been fought over one all-important issue, " 'Who shall turn the
crank?' " At any time in the past when the people had grown
weary of the "endless monotony" and had "demanded a change
of program,'' the disenchanted "have been assured the trouble was
with the unskilled or negligent wretch who was grinding the
machine; but no matter how often the operator has been changed,
suffering humanity's ears have still been greeted with the same
old tunes which were doubtless popular with their progenitors
some centuries before the flood." Finally, wrote Clemens,
a party has arisen to demand a more radical change; which
says to the people, "Let us remodel the old organ somewhat, so as to adapt it to modern music, and put into it an
entirely new set of tunes. Let us substitute for this antiquated noise the beautiful strains of "The Earth was
Made for All," and "All Men are Brothers Now," and ...
"Poverty is No More." But the champions of prehistoric
melody exclaim in horror, "The impious innovators are
going to change our consecrated tunes and even overhaul
the sacred machine! Let us redeem the holy noise-box from
the blasphemous wretches.'' 16
G. C. Clemens, as previously indicated, was later carried by
the logic of his reasoning into the socialist camp. A number of
the leaders of Kansas Populism identified themselves as advocates
of a moderate or evolutionary socialism, and a portion of that
group chose the same course as Clemens after 1898, but they were
not all convinced that governmental machinery needed as drastic
an overhaul as Clemens desired. Piecemeal change was unquestionably the design of the great majority.
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The dominant segment of the Populist leadership in
Kansas reasoned, as did Dr. Stephen McLallin, that "Competition,
except in the ranks of labor, in the production of farm products,
and in the retail of certain lines of merchandise," was a thing of
the past.17 This element readily admitted the efficacy of cooperation and combination. They were willing to accept the organization of industry on a large and systematic scale. They agreed
that measures were necessary so that large-scale enterprise could
be made to better serve the public interest. They differed on how
this was to be accomplished. One element of this group which felt
that competition was no longer a practical regulator of industrial
enterprise reasoned that the solution was public ownership of
those enterprises that were national in scope and clearly affected
with the public interest. For many of these individuals, however,
as Chester M. Destler has noted, collectivist methods were simply
a legitimate means of restoring free enterprise and small competitive capitalism; in particular, they felt government owned and
operated railroads would contribute to that end.18
Another element of that dominant segment was reluctant to
support the solution of government ownership from the beginning
-or in certain cases came to that position because of pragmatic
politics-and placed their faith in government regulation of largescale enterprise. The response of this latter group would later be
seen more clearly in Theodore Roosevelt's New Nationalism and
in the second phase of Woodrow Wilson's New Freedom.19
Another faction, whose ideas represented a minority view
among the leaders but may have appealed to a significant portion
of the rank and file, reasoned that large-scale enterprise in the
form of monopolies should be abolished so that competition would
serve as an effective regulator. Those who took this position
would not admit, as many of their colleagues did, that the trust
was the logical product of the principle of competition in industry. The conventional wisdom was not easily evaded. Kansas
Populist William Marshall must have struck some responsive
chords when he pleaded with his fellow reformers to declare:
"Natural laws are good enough for us. Competition will do. The
provision which God has created cannot be improved upon;
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neither can it be violated without injury to ourselves ... ; consequently we will suppress that instrument of artificialism and oppression, the combine, and restore to its full function and force
the natural law of competition."20 The approach of this faction
would subsequently find an influential representation in the first
phase of Woodrow Wilson's New Freedom.21
Besides these fundamental differences, party leaders were
to be plagued and torn by numerous problems that can only be
understood by studying the history of the party itself in its logical
context-from that first whirligig campaign of 1890 to the denouement of the 1896 silver crusade and after. For the moment, suffice
it to say that the leaders of Kansas Populism were by no means
clodhoppers in the usual sense of that word; they were, on the
whole, an extraordinary group of individuals, iconoclastic in their
appraisal of society, bold and at times radical in their solutions.
Their great problem derived from the fact that they were critics of
an emerging industrial order whose strength and opportunity for
criticism were largely the result of a wave of discontent made
possible by the frustrations and misfortunes of an agarian order
functioning within a rapidly industrializing society that paid little
heed to the farmer's plight.

"A TURNIP CRUSADE, AS IT WERE"

w
-

ords fail to describe the
ferment that came over Kansas in the summer of 1890. The campaign was on. As Elizabeth N. Barr has written so well, "The
upheaval that took place ... can hardly be diagnosed as a political
campaign. It was a religious revival, a crusade, a pentecost of politics in which a tongue of flame set upon every man, and each
spake as the spirit gave him utterance." The ground had been
well prepared by the Alliance. Literally hundreds of lecturers
throughout the state, men and women, addressed themselves to
topics that agitated their audiences. But it was not just the recognized leaders who sounded the call for action; in the words of
Barr, "The farmers, the country merchants, the cattle-herders, they
of the long chin-whiskers, and they of the broad-brimmed hats
and heavy boots, had also heard the word and could preach the
gospel of Populism." Preach they did; never before had the ordinary citizen been so engrossed in political matters. From August
to November, 1890, political ferment consumed the state like a
prairie fire, as tens of thousands of Kansans flocked to the banner
of the People's party intent on demonstrating, apparently, that the
purification of politics was not an iridescent dream.1
The discontented did not have to look far for spokesmen:
numerous third-party campaigners eagerly threw themselves into
the fray; and skill in political criticism and analysis, in some cases
developed over a twenty-year period, immediately and logically
catapulted them to positions of leadership. The Alliance movement, moreover, provided the forum whereby many new personalities burst upon the political scene.
By far the most spectacular of the relative newcomers was
Mrs. Mary Elizabeth Lease.2 The future stem-winding prophetess
of Kansas Populism was born in 1853 in Pennsylvania, not Ireland
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as she occasionally claimed in the Populist era, and her maiden
name was Mary Elizabeth Clyens. She received an academy education in New York and moved to Kansas in about 1873. Settling
in Neosho County, she became a teacher in the parochial school at
Osage Mission. It was there she met and married a druggist
named Charles Lease. Shortly after their marriage they moved to
a farm in Kingman County. After a brief and unsuccessful effort
at farming, they moved to Denison, Texas, and then back to
Kansas again. In the meantime ten years had intervened. During
this period Mrs. Lease bore four children, managed the household,
and in her spare time studied law. Her study of law was done
entirely at home; at times, so it was said, this required "pinning
sheets of notes above her wash tub to study while she scrubbed the
washings she 'took in' at 50¢ a day." However it was done, she
was admitted to the bar in 1885 and became one of a small number
of Kansas women lawyers.
Between 1885 and 1887, Mrs. Lease began to build a reputation as a lecturer on various subjects. She gave several lectures
in behalf of the Irish National League, and championed woman
suffrage and temperance. Until 1888 she was a Republican. In
that year, however, she left the G.O.P. to work in behalf of the
newly organized Union-Labor party. She made a political debut
of sorts that year also by speaking before the Union-Labor party's
state convention.
Mrs. Lease gained considerable experience from her activities in the 1888 contest and a certain amount of notoriety in the
middle counties of Kansas, and from there she moved quite
logically and wholeheartedly into the reform agitation that led to
the creation of the Populist party. Her natural talents then catapulted her to prominence among the orators of the time.3
Mrs. Lease obviously had a truly remarkable voice, for it
was widely noted. Annie Diggs, who rivaled Mrs. Lease for the
affection of Kansas Populists, considered it her greatest "distinguishing gift." William Allen White stated that he had "never
heard a lovelier voice than Mrs. Lease's." He described it as "a
golden voice-a deep, rich contralto, a singing voice that had
hypnotic qualities." Concerning her persuasive powers, White
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wrote, "She put into her oratory something which the printed
copies did not reveal. They were dull enough often, but she could
recite the multiplication table and set a crowd hooting or hurrahing at her will." The pudgy little Republican editor supplied the
following image of her appearance: "She stood nearly six feet tall,
with no figure, a thick torso, and long legs. To me, she often
looked like a kangaroo pyramided up from the hips to a comparatively small head .... She wore her hair in a Psyche knot, always
neatly combed and topped by the most ungodly hats I ever saw a
woman wear. She had no sex appeal-none!" 4
Mrs. Lease, nevertheless, had that special something that
made her a magnetic orator. Early in 1891 she was interviewed by
a reporter who was indeed quite fair in his treatment of that
interview. In summing up, he stated that she impressed him "as
one of those radical, strong, warm natures which feels and has
impulses rather than thoughts. She can see a wrong and feel an
injury quickly, but would be slow and far from sure in her remedies. Her mind is untrained, and while displaying plenty of a
certain sort of power, is illogical, lacks sequence and scatters like
a IO-gauge gun." 5
It would seem that a good deal of Mrs. Lease's success was
due to her ability to feel and express what was agitating many
people at the time. She was in this sense more a barometer of
discontent than an originator and leader of reform activity. Years
later, Mrs. Lease herself noted this fact but gave it a mystical
twist. A reporter asked her how she became an orator; she replied:
"Brother, I don't say that I ever did. I was untrained in the arts of
the public debater, unschooled in the methods of the political
exhorter. If I succeeded in swaying my audiences I did not deserve the credit. That belongs to a hidden power that worked
within me. I was merely a voice, an instrument in the hands of a
Great Force." 6 Reform pursued in this fashion may perhaps have
been effective as long as the impulse was strong and its meaning
reasonably clear, but it could be disastrous in opposite circumstances. This observation may hold the key to understanding why
the subsequent careers of Mrs. Lease and several other Populist
leaders, in Kansas and elsewhere, were quite erratic.
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For the moment, however, the Lease style of oratory was
just the thing. Unquestionably, she played a mighty role in that
first whirligig campaign. She moved about the state, her reputation growing by leaps and bounds, roasting the opposition in a
manner that most men would dare not use for fear of physical
reprisal. A measure of the effectiveness of her attack may be seen
in the following remarks of a Republican editor in Wellington,
Kansas, after a Lease visit: "At the opera house last Monday night,
a miserable caricature upon womanhood, hideously ugly in feature
and foul of tongue, made an ostensible political speech, but which
consisted mainly of the rankest kind of personal abuse of people
in this city, among which [sic] the editor of this paper understands that he came in for the principal share." He went on to
write that he did not know exactly what were the "old hag's
reasons" for the attack. "All we know about her is that she is
hired to travel around the country by this great reform People's
party, which seems to find a female blackguard a necessity in its
business, spouting foulmouthed vulgarity at $10 a night." He was
certain "the petticoated smut-mill earns her money, but few
women want to make their living that way." He capped off this
bit of vitriol by noting, sardonically, "We thought at first we
would write her up in something after her own style of expression,
but upon reflection concluded that the space could better be devoted to something else. Her venomous tongue is the only thing
marketable about the old harpy, and we suppose she is justified in
selling it where it commands the highest price." Besides, "In about
a month the lantern-jawed, goggleeyed nightmare will be put out
of a job, and nobody will be the worse for the mud with which
she has tried to bespatter them." 7
A summary example of Mrs. Lease's oratory in the 1890
campaign was distilled in a speech she delivered in Kansas City
late in March, 1891. Speaking with little attention to notes (her
usual style), her speech, as noted by a Kansas City Star reporter,
was presented in "a fragmentary, desultory way which showed it
to be a crazy-patch of perhaps a dozen different speeches." Considering her importance in that campaign and the paucity of
extant material, it merits special attention. She said:
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Wall street owns the country. It is no longer a government
of the people, for the people, by the people, but a government of Wall street, for Wall street, and by Wall street.
The great common people of the country are slaves, and
monopoly is the master. The West and South are bound
and prostrate before the manufacturing East. Money rules
and our Vice President is a London banker.... [Our legislation] is the output of a system which clothes rascals in
robes and honesty in rags. The parties lie to us and the
political speakers mislead us. We were told two years ago
in Kansas to go to work, raise a big crop-that's all we
needed. We went to work and plowed and planted ; the
rains fell, the sun shown, nature smiled and we raised a
big crop they told us to; and what came of it? Eight-cent
corn and ten-cent oats and two-cent beef and no price at
all for butter and eggs ; that's what came of it. Then the
politicians said we suffered from over production, when
10,000 little children .. . starve to death every year in the
United States and over 100,000 shop girls in New York
City are forced to sell their virtue for the bread their niggard wages deny them . .. . John J. Ingalls never smelled
gunpowder in all his cowardly life. His war record is confined to court marshalling a chicken thief.... Kansas suffers from two great robbers; the Santa Fe railroad and the
loan companies. The common people are robbed to enrich
their masters .. . . There are thirty men in the United
States whose aggregate wealth is over one and one-half
billions of dollars. There are one-half million tramps; that
is men looking for work .. .. What the Alliance wants
are money, land and transportation. We want the abolition
of national hanks and we want the power to make loans
direct from the government. \Ve want either the amendment or the wiping out of the accursed foreclosure system
in the state of Kansas. Land equal to a tract thirty miles
wide and ninety miles long in Kansas has been foreclosed
on and bought in by the loan companies in a year. We will
stand by our homes and stay by our firesides by force, if
necessary, and we will not pay our debts to the shark loan
companies until the government pays its debts to us. The
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people are at bay; let the blood hounds of money who have
dogged them so far beware.8
"Raise less corn and more hell!" was the advice she allegedly
gave to Kansas farmers; 9 it was the kind of advice they could
well understand.
Decidedly inferior to Mrs. Lease in spectacular crowdpleasing attributes but by far superior in intellectual attainments
and abilities was Mrs. Annie L. Diggs-or "Little Annie" as she
was affectionately identified by her fellow Populists. Almost a
decade after this campaign, a journalist gave the following description of Mrs. Diggs:
Imagine a little woman, slender, almost to fraility, barely
five feet tall and weighing only ninety-three pounds. Picture . . . a face on which shines the light of zealous endeavor and enthusiastic championship of a beloved cause;
rather thin lips, an intellectual forehead from which the
hair, now fairly sprinkled with gray threads, is brushed
back pompadour like; twinkling eyes which alternately
squint almost shut, then open wide as she expounds her
favorite doctrines of socialism; a trifle nervous, a soft voice
and an occasional musical little laugh as she talks, and you
have a fair photograph of [Annie Diggs] ....10
Born in Canada in 1853 to an American mother and French
father, Annie La Porte had moved with her parents to New Jersey
at age two. She was not a college graduate ( a fact that she "regretted"), although she had a better than average education,
having studied with a private tutor, in the public schools, and, for
a time, in a convent school. An adventurous soul by nature, eager
to confront new challenges, the young and attractive Miss La
Porte had gone to Washington, D.C., to take up a career in journalism soon after the termination of her education. After working
at that for a time, she decided to go out West. The year was 1873;
she was nineteen; and the destination was Lawrence, Kansas. She
had arranged for a position in a Lawrence music store, where she
would demonstrate the quality of the store's pianos. Within a
short time, she met and married A. S. Diggs, an employee in the
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Lawrence post office, and the Diggs family was soon enlivened by
the addition of a son and two daughters.11
Much too talented and energetic a woman to be content
solely with the cares of homemaker, Mrs. Diggs worked enthusiastically for the Woman's Christian Temperance Union and for
woman suffrage; she also became actively involved in the activities of the Unitarian Church and in the Social Science Club of
Kansas and Western Missouri.12 In the early 1880s she returned
to the East on several occasions to lecture before Unitarian conferences. Then came an opportunity to resume her journalistic
career, in Boston, as a representative of several Kansas papers.
Back East, she maintained her interest in reform; in fact, her
thinking was affected significantly by the conditions she encountered there. About this experience, she later stated: "While I
studied conditions in the East I became all the more convinced
that the reforms which we sought were after all economical rather
than moral questions. There was little hope in the East because
the wage earners were afraid to say their souls were their own.
But if the farmers could become interested there was, I thought,
some promise of success. You cannot evict a farmer whose farm is
his own. He is a sovereign."13
Returning to Lawrence just as the Farmers' Alliance was
becoming a force to be reckoned with, Mrs. Diggs turned her
persuasive charms on Colonel 0. E. Learnard, who was editor of
the Lawrence /ournal, the leading Republican newspaper in the
town, and won his consent for an Alliance column written by herself. The day following her first article an editorial appeared
disclaiming any responsibility for the views that appeared in her
column; she was allowed to continue, nevertheless, and her articles were widely copied. Her work came to the attention of Dr.
Stephen McLallin and he persuaded her, without much difficulty,
to join the staff of The Advocate in Topeka as associate editor in
March, 1890. Together they created, in The Advocate, a newspaper which was indeed worthy of the reputation that it soon
acquired as the leading reform weekly in the state. At its peak in
the mid-nineties the paper would attain a circulation of around
80,000.14
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In spite of her numerous public activities before 1890, Mrs.
Diggs was apprehensive about campaigning actively; once enlisted in the cause, however, she proved herself a highly effective
campaigner. 15 In her speeches she drew upon her acquaintance
with conditions in the East and in the West, added a large dose of
factual argument, and in her reasoned, soft-spoken, and pleading
oratorical style won over her audiences completely. 16
Mary Elizabeth Lease, Annie Diggs, and many other Kansas women added considerable color to the campaign, but all the
excitement was not generated by the ladies. The party's congressional nominees managed to create considerable enthusiasm. Ben
Clover led the fight in the third congressional district, encompassing nine counties in the southeastern corner of the state. Big,
insipid, malleable, superficial but determined would be a fair
description of the state Alliance leader. Clover used that determination to hammer home the arguments he had perfected since
leaving the Republican party in 1888.17
Out in the north-central portion of the state, in the fifth
congressional district, John Davis drew effectively upon his
twenty-year association with reform to carry the message to the
people. One of Davis' favorite themes was the "new slavery." He
asked:" 'Have we abolished slavery?'" Go "Ask the factory girls,
the sewing women, the coal miners, the iron workers, the farmers
and all the men and women of toil who form the great public
which the V anderbilts would damn to perpetual servitude!" The
ante-bellum slave system, he said, "rested on three millions of
blacks, whom it pauperized, but fed and clothed." But "The
masters never became millionaires. They were brutal and overbearing, but they had not the means to purchase great lines of
railroads and telegraphs, and through them to levy tribute on
whole states." The new slavery, he insisted, was much worse, "it
rests on sixty millions of people. It makes paupers which society
must feed; and it has created thousands of millionaire slave
masters ...."18
The "new slavery" motif was prominent also in the campaign of John Grant Otis in the fourth congressional district. A
native of Vermont, where he was born on a farm in 1838, Otis was
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perhaps as intense and sober a personality as Kansas Populism
counted among its leaders. Reform was a deadly serious matter to
him, and perhaps no one took Mr. Otis quite as seriously as he did
himself. He operated a dairy farm to the southeast of Topeka, but
his interests and his abilities had always roamed far beyond the
barnyard. His educational qualifications were considerable: he
had attended Burr Seminary in Vermont, Williams College in
Massachusetts, and Harvard Law School. In 1859 Otis moved to
Topeka where he practiced law for about five years before giving
up his practice for the dairy business. In politics, he was a Republican of "abolitionist vintage," and during the Civil War he had
organized and commanded a contingent of Negro troops in an
effort to turn back the Confederate forces of General Sterling
Price. In the mid-seventies, however, he had left the Republican
party to work for reform as a Granger, Greenbacker, and Prohibitionist.19
Early in 1890 Otis had informed Ben Clover by public letter
that he earnestly believed that "When the American people shall
introduce co-operation into the field of PRODUCTION as well
as into the field of DISTRIBUTION, and shall organize for
'work' as we organize for 'war'! then will we behold PROSPERITY such as the world has never witnessed." A communitarian socialist of sorts by 1890, Otis was ready to apply that
principle to American society.20 He had also played an active part
within the Grange, and when the People's-Alliance forces of the
fourth congressional district looked about for a leader, Otis was
ready to assume a leading role.
The John Otis message in the 1890 campaign was stated
best at a Grange picnic in Olathe. Reflecting, perhaps, his familiarity with Edward Bellamy's Looking Backward, 2000-1887, he
told his audience, "This great industrial movement, over our land
to-day, is but another advancing step in the forward march of
human society. We are emerging from an age of intense individualism, supreme selfishness, and ungodly greed to a period of
co-operative effort. Competition is giving way to unite[ d] action."
It seems that we are "waking out of the mesmeric sleep of a selfish
age, to find ourselves closely related to the whole human family
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and to discover whatever effects the interest of one, in a greater or
less degree effects the interests of all." All the old issues were dead,
he declared. The people were arraying themselves on one side or
the other of a "portentous contest." On the one side were the forces
of capital, on the other was labor. Events, he believed, indicated the
struggle was about to be won by the strength of the combined
forces of labor, which would herald the establishment of a society
founded on "mutual co-operative effort." 21
Out West in the sixth congressional district, an area encompassing twenty-two counties in the northwestern corner of the
state, the Alliance had nominated its district lecturer, a fifty-nineyear-old rancher and former Republican from Lincoln County
named William Baker, who was destined to be the only Populist
elected to three consecutive terms in congress. Although Baker
had been engaged exclusively in ranching since his arrival in Kansas in 1878, his background was diverse: before coming to Kansas
and following his graduation from Waynesburg College in his
native state of Pennsylvania in 1856, he had worked in the public
school system as teacher and principal, studied law and qualified
for admission to the bar, as well as engaging in the mercantile
business for sixteen years. The William Baker style of oratory
was hardly spectacular but it was convincing. He spoke primarily
from experience, emphasizing the particular difficulties that confronted farmers, ranchers, and small businessmen; it was the kind
of approach that many people of the northwestern counties could
well understand. In William Baker the Alliance had found a formidable and level-headed spokesman.22
The southwest quarter of the state, thirty-six counties in all,
made up what was generally referred to as the "Big Seventh."
Like the sixth congressional district, it had become a hotbed of
Alliance activities after 1888; political revolt was a foregone conclusion. In late July there emanated a cry of horror and anguish
from Holton that the seventh district would nominate "a rabid
fiat greenbacker with communistic tendencies." 23 That political
monstrosity was one Jeremiah Simpson, or the "Sockless" Jerry of
political legend.
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The man destined to become one of the most popular and
renowned of all Populist leaders was born March 31, 1842, in the
province of New Brunswick, Canada. Moving with his parents
to New York at age six, he received a rather limited elementary
education before he left home at fourteen to follow a seafaring
life. For more than twenty years ( excluding a short period during
the Civil War when he had served with an Illinois regiment until
incapacitated by illness) he had sailed the Great Lakes as cook,
sailor, mate, and captain. Marriage in 1870, and family responsibilities that followed, greatly altered the pattern of Simpson's life,
however, and he soon left the sea for the land. After a brief period
on a farm in Indiana, where he was introduced to an agricultural
depression and the Grange, he moved his family to Kansas, purchasing a small farm and a sawmill near Holton in Jackson
County in the northeastern part of the state in 1878.
Years later, when asked by Victor Murdock what had
prompted his move to the West, Simpson would answer: "The
magic of a kernel, the witchcraft in a seed; the desire to put something into the ground and see it grow and reproduce its kind.
That's why I came to Kansas."24 Undoubtedly, he also had hopes
of bettering his station in life, but the going was tough. Not long
after their small daughter was killed in a tragic logging accident,
the Simpsons moved out to a ranch in the southwestern part of the
state near Medicine Lodge. With all of their savings invested in
land and cattle, Jerry Simpson soon became acquainted with all
the special problems confronting those who were endeavoring to
earn their living as farmers and ranchers. Somewhere along the
way he left the Republican party to work actively in support of
the Greenback party, and in 1886 he ran as a candidate on the
Independent ticket for the legislature. Then came the severe
winter of 1886-87, and the savings of a lifetime were swept away
with his winterkilled herd. Already a reformer by temperament
and affiliation, Jerry Simpson was all the more committed to thirdparty politics.26
Simpson's education had not prepared him satisfactorily for
writing; he was a terrible speller, and apparently he made no great
effort to overcome the handicap, but he was an omnivorous reader
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and his many years aboard ship had given him the opportunity to
do much reading.26 William Allen White later recalled: "He was
smart. He had read more widely than I, and often quoted Carlyle
in our conversations, and the poets and essayists of the 17th century. His talk ... was full of Dickensian allusions, and he persuaded me to try Thackeray, whom I had rejected until them."27
One of his favorite works was Henry George's Progress and
Poverty, and his reading of George had made him a devout
Single-Taxer.28
Above all else, though, Jerry Simpson was a reformer with
an unrivaled sense of humor. It was a rare quality that could be
ascribed to few of the era's politicians. It affected his whole presence, adding the one simple touch that elevated him above his
fellows. Hamlin Garland met him in Washington in 1891 and
wrote a vivid description which is not likely to be improved upon:
He is about fifty years of age, of slender but powerful figure, whose apparent youthfulness is heightened by
the double-breasted short sack coat he wears. His hair is
very black and abundant, but his close-clipped moustache
is touched with gray, and he wears old-fashioned glasies,
through which his eyes gleam with ever-present humor.
The wrinkles about his mouth show that he faces the
world smilingly. His voice is crisp and deep and pleasant
to the ear. He speaks with the Western accent mainly;
and when he is making a humorous point or telling a
story, he drops into dialect, and speaks in a peculiar slow
fashion that makes every word tell. He is full of odd turns
of thought, and quaint expressions that make me think of
Whitcomb Riley. He is a clear thinker, a remarkable
speaker, and has a naturally philosophical mind which carries his reasoning down to the most fundamental facts of
organic law and human rights.29

In 1888 Jerry Simpson had again campaigned for a seat in
the legislature, running on the unsuccessful Union-Labor ticket.
By this date also Simpson had been forced by economic circumstances to supplement his income as best he could. As happened
with so many other third-party leaders, the Alliance movement
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claimed him and he claimed it. But this time the stakes were
larger; the city marshal of Medicine Lodge-for that was the position he held at the time of his nomination-was a candidate for
congress.
In the campaign Jerry Simpson was subjected to extremely
bitter abuse by the opposition press. He was accused of being an
"infidel," an "anarchist," an "atheist," a "swindler," as well as
being "unpatriotic," and having "simian" characteristics.30 But
Jerry Simpson stood up well under the attack; in fact, with his
humor, he usually managed to turn the abuse to his advantage.
An example of this was seen in his speech at Harper on August
30. He began by stating: "You may be surprised to see me in the
form of a man, after the descriptions of a partisan press, but I'm
no zoological specimen-not even a monkey or an orangutan."
There followed a great roar of laughter, and Jerry Simpson had
attuned his audience for the remainder of the speech.
Just as in this Harper speech, he liked to stress that in spite
of "improvements in wealth producing machinery" the farmer
was worse off than twenty years before. What was the problem?
The "People are without a medium-less than $10 per capita in
circulation." The railroads also shared in the responsibility for
the people's plight, he said. "We have all the machinery for the
finest government on the face of the earth, but we are fast becoming entangled in the web of the giant spider which controls
our commerce and transportation. We must own the railroads or
enough of them to do the necessary carrying. 'Tis idle talk to say
we have not the authority. The government is the people and we
are the people." Land was another subject dear to his heart. The
existing land system, he said, was "robbery." "Man must have
access to the earth or he becomes a slave." And so he spoke, here
and there interjecting a pertinent and usually humorous story to
emphasize a point and to retain the interest of his audience.31
The Republicans of the seventh district had nominated
Colonel James R. Hallowell, a rather sedate gentleman who carried the appellation "Prince Hal."82 Much was made of the contrast between Hallowell and Simpson. "The opposing candidates
are opposites in every way," said the Topeka Capital. "Colonel
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Hallowell is a brilliant, experienced and competent man who
would add strength to the Kansas delegation; Jerry Simpson is an
ignorant, inexperienced lunkhead ...." Said the Capital, "Jerry
would disgrace the state in congress; scarcely able to read and
write, unacquainted with public affairs, without experience as a
legislator, raw, boorish, fanatical with the fanaticism of sheer ignorance, he would render Kansas a laughing stock ...." 33
Republican leaders hit upon the idea of bringing the two
candidates together for a debate. The obscure city marshal of
Medicine Lodge would be vanquished by the polished and dignified personage of "Prince Hal." The debate was arranged to take
place toward the end of the campaign, and Hallowell, as agreed,
was assigned the opening and closing speeches. Jerry Simpson
later recalled the event as follows:
He was a handsome fellow, a good dresser, and his followers had dubbed him "Prince Hal." He was a splendid
talker, and long before he had finished his speech I knew
he had the crowd with him and that I would have to do
something drastic to jar them loose. He poked considerable
fun at me. The idea of sending a man to Washington who
had no public experience, other than being city marshal of
Medicine Lodge, was really funny. He, Hallowell, on the
other hand had had legislative experience. He knew how
laws were made, etc.
When my turn came I tried to get hold of the
crowd. I referred to the fact that my opponent was known
as a "Prince." Princes, I said, wear silk socks. I dont [sic]
wear any. The crowd laughed at this but it was not enough
and I had to try again. Now, I said, Hal tells you that he
is a law maker. That he has been to Topeka and that he
has made laws. I am going to show you the kind of laws
that Hal makes. Reaching over on the table and picking
up a book I opened it and, tapping on the page with my
finger, I said, here is one of Hals [sic] laws. I find that it
is a law to tax dogs, but I see that Hal proposes to charge
two dollars for a bitch and only one dollar for a son of a
bitch. Now the party I belong to believes in equal and
exact justice to all.34
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As one might imagine, "the crowd roared" and Jerry Simpson had
his audience right where he wanted them. Having miscalculated
in bringing Simpson and Hallowell together in the first place, the
opposition press compounded the error by providing Simpson
with an invaluable sobriquet-from that day forth it was "Sockless" Jerry Simpson.35
As the story of Jerry Simpson demonstrated, the Republican
organization was slightly out of touch with the people. "Abuse
and vituperation" of People's party candidates-or so one Republican editor admitted-was the major strategy of the G.O.P.36 The
Topeka Capital waged a somewhat more inclusive campaign,
which amounted to one part personal abuse, one part bloody shirt,
and one part prohibition. J. K. Hudson of the Capital repeatedly
informed his readers that the only thing at stake was prohibitionwhisky was the issue.37 Speaking of the leaders of the new party,
Hudson stated: "They are unworthy of citizenship and belong in
the penitentiary."38 The October 12 edition offered this commentary: "Members of the people's party: Your man Polk appears to
be an unscrupulous trickster; your man Clover an unprincipled
demagogue; your man Willits a low-lived perjurer; your man
Rightmire an indicted swindler, and your man Ives a creature of
the rum-soaked democracy." The same issue ran an article entitled "The People's Party is the Scheme of Ex-Rebels."89
The editor of the Capital, and Republican leaders throughout the state, were indeed shocked by the effrontery of Kansas
voters who went to the polls early that November and administered a stunning blow to the Republican party. Said Hudson,
"The people's party managers trusted for victory to the ignorance
of the people, and to the shame of Kansas their confidence was not
misplaced." 40 Republican Governor Lyman Humphrey was reelected by a small plurality, as was the rest of the ticket, with the
exception of the attorney general, but the People's party elected
Clover, Otis, Baker, and Simpson to congress and 96 of 125
members to the lower house of the legislature. All this in a state
where the G.O.P. had grown accustomed to a comfortable majority approximating that of 1888 when the party had elected 120
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of 125 members of the lower house and 39 of 40 members to the
state senate for four-year terms.0
Comparing the returns for 1888 ( vote for presidential
electors) and 1890 ( vote for secretary of state), the vote had shifted
as follows :42
Party
1888
Republican ............ 182,800
Democratic ----·--··· 102,600
Union-Labor -···· -··
37,600
Prohibition ··········
6,700
People's ················
Total ................ 329,700

Loss
Gain
1890
120,969 61,831
55,873 46,727
37,600
1,316 5,384
115,933
115,933
294,091

The vote of 1890 showed a decline of about eleven percent since
1888, caused both by the exodus of people from the state and by
the normal reduction of an off-year election. By reducing the vote
of each party by that amount its natural loss may be seen; further
reduction may be attributed to defection to the People's party. On
that basis, then, the rank and file of the People's party included
roughly 41,000 former Republicans, 35,000 former Democrats,
33,000 former Union Laborites, and 4,500 former Prohibitionists.
Populists were of course jubilant; Republicans were shaken.
The latter could console themselves, however, as did J. K. Hudson
of the Topeka Capital, by noting that "While the people's party
controls the house by a very large majority, the senate is still
republican by 38 to 1, and a governor's veto also stands in the way
of radical legislation of which businessmen and capitalists might
have stood in dread. There is no danger of the passage of any
measures which would render capital unsafe ... .'>43 There was,
on the other hand, a real possibility that Senator John J. Ingalls
would be defeated for reelection by the new legislature.
The legislature that convened in January, 1891, presented
an interesting contrast in membership. Compositely, the Populist
representative was a forty-six-year-old farmer or stock raiser, who
was most often a native of Ohio, Indiana, New York, Illinois,
Virginia, or Kentucky, and had moved to Kansas in 1878. About
one in nine, however, was foreign born; one in three had been
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active in third-party politics for years; one in five was a college
graduate. Only eleven had had previous legislative experience,
while one in three had held local office only.44 The Republican
representative, on the other hand, was a forty-five-year-old native
of Pennsylvania, Ohio, Indiana, or New York, and a business or
professional man who had moved to Kansas in 1877. One out of
four had had previous legislative experience; one in five was a
college graduate, and only one of the group was foreign born.45
The holdover Republican senate offered a sharper contrast
with the Populist house. The Republican senator was, compositely, forty-five years old (forty-three at the time of his election),
a lawyer, a proprietor of some business, or a banker, who was a
native of Ohio, Pennsylvania, or New York, and had lived in
Kansas since 1868. Only four of the thirty-eight were farmers.
One out of two had had previous legislative experience. Six of the
group were college educated.46
In short, the most meaningful and distinct contrMt between
Republicans of the house and senate and Populists of the house
was not one of age or education but of occupation. To use the
terminology of Lee Benson, it was a case of the agrarian-minded
versus the commercial-minded. But it was not the agrarian mind
of the eighteenth century; these men were not unaffected by the
considerable changes that had occurred over the course of the nineteenth century, even though their place in society predisposed
them to be most concerned with what might be termed agrarianinterest politics. One should note, moreover, the rather significant
contrast revealed in the major leadership's middle-class orientation
as compared to the legislator's farmer background.
The most pressing assignment facing these legislators once
the house was organized was the selection of a United States
senator. The leading candidates for the position among the Populists were John Willits and William Peffer. Between the two,
Peffer was regarded as the conservative candidate. Nearly all the
former third-party leaders opposed the editor of the Farmer. As
one of them later wrote, "they lacked faith in his loyalty to the
principles on which the campaign had been fought, and believed
that he would really act with the Republicans after going to
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Washington." 47 The People's party caucus, nevertheless, chose
Peffer, and his election was assured as long as there was no bolt
from the caucus decision. To prevent this occurrence, as much as
anything, a meeting of all those members who had opposed Peffer
(nearly all former third-party men) was held at the Copeland
Hotel in Topeka. Its participants reconciled themselves to the
support of Peffer rather than elect a Republican by working for
his defeat.48
The ranks held. Senator Ingalls was defeated, and the new
party had a United States senator to go with five congressmen.
The defeat of Ingalls, in a sense, marked the real close of the 1890
campaign. Senator Ingalls, never at a loss for words, described
himself as "the innocent victim of a bloodless revolution-a sort of
turnip crusade, as it were." 49 What had occurred in Kansas did
indeed represent a sharp turnabout; it remained to be seen just
how revolutionary the results would be.

LOOKING TOWARD 1892

Fallowing the election triumph of 1890, Populist State Chairman S. W. Chase announced
that the party could be "justly proud" of its victory but they
should "not forget that the war is not yet at an end. We have still
a great work to accomplish. We must maintain and strengthen
our organization for the great conflict of 1892." 1 The agenda of
unfinished business included the work of the 1891 legislature, the
perfection of a national party organization, and the education of
the public in support of their principles.
Controlling only the lower house, there was little hope the
new party would be able to translate much of its program into
legislation. Legislative experience was stacked heavily in favor of
the opposition, as represented by the Republican senate; and there
was also the threat of executive veto. But Republican legislators
were not nearly as intractable as Populists believed, and considerable legislation was enacted. From the standpoint of reform, the
record demonstrates that when important legislation was passed it
usually required the initiation of Republicans in the senate.
Populist-sponsored measures found the going tough in the upper
house. Among the more important measures to survive this alignment was a law prohibiting alien ownership of land in Kansas,
which the new party had indorsed in its 1890 platform; an act
providing an eight-hour day for all workers engaged in work
associated with state, county, city, or township governments; an
act providing for the regulation of warehouses and the inspection,
grading, weighing, and handling of grain; an act prohibiting
combinations designed to prevent competition among persons engaged in buying or selling livestock, and to provide penalties for
the same; and an act regulating and controlling all state banking
institutions, which created the office of Bank Commissioner with
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power to put an end to the era of "wildcat" or unregulated banking.2 The Bank Commissioner bill was introduced by a Populist
in the house, but the Republican convention of 1890 had made that
one of its primary demands.3
Just as important, however, were the measures defeated by
the senate. The lower house drafted a bill to regulate and establish
"reasonable maximum" rates for railroad freight within the state,
which included a provision prohibiting discrimination in shorthaul, long-haul charges and providing for the popular election of
railroad commissioners who would have "full power and authority
to control, fix and regulate the charges and rates"; the senate committee on railroads, ignoring their party platform of 1890, rejected
the bill in no uncertain terms as calculated to open "an almost
limitless field of legal and business absurdities." 4 The house also
passed a bill, which, according to Populist spokesmen, "would
have driven unscrupulous Shylocks who are robbing the people by
a usurious interest of from 25 to 100 per cent. per annum out of
the state or forced them to become honest, law abiding citizens,
by loaning their money at a legal rate of 10 per cent." The measure required the "forfeiture of both principal and interest in case
of usury," and was, as stated by Populist spokesmen, "nearly a
copy of the New York laws on this subject." 5 The senate judiciary
committee rejected this bill as "a declaration of animus," which
they contended would at that moment unduly discourage capital
investment in the state.6 A bill providing for the Australian ballot
expired on the senate calendar, and a number of important measures were defeated more directly by the senate. Among the latter
were bills providing penalties for accepting bribes, outlawing child
labor, for prohibiting the corrupt use of money in elections, one
prohibiting the use of private-detective forces in disputes between
the management of railroads and their employees, and one giving
women the right to vote.7
The most divisive issue to come before the Populists of that
1891 legislature was woman suffrage. Early in the session a
Populist representative had introduced a bill to give women the
unrestricted right to vote and hold office.8 This was to be accomplished by legislative enactment: its sponsors contended that a
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constitutional amendment was not required to confer the right,
but they conceded one would eventually be needed to prevent a
future legislature from repealing the statute.9 Accordingly, the
bill was brought to a vote and defeated on February 17, when it
failed, by three votes, to receive a constitutional majority.10 Then,
by special order, the measure was brought before the house again
the following day and was passed by a vote of sixty-nine to thirtytwo; in the process, Populist ranks were badly shaken.11
The issue had drawn some of the party's leading spokesmen
into conflicting positions. The Advocate, as edited by Dr. McLallin and Annie Diggs, was strongly in favor of woman suffrage.
Just as the issue came to a head in the house the paper ran an
article which declared that there was "no measure of greater importance before the Kansas legislature than the bill giving full
suffrage to women." 12 The measure's chief opponent was none
other than the speaker of that Populist house, Peter Percival Elder.
P. P. Elder-as he identified himself-had fought woman suffrage
for more than twenty years.13 He was a formidable opponent; the
more so since few men could claim to have played a more active
role than he in Kansas politics during the state's brief history.
After removal to Kansas from his native state of Maine in 1857, he
had participated in the organization of Franklin County, the Republican party, and the first state government. He had been active
in Kansas politics as a Republican for over twenty years when he
left the G.O.P. in 1878 to fight for the Greenbackers. While a
Republican he had served in the legislature on a number of occasions, and had been, as member of that party, house speaker, as
well as lieutenant governor. In addition, he had been the UnionLabor party's nominee for governor in 1888. This big, heavy-set,
sixty-eight-year-old farmer-banker-editor-politician, with rough
features and an uncomfortable-looking beard, was indeed a worthy opponent.14
During the house debate, Speaker Elder entered a special
protest into the record setting forth his reasons for opposing the
bill. The measure, he argued, was "wholly unconstitutional," contrary to public sentiment, and, besides, women already enjoyed
rights in Kansas "far in advance of any other state in the Union."
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Then came the basic reasons that undoubtedly determined his
position:
This privilege conferred will bring to every primary,
caucus and election-to our jury rooms, the bench, and the
legislature-the ambitious and designing women only, to
engage in all the tricks, intrigues and cunning incident to
corrupt political campaigns, only to lower the moral standing of their sex; invites and creates jealousies and scandals,
and jeopardizes their high moral standing; hurls women
out from their central orb fixed by their Creator to an
external place in the order of things.

Elder also contended, "The demand for female suffrage is largely
confined to the ambitious, office-seeking class; possessing an insatiable desire for the forum, and when allowed, will unfit this
class for all the duties of domestic life and transfer them into
politicians, and dangerous ones at that." He ended his protest by
stating: "When the laws of nature shall so change the female
organization as to make it possible for them to sing 'bass,' I shall
then be quite willing for such a bill to become a law." In the
meantime, it would be "a grave mistake, an injury to both sexes
and the party,'' he warned, "to add another 'ism' to our political
creed."15
Four Republicans, four Democrats, and seven Populists in
the house joined P. P. Elder in this protest, which Annie Diggs
designated in The Advocate on February 25 as "A Relic of the
Dark Ages." Mrs. Diggs evaluated the protest as "coarse, boorish,
ungentlemanly and entirely devoid of that dignity that should
characterize the utterances of a representative of the people and
especially of the speaker of the House." She wanted to know
"who authorized Speaker Elder and his compatriots to define the
particular 'central orb, fixed by their Creator' as the limit in which
woman shall move?" She concluded her critique by notifying
Elder that if he had "any future political aspirations he may as
well abandon them. In a state where woman's influence in politics is as potent as it is in Kansas, it will be useless for any man
who has so little respect for that influence, and whose allusions to
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the fair sex are characterized by the coarseness of this protest, to
ever again become a candidate for office." 16
Although the measure passed in the house to be defeated in
the senate, the struggle had revealed a point of fundamental difference in reform ranks that could well become an obstacle to Populist aspirations. 17 Another issue, not as divisive as woman suffrage
but likewise fraught with danger for the party, was prohibition. A
resolution was introduced in the house by a Republican to resubmit the state's prohibitory amendment to the voters; the resolution
was defeated rather decisively by a vote of seventy-two to twentysix, but eighteen Populist representatives had voted for resubmission.18 Prohibition and woman suffrage were both anathema to
the state's Democrats, and these two issues could become even
more troublesome if the new party deemed it necessary to hold
and enlarge upon its support from Democratic ranks.
For the moment, however, there was little thought of such
matters. Early in 1891 most Kansas Populists were convinced that
they were part of a great irresistible movement that was destined
to move straight forward to victory, although they would concede
that this could not be done without some organizational groundwork ahead of time.
Long-time third-party leaders who had been content to
work quietly and inconspicuously within and behind Alliance
lines before the 1890 election began soon thereafter to work
diligently in behalf of a national organization of the party. The
Alliance had elected candidates for governor in South Carolina,
Georgia, and Tennessee. The man it had indorsed won in Texas.
Eight southern legislatures were successfully captured by the Alliance. In Nebraska the Independents won a majority in both
houses of the legislature. In South Dakota and in Minnesota the
Alliance held the balance of power. Nationally, "Perhaps as many
as forty-four" congressmen and "two or three" senators were to be
counted in the Alliance camp.19 These successes had of course
greatly stimulated the hope that a third party along national lines
could be formed. Nowhere was this hope more vigorously acted
upon than in Kansas.20
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W. F. Rightmire, recently defeated People's party candidate
for chief justice and secretary of the State Citizens' Alliance, was
perhaps as active as anyone in promoting the national organization. Following the election, he took it upon himself to contact
reformers in various states to urge upon them the calling of a convention in 1891 for the purpose of forming a national party, and,
according to him, "the signatures of every prominent Northern
reformer were secured to a call for this purpose!' "Southern men,"
he added, "did not join this movement." 21 The Alliance in the
southern states had of course the special problem of whether to
break with a one-party system that had been used so successfully
to maintain white supremacy; there was, in addition, some reason
to believe that the Alliance in the South could work successfully
within the Democratic party. 22
This conflict was revealed at the national meeting of the
Southern Alliance held at Ocala, Florida, early in December, 1890.
The Kansas delegation went to the meeting determined to commit the Alliance to third-party action. They there encountered the
opposition of hesitant southern delegations. Seeing that they could
not move the national organization on this point, a number of the
more radical Kansas delegates, 23 working with other northern
delegates, particularly Captain C. A. Power of Indiana, issued a
call for a national conference to meet in Cincinnati on February
23, 1891, "for the purpose of forming A NATIONAL UNION
PARTY." The call was obviously the work of men who were
convinced that the movement was bigger than the Alliance; bigger
even than farmer organizations; it summoned delegates from the
Independent party, People's party, Union-Labor party, Farmers'
Alliance, the Farmers' Mutual Benefit Association, the Citizens'
Alliance, the Knights of Labor, and the Colored Farmers' Alliance. Southern delegates, however, were unmoved by this maneuver .24 The record is conflicting and rather vague at this point,
but it does appear that third-party advocates at Ocala, who were
primarily Kansans, agreed to postpone the call for a national
convention, and in return Ben Clover and John Willits were
named as national officers of the Southern Alliance. 25
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In the meantime, some of the more radical leaders of Kansas Populism-in this case individuals of an urban orientation,
who regarded the movement as a good deal more than just a
farmers' movement, and who in fact were determined to unite
farmers and laborers in a fight against what they termed the
country's plutocratic class-met in Manspeaker's Hall in Topeka
on January 13, 1891 (by design, the same day the Kansas legislature convened), to fashion a national organization designated as
the National Citizens' Industrial Alliance.26 The group formulated
a radical statement of principles and elected a full set of national
officers.27 W. F. Rightmire, secretary of the State Citizens' Alliance
formed five months earlier, was elected national secretary. The
activities of the organization were kept secret, but it obviously
became the chief agency through which the national organization
was to be effected. Rightmire later stated that he was "instructed"
by a resolution adopted at the Topeka meeting "to issue a call for
a conference to meet in Cincinnati to organize a national third
party" whenever he considered it "advisable."28
In January, 1891, also, the Northern Alliance, which was no
longer operative in Kansas, held its annual meeting in Omaha.
Although the northern Alliancemen represented at this meeting
adhered to their radical platform demands earlier expressed, the
general sentiment favored a cautious, go-slow approach to the
third-party idea.29
This was not the case in Kansas. On February 7, 1891,
Rightmire, by means of the press, reactivated the call for the Cincinnati conference to meet on May 19, 1891.30 No arrangements
were specified as to size of delegations, and no special provisions
were made for the selection of delegates; there was only the call
for delegates from various farmer and labor organizations interested in reform. This meant that the delegations would be largely
self-appointed and highly motivated-or to put it another way,
composed of numerous individuals who had fought the third-party
reform battle for years. 31 Kansas certainly contributed her share;
as the day for the convention approached, an enthusiastic delegation of 483 persons assembled in Kansas City and boarded a
special train for Cincinnati. At the convention, 407 of these indi-
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viduals were accredited as delegates-407 out of 1,417. More than
one out of every four delegates, then, were Kansans. Ohio supplied a delegation almost as large as Kansas; Illinois and Nebraska
accounted for another large portion. The rest of the convention
was composed mainly of a scattering of delegates from other
northwestern states; the South was represented by relatively few
delegates.32
There was still at that time considerable hostility among
Southern Alliance leaders to the third-party idea; these leaders at
the convention were intent on forestalling any such action, and
they were assisted in this effort, at least tacitly, by a more conservative segment of northern delegates.33 Advocates of the thirdparty idea had anticipated this, of course, and were ready for all
contingencies.34 The leading figures among the third-party advocates got together soon after their arrival in Cincinnati and agreed
that the first course of action, once the convention opened, would
be to work together to gain control of its resolutions committee
and its committee on permanent organization. Obviously, with
these two committees under their domination they would be in a
position to influence significantly the convention's actions.35
Thus armed, the National Union Conference-its official
title-was called to order on the afternoon of May 19 in Music
Hall by W. F. Rightmire. A temporary chairman was then selected and the committee assignments were made.36 Avid thirdparty advocates, apparently according to prearrangement, gained
control of the committees on resolutions and organization; the
convention then recessed until the following morning. 37 In the
interval, with Ignatius Donnelly of Minnesota ( chairman of the
resolutions committee),38 Rightmire, a Colonel Norton of Illinois,
and Morris L. Wheat of Iowa in the lead, strategy was perfected
in an effort to overcome anticipated opposition to the creation of
a national third party. The committee on permanent organization
was persuaded to add a clause to its report advising " 'That the
delegates from each state select three members of the executive
committee of the new party.'" These leaders then set out to contact as many of the old third-party men as they could to get their
support in moving the previous question on the committee's report
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as soon as it was presented to the conference. Rightmire stated that
the task was handled so well that, "when the report was submitted
to the conference in the morning, those opposed to the organization
of a party were taken by surprise, and the previous question was
moved. More than 500 delegates arose to second the previous
question, and it and the adoption of the report of the committee
were carried by the unanimous standing votes of the delegates
assembled."39
Whether it knew it or not, the convention had taken the
decisive step in forming a national third party. The various state
delegations then caucused to select their representatives on the
national committee,40 and the resolutions committee was instructed to select a name for the new party. It in turn announced
the "National People's Party" as its choice. Even Senator Peffer,
who was selected to serve as permanent chairman, would seem to
have cast off all reservations. In his address to the convention,
Peffer stated: "Now, gentlemen and ladies, permit me to give you
a word of encouragement and a word of caution. We have started
and there is no such thing as stopping us [a voice: That's it], and
the right thing to do is keep in the middle of the road [ a voice:
That's right], and to go ahead [applause] ."41
The party's forward progress was assured, for the executive
committee was instructed to attend the proposed St. Louis conference, which had already been scheduled for February, 1892, and if
possible join with it. Should no "satisfactory arrangement" be devised, however, the committee was "to call a national convention
not later than June 1, 1892, to name a presidential ticket."42 As a
national organization, then, the People's party came into being at
this conference.43
The Cincinnati platform contained little that had not been
stated earlier in the demands made at St. Louis (December, 1889),
Ocala (December, 1890), and Omaha (January, 1891). The subtreasury plan calling for government loans at two percent per
annum on farm products and real estate, first introduced nationally at Ocala, was included. For the first time woman suffragists
could claim a small victory: although not an integral part of the
platform, the convention had favorably recommended the adop-
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tion of universal suffrage. Avid Prohibitionists were also represented in the convention; their efforts were fruitless. Former
Kansas Republican Governor John P. St. John, one-time Prohibition candidate for president, fought the prohibition fight. He left
before the affair ended, in disgust, declaring that "all meritorious
reforms were neglected" and that the convention simply had given
birth to a "third whisky party ."44
On her return from Cincinnati, Mrs. Diggs was, in her
words, "besieged by questioners" who wanted her reaction to "the
new party in view of its refusal to incorporate a prohibition plank
in its platform." Particularly, "have I been asked," she wrote,
"concerning the reported assertion of ex-governor St. John that
'there was simply another whisky party born.' " As to the inclusion of a prohibition plank, she stated: "I have merely to say that
I did not expect it, and hence was neither surprised nor disappointed by its omission. No person who is conversant with the
cause and the purpose of our political revolution could for a moment expect that any other than the industrial and economic issues
would be made vital or prominent.'' The young temperance
worker of the late 1870s had indeed broadened considerably in her
thinking by 1891. She now believed that poverty was "the large
underlying cause of intemperance ... [ and] that monopoly, the
concentration of wealth and power in the hands of a few, and the
increasing poverty, degradation and helplessness of the many are
the near evils which threaten the life of the republic ...." 411
Not all those Populists who were also prohibitionists were
as willing to subordinate the fight against John Barleycorn to the
fight against the system managed by Mr. Shylock or Mr. Capitalist; in fact, prohibition (among Populists and among Republicans) and woman suffrage ( among Democrats) in Kansas fulfilled to a lesser degree, perhaps, the same role for Populism's
opponents as did Negrophobia in the South. In 1892 Tom Watson
of Georgia wrote:
You might beseech a Southern white tenant to listen to you
upon questions of finance, taxation, and transportation;
you might demonstrate with mathematical precision that
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herein lay his way out of poverty into comfort; you might
have him "almost persuaded" to the truth, but if the merchant who furnished his farm supplies ( at tremendous
usury) or the town politician ( who never spoke to him excepting at election times) came along and cried "Negro
rule!" the entire fabric of reason and common sense which
you had patiently constructed would fall, and the poor
tenant would joyously hug the chains of an actual wretchedness rather than do any experimenting on a question of
mere sentiment.46

In Kansas the witching words were "whisky" and "female suffrage."
Kansans were quite vulnerable to emotional issues and
emotional appeals-this was equally as true whether exploited by
Populists, Democrats, or Republicans. The chief beneficiary of
this condition in the 1890 campaign, however, was the People's
party, for the electioneering success of many Populist leaders owed
considerably to their skills in exploiting the widespread public
malaise. But just how loyal were those converts who had been
driven to the support of the new party by an aroused discontent?
Here was a question the more thoughtful leaders were concerned
about. The former Greenbacker and Union Laborite elected by
Dickinson County to the Kansas legislature, Michael Senn by
name, 47 advised his party, "We must not forget that a large proportion of the people are ignorant, as well as biased by prejudice.
The man who does not personally understand ... economic questions, who has not been able to emancipate himself from party
prejudice is an uncertain factor in a political campaign." Displaying extraordinary insight, Senn emphasized that this individual
"may have voted with us the last election on the principle that a
change would be desirable, or because he was inspired by the enthusiasm of the move; but in order to insure the permanent
support of this class, we must educate until they personally see the
evils and injustice of the present monopoly system, as well as the
justice, fairness and beneficent results of our proposed remedies."48
This was a commonly shared observation among the leaders, and the party set out after 1890 to "educate" Kansas voters on
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the issues. Their task was not easy. As third-party advocates put
it, the Farmers' Alliance had "graduated" when it moved into the
political arena to fight the third-party battle. In one sense they
were correct, for the decision for political action very largely transferred the power and energy of the Alliance to the party. In the
process, the more radical Farmers' Alliance leaders moved over to
party work in cooperation with their Citizens' Alliance brethren,
and the now comparatively impotent Farmers' Alliance was left
in the hands of more conservative leaders-among whom were
some who did not particularly care about "graduating."49 As it
turned out, Frank McGrath, who had replaced Ben Clover as
president of the state Alliance in October, 1890, was unsympathetic
to the idea of taking the Alliance bodily into a third party. He
apparently thought of the revolt almost exclusively as a farmers'
movement. The best way, in his viewpoint, for the Alliance to
achieve its ends was for it to operate as an independent and nonpartisan interest block; this, in his mind, was the most feasible
method for uniting the Alliance of the South and Northwest.
Perhaps it was because of this belief that he had not indorsed the
call for a national third party issued from Ocala.60 However that
may have been, his position won him the distrust of avid thirdparty advocates. There may or may not be any connection, but at
the time the Kansas legislature was to elect a United States
senator it was charged that McGrath had made a deal to work for
the election of "his friend," Republican Congressman E. J. Turner.
Some of the more radical leaders pushed the charge, an investigation was held by the Alliance, and McGrath was, according to it,
"fully exonerated and commended to the confidence of good
Alliancemen everywhere."51
McGrath's opponents were no less convinced that he meant
to derail the reform movement. Then, in April, 1891, as plans for
the Cincinnati conference were being perfected, McGrath heightened the controversy by stating that he believed he expressed the
feeling of northwestern Alliancemen by saying that they would
"either be in union with the South, 'in the middle of the road in
1892,' or the northwestern states will return their old time majorities for the old party ...." 52 Since it appeared likely at that time
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that the South would not join the Northwest in the middle of the
road, McGrath's statement was considered by party officials as a
mere subterfuge. Populist State Chairman Levi Dumbauld53 responded immediately by saying that he was "authoritatively informed" that McGrath's statement was without "instruction or
authority of the Kansas Alliance, and without the approval of his
fellow officers." Nor does he have "any authority to speak for the
People's party of Kansas or for Alliance voters on the subject. I
therefore feel called upon to state that the People's party of Kansas
is in the field to stay, and has no intention under any circumstances of abandoning the third party movement and returning to
old party lines." 54
The position of Dumbauld and not McGrath definitely
represented the dominant attitude of the Alliance. McGrath subsequently announced that he would not be a candidate for reelection, and at the October meeting of the state Alliance third-party
advocates elected their man in his place.55
The efficacy of the McGrath versus the third-party approach
to Alliance goals may well be debated; it could be the former
offered the better hope of success for the farmer. The revolt that
had come over Kansas, however, was not just a farmers' revolt-at
least not in its leadership and in its appeal for support from the
combined forces of labor and urbanites generally. Unquestionably,
it was the party's nonfarmer leadership that pointed the way to
political action. Had the movement been exclusively a farmers'
revolt, it seems likely that it would have made a much smaller
ripple on the political waters. As James C. Malin has written, "the
outcome of the election of 1890 was a popular not a Populist uprising-so far as organized political parties were concerned, it was
a non-partisan discontent demanding reform, the exact nature of
which was not clearly understood nor sharply defined." 56
After 1890, however, Populist leaders did not cease in their
efforts to understand and define the meaning of the reform effort
( despite the confining approach of historical analysis which would
have one believe the issues were formulated definitively by 1890),
and when they spoke of educating the public they included themselves as well. Their overriding concern was with the promotion
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of a multiplicity of reforms bearing upon the issues of land, transportation, and finance. As might be expected, there were differences in emphasis among Populist leaders on the priority of issues,
and in Kansas financial reforms probably loomed larger, but railroad regulation ran a close second.
In spite of the differences in emphasis, there was no exclusiveness in reforms advocated, and the emphasis upon finance
by no means meant that the Populist party came into existence as
a silver party. The concern in Kansas was for monetary reform
that would provide a more flexible system than that afforded in the
national banking system, which Populists, of course, proposed to
abolish. Free silver was demanded, but the discussion of it usually
carried a note of indifference, or at times even hostility. In 1890
Ben Clover and William Peffer, both of whom believed finance to
be the most important issue, had ridiculed the idea of free silver
as a relief measure. 57 The Advocate persistently added its voice in
opposition to any suggestion that free silver would have any appreciable effect for the better.58 Indeed, most Populist spokesmen
could agree with William Rightmire's contention in 1891 that
"Free coinage of silver will not bring sufficient relief, for if every
ounce of our annual United States output was coined it would
increase currency not over $1 per capita annually, and at that rate
most of us would be dead and gone before that happy standard of
1865-66 is again reached." 59 Free silver, moreover, was Republican
policy in Kansas, and the party's leaders, including Senator Preston B. Plumb and Senator John J. Ingalls, declared themselves on
the issue at every opportunity.60
Kansas Populists were determined to have a more fundamental change than that represented in free silver, and in that
1891 "educational campaign" they made a massive effort on all
fronts to win the voters to their program. The literature of that
effort was overwhelming. Annie Diggs, as Washington correspondent for the Topeka Advocate, Jerry Simpson, Ben Clover,
John Davis, James D. Holden, Sam Wood, Dr. Stephen McLallin,
John Grant Otis, James Lathrop, Mary Elizabeth Lease, and scores
of others, in speeches, articles, and pamphlets, interpreted the
movement to the people. 61 Perhaps in all that mass of material a
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letter by Congressman Otis, published in The Advocate, stated as
succinctly as possible what Populism stood for in the minds of its
supporters at that triumphant stage. Populism, wrote Otis,
is a spontaneous production, born of the necessities of the
people and the demands of the period. . . . It is a party
that will know no north, no south, no east, no west, but
one common country ... ; a party that will aim to secure
liberty, equality and justice to all and will recognize the
universal brotherhood of men. It will acknowledge unbounded faith in the ability of the common people of this
republic for self government, and recognize as the supreme
law of the land, the will of majorities legally and honestly
expressed at the ballot box. It is a party that takes for its
guide the golden rule and not the rule of gold. It is a party
whose chief cornerstone is labor and the inalienable rights
of humanity; and whose chief object is to rightfully protect
this prime factor in production, and so organize human
society as to secure general prosperity and happiness to all
classes. We recognize money as a creation of law, a simple
representative of value, an instrument of exchange and not
in any true sense a commodity; that railroads are in the
nature of public highways, which should be controlled and
operated at a minimum rate. A party that holds the earth
to be the common heritage of the people and every person
born into the world is entitled equally with all others, to a
place to live and an opportunity to earn a living. It is a
party that earnestly desires the greatest good to the greatest
number. In short, a government of the people, by the people, and for the people.62
There was nothing especially original about Otis' statement, and
the same may be said of the party's position in general. Its spokesmen drew upon the past to apply the unfulfilled ideals of a democratic tradition to contemporary circumstances. Perhaps what
distinguished the movement in its early stage, more than anything
else, was the extent of its identity with labor, represented in the
following words of Abraham Lincoln, quoted by Otis: " 'Labor is
prior to and independent of capital. Labor is the parent of capital.
Capital could not have existed if labor had not first existed. Labor
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is superior to capital and entitled to much the higher consideration.' " 63 The intensity of Populist attachment to this labor theory
of value would serve as a barometer of Populist radicalism.
Republican leaders were not insensible to the threat implicit
in any real cooperation between farmers and laborers; they were
also not insensible to the vulnerability of that partnership. Those
who were not engaged wholly in vituperation followed the lead
of Senator Preston B. Plumb early in 1891 in working on that
weak link in the reform chain. Senator Plumb argued that the
economic interests of farmers and laborers were incompatible.
"There will be sympathy to a degree," he concluded, "but no cooperation except between the destructive elements.''64 Populist
spokesmen denied this, of course, but their denials lacked conviction.65
Shortly thereafter, on May 14, 1891, a speech by a district
judge from Marion, Kansas, caught the attention of the entire
state. Friend and foe alike dwelt upon his contention that "the
rights of the user are paramount to the rights of the owner of
capital." Quoted out of context, as they invariably were, these
words immediately made their author, Frank Doster, a central
figure in the reform movement, and Populism, in the state and in
the nation, gained the support of a man who was one of its most
brilliant intellectual leaders.
In 1891 Frank Doster was forty-four years old and recognized as one of the outstanding lawyers in the state. A native
Virginian who had moved with his parents to Indiana and then
Illinois, during which time he had attended Indiana University
and Illinois College, fought for the Union in the Civil War, and
graduated from Benton Law Institute in Illinois. It was early in
1871, not long after his admission to the bar in Illinois, that Doster
had moved with his young wife to set up practice in Marion Center, Kansas. The ambitious young Republican lawyer had soon
become active in politics and won a seat for himself in the 1872
state legislature. Defeated in 1874, he had remained with the
G.O.P. at least until 1876. By 1878, however, he had become a
Greenbacker, and he ran that year as the Greenback candidate for
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state attorney general and for congress in the third district. Apparently Doster retreated, politically, to a more orthodox position in
the 1880s, for Republican Governor John A. Martin had appointed
him in March, 1887, to serve out the remaining months of the
vacant district judgeship in the twenty-fifth district. He subsequently had become a candidate for a full four-year term, and was
elected in November, 1887, on a nonpartisan ticket.
As the Farmers' and Citizens' Alliance movement grew
and was converted into the People's party and revolt swept over
the state, Judge Doster no longer felt bound by the nonpartisan
tradition of the district, for he had become actively involved in the
work of the Citizens' Alliance and the People's party by 1891.
Intellectual, iconoclastic, widely read, extraordinarily informed on
a wide range of economic, social, and political questions, it was
little wonder Judge Doster had devoted considerable thought to
the meaning of the great revolt; his speech in Marion on May 14
was the product of that reflection. 66
The judge began his speech with a commentary on why the
revolt had occurred. He stated : "If these expressions of discontent
were confined to the members of a particular trade or occupation
in life, or to the people of a particular country we might conclude
that they arose from no general cause, but were excited by the
hardness of some untoward or unusual fate, bearing for the time
being upon the fortunes of the impatient and over complaining."
And so he continued, concluding the line of thought by stating:
But when paralysis has seized upon every limb and member of the industrial and commercial world, and all classes
except those engaged in the purely speculative lottery
[and] gambling pursuits of life, and many even of such
class, voice the cry of complaint at existing conditions, and
stories of strikes, and lock-outs, and failures, and foreclosures, and money panics are poured out upon us daily,
like a never-to-be-emptied Pandora's box of evils, and distrust and unrest and despair seize the mind of every individual awake to the situation, we must conclude that some
unusual causes arc operating to produce this abnormal and
unhappy condition.
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Turning then to the critics of the reform agitation, the
judge stated:
It is the habit of a class of dull observers and superficial thinkers to speak in terms half derisive and half
slanderous of those who express dissatisfaction with existing conditions as calamity shriekers, apostles of woe, political lunatics; to class them with the vagrant and vicious,
possessing no instinct beyond that of rebellion against the
inexorable laws of nature and the settled and orderly
methods of social life, but the fact is that the popular unrest and complaint is voiced and controlled by the most
intellectual elements of society.
He emphasized this line of thought by saying that, although it
was not generally known,
every college in the land is a hot-bed for the sprouting of
treason against our economic theories and our social organization. Socialism is boldly taught by professors in every
school of note in both Europe and America. I think I have
sufficient acquaintance with the literature of the subjects to
warrant me in saying that there are now but four writers
of recognized merit in this country who adhere to old time
theories of economic science ....67
After some commentary on the growing influence of the
new economic and social gospel, Doster then told Farmers' Alliance enthusiasts that if they thought they had "led off in a great
and beneficent movement of reform" they were "mistaken." They
were "simply followers," and were the "very last to fall into line
among the forces of industrial revolution." Their leaders were
merely "drill sergeants and minor officers in the army of labor."
Their real mentors were the great thinkers of the age. Men like
"Ruskin and Mill and Maurice in England, Rousseau and Louis
Blanc in France, and Karl Marx and a score of others in Germany,
and Emerson and Mulford and many others in this country ...."
Doster then hurriedly reviewed a number of the suggested
theories as to the causes of the era's dislocation, and concluded that
none got "at the root of the evil," or to put it another way, they
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were "but palliatives and stimulants, temporary and spasmodic in
their effect." Then he came to his own explanation: "the cause of
all industrial derangement is a misconception of the just relations
between labor and capital." "Radical and unpopular as it may be,"
he said, "I deny the existence of that mutuality between labor and
capital which we hear so constantly asserted ...."
Doster then approached his proposition from several different angles, attempting to clarify his point in the simplest terms.
Later in the speech he said: "I do not deny that ownership has
rights. I do not deny that capitalists have rights. My contention
is that labor and capital, or more accurately speaking, ownership
and use, or still more accurately speaking, creator and created are
not mutual and equal. Ownership is a trustee for use, and the
owner is a trustee for the user, and entitled to consideration as a
trustee, and as nothing else." Doster recognized that there were
cases where "mutuality does exist between labor and capital, or
between laborers and capitalists, because the qualities of ownership and use are combined in one person ... ." His major proposition was that when "the man who possesses a thing not for the
purposes of his own use, but for purposes of somebody else's use,
and whose interest in it is limited to the compensation which he
can extort from others for the privilege of using it occupies an
entirely different position, and must be viewed from an entirely
different standpoint."
The judge also demonstrated how the demands of the
Farmers' and Citizens' Alliances rested on the validity of the
proposition he had just stated. And to make his speech more
meaningful to his less-sophisticated audience, he then drew an interesting and knowledgeable picture of the changes that had come
over agriculture during the century, demonstrating how changed
industrial methods had altered the pattern of agrarian life. He
made a point of emphasizing, however, that he was
not now characterizing these as "the good old times," and
lamenting their decadence. So do not misunderstand me. I
speak of them only to bring into clearer view the conditions of dependence under which we now live as compared
with the conditions of independence obtaining then, and to
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enforce the idea of the superiority of right, because of these
changed conditions, in the user of capital as against the
mere owner of the same. Within this century changes of
industrial method have occurred compared with which all
past improvements are as nothing. We have begun a new
life. We are living in a new world, as it were, so radical and
complete has been the revolution in our ways of working. 68

The reaction to Doster's speech among Populism's opponents was hysterically bitter; immediately the judge became the
worst devil of them all. Republicans and Democrats subsequently
summoned a "nonpartisan" antisocialist convention and nominated a Resubmission Democrat named Lucien Earle to oppose
Doster in the November election. This combination proved too
much for the judge and he was defeated.69
The polarization of politics, which occurred in Doster's
district in exaggerated form, occurred in various parts of the state
in 1891. Populists could flatter themselves that their opponents
really considered them a formidable threat, for more than anything else this was what that particular trend demonstrated. Republican leaders, on the whole, adopted a strategy of abuse and
ridicule, and, if anything, were driven to a more conservative
position than was normally the case in Kansas. A few voices were
heard in behalf of a radical program; for instance, ex-Senator
Ingalls was expounding views by April, 1891, that could hardly be
distinguished from those of the Populists, but he was attacked
quite generally by the Republican press for his efforts.70 Republican chieftain Sol Miller, in a moment of pessimism, could write:
"If we do not want Alliances and anarchists, and all that sort of
thing, wouldn't it be advisable to give something a chance besides
capital?" Generally, though, the major opposition strategy was
that old standby vituperation.71
The Lawrence/ournal could write, "There is not one man
in the [Populist] movement who has the necessary ability to lead
any political movement, local or national," and there were echoes
in the East that resounded with emphasis. 72 The New York Sun
noted that Kansas Populists had elected to congress "four obscure
men of no known fitness for political life, and one man whose
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qualification consists in a very red and volcanic mouth, and in the
legend that he refused to wear stockings until the duty on wool is
knocked off." Also, read the Sun, the party had chosen "a tanglewitted fanatic with a beard that reaches to his waistband" to succeed a senator and "a statesman of national distinction." They had
elected, as well, a state house of representatives "whose chief
pleasure and business is to threaten invested capital" and the bigger part of its economic views were "crazier than Bedlam." Said
the Sun, "It is as intolerant as it is silly, and it seeks by many
means, mostly not intelligent, the prosperity of a class at the expense of the nation." Mainly, "it is composed ... of honest but
wrong-headed men, who are doubtless at home at the plow tail,
but who are as helpless and clumsy as a stranded whale when they
take to political economy and financial reform and the regulation
of transportation." 73
Ex-Governor George T. Anthony delivered a major Republican address in Kansas City on October 16 which sustained
the attack. Alluding to Populist ieaders as "robbers," "highwaymen," "dastardly villains," and "infamous wretches," he made the
following confession: "I will say to republican and democratic
friends, the fault is ours, for we allowed these fellows to collect
and read the Bellamy books and such trash, and pour it into listening ears behind closed doors." 74
In its conspiratorial attitude, its bitter, emotional, and merciless attack against the opposition, the Republican effort in this
odd-year election resembled the Populist effort of the previous
year-and there were other similarities.75 The radical appeal of
Populists, plus a heightened disposition to go it alone without
Democratic support, assisted in driving Democrats and Republicans closer together. Populists made a special effort during the
summer and fall of 1891 to win support for the subtreasury plan,
which especially helped promote Democratic-Republican cooperation because Democratic hostility to this land-crop loan proposal
matched or exceeded that of Republicans. For these and other
reasons, then, the Republican party paid the People's party the
compliment of utilizing its strategy of the previous year by coop-
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erating with the Democratic party in hopes of defeating Populist
candidates in a number of the local elections.76
Republican strategy was eminently successful, and the election of 1891 was a jolt to Populist aspirations. The Advocate
quoted the Topeka Capital without argument that Republicans
had carried 277 local offices as compared with 127 by Populists. In
the previous election Republicans had elected 71 and Populists
324. 77 The effect of Republican-Democratic cooperation was attested to by the fact that in its defeat the People's party vote actually increased some eleven percent over 1890.78
The campaign and election of 1891 had a rather sobering
impact on many Populists. What was to be learned by the defeat?
J. B. Coons, Populist state representative from Miami County,
concluded that the results indicated that there were two possibilities open to the party: they could proceed with "straightout missionary work as in the past" to win the voters to their program, or
they could form a "coalition with one of the other parties." By
coalition, he wanted it understood that he did not mean "a coalition of platforms or principles but the formation of a fighting
league for campaign purposes." As to the first possibility, Coons
did not believe anyone was "sanguine enough" for it at the moment. The best way of achieving victory, he said, was by working
with one of the other parties. "The Republican party," he hastened
to add, "has no desire or need of assistance from us in any shape.
Besides, modern Republicanism is just what we are fighting." The
answer, then, was coalition with the Democratic party.79
Whether to forge ahead in the middle of the road or to
form a coalition with Democrats? that was the question confronting the party as it headed into the important election year of 1892;
it was a potentially disastrous question.

"RATS, RATS, AND PICKLED CATS
ARE GOOD ENOUGH
FOR POPS AND DEMOCRATS"

l,nsas

PopuI;st, retained thefr
enthusiasm in spite of the rather dismal showing at the polls in
1891. Plans for the February, 1892, St. Louis conference proceeded
without interruption, and third-party sentiment dominated the
delegations that assembled on Washington's birthday in Exposition Music Hall in St. Louis. Since the movement to create a
national third party now appeared inexorable, the conference's
primary attention focused on the platform. The most remarkable
thing about the document it produced was its radical preamble,
which bore the stamp of Ignatius Donnelly's passionate and lucid
prose style. The platform itself simply restated earlier demands:
only its return to the position of government ownership of railway,
telegraph, and telephone systems instead of regulation, moderated
after the 1889 St. Louis conference, set it apart significantly. 1
But to the delegates assembled there in Exposition Hall it
was not all that matter-of-fact. The press reported that when
Donnelly and Hugh Kavanaugh had finished reading the preamble and platform everyone, "as if by magic, ... was upon his
feet in an instant and thundering cheers from 10,000 throats
greeted these demands as the road to liberty." "For fully ten minutes," wrote this reporter, "the cheering continued, reminding one
of the lashing of the ocean against a rocky beach during a
hurricane .... "2
The most important work of the conference came after it
was formally adjourned but with the majority of the delegates still
participating. The rump action produced a committee to confer
with the People's party central committee to work out plans for a
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national nominating convention. July 4, 1892, and Omaha were
the time and place of decision.8
Before Omaha, however, Kansas Populists first had to deal
with the important task of nominating their candidates for leadership in the state. In February, 1892, Dr. McLallin announced a
significant new approach in Populist politics: whereas in 1890 he
had discouraged discussion of candidates for state offices on the
principle that the office should seek the man, he now was convinced he had pursued "a mistaken policy." "It will never do," he
wrote, "for delegates from all parts of the state to assemble in state
convention, having no knowledge of the men whose names will
be presented for the several offices, and permit the slate makers to
spring such names as they have selected and secure their nomination ...." He invited an open and thorough discussion of
candidates for all positions. 4 The following month W. F. Rightmire assisted this effort by taking himself out of the running by
suggesting that the entire ticket of 1890 should step aside. "Each
of us has had a demonstration," he said; " ... we are not wanted
by the people of this state for their state officers, and ... it is our
duty for the good of the party to get out of the race ... and let
our party select new men ...." 5
McLallin's concern about the manipulation of the slatemakers was prompted no doubt by the talk of fusion with Democrats then being heard in some Populist circles. The editor of The
Advocate was a staunch foe of fusion. In McLallin's mind fusion
meant "a sacrifice of principle and an ultimate sacrifice of
strength"; he even went so far as to declare, "Better defeat than
victory at such a sacrifice."6 He was not willing to concede, however, that Populism would not continue to augment its strength
without the assistance of Democrats. A number of other prominent Populist leaders were outspoken critics of fusion. In April,
1892, Mrs. Lease added her voice to the antifusion element by
declaring: "there can be no fusion. We take warning by the past.
The history of every fusion party has been destruction. Let us
utterly and absolutely refuse to 'compromise with evil,' and go
forth with the ... hope of complete victory ."7
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But the idea of some kind of cooperation with Democrats
in the upcoming election could not be stilled that easily. Democrats were anxious to work out some kind of arrangement. The
year 1892 was, after all, a presidential election year and the desire
to remove Kansas' electoral votes from the Republican column
was irresistible. A number of Populist leaders were also aware
that their party, on the basis of all indications to that point, constituted a minority of the voters; victory, they believed, required
the cooperation of Kansas Democrats.
As the state and district conventions drew nearer, apparently fusion exponents among the Democratic and Populist
leadership did get together to devise a plan which they hoped to
have the nominating conventions accept. At least this was the
contention of David Overmeyer, who was a prominent Kansas
Democratic leader and allegedly one of the men who participated
in a conference at the Midland Hotel on June 6, 1892, in Cottonwood Falls to concert Populist-Democratic strategy.8 According
to Overmeyer, he and some other unnamed Populist and Democratic leaders of the fourth congressional district agreed that the
Democrats would, in addition to their unstated hope of removing
Kansas electoral votes from the Republican column, be allowed to
name congressional nominees in the first, second, and fourth districts, plus two places on the state ticket. Assuming Overmeyer's
revelations were true, Populists had conceded little in the plan.
The first and second congressional districts were held by Republican incumbents, and the fourth, that of John Otis, which included
the Republican strongholds of Emporia and Topeka, was considered a questionable prospect-especially since Otis had made
himself repugnant to Democrats by his radical views and his uncompromising antifusion position.9
It was one thing to make the arrangements, quite another
to convince a Populist convention to go along with the plan. The
agreement apparently worked well in the fourth congressional
district where it had been concocted. Democrats and Populists held
their conventions in Emporia on June 14, and by arrangement
both conventions nominated a Democrat named W. V. Wharton.
In the first and second districts, however, the plan miscarried.
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Populist leader William A. Harris,10 an ex-Confederate and an
ex-Democrat who had many friends among Populists because of
his Alliance activities, was known to be acceptable to the Democrats of the first district, but the Populist convention chose Fred J.
Close, 11 a Union veteran and a third-party man, rather than appear to be dictated to by Democrats. First district Democrats then
placed their man Ed Carroll, state senator and banker from Leavenworth, in the running. In the second district, Democrats held
their convention first and nominated a banker from Lawrence by
the name of H. L. Moore; fusionists in both parties then urged
second district Populists to indorse Moore. At the convention,
antifusionists, led by John Willits, blocked the indorsement of
Moore by a slight margin and nominated the Populist leader
S. S. King. 12
By 1892 Ben Clover had adequately demonstrated his incompetence for the role of congressman; he was also embroiled
in marriage difficulties by that date.13 The third district convention therefore passed him by to name a lawyer and former
Democratic leader from Fredonia by the name of Thomas Jefferson Hudson; 14 Democrats of the third district subsequently indorsed the candidacy of Hudson. Out in the seventh district,
Populists and Democrats had no trouble getting together on the
renomination of Jerry Simpson. William Baker in the sixth district, like Simpson in the seventh, had been unopposed by a
Democrat in 1890, but unlike Simpson in 1892 Baker was renominated to oppose a Republican, a Democrat (stalwart variety), and
a Prohibitionist. John Davis in the fifth district, who had won in
1890 against a Republican and a Democrat, was renominated to
take on the same trio of opponents as Baker in the sixth.15 The
fifth and sixth were strong Populist districts, however, and there
was little anxiety among Populists about their chances there. The
real concern as Populists prepared for the state convention centered on the strong Republican districts of the first and second
where Populists and Democrats had failed to get together.
The issue of Democratic-Populist cooperation carried over
into the People's party state convention. Wichita, inhabitated by
about as many Democrats as could be found in any one spot in
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Kansas, was selected as the site of the affair, which in itself may
well have been the reflection of a willingness to have Democratic
support. On the morning of June 15, State Chairman S. W. Chase
called the convention to order and introduced Mayor Carey of
Wichita, who briefly extended a welcome on behalf of the city.
Carey was then followed by another Wichita resident, L. D.
Lewelling, who was a produce merchant and chairman of Sedgwick County's Populist organization. 16 Because of his reputation
as an eloquent speaker the local county chairman was given an
opportunity to make a formal and extended speech of welcome,
which would serve as a keynote address; it was an opportunity of
which Lewelling was well qualified to take advantage.
Lewelling was an impressive man physically, six feet in
height and weighing just over two hundred pounds, with thinning dark hair and rather heavy dark mustache, but the convention quickly became aware of an even more impressive aspect of
Lewelling's presence-his ability to give the spoken word a rather
dynamic delivery. In a series of short and explosive paragraphs,
which was his style, he captivated those Populist delegates completely, every one of whom had been inundated by a torrent of
oratory over the course of the preceding two years. "We are met
today," he said, "to direct the movement of a greater and grander
army than ever before went forward to victory." Be it known,
"Our battle is not for supremacy, but for equality. We demand no
paternalism at the hands of the government, but we do demand
protection from corporate vultures and legalized beasts of prey.
We ask in God's name that the government shall be so administered that the humblest citizen shall have an equal chance." How
can government expect to "command the respect of the people
when so large a portion are abandoned to become victims of superior cunning and insatiate greed?" The People's party, he went
on to say, would right the situation, but our "contest with plutocracy will demand the most persistent effort." "It will demand
the most unswerving fidelity. It will demand the most dauntless
courage. It will demand the most sublime devotion of the citizens
of our commonwealth."
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Populist principles, it had been said, were "but the ground
work of anarchy, a sort of basement story of the edifice of destruction. But we don't believe it." No, "the farmers and laborers of
this country are not anarchists. They are earnestly seeking to avert
the experiences of the old world and to subdue the spirit of anarchy with the milk of human kindness." But "God only knows
what another generation of misrule may bring!"
T award the end of the speech he offered some significant
advice to the convention: "While we are brave let us also be wise.
Let us welcome honorable allies and we shall go forth to victory ."17 At the finish, he was given a wildly enthusiastic burst of
applause, and the local county chairman left the stage a prime
prospect for the gubernatorial nomination.
Up to the time of the convention, Lewelling had not been
mentioned seriously for any state office. The discussion of possible
nominees for governor in the Topeka Advocate included fourteen
names. William D. Vincent, S. M. Scott, John Willits, P. P. Elder,
Frank Doster, and John W. Breidenthal were among the betterknown men suggested. 18 Dr. McLallin personally favored the
nomination of William Vincent. 19 Six men were actually placed
in candidacy-the candidates for governor and lieutenant governor in 1890, Willits and A. C. Shinn, Vincent, Elder, John S.
Doolittle of Chase County, and Lewelling. John Willits withdrew
his name before the first ballot, and that vote subsequently narrowed the contest down to Vincent and Lewelling. Lewelling
then won on the second ballot by a vote of 339 to 217. 20
According to tradition, Lewelling won solely because of his
speech. Undoubtedly, his rousing address was important in bringing his name to the attention of the delegates, but this interpretation minimizes the desire to obtain the indorsement of the Democratic party. In a close contest, fusion sentiment, although in the
minority, could have been a decisive factor. William Vincent was
not opposed to having the support of Democrats, but he was a
well-known third-party leader; Lewelling, on the other hand, had
resided in the state only six years (liability or asset?) and was as
new to Kansas politics as Populism, had emphasized in his welcoming address the necessity of working with "honorable allies,"
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and was the resident of a city with a sizable Democratic vote.
Availability, as well as oratorical abilities, must be considered in
accounting for Lewelling's nomination.
The influence of fusion leaders in the convention was not
great enough to follow through on the arrangements of the Midland Hotel conference. John Martin (not to be confused with the
former Republican governor by the same name) and David Overmeyer, the two leading Democrats in the state, were slated for the
two places on the ticket. Reportedly, Overmeyer would not accept
the nomination as a Populist, insisting on the Democratic label;
his name was not presented to the convention. Had Overmeyer
been nominated, it appears unlikely he would have received the
indorsement of the convention. John Martin was far more acceptable to Populists than Overmeyer. Martin was there. He was
nominated for associate justice, and he lost, receiving only 199 of
556 votes, which was an indication of the strength of the fusion
block.21
The convention chose General Percy Daniels for second
place on the ticket. Stephen H . Allen of Linn County won out in
the contest for associate justice. Russell S. Osborn, state Alliance
lecturer from Rooks County, and W . H. Biddle, president of the
state Alliance from Butler County, the party's nominees, respectively, for secretary of state and treasurer in 1890, were renominated. John T. Little, a forty-seven-year-old lawyer from Olathe
and a former Greenbacker, was the choice for attorney general.22
Forty-two-year-old Van B. Prather, one of the founders of the
National Citizens' Alliance and Industrial Union, an ex-Democrat
and a college-educated, former teacher turned rancher from
Cherokee County, was selected as the candidate for auditor. For
superintendent of public instruction, the party selected a thirtytwo-year-old educator and Populist orator from Linn County by
the name of Henry Newton ("Newt") Gaines. 23
Kansas was allowed another congressman as a result of the
1890 census to be elected at large, and the selection of the man for
that position became one of the highlights of the 1892 Populist
convention. William A. H arris, the party's popular ex-Confederate
and ex-Democrat from Linwood in Leavenworth County who
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had lost to Fred J. Close in the first district convention, was the
man to beat for the nomination. Harris had been proposed for the
office through the columns of the Topeka Advocate, and, if anything, the Harris bandwagon had gained speed all the way to the
convention.24 When it came time for nominations, Fred J. Close
himself rose to place Harris' name before the delegates. The
memories of the Civil War were still much alive for many of
those assembled in the convention, and this gesture by Close, the
one-armed Union veteran of Chattanooga, Missionary Ridge, and
Lookout Mountain, was, however melodramatic it may seem in
the telling from this point in time, deeply moving to the convention. A McPherson delegate recalled that Close rose "and pointed
to his empty-sleeve, then to the American flag, and said he had
sacrificed an arm for the preservation of those stars and stripes,
God knew that he no longer harbored in his heart any ill feeling
for the boys who wore the gray ...." There was no question in
his mind that "Mr. Harris would shoulder his musket now as
quickly as any Federal soldier to defend the stars and stripes and
to keep this one united country."
As soon as Fred Close sat down, a Captain Evans, another
Union veteran, was on his feet to second the nomination. Evans
then appealed to the delegates to demonstrate their willingness "to
shake hands across the bloody chasm." For far too long, he said,
"have evil designing men stood between the blue and the gray.
We have been taught to look through distorted mediums, held up
by those men for the sole purpose of dividing public opinion, that
they might, like Judas, satisfy their thirst for gold."
Mixed metaphor notwithstanding, in response to a request
by Evans that all ex-Union soldiers stand to second Colonel Harris' nomination, several hundred "gray haired veterans" were said
to have been counted. Needless to say, William Harris was the
party's candidate for congressman-at-large, and more than a few
delegates were rather naively convinced, as was the McPherson
man, "that on the night of June 16, the great rebellion closed ....
The war started in Kansas in '56 and ended in the People's party
convention at Wichita in '92. The bloody shirt was buried there,
never to be resurrected again by men who are lovers of liberty." 25
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In its platform, the state convention reaffirmed the 1892 St.
Louis "preamble and platform" and made a point of stressing that
they indorsed "every sentence and line of the same ...." The
platform singled out a number of issues, however, which were of
special interest to the convention. Included were resolutions in
support of government-owned telephone and telegraph lines, a
free mail delivery system, and the direct election of United States
senators. A number of other resolutions applauded the work of
the Populist house and condemned the Republican senate. It concluded with the statement that even though the Populist party was
composed mainly of farmers "we sympathize with all classes of
laborers and will aid them in their contest for a better system and
a more equitable division of the profits of their toil, and we invite
their cooperation in our warfare against a common enemy."26
The convention took one other action, quite unheralded at
the time but of great consequence for the party; it elected John W.
Breidenthal state chairman. Breidenthal was a thirty-five-year-old
organizational genius of sorts. Although young of age and youthful in appearance, his leadership credentials were impressive. The
new chairman was a native of Minnesota who had removed to
Kansas in 1877 from Indiana, then in his twentieth year. After
residing on a farm in Labette County for several years, he moved
to Chetopa (Labette County) to work as a clerk in a real estate
office. By 1882 he was a partner in the business; by 1884 the business had grown with Breidenthal's assistance into a much more
ambitious venture organized as the Neosho Valley Investment
Company. With Breidenthal as secretary, this company then grew
to comprise "nearly four hundred companies" in Kansas, but only
seven of these were said to have survived the financial difficulties
of the late 1880s, one of the seven being the original company.
Breidenthal was bold, daring, occasionally reckless in his ventures;
in 1890, for example, he became involved as secretary and chief
promotor of an unsuccessful cooperative colonization project at
Topolobampo, Mexico.27
Politically, Breidenthal was just as unconventional. He had
been a third-party man from the time he was old enough to shave,
if not earlier. In 1876, at age nineteen, he had attended the Green-
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back convention that had nominated Peter Cooper for president
and had campaigned actively in behalf of the ticket in Indiana.
His politics had not changed in Kansas, nor had his interest in
economic questions. In 1884-he was then twenty-seven-Breidenthal had been the Greenback-Labor party's candidate for lieutenant governor. With the demise of the Greenback party,
Breidenthal had then become one of the principal organizers of
the Union-Labor party and had served as its state chairman until
it gave way to the People's party. 28
The new chairman assumed his duties at a crucial point,
for Republicans were more determined than ever to vanquish the
Populist enemy. The Republican convention that met toward the
end of June, however, was badly divided on the best approach to
Populist defeat. On the one hand were the conservative regulars
led by Cy Leland and Sol Miller who favored E. N. Morrill, a
banker, and on the other the radical or reform faction led by
George L. Douglass and other young Republicans who supported
A. W. "Farmer" Smith.29 The we're-as-radical-as-you approach to
defeating Populists controlled the convention. Smith was nominated, and the convention adopted a platform that was every bit
as radical as that adopted at Wichita. The Republican problem
was that of convincing the voters that their rather sudden conversion to reform was any more than political subterfuge.30
The radical stand of Republicans, especially their indorsement of a plank favoring the submission of a woman-suffrage
amendment, made the way of fusion easy. Democrats met in
convention, and John Martin, despite the aborted Midland Hotel
deal, made a speech asking that the party indorse the Wichita
nominees man for man; the convention did just that, and one
large obstacle in the road to Populist victory was cleared away.31
Only the existence of Democratic and Populist candidates
in both the first and second congressional districts prevented there
being only one major opponent for the Republican nominee in
each contest.32 The adroit management of John Breidenthal was
soon at work to solve that problem. In a letter dated July 5, 1892,
S. S. King notified Breidenthal that he was willing to withdraw
in favor of the Democratic candidate, H. L. Moore. Then by letter
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to the second district chairman on August 15, King withdrew
from the race officially; as he put it, in order to "greatly strengthen
our ticket all over the state ...." 33 Later, only a few days before
the election, Ed Carroll, the Democrat, withdrew in favor of Fred
Close in the first district to make the united front complete.84 If
all went well, Populists were now in a position to poll the bigger
part of the 55,000 votes that had gone to the Democratic party
in 1890.
Having assured themselves of "honorable allies," Kansas
Populists set out for Omaha on the first day in July to help select
their party's national ticket. The convention opened on Saturday,
July 2. Between thirteen and fourteen hundred accredited delegates, and many more observers, were on hand to see that the
great affair would have few dull moments. With a flair of dramatics, it was arranged so that the platform and the nominations
would be consummated on the third day-Independence Day.
The platform was no great problem: the finished product was an
extraordinary document as national party platforms had gone, but
it was not a new statement by any means; it was the St. Louis
demands of the preceding February with only slight alterations.
The Omaha platform, however, was the official statement and
rallying cry of a party waging its first national campaign, and as
such it assumed immediately a far more reverential aura than all
the reform statements which had preceded it. 35
The selection of candidates was a more trying assignment.
Who in the movement had the national stature desirable in presidential candidates? Colonel L. L. Polk, the main southern contender, had died a few months earlier; Senator Leland Stanford of
California was mentioned but rejected since he was unacceptable
even to fellow Californians in the party. Ignatius Donnelly was a
willing prospect, but he was too radical, too controversial, and too
little known to inspire any general move in his direction. There
was General James B. Weaver of Iowa, of course, but the Greenback party's presidential candidate of 1880 had his liabilities. Too
conservative for some and too closely associated with third-party
politics for others, the general nevertheless was willing, and he
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did have as great a claim to national stature as could be found in
the Populist camp.
But how about going outside the party for a candidate? It
was rumored that Judge Walter Q. Gresham was willing to accept
the nomination. The Indiana Republican was a tried and tested
national leader, and the judge was at the moment on the outs with
his party over its tariff policy.36 The Indiana, Illinois, and Iowa
delegations were determined to have the judge, and they dispatched a committee to get his consent for the use of his name. So
determined were they that one of the Indiana delegates caused
quite a stir on the third day of the convention by reading a telegram which said: "Have just seen Gresham. If unanimously nominated he will accept." The message was greeted with applause,
and in the heat of the moment it appeared that the convention
might be stampeded into nominating a man who, in addition to
being a Republican, might not even want the nomination. Several
leaders immediately saw through the whole thing and gained the
floor in an attempt to take the steam out of the demonstration, but
with little success. At this critical moment, Mrs. Lease obtained
the floor. Her presence was enough to command the attention of
the delegates where others had failed. Then in her "most sepulchral tone," she announced that "she had a message in her hand
which read that if unanimously tendered Benjamin Harrison
would accept the nomination." 37 This facetious announcement
had the desired effect, and the Gresham boom was punctured with
the adjournment that followed. It was subsequently learned that
the judge had refused the use of his name "unconditionally."38
In the aftermath, there was little else the convention could
do but nominate General Weaver. Second place on the ticket
went to General James G. Field of Virginia. Although the ticket
was not the kind to generate great enthusiasm, the delegates may
have derived some satisfaction from their obvious ridicule of the
bloody shirt by having nominated an ex-Union general and an
ex-Confederate general on the same ticket. 39
On the national level the new party may have suffered from
disorganization, stemming mainly from the very fact of its newness, but in Kansas the activities of the party were now as coordi-
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nated as they had ever been. Soon after the Omaha convention,
John Breidenthal established a lecture bureau under his direction
so that all speaking in the campaign could be coordinated by the
central committee, and hundreds of Populist speakers were readily
available to blanket the state in that crucial campaign. 40
Quite unintentionally it seems, the campaign got a premature start on July 30. Lewelling attended an Alliance picnic in
Windom (McPherson County, Kansas) on that date which was
supposed to be a nonpartisan affair. But Windom was the home
of the Republican nominee, A. W. Smith. Naturally, the appearance of the two candidates at the picnic immediately converted the
gathering into a partisan rally. Both men delivered speeches. An
observer reported, "Mr. Lewelling presented in a forcible manner
the trend of the present public policy of the Republican party, and
the inevitable ruin that is daily entailed thereby upon the country." The Populist candidate was followed by A. W. Smith who
praised "the thrift" of Kansas farmers which had in two decades
"transformed a desert into a blooming garden," and he deprecated
"the fact that there should be, in view of the blessings that we do
enjoy, . . . people that will belittle the grandeur of our achievements, and raise the wail of a calamity howl." 41 The reporter was
probably a Populist but the report was accurate enough, for it was
the Republicans and not the Populists who invoked the "myth of
the garden." The report contained, as well, what Republicans
made the major issue of the campaign-the "calamity howl."
At about the same time, John Martin was under heavy
attack for having "turned the Democratic party over to the calamity howlers." The chiding of a Republican friend prompted
Martin to respond in an open letter by writing: "These 'calamity
howlers' to whom you refer are the farmers, the laborers and the
general workmen of the country ...." It was they who produced
"the products and commodities that you and I and other nonproducers have no lot or part in contributing to the world's mass
of wealth." The intimation that the Populists, "100,000 or 125,000
citizens of Kansas," were "engaged in a conspiracy against the
honor, the credit and the welfare of the state" was in Martin's
mind an "insult" to any "intelligent man." 42
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Moderation was in short supply. Republicans and Populists
were inclined to think the worst of their opponents, and both sides
went all out in their political battle. Populists hammered away at
the system; Republicans, generally, ridiculed Populist leaders.43
The G.O.P.'s defenders did not allow even trivial opportunities for
ridicule to escape. It began when Sol Miller's newspaper and other
Republican sheets supplied their own name for the initials of
Lewelling's name-L. D. Lewelling became "Lorraine D. Lewelling." Sol Miller, for one, refmed to use the name Populist, used
the name People's party as little as possible, but preferred the name
"Calamity party ."44
J. K. Hudson of the Topeka Capital told his readers that
there were two things at stake in the election ( the crisis was obviously mounting, for Hudson had argued that there was only one
thing at stake two years earlier-"whisky"). First of all, wrote
Hudson, "Let the majority of the people of Kansas vote for the
party of irredeemable money and paternalistic hobbies of the most
preposterous stamp and we cannot blame the rest of the country
for distrusting us in the future as a community of wild-eyed socialists and cranks. Kansas can ill-afford to bear such a reputation."
Without question, "It is better to get the credit of having obliterated this party of humbug and political insanity by a majority that
will establish the good name of the state and assure all observers
that fiat and communism were a mere ephemeral fad in Kansas
...." The second thing at stake was "property," said Hudson.
"Give them the power, encourage them with a sense that the
people are with them, and it will be a long farewell to the hope
of business revival and property improvement in Kansas." 45

In this atmosphere it was little wonder the sudden conversion of Republicans to radical reform was not taken seriously;
or that Populist candidates were rotten-egged,46 and children of
Republican parents were heard chanting little rhymes like: "Rats,
rats, and pickled cats, / Are good enough for Pops and Democrats."47 Nor was it surprising that an attempt to discredit State
Chairman Breidenthal resulted in his arrest midway through the
campaign for allegedly having violated the state banking laws in
connection with his Topolobampo project. 48 Small wonder, too,
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that the slaughter of the Dalton boys at Coffeyville that October
would be injected into the contest when Jerry Simpson was quoted
as saying that "the Dalton boys were no worse than the national
bankers and thousands of others in Kansas who are engaged in
pretended lawful pursuits, while they are really robbing the people."49 Or, for that matter, it was no less unexpected that the
Topeka Capital would refer to Congressman Simpson as a
"Freak," "Buffoon," "Anarchist," "the Political Mountebank,"
"Sockless monstrosity," and the "Clown of Kansas Politics." 50
As the campaign came to a close the same paper stated
rather succinctly what the election signified from the Republican
standpoint. Said Hudson, the issue facing Kansans was "whether
to vote that the state has been a failure, that we can't pay our debts
out of our own resources, that Uncle Sam must come to our assistance and satisfy our creditors, that our business is not a success
and we are a state of bankrupts; or to vote that Kansas is the most
beautiful, the most progressive, the most prosperous and the most
promising state between the Allegheny mountains and the Pacific
ocean."51 Populists of course looked upon the contest a bit differently, and apparently, with Democratic support, so did a majority
of the voters.
The day after the election the Topeka Capital announced
in bold type, "KANSAS REDEEMED," "Jerry Simpson Slaughtered by the Voters"; the Topeka Advocate announced in comparable fashion, "CALAMITY OVERTAKES THE APOSTLES
OF PLUTOCRACY."52 Both sides were a little premature in
their rejoicing. The victory belonged to Populists and their Democratic allies but it was not as complete as was first thought. The
state's electoral votes went to Weaver by a margin of 5,900 votes.
Lewelling and the entire Populist state ticket was elected. Harris,
Simpson, Davis, Baker, Hudson, and the Democrat Moore were
elected to congress by a combined Democratic-Populist vote-six
of eight congressional seats, then, were denied Republicans. 53 The
picture was not quite so bright on further analysis. The Republican vote for governor since 1890 was revealed to have increased
43,000, going from 115,000 to 158,000. The combined vote of
Democrats and Populists, on the other hand, was shown to have
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decreased from 178,000 to 163,000, which left Lewelling with a
4,432 vote (1.3 percent) margin of victory. The fourth district
congressional race, which Otis had carried in 1890 by a 5,000 vote
(11.2 percent) margin, was lost by the Democrat Wharton to
Charles Curtis by almost 3,000 votes (5.6 percent), and Populist
margins of victory in the third, fifth, sixth, and seventh were all
smaller than they had been in 1890. In the first and second districts, the Democratic-Populist vote had dropped considerably. In
1890 the combined votes of separate Democratic and Populist
tickets had exceeded the Republican vote by 5,000 to 6,000 votes in
each district, but in 1892 Fred J. Close lost to the incumbent Case
Broderick in the first and Moore won by a mere 83 votes in the
second. 54
Worse yet for Populists, it was uncertain whether they had
gained control of the legislature. The senate was safely in the
hands of the party with twenty-four Populists, fifteen Republicans,
and one Democrat having been elected to the upper house, but the
situation in the lower house was badly confused. On the face of
the returns certified by the Republican-dominated state board of
canvassers, Republicans had elected sixty-five members, Populists
fifty-eight, and Democrats two. 55 A number of irregularities had
occurred, however, and both sides were crying "steal." And as
Kansas awaited the installation of the Lewelling administration it
appeared that an explosive situation was building.

"THE FIRST PEOPLE'S PARTY
GOVERNMENT ON EARTH"

~anuary 9, 1893, was Populism's triumphant moment in Kansas, for on that day Populist
leaders and supporters from all over the state gathered in Topeka
to celebrate the inauguration of the "first People's party government on earth." A procession down Kansas Avenue and the
ribbons, flags, and flowers adorning the Capitol's Representative
Hall bore witness to the jubilant mood of party faithfuls, but
through it all there was a note of sobriety, an awareness that their
party was on trial, and a realization that they had an important
mission to fulfill.
More than others, perhaps, Governor Lewelling felt the responsibilities of the moment. The forty-six-year-old Wichita
resident was indeed about to embark on a difficult and demanding
assignment. But Lorenzo D. Lewelling was better prepared for
the task than most people realized at the time. The designation
"Wholesale Butter Merchant" of the Wichita directory belied
quite a diversified and capable background. The Salem, Iowa,
native was articulate, well educated, acquainted by occupational
experience with the problems of labor and management, as well as
an experienced administrator of demonstrated liberal persuasion.1
Governor Lewelling was also a man with literary training
and literary aspirations; he long had prided himself on his ability
to use the spoken and written language. His grand opportunity
came with his inaugural address, and he presented Kansans an
incomparable message. He asked that they put aside partisan differences to see that
political parties shall exist by reason of progressive principles rather than subsist upon the spoils of office. The "sur-
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vi val of the fittest" ( or strongest) is the government of
brutes and reptiles, and such philosophy must give place to
a government which recognizes human brotherhood. It is
the province of government to protect the weak, but the
governments of to-day are resolved into a struggle of
masses with classes for supremacy and bread, until business, home and personal integrity are trembling in the face
of possible want in the family.

In this situation, said the governor, "I appeal to the people of this
great commonwealth to array themselves on the side of humanity
and justice."
Later in the speech, he declared:
The problem of to-day is how to make the State subservient to the individual rather than to become his master.
Government is a voluntary union for the common good. It
guarantees to the individual life, liberty, and the pursuit of
happiness. If the Government fails of these things, it fails
in its mission. It ceases to be of advantage to the citizen;
he is absolved from his allegiance, and is no longer held by
the civil compact.
The governor then injected a bit of poetry: "Talk to the
winds, and reason with despair, / But tell not misery's sons that
life is fair." Then came a discussion of the conditions confronting
farmers, laborers, and businessmen, which the governor concluded
by asking if government were powerless to deal with these conditions. His answer was:
Government is not a failure, and the State has not been
constructed in vain. This is the generation which has come
to the rescue. . . . Conscience is in the saddle; we have
leaped the bloody chasm, and entered a contest for the protection of home, humanity, and the dignity of labor. The
grandeur of civilization shall be emphasized by the dawn
of a new era, in which the people shall reign; and, if found
necessary, they will "expand the powers of government to
solve the enigmas of the times." 2
No mealy-mouthed words these. For Populists they were
at once an inspiration and a call to action. For Republicans, and
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not a few Democrats, they were the worst kind of heresy. J. K.
Hudson of the Capital referred to the speech as "his incendiary
Haymarket inaugural" and an "old fashioned calamity howl,"
which was "well enough for the stump, but not so becoming in
the executive of one of the most prosperous states on earth."3 The
editor of the Topeka Journal, the other major Republican daily in
the capital, on comparing the inaugural with the governor's innocuous message to the legislature, later concluded that there was
"a Doctor Jekyl[I] and a Mr. Hyde in the executive office ....
Doctor Jekyl[I] wrote the governor's first message to the legislature; Hyde delivered the inaugural address." 4
The worst fears and exaggerations of Populism's opponents
appeared to be confirmed the day after the governor's inaugural
when the opening of the legislative session became at once an
opera bouffe. Things went well enough in the senate where the
Populist majority managed to organize in routine fashion. But in
the house chaos was the order of the day. Populist representatives
were determined to prevent Republican organization of the house.
Leaving aside the Populist claim that their party "had a majority
of the legally elected representatives," 5 the fact remained that Republicans held sixty-five certificates of election, Populists fiftyeight, and Democrats two. One of these Republican certificates
was clearly in error, 6 and Republicans and Populists had challenged each other in a number of other cases.7 After the state
supreme court had refused to intervene on the ground that the
legislature was the sole judge of its own elections, Populists took
the position that all those representatives who had contests filed
against them should not be allowed to participate in the organization of the house-a sure way to insure a Populist majority,
since ten Republicans had been challenged. But precedent was all
on the Republican side in their contention that certificates of election were prima facie evidence of election, entitling them to organize the house before an investigation was conducted into the
contested seats-a sure way of maintaining a Republican majority. 8
Both parties had sized up the situation and had mapped out
their strategy before Secretary of State Russell Osborn called the
session to order on the afternoon of January 10. It was the secre-
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tary's duty to read the official list of members-elect. Populist
strategists apparently hoped to have the secretary installed as
temporary chairman so that he could assist in organizing the
house for the Populists-presumedly by helping to enforce the
Populist position that all contested members-elect be omitted from
the original organization. Whether Osborn was in complete accord with this plan is not known, but he did announce that he
recognized that he had no legal right to serve as temporary chairman and would not do so unless he had the unanimous consent of
the house. Immediately, Republicans voiced their opposition to
this proposition; Secretary Osborn, in turn, refused to read the
names of the members-elect and left the hall with the official list.
As soon as he had departed, both sides scrambled to elect a temporary chairman. Sixty-four Republicans on one side and sixty-eight
Populists (fifty-eight with certificates and ten contestants) on the
other then proceeded, amidst utter pandemonium, to elect a dual
set of officers. When they had completed this riotous maneuver,
both sides notified the senate and the governor that the house was
organized for action.9
Adjournment was then in order; but the Douglass house
(Republican) and the Dunsmore house (Populist), as they were
immediately identified according to their speakers, were both
afraid to vacate the hall for fear the other might bar their reentry;
so both sides remained in the hall throughout a long, cold, and
uncomfortable night. Midway through the next day a truce was
arranged, according to which each would occupy the hall at alternate periods without attempting to prevent the other's reentry.10
The following day, the Populist cause suffered a damaging
blow when the three Democrats joined the Douglass house, bringing its membership up to sixty-seven. Perhaps it was to counteract
this move that the governor and senate-in one of those we'll-bedamed-if-we-do and we'll-be-damned if-we-don't situations-accorded their recognition to the Dunsmore house.11
For the next thirty-one days the situation in the house remained unchanged: Populists and Republicans used the hall alternately, passing bills and making speeches, attempting to be as
oblivious as possible to the existence of each other. The world
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outside, thanks to an unusually partisan press, was anything but
oblivious to what was going on. Newsmen were having a field
day with what was soon publicized throughout the nation as the
"Kansas legislative war." From the opening blast, the battle of
the press was won by Populism's opponents; without a daily paper
in the capital, the shaky Populist position was riddled through and
through and little could be done to offset the devastating attack.
All kinds of advice and advisors descended on Topeka. Populists
were of course waging their fight on a Republican sea, and in the
heat of the moment the city of Topeka was first of all the citadel
of Republicanism and secondly the state's capital city. Before long,
the local Republican county sheriff had sworn in around "sixty
Republican deputies," and Populists had recruited their own force
of partisan "deputy adjutant generals," as both sides prepared for
the worst. 12
In the meantime, both houses and the senate met in joint
session, with Lieutenant Governor Daniels presiding, to elect a
United States senator to fill the vacancy created by the death of
Senator Preston Plumb the previous year. Republicans were outmaneuvered in this contest. Populists, reluctantly and not without
causing irreparable damage within the party, supported John
Martin, the Democratic leader who had promoted his party's indorsement of the Populist ticket. 13 The refusal of Republicans to
respond to the call of the clerk of the Dunsmore house allowed
Daniels, with the aid of parliamentary legerdemain, to muster a
majority vote of duly elected members for Martin. Republicans
protested but the Democratic majority in the United States senate
subsequently honored Martin's certificate of election.14
The senatorial election took place on January 26, and the
legislative session was obviously being frittered away with no immediate prospect for solution. Feelings on both sides were also
becoming more inflamed with each passing day. The leaders of
the two factions professed their willingness to resolve the conflict,
but the terms of each were completely unacceptable to the other.15
Then on February 14 Republicans decided to break the no-conflict
agreement in hopes of precipitating a solution favorable to themselves. On that date the Douglass house adopted a resolution
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stating that if the duly elected representatives of the Dunsmore
house did not join the Douglass house by February 21 their seats
would be declared vacant, and to expedite the matter even further
they ordered the arrest of the clerk of the Dunsmore house on
charges of having "continuously interrupted the regular proceedings of the House by loud and boisterous language and unlawful
noises ...."16 With these fatal steps out of the way, the Douglass
house then adjourned until 9:00 o'clock the next morning.
The Republican desire to force the situation to a conclusion
was fulfilled; the Douglass house was called to order the next
morning in the Copeland Hotel. In the interval, Populists had
"rescued" their clerk, taken possession of Representative Hall, and
posted armed guards intent on admitting only those members of
the Douglass house whom they deemed eligible to membership.
Republicans countered by marching in a body from the Copeland
Hotel to Representative Hall; whereupon they diverted the guards
and took possession of the hall by battering down the door with a
sledge hammer, which Populists claimed bore rather appropriately
the label of the Atchison, Topeka, and Santa Fe Railroad. Populists then retired from the hall to regroup and to plan their next
move; Republicans resumed business and issued an appeal to the
outside for support in their battle to save "constitutional government" from the "forces of anarchy and revolution." 17
By afternoon the situation was critical. Republicans had
recruited over six hundred assistant sergeants-at-arms, and the
sheriff now had about four hundred deputies as well. With this
force at their disposal, the refusal of the Republicans to allow the
Populist house to take possession of the hall at its usual time that
day appeared to indicate that a bloody battle was close at hand.
Governor Lewelling at this point alerted the state militia; later
that evening he appeared before the Douglass house and pleaded
with the Republicans to vacate the hall and wait for a decision
through the courts. "As the matter now stands," said the Governor, "it becomes my duty to use some method which I almost
shrink from naming, to secure possession of this hall."18
Republicans did not vacate the hall, they merely made
preparations for additional barricades; and Governor Lewelling
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did not have to worry about using the militia, for the ill-equipped,
undermanned, and outnumbered force that responded to his call
was under the command of a Republican colonel by the name of
Hughes. It was no secret that Hughes had made up his mind not
to use the troops to oust fellow Republicans from Representative
Hall. The next day, Thursday, February 16, Colonel Hughes was
ordered to clear the hall, and he refused to carry out the order. In
disobeying the governor's direct order, Colonel Hughes got himself relieved of command, and earned for himself, ultimately, a
court-martial and dismissal from the militia; he may also have
given both sides a little more time to work out a peaceful solution.
The militia, under new command, took up its post around the
Capitol but no order was issued to clear the hall.19
At this point in the dispute Populism's journalistic opponents were taking full advantage of the situation to prove that all
they had ever written about Populism was true. The Kansas
City Mail told its story under a banner headline that read
"ANARCHY!"; the Wichita Daily Eagle preferred "ANARCHISTIC"; the Marion (Kansas) Times employed the headline
"The JACOBINS"; and the Kansas City Gazette asked its readers the headline question: "Is the Kansas Trouble the Incipiency
of a National Anarchist Uprising?" 20 Similar headlines and articles flooded Kansas and the nation, delivering, no doubt, a devastating blow to whatever little good will the party may have
accumulated since 1890.
The Populist leadership was guilty of having made some
terrible errors of judgment in their determination to control the
house, but one would have to search long and hard to find any
anarchists among them and even harder to find any Jacobins.
Little wonder, then, that on the snowy winter night of February
16-17, an overture by Governor Lewelling prompted a communication between the two sides that ended the conflict. The concessions were Populist concessions. The militia, assistant sergeantsat-arms, and deputy sheriffs were to be dismissed or discharged;
and, while both sides awaited the verdict of the courts as to which
was the legal house, Republicans were to retain possession of the
hall and Populists were to meet in other quarters. The agreement
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to resolve the issue in the state supreme court was crucial, for the
decision of that Republican-dominated tribunal was a foregone
con cl usion.21
On February 28, after the court had made the anticipated
decision, all those Populists who had the Republican stamp of
approval (fifty-four to be exact) pocketed their pride and claimed
their seats in the Douglass house. 22 Animosity generated by the
dispute was not easily dispelled, however, and any real hope for
cooperation between Populists and reform-minded Republicans
had vanished. It was the situation of 1891 all over again, with the
senate and house working at cross-purposes, and with only eleven
legislative days left on the calendar. At the session's close, Republican and Populist legislators-all of whom ran on a reform platform it will be recalled-had little to show for their effort. Only
two major pieces of reform legislation (an Australian ballot law
and an act prohibiting corrupt practices in elections) and three
minor reform laws were added to the statutes.23
The most important measure of the session was the railroad
bill, and it was beyond all doubt a camalty of reciprocal party
animosity. Republicans in the house, with the aid of quite a few
Populists, passed the so-called Greenlee railroad bill late in the
session which would have made the board of railroad commissioners an elective board with the necessary powers to carry into
effect most of the regulations then desired. But Republicans had
specified that the "present commissioners" (meaning Republicans)
would serve until January, 1894; in addition, the new commissioners were to be elected in the 1893, off-year, election. Populists
objected to the first provision for obvious reasons, and to the
second because they believed their strength was diminished in the
off-year contests. The senate therefore amended the bill rather
drastically before passing it with only three days left in the session;
house Republicans refused to reconsider the bill as amended. 24
Thus ended the work of the 1893 legislature.
Their record was bleak, but what manner of men were
these veterans of the "legislative war"? In background, the men
of the 1893 house differed little from those of 1891. As a matter of
fact, thirty-two of these men (twenty-one Populists and eleven

"THE FIRST PEOPLE' S PARTY GOVERNMENT ON EARTH"

137
Republicans) had served in the 1891 house. 25 As for the typical
Populist representative, he was a forty-five-year-old farmer or
stock raiser who was in most cases a native of Ohio, Illinois,
Pennsylvania, or Indiana, and a resident of Kansas since 1878.
Twenty-three of the group were experienced legislators; two out
of four had attended or graduated from college; most of the remainder had only a common-school education. Roughly three out
of ten were former third-party men, while four out of ten had
come to the Populist party from the Republican party and three
out of ten from the Democratic party. 26 The Republican representative, on the other hand, was a forty-six-year-old business or
professional man, a native of Indiana, Pennsylvania, Ohio, New
York, or Iowa, and a resident of Kansas since 1871. Slightly more
than two out of four had attended or graduated from college; the
rest in approximately equal numbers were recipients of only an
academy or common-school education.27
Like their colleagues in the house, the most significant
contrast between the Populist and Republican senator was that of
occupation. The Populist senator was in more than three of four
cases a farmer or stock raiser, and the Republican senator was in
almost as high a ratio a business or professional man. At fortyfour, the Populist senator was four years younger than his Republican counterpart, but both were natives in greatest frequency of
states like Illinois, Indiana, New York, or Pennsylvania, and both
had come to Kansas in about the same year-the Populist in 1871
and the Republican in 1872. Republicans had more collegeeducated men in their ranks and more experienced legislators, but
the majority on both sides had only a common-school education
and only three of the entire group had served in the previous
senate.28
These senators and representatives could claim some special
legislative experiences that were not likely to be repeated; they
were the veterans of the Kansas legislative war. But the short
biennial session made no allowances for the kind of campaign
they had waged, nor were they likely to be decorated for their
services. They had failed in their purpose. In particular, Populist
representatives had failed, for they had lost the war, and fate was
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not kind to losers-especially the kind who were portrayed by
opponents as determined and desperate men, and who by their
own admission were fighting for a righteous cause, but who nevertheless submitted to the enemy at the height of battle. It made no
difference that their opponents had created a distorted and exaggerated image of them, or that they were well within the pattern
of American democratic radicalism which had long been more
radical in rhetoric than deed. Times had changed, and the crossfertilization of urban and agrarian radicalism in the new industrial
age had culminated in a literal-mindedness fatal to reasoned
reform.
The Populist legislative defeat was also the Lewelling administration's defeat; but unlike the house, Governor Lewelling
had time to soften his image in the public mind. Due to a combination of factors, however, the governor failed in this endeavor.
His troubles began with some unfortunate appointments. The
most troublesome of these was the appointment of a lawyer named
H. H. Artz as adjutant general. In the case of Artz, the spontaneity and newness of Populist politics appear to have worked to
the governor's disadvantage. Artz was the man who had presented Lewelling's name to the Wichita convention, and his appointment as adjutant general, a rather innocuous administrative
position with respect to the Kansas militia, was not an unreasonable political reward. Soon after his appointment, however, it was
publicized throughout the state by the Republican press that Artz
had earlier been arrested in Colorado for bribing a witness in the
district court, had been fined, ordered to appear before the court
on perjury charges, and subsequently disbarred by the C-olorado
supreme court because he had "skipped out" of the state. The
merits of the charge were not demonstrated one way or the other,
but considerable confusion in Populist ranks was created by the
Artz controversy. 29 The adjutant general was not removed until
a year later, and then because an investigation of his accounts revealed minor irregularities in his office.80
The legislative war also had far-reaching effects on the
administration not directly related to the controversy itself. After
the 1893 session the worst that could possibly be said about the
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Lewelling administration was not too bad to print nor too difficult
to believe as far as the Republican press was concerned. Populism's Republican opponents were especially eager to exploit those
issues that would hasten the demise of Democratic-Populist coalition. The appointment of police commissioners was most conducive to this end, for it involved the highly emotional issues of
prohibition enforcement and gambling. J. K. Hudson of the
Capital, even before the legislative session had ended) charged that
the administration had accepted "boodle" from Kansas City gamblers in return for the selection of favored men as police commissioners. James F. Legate, an erstwhile Republican lobbyist who
had joined the Populists the year before, admitted receiving $4,500,
which he maintained was his to use without strings attached, and
stated that Hudson's charge that Governor Lewelling or any other
administration official was involved in the "transaction" was "an
absolute lie." Legate told Hudson he welcomed an investigation
but he desired that it "be broad enough to cover [all] expenditures
of money upon the legislature. Then I think you will have bitten
off more than you can 'chaw.' "31
The investigation was held by the senate, and before it had
ended testimony had been offered stating that Republican party
"boss" Cy Leland had attempted to buy votes in the senatorial
contest, that J. K. Hudson had done the same in attempting to get
the state printer's job; but there was no evidence that Legate's
story was false, and the bipartisan committee reported unanimously that the charges were not sustained by the evidence. The
revelations of the investigations, however, failed to silence the
boodle cry .32
Governor Lewelling and State Chairman Breidenthal were
guilty of attempting to maintain an effective Populist-Democratic
coalition. Both men were realistic enough to know that Democratic support was crucial if the party were to maintain itself in
power. As part of that strategy, the administration and the Populist organization under Breidenthal's leadership tried to steer
clear of the prohibition and woman suffrage issues, while at the
same time attempting to strengthen the coalition by rewarding
their Democratic supporters in the distribution of political offices.
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This could not be done without increasing their vulnerability to
Republican attack, nor could it be done without creating dissension within the Populist party itself. Quite a few Populist leaders
believed that the reform cause would flounder on the rock of
fusion, and after the Democrats had abandoned them in the legislative war, and the Democratic Cleveland administration was
saddled with the panic and depression of 1893 and had made itself
extremely unpopular by the repeal of the Silver Purchase Act,
antifusion sentiment intensified. Most of those who held that
opinion, however, were not willing to destroy the Populist party
to drive the Democrats out; but some were.
Throughout 1893 the extreme antifusion view was aired in
Topeka through the columns of two weekly newspapers, one
edited by Cyrus Corning and the other by A. J. R. Smith.33 Both
men claimed to be "true Populists," but neither had ever been a key
figure within the party; their Populist antagonists were convinced
they were working for Republican pay. Of the two, Corning was
most vehement in his attack. The latter had earned for himself a
reputation that followed him to Topeka. On learning that Corning had set up shop in the capital, the editor of Wichita's Populist
paper commented: "If Cyrus will try to use just a little bit of
discretion, be content to stick his knife in without twisting it, he
may be useful. He has the ability, is zealous, and we believe
honest, but Cyrus ought to learn that aqua fortis, lunar caustic,
nitric acid and cayenne pepper mixed and applied with a red-hot
poker may be a vigorous treatment but not calculated to be at all
convincing."34
Corning's first Topeka edition of The People, later called
the New Era, came out shortly after the legislative session ended,
and it struck an immoderate note from the beginning. He stated
that he had "little hope for relief to the people through political
methods," and believed reform could best be obtained by the
idea of voluntary cooperation as embodied in the Labor Exchange
idea, which was a plan for superseding money with labor checks.35
The paper was, of course, intensely antifusion; Democrats were
boodle rs per se; and Corning wanted it understood that "fighting
fusion is not fighting the People's party any more than fighting
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prostitution is opposing virtue." 36 After all, said Corning, in another edition, "Christ was no fusionist." 37 As for the legislative
war, Corning's position was that it had been "a disgraceful row
between republicans and FUSIONISTS, and that is all there is to
it. The People's party had nothing to do with it ...." 38
At the same time, A. J. R. Smith's Populist was promoting
an identical antifusion line and attacking Lewelling as "a tool in
the hand of the Rock Island railroad," a "traitor" to the party, and
"an unprincipled adventurer." 39 Republican papers, of course,
picked up every choice passage of the Corning-Smith ad hominem
attack and distributed it appreciatively throughout the state.
Governor Lewelling refused to dignify the Corning-Smith
barrage with a reply, but Chairman Breidenthal stated that Corning had turned on the administration because he had demanded
ten dollars a speech for himself and a daughter in the 1892 campaign and had been refused, and also because "he was not given
an office." "Smith," said Breidenthal, "is a man whose hand is
against everybody." Secretary Osborn seconded Breidenthal's appraisal of Corning with the humor of an ex-Congregational minister: Corning "was like the old maid," said Osborn, "who, when
she prayed to the Lord for a husband, said, 'O Lord anything,
anything, so it is a man.' We did not give him anything, and now
he is firing a popgun at us thinking it is a cannon." 40 And Dr.
McLallin of the Topeka Advocate, an antifusionist himself, later
commented that "Corning's record in nearly a dozen counties of
Kansas prove[ d] him to be a swindler, a sneak, a common confidence man and an all around dead beat." If he were not "guilty"
of more than that, said McLallin, it was because he was "a miserable coward; and it is probably this latter qualification that has
kept him out of the penitentiary."41
If Smith and Corning were not receiving Republican pay
for their hatchet job, they should have been; their papers could
hardly have been improved from the Republican standpoint even
if they had been written by the Republican central committee.
Both papers reserved their whole attack for Governor Lewelling.
But perhaps the extremity of the Corning-Smith assault rendered
it more of an annoyance than a serious threat; besides, the in flu-
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ence of both papers was practically nonexistent outside Topeka
(excepting, of course, many happy Republican editors), and the
checkered reputation of both editors was generally recognized. It
would probably have remained no more than an annoyance had
it not had a sequel of more dramatic proportions.
On November 10, 1893, that episode began to unfold in
Topeka. Mrs. Lease made the front page with an interview reported in the Topeka Capital. The Populist party had just suffered
some reverses in the 1893 local elections, and the reporter asked
Mrs. Lease how she accounted for the losses. In no uncertain
terms she attributed them to the Lewelling administration. Said
Mrs. Lease, "the present administration is enough to damn any
party." She described Lewelling as a "weak man" without "backbone," and stated that she had been the only delegate from the
Sedgwick County delegation who had voted against him in the
1892 convention. The defeat, as she saw it, was "a loud and effective protest against corrupt men and their measures and fusion
with the democrats." 42
Several days after the Topeka interview Mrs. Lease was
interviewed again, this time at home by the Wichita Beacon. She
promptly denied everything she reportedly had said in the Topeka
interview. She said that she had "never spoken unkindly of Governor Lewelling." She considered him a "brave, noble man," who
was doing a fine job under difficult circumstances. He was, moreover, her first choice for governor in 1894.43
The Topeka Capital was not above fabricating stories, but
it would appear that the first interview reflected her true feelings
at the moment and that the second was an attempt to smooth over
the whole affair. A break between Mrs. Lease and the administration had been building for some time. Lewelling had appointed
her to the state board of charities. As chairman of that board she
was in a position to determine appointments that came under its
jurisdiction. Governor Lewelling on several occasions attempted
to obtain positions for favored individuals, some of whom were
Democrats. Mrs. Lease resented Lewelling's efforts to dictate the
allocation of jobs, and she especially detested the idea of appointing Democrats.44
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Mrs. Lease was in fact psychologically incapable of cooperating with Democrats. In spite of all the talk about leaping the
"bloody chasm," not a few Populists failed to make it across the
sanguinary abyss ; Mrs. Lease was a prominent example. One of
her brothers had been killed at Fredericksburg, another at Lookout Mountain, and her father had died under ghastly circumstances in Andersonville prison. 45 She insisted that her "whole
life" had "been a struggle with poverty because of that cruel war,"
and she harbored a deep resentment against the Democratic party,
which to her mind was solely responsible for bringing it about. 46
On December 28, 1893, the whole thing came to a head
when Governor Lewelling notified Mrs. Lease she had been removed from the board of charities. She refused to consider the
removal final and immediately countered with a bitter tirade
against the administration. On January 2, 1894, the Kansas City
Star published Mrs. Lease's version of the dispute. She argued
that Lewelling wanted to get rid of her not because she had
"interfered with his office trading" but because she intended to
fight for the inclusion of a woman-suffrage plank at the upcoming
state convention. Governor Lewelling, she said, knows that with
that plank in the platform "every hope of fusion is gone." She
added: "Let me say now that the woman's suffrage plank will go
in and that there will be three tickets in the field. As to fusion the
people won't stand it." And when asked if she would support
Lewelling if he were renominated, she answered that he would
not be renominated, but if he were she could not support him and
be true to her conscience.47
Shortly after this it was common knowledge that Mrs.
Lease was working closely with the "Corning crowd." She admitted contributing money to support the New Era. It was also
reported that she met with George R. Peck and W. H. Rossington,
attorneys for the Santa Fe Railroad, on January 9, 1894, in St.
Louis, and there was speculation that the Republican party had to
be tied in somehow. Curiously, about two months later it was
revealed in the Kansas City Gazette that she was one of the heirs
of a five-thousand-dollar estate of a relative in Ireland.48
Before that, however, on January 26, 1894, the Pleasanton
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Herald published a letter from Mrs. Lease that topped anything
she had written to that point. She wrote:

It is necessary to "kill me politically" ere they can
succeed, and to destroy me they say I am working for Republican pay .. . . Not only that, but they paid $500 to
obtain affidavits that General J. B. Weaver and I slept together at many of the leading hotels during the campaign .
. . . The governor said to two of the state officers: "If Mrs.
Lease makes any fight on me I will spring those affidavits
on her!" 49
Governor Lewelling avoided a newspaper debate with Mrs.
Lease, but the press did manage to get a reaction from Secretary
Osborn to the Pleasanton letter. Asked what he thought of her
latest charges, Osborn replied: "I am no longer surprised at anything she says. The woman is crazy. Her reference to the supposed story about J. B. Weaver and herself is new to me and new
to everybody in the state house. I have nothing to say about it. If
she wants to advertise her own shame that's her business, not ours.
The story I have heard about Mrs. Lease does not drag in the
name of Weaver."50
By the end of January Mrs. Lease had made three major
accusations: she claimed that the administration was in partnership with Kansas City gamblers; that bribes had been taken from
three railroad companies; and that they had paid for false affidavits purporting to prove improper relations between her and
General James B. Weaver. She offered no proof to substantiate
these charges. At one point she indicated in a speech that the time
was not yet right for revealing the evidence; apparently that was
as far as she ever got. 51
The administration claim that Mrs. Lease was working
hand-in-glove with the Republican party would not seem worthy
of consideration were it not for the existence of a long-overlooked
manuscript contained in the Kansas State Historical Society. The
manuscript in question was a handwritten biography of Mrs.
Lease by James Arnold, with a note attached by the author to a
Mr. McCray. The biography was not dated, but internal evidence
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indicates that it was probably written in January, 1894. James
Arnold was unquestionably Mary Elizabeth Lease. 52 Mr. McCray,
to whom the "biography" was sent, was by all indications David
Owen McCray. McCray was prominent in the Republican organization. From 1887 to 1889 he was managing editor of the Topeka
Capital; from 1889 to 1893 he was executive clerk to Governor
Lyman Humphrey; and, in the period in question, he was working in Topeka as a representative of various Eastern newspapers
as Kansas correspondent.53
Mrs. Lease obviously wrote this autobiographical sketch for
McCray's assistance in preparing a formal treatment of Populism.54 In her note to McCray she instructed that he be sure to
give her "sole credit" for the defeat of Senator John J. Ingalls. She
advised that he "say nothing" about her "political views now."
From the standpoint of implication, the most damaging part of
the note read as follows: "get the Capital to slobber over Breidenthal, [sic] and McLallin they are going to use against me that the
Republican papers are friendly to me and have said nice things
about me .... I have obtained the promise of the Wyandotte
reps [representatives or republicans?] . . . . Get the Capital to
make fun of my radical views and abuse me a little."
Mrs. Lease's autobiographical sketch was also quite revealing as to her state of mind at that point. Writing under the
pseudonym James Arnold, she described herself as "Thoroughly
genial and unemotional . . . . " Mrs. Lease, she wrote, was a
woman who "moves in close touch with the people. The lower
strata of laborers [,] rough-handed begrimy fellows love her, and
she bears among her loyal subjects the title of 'Queen Mary.'" She
then wrote, "Success and popularity make no difference in her
demeanor and warm praise and cutting sarcasm are alike unheeded.'' At another point she decribed herself as "original in
thought, prompt and decisive in action, forcible and eloquent with
tongue or pen," a woman who "possesses in a marked degree the
traits of leadership.'' Concerning her work in the party, she wrote
that it was due to Mrs. Lease's "efforts more than to any other
factor" that the "People's party owes its inception, and upbuilding." Then with obvious reference to her dispute with the Lew-

KANSAS POPULISM

146
elling administration, she wrote that Mrs. Lease "has made it
possible for men who would never have been heard of to boil up
and scramble for office. And in their greedy haste they would
ever mete out to her the fate of her protoype Joan of Arc, but calm
and dignified Mrs. Lease forges ahead, winning triumphs and
cheering success in all she undertakes." 50
In February, 1894, the state supreme court ruled that Mrs.
Lease could not be removed from the board of charities "without
cause and without notice." It then became a question of preferring charges against her, and the administration wisely elected to
drop the whole matter. 56
The controversy had ended Mrs. Lease's effective association with the Populist party, but irreparable damage had been
done in the process. Just how great the damage was would be
impossible to determine; it undoubtedly contributed heavily to
the 1894 Populist defeat. As for Mary Elizabeth Lease, the key
to understanding the actions of that famous lady would appear to
revolve largely around three facets of her personality: an exaggerated sense of her own importance, which made her a formidable
spokesman but allowed her to be used by the opposition; an intense hatred of Democrats, which made fusion unthinkable; and
a shallow understanding of the problems of her time, which gave
her little to hold to once the going became rough and the impulse
for reform less intense.67
Undoubtedly the Lease revolt gave an immense assist to
antifusionists (both irrational and rational types), but an important assist also came from that combination of circumstances that
had burdened a Democratic president with a depression, and by
the policies adopted by President Grover Cleveland in combating
that calamity. As the depression deepened, furthermore, Kansas
Populism, at least in its urban leadership, became bolder, more
radical in its rhetorical position. This combination of developments virtually assured the termination of any effective coalition
between Populists and Democrats.
Indeed, it was in 1893 that Populist leaders began to discuss
and indorse socialism with any degree of frequency. After the
legislative war Republicans had launched a concerted attack on
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the Populist party as a foreign product led by socialists or worse; 58
Populists, in turn, initiated a discussion of socialism in defense.59
Perhaps "Gas-and-Water," or Fabian, would be an appropriate
prefix for the brand of socialism espoused by most Populists; but
whatever prefix is applied, socialism received a sympathetic hearing among Kansas Populist leaders. Quite a few of them reasoned,
as did Dr. Stephen McLallin of the Topeka Advocate, that
The best features of our government to-day, national, state,
and municipal, are those which are purely socialistic. We
would refer especially to our public school system and our
postal system. There is not a feature of either that is not
an exemplification of pure socialism; and these meet with
universal approval. Municipal ownership of waterworks,
gas works, electric light plants, and other public utilities by
which the people receive the maximum of service for a
minimum of cost afford other examples of pure socialism,
by which serious abuses are corrected and great benefits secured to the public.60
Such talk merely confirmed the worst fears and exaggerations of
Republican leaders and evoked more extreme attacks like that of
Republican leader J. G. Waters in the 1893 campaign, when he
told his audience in Newton that it was "the duty of every Kansan
to give this party a black eye, it is a foreign product, it has none
of the sunlight of the state about it. It has the taint of steerage
bilge-water that imported anarchists have brought ashore in their
clothes. It is a bold pander to every bad element in society." 61
Having convinced themselves that the Populist party was
led by men who hated "our competitive system of government"
(or so Republican chieftain Ed Hoch maintained) 62 and were
openly critical of capitalism, Republicans began to employ all the
weapons of the success myth and the folklore of capitalism in their
continuing war upon Populism. None were more brilliant in that
attack than a young Republican leader named James H. Troutman.63 At the annual Republican banquet in January, 1894,
Troutman stated the Republican case against the Populists in a
clever combination of vitriol and exaggeration that may have won
him his party's nomination for lieutenant governor, which he re-
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ceived a few months later. A party like the Populist party, he said,
which was "conceived in iniquity, born in sin, rocked in the cradle
of superstition and perfidy and nurtured in ignorance and hypocrisy must be of few days and full of trouble." In addition to
"its contempt for the constitution and laws of the state, it has lived
a life of duplicity and falsehood." The party had announced itself
as the party of the laboring classes, said Troutman, but
it has crucified upon the altar of personal ambition and
aggrandizement the distinctive claims of every form of industrial toil, and elevated to exalted places a class of nondescripts having no visible means of support. This party,
organized as it maintains, to subserve the interest of the
toiling masses, is dominated by lawyers without clients, by
doctors without patients, by preachers without pulpits, by
teachers without schools, by soldiers without courage, by
editors without papers, by bankers without money, by financiers without credit, by moralists without morals, by
farmers without farms, by women without husbands, and
by statesmen out of a job.
The people had been fooled for a time by a Populist "elixir of
moonshine," he continued, but they were now demanding "a more
substantial diet" since they realized that the "entire creed" of the
Populist party, "when reduced to its simplest form, is the sublimated quintessence of flapdoodle." 64
Troutman's assessment of the Populist party was severe,
and understandably so since the new party had challenged the
conventional wisdom as it had never been challenged before. Perhaps this was best illustrated by the reception accorded one of
Governor Lewelling's executive orders. Early in December, 1893,
the governor appealed to local law enforcement officers to exercise
restraint in applying the vagrancy law passed by the legislature of
1889. Governor Lewelling predicated his action on the belief that
the monopoly of labor saving machinery and its devotion
to selfish instead of social use, have rendered more and
more human beings superfluous, until we have a standing
army of the unemployed numbering even in the most prosperous times not less than one million able bodied men; yet,
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until recently it was the prevailing notion, as it is yet the
notion of all but the work-people themselves and those of
other classes given to thinking, that whosoever, being able
bodied and willing to work can always find work to do ....
Under the vagrancy law and similar city ordinances, said the governor, "thousands of men, guilty of no crime but that of seeking
employment, have languished in the city prisons of Kansas or
performed unrequited toil on 'rock piles' as municipal slaves, because ignorance of economic conditions had made us cruel." 65
Populism's opponents professed to be shocked that a message of this kind would be released by a Kansas governor; immediately the order was dubbed Lewelling's "Tramp Circular,"
and the opposition press rushed into print to heap abuse on the
"disgraceful" message. The Cawker City Record wrote: "Bums,
tramps, thugs, and wharf-rats, come to Kansas. The right hand of
fellowship is extended to you by our governor. Fear not the 'rock
pile' or the 'bull pen,' they are banished. Walk right into the
governor's office and occupy his chair; you are better qualified to
fill it than the present incumbent." The Dighton Herald declared:
"According to the suggestions of the Governor's letter, the safeguard of society has been torn down, idleness has been raised to
the plain of pleasure and a premium placed on vagrancy .... This
is some more of Lewelling's socialism and is an insult to society
and civilization." And the Salina Republican told its readers:
Governor Lewelling has issued another semi-socialistic manifesto declaring that the social conditions under
which we now live are responsible for tramps and intimates
that the individual is not in any way responsible for his
financial condition and that if he chose to be a lazy shiftless
tramp he has a right to do so and that the people ought still
to keep him in plenty of food and clothing. Lewelling is a
disgrace to Anglo-Saxon civilization. A cowardly repulsive
demagogue.
Similar press comments were made by Republican newspapers
throughout the state.66
As governor, Lewelling was of course by no means as
unconventional as Populist rhetoric and attacks upon his admin-
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istration might lead one to believe. There were limits to what he
could do to act upon his beliefs, and he was also determined that
whatever was done violence was to be avoided.67 Within these
limitations, there was little he could do, as he put it, but utilize the
powers of moral suasion in behalf of "suffering humanity"; and
in the heated political atmosphere of 1893-94, that particular course
was calculated to inspire Populism's opponents all the more in
their campaign to see that the first People's party government on
earth was also the last. 68

NOTHING FAILS LIKE FAILURE:

1894 and the Redeemers

-n the eve of the nominating
conventions of 1894, it was quite obvious the Lewelling administration was in trouble. Most Populists and quite a few Democrats
were in no mood to listen to talk of a Democratic-Populist coalition, an end toward which Republican party managers had been
working since the humiliating defeat at the hands of the coalition
of 1892. Regulars were back in command of the G.O.P. again, and
Republican strategy was being molded, rather adroitly, to accomplish one supreme objective-Populist defeat. As one Republican
regular put it, "In Kansas politics I am a firm believer in the
doctrine of the survival of the fittest." 1 There was of course no
question in his mind which party was fit and which was unfit;
nor was there any question that the concept of survival included a
large dose of political cunning. With the wealthy Troy merchant
and wily political boss Cy Leland calling the shots again, Republicans were assured an ample supply of the latter.2
By the time the Republican state convention assembled in
Topeka the first week in June, the party's conservative wing had
the upper hand. This faction, with Leland's careful direction,
then proceeded to draw up a platform and to nominate a slate of
candidates which not only suited their conservative temper but
which also was designed so as not to assist in patching up the rift
between Populists and Democrats. The latter maneuver was
achieved by avoiding statements on woman suffrage and prohibition enforcement, despite a rather vocal demand from within
and without the convention that the party declare itself on those
two issues as it had done in 1892. The gubernatorial nomination
went to Leland's man, Edmund Morrill, a banker and a former
congressman from Hiawatha.3
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Republicans had done all they could do to divide the opposition, but the final decision on whether Populists and Democrats
would make a joint effort depended on the actions of the Populist
convention which was to follow. If the convention could avoid
committing itself on the proposed woman-suffrage amendment,
as Governor Lewelling and State Chairman Breidenthal apparently hoped, there was still a chance that the Democrats, for whom
there was no more abhorrent reform, would indorse the Populist
ticket. But Populist conventions were noted for making their
own decisions.
On June 12 the Populist state convention was called to
order in the same hall the Republicans had used less than a week
before. Close to three thousand enthusiastic delegates and observers were on hand. According to one sympathetic observer, the
contrast between the delegates of the two conventions was most
striking. Said he, "untanned faces, spotless shirt fronts, and new
clothes" had been "the rule in the Republican convention"; most
of the Populist delegates had the mark of "the sturdy sons of toil"
upon them. To this observer there was an unmistakable message
in this contrast. He was sure this great representation of the state's
working classes, "the very men from whom in years gone by the
Republicans used to roll up their overwhelming majorities," met,
as they were, to oppose that "once grand old party," would be
"a lesson to this fanatical, hidebound Republican town of
Topeka ...." 4
The Populist organization had not been content to rely on
the subjective powers of observation to convey their sentiments.
The hall was decorated in gala colors. Flowers and bunting were
used liberally throughout. The most striking decor, however,
adorned the south wall of the hall. Under a large banner which
read "REPUBLICAN REDEEMERS" (the theme of the Republican state convention and campaign), a number of placards were
on display which expressed quite aptly the Populist feeling about
the would-be redeemers. Former Republican Governor George
T. Anthony appeared in one which pictured him getting away
with a sack of money from a safe designated as the "New York
school fund." Edmund Morrill was portrayed over the words
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"Three per cent. a month redeemer." J. K. Hudson, editor of the
Topeka Capital, champion of prohibition, and arch foe of the
Populists, was caricatured in one showing him drinking a bottle
of beer. Another placard pictured a bloody shirt, and under it
were the words: "This is a real live issue, and we mean what we
say." Beneath a cartoon of John J. Ingalls, Populists had applied
the words of Kansas poet Eugene Ware: "Up was he stuck, but in
the upness of his stuckitude he fell."
Of the several banners which also appeared on that south
wall, two in particular caught the eye. One read "DEATH TO
POPULISM," with the words "Republican State Convention,
June 6, '94" attached. Directly beneath this hung another reading:
"DEA TH TO POPULISM MEANS DEA TH TO THE COMMON PEOPLE."5
If the banners and placards were there to evoke enthusiasm,
they were not needed. The delegates and observers all knew that
the convention would have to deal with the issue of the womansuffrage amendment placed on the ballot by the 1893 legislature,
and, whether they opposed or favored the commitment of that
Populist convention to woman suffrage, both sides were convinced
that the decision was critical for the future of the party. No simple
explanation would suffice to explain why the convention was split
on the issue. Among the opponents of a supporting resolution
were some who opposed woman suffrage on principle and others
who believed an indorsement unnecessary and unwise, who may
or may not have supported the right of women to vote, but who
were certain an indorsement would cost the party badly needed
Democratic support. The motives of those who favored a supporting resolution were more complex. For extreme antifusionists the
woman-suffrage issue had become a test of the party's purity.
Prohibition was involved as well. It was a commonly shared
opinion that if women were given the vote the state's prohibitory
amendment would be that much safer from repeal. For those
Populists then who were also prohibitionists and antifusionists,
woman suffrage was a means of striking a double blow at the
Democratic party, to which of course both prohibition and woman
suffrage were anathema. There were many Populists, however,

KANSAS POPULISM

154
who nevertheless supported woman suffrage on principle and
wanted the convention to indorse the pending amendment.
Even before the convention opened, both sides had settled
on a man for temporary chairman-W. F. "Ironjaw" Brown of
Kingman for the anti's and Ben S. Henderson of Winfield for the
pro's. In that first test of strength, Henderson was the choice of
the convention for temporary chairman, and in his acceptance
speech the Cowley County lawyer wasted no time in getting to
the crucial issue. He told the convention he was proud to have
been selected to preside over a party that had as "its mission the
destruction of both the Republican and Democratic parties, both
of which were responsible for the legislation that had doubled the
mortgage indebtedness of the United States, and cut the price of
wheat down from two dollars to fifty cents a bushel [ a voice in the
crowd rang out: 'thirty-five cents a bushel']," and for the legislation that "had made four million ... tramps." He then told the
convention that it must not emulate the cowardice of the Republican convention on the issue of woman suffrage. "The women," he
said, "were in this convention, just as they were in that, asking for
nothing but their God-given right, and this Populist convention
ought to give it to them." This statement evoked a loud cheer,
especially from the galleries where the Equal Suffrage Association
was present in force. 6
The rest of the morning passed rather quickly and without
incident. When it came time to close for the noon meal, Henderson requested that the convention stand while a minister from
Pawnee County offered a prayer. That prayer became one of the
highlights of the morning session. The Populist reporter representing the Ottawa Journal and Triumph recorded that the
prayer was of rather a small-sized kind, injected into a
large-sized political speech. It was full of timely and telling
hits, and pleased the audience immensely. When the reverend gentleman, after praying for Governor Lewelling, the
state administration, and the success of the people's cause,
got to that point where he called upon "God to bless the
President of these United States-after he has repented of
his sins," the audience, running over before, could contain
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itself no longer, but broke loose in a storm of appreciative
laughter and applause. 7

The reporter could have added that the minister also made a direct
plea for action in support of woman suffrage.
By afternoon the crowded hall grew quite warm. The delegates and observers, many in shirt sleeves by this time, sat and
sweltered and fanned themselves while listening to speeches and
awaiting anxiously the reports of the various committees. Most of
the time on the floor during the afternoon was consumed by
speeches for and against a formal indorsement of the womansuffrage amendment. Woman-suffrage interests were well represented in the personages of Mrs. Carrie Lane Chapman Catt, Miss
Susan B. Anthony, Reverend Anna Shaw, and Frank Doster.
These speeches, plus the selection of the officers of the ill-fated
Dunsmore house as the convention's permanent officers, rounded
out quite an eventful first day's activity.
Chairman John Dunsmore's call to order the next morning,
however, signaled the beginning of a session that made pale in
comparison the events of the previous day. The majority report
of the resolutions committee was presented to the convention
minus a resolution in support of the woman-suffrage amendment.
The convention was clearly agitated by this development. At this
tense moment E. R. Ridgely of Crawford County was presented
to the convention in order to make a minority report on resolutions. With this announcement the hall fairly exploded with applause and cheering. Women in the audience were especially
demonstrative, as it was now obvious that this Populist convention
was not about to be gagged as had been the Republican convention.8
In his remarks before reading the minority report, Ridgely
announced with obvious satisfaction that the antisuffrage men on
the committee had served notice that they would file a minority
report if the suffrage plank was inserted; consequently, when the
suffrage advocates found themselves in the minority they felt no
qualms about pursuing the same course. Great applause accompanied this announcement. It was plain to everyone now that this
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divisive issue would have to be fought out on the floor of the
convention. The committee had divided fourteen to eight on the
question. Peter P. Elder and W. L. Brown were the only members on the committee who had distinguished themselves as leaders of state Populism up to that point, and they were the leading
opponents of the plank. This by no means, however, should be
taken as an indication of the position of the major leadership on
this question; loyalties were clearly divided, although the party
organization, as it had managed to represent itself on the resolutions committee, preferred to avoid the issue. 9 Ridgely's appearance on the stage smashed that preference.
Ridgely stated the minority position rather succinctly:
"Whereas, The People's party came into existence and won its
glorious victories on the fundamental principle of equal rights to
all and special privileges to none: therefore, be it Resolved, That
we favor the pending constitutional amendment." Pandemonium
then broke loose in the hall. Delegates were on their feet in an
instant, standing on chairs, yelling, seeking recognition from
Chairman Dunsmore. The chairman at the same time began
pounding and screaming for order, which, as one might expect,
seemed a long time in coming. As soon as a semblance of order
had been restored to the hall, the chairman was deluged with
motions and amendments on the critical issue. Finally, W. H.
Wilson, delegate from Miami County, obtained the floor and presented the following compromise amendment: "Whereas, The
initiative and referendum is one of the cardinal principles of the
Populist party, we indorse the action of the people's legislature of
1893 in submitting the question of female suffrage to the voters of
the state of Kansas." W. L. Brown was then recognized, and he
stated that the woman suffragists who had appeared before the
committee would accept nothing but an unequivocal indorsement
of the pending amendment. Brown turned to Annie Diggs who
was on the stage with him at the time and asked that she verify
his statement. Mrs. Diggs, who since the disaffection of Mary
Elizabeth Lease wore undisputedly the laurels of the most outstanding woman in Populist ranks, declined to do so but stated
emphatically that her co-workers in the cause of woman suffrage
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"did not like the milk and water amendment" presented by delegate Wilson. 10
An animated discussion then ensued, initiated by Wilson
in behalf of his compromise proposal. He was followed by another
delegate, advocating the defeat of the Wilson amendment and an
immediate vote on the minority report. Then Ben Henderson, the
convention's temporary chairman, obtained the floor and spoke
quite strongly in opposition to the compromise measure. He told
the convention he regarded the Wilson amendment as a "subterfuge." As for him, he wanted "the noble men of the People's party
to declare where they stood upon the question." His next statement revealed the prohibitionist-antifusionist side of the womansuffrage question: "God Almighty hated a coward," he said. The
People's party was "not making platforms for Republicans or
Democrats or whiskyites." The party "stood for right and law,
and the opponents of suffrage for the beer classes."
The argument that the opponents of the suffrage plank
were either "whiskyites" or were afraid to alienate the "beer
classes" had been circulating freely about the convention; Henderson's statement therefore stirred W. J. Costigan from Franklin
County to the attack. After obtaining the floor this opponent of
the suffrage plank declared:
I have been in this reform fight for sixteen years,
and the charge of cowardice does not apply. I was in it
when it was so small and weak that the gentleman who has
just spoken went back on us, after being state secretary of
the party, and fought us from the ranks of the Republican
party. The charge of cowardice comes with poor grace
from him. I received my education at the knee of a Christian mother, who taught me to hate whisky, and I protest
against being called a whiskyite by a graduate of the
Keeley cure.

A mixed response of cheers, hisses, and cries of "Shame!"
"Shame!" prevented Costigan from going any further. Henderson
then regained the floor on a point of personal privilege and stated:
"I have listened with considerable contempt to the sarcastic words
of the gentleman who preceded me. I will admit to you that I
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have been one of those unfortunates, and I stand here now and
say ... , God being my judge, I propose to stand for the women."
It now seemed that everyone had something to say on the
matter. Hence it was suggested that speakers be limited to five
minutes with debate coming to a close at the noon hour. The last
ten minutes, it was proposed, would be reserved for Annie Diggs
and P. P. Elder to make closing statements for their particular
sides.
This agreed, the debate continued in earnest. There is no
count of how many delegates spoke during this period. Undoubtedly more wanted to speak than did. Most used less than the
allotted five minutes. Speakers followed each other in rapid succession and engaged in a heated dialogue, the arguments of one
speaker generally rousing another in response. T. J. Thompson
from Miami County pleaded the case of the compromise measure
and warned, without specifying how, that the suffrage plank was
"detrimental to the party and to the cause of women." G. E.
Miller, delegate from Republic County, declared that "cowardice
was always contemptible" and admonished the convention to
"stand for what they believed to be right, and cease following the
will-o'-the-wisp-policy." A Negro delegate from Pottawatomie
County, identified only as Beck, declared that "the Republican
party had been buried by isms," and in his opinion "it was very
foolish for the Populist party to get down on all fours and play
horse and allow these isms to be unloaded upon it." He then
spoke out in no uncertain terms in opposition to woman suffrage.
His effort accentuated feeling on the issue.
At this point, Frank Doster, who was a leading proponent
of woman suffrage, managed to gain recognition from the chair.
He stated with as much feeling as he could mtister that
The Populist party is a party of isms, and without
desiring to say anything which will bring back unpleasant
memories to the gentleman who has just sat down, I will
remind him that if it had not been a party of isms, he
would have not had a chance to speak before this convention.
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What does this substitute for all these other resolutions signify? Does it signify that the Populist party is
about to take any progressive step? I stand against regarding this as a question of expediency, and ask that the
Populist party take a step forward and adopt the minority
report.

John Otis, elected to congress in 1890 but sacrificed in 1892
for the fusion nominee in the fourth district, obtained the floor
several times during the debate to speak for the suffrage plank; he
did so again a short time after Doster's effort. Otis was a prohibitionist and an extreme antifusionist-he was in fact president
of the recently organized "Anti-Fusion People's Party League of
Kansas," which featured Cyrus Corning as secretary.11 This time
up, Otis stated that the issue was simply a question of whether
"the people of the People's party control its policy or the politicians?" As he saw it, the opponents of the plank "simply wanted
to bid for the ignorant foreign vote, the Democratic vote, and the
whisky vote." Beck from Pottawatomie then rose to a point of
order and requested that Otis be silenced. Said Beck, "He has
been talking all morning. He has talked himself to death, and
now he is talking the party to death."
Mrs. Eliza Hudson, the only woman delegate in the convention, gained the floor a short time later, spoke a full five minutes in support of the plank, and then sat down dejectedly when
time was called. A delegate from Marshall County, Andrew
Shearer by name, identified himself as a Scotchman and as a
spokesman for the foreign-born. He stated that those who had
arrived more recently on American shores were "catching on to
the spirit of American institutions as rapidly as possible." Conceding that the adjustment was difficult, Shearer indorsed the suffrage
plank, advising: "Don't turn back for us!"
Of the many speeches in opposition, that of an unidentified
farmer must have struck a responsive chord. Speaking in a manner that communicated at once the honesty and conviction of his
position, he informed the convention, the Ottawa /ournal and
Triumph reported,

KANSAS POPULISM

160
that it was not so much a question with him or his wife
whether she should have the right to vote, but the question
was whether they would be able to retain their home. The
People's party had been organized and educated on the line
of the paramount importance of the financial question, and
he believed that it was only by a reformation of this system
that the people could find relief. He thought it unwise to
incorporate planks in the platform to which a large number of the delegates were opposed ....

Amidst all these lively happenings, the time had slipped
away almost unnoticed. Shortly before the noon hour Chairman
Dunsmore brought the floor debate to a close and called Annie
Diggs and Peter Elder to the rostrum for their closing statements.
It was no accident, of course, that Mrs. Diggs and P. P.
Elder were selected to represent each side in the finale; they had
clashed three years before when the same question was before the
1891 house, and if the passage of the woman-suffrage bill by that
Populist house was any indication, Mrs. Diggs had won the first
encounter.
Mrs. Diggs spoke first. Woman-suffrage proponents were
indeed fortunate to have "Little Annie" on their side. Now fortyone and as attractive as ever, no other woman within Populist
ranks could have won as readily as she an instant hearing for the
cause of woman suffrage. Since that first rough-and-tumble
Populist campaign of 1890, through thick and thin she had maintained her equilibrium, demonstrating by word of mouth and by
pen that she was eminently qualified to play a leading role in the
male world of politics. All this she had done without destroying
her image of femininity-no small accomplishment in the last
decade of the nineteenth century.
Mrs. Diggs first tried to allay the suspicion entertained by
some that the women who had appeared before the convention in
behalf of the plank were enemies of the party. "Does any man
here doubt my loyalty to the Populist party?" she asked. "I stand
here to say that these women are simply here in the interest of suffrage, as I was on the Republican platform in the interest of suffrage." She then stressed that the issue being debated was of vital
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concern to men as well as women. "It is to your interests," she
said, "to get this amendment in your state constitution, and I believe that the vast majority of this convention means to stand by
their own Populist women and give us their votes for the amendment." This statement brought cheers from the audience. She
then pointed out that it would be broadcast that the Populists
were going to vote for the amendment, so it would be used against
them just as strongly whether in or out of their platform.
"The Republicans met in convention the other day," she
continued. "They had not the courage to declare in the presence
of the people that they were going to vote for the amendment, but
their candidates promised the women, on the sly, that they would
vote for it on the sly." She then assured the delegates that the
amendment would be approved and asked:
Don't you want to have the leverage of having the gratitude of the women of this state? Don't you want to be able
to say, to the Populist party belongs the honor of not only
submitting this amendment, but also of supporting it at the
polls? If you take a noble, manly and courageous stand, as
I am sure you will, then every cowardly Republican candidate will be forced to go upon the rostrum and plead the
record of his party in its defense. My good friends, the
thing for you to do now, from a People's party standpoint,
is to have the courage of your convictions.

She had used her five minutes, and her talk ended with the great
applause of the convention resounding about the hall.
The mood of the convention being what it was, Peter Elder
had an unenviable assignment ahead of him as he rose to address
the delegates. Elder's long experience in public life, his enduring
commitment in opposition to woman suffrage, should have enabled him to present an effective case against the minority report.
But the situation was delicate, and the Ottawa fournal and Triumph reporter recorded that the old reform campaigner "proved
himself wholly inadequate" to deal with the arguments of Mrs.
Diggs. In the words of that reporter, "his rambling speech was no
match for her downright reasoning." Elder simply took second
place to Mrs. Diggs when it came to extemporaneous speaking.
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The essence of his plea came toward the end of his talk. With
much feeling, he remarked: "In the name of the great Jehovah
and the Continental Congress, we have been struggling for fifteen
years against Republicanism. Don't, for God's sake, ladies, don't
drag us down this time so we cannot whip them. You will not
gain anything. This question has been submitted as an independent proposition." He then assumed a more confidential tone of
voice and stated: "I confess to you, gentlemen of the convention,
that I did not dare to have a vote taken in the presence of the
ladies in the committee room." This remark prompted some loud
jeers. As the noises began to subside, Chairman Dunsmore signaled to Elder that his time was up. Elder turned and remarked:
"My God, is my time up?" Granted more time to make a brief
closing remark, Elder then made one very large faux pas. "I want
to say just one word," he remarked. "Now I say let us have a clean
repub-" At this point the convention broke loose in a demonstration of continuous and uncontrollable cheering. In the meantime
Elder returned to his seat; perhaps, as the reporter of the Ottawa
Journal and Triumph observed, to "meditate upon the mutability
of human affairs." He made no effort to clarify the remark that
had ended his talk.
What followed was anticlimax. The compromise amendment was defeated by a decisive 528 to 82 vote. The vote was then
taken on the minority report. The ayes and nays remained close
throughout most of the count. At the end, the vote stood 337 for
and 269 against, and John Breidenthal's announcement that the
minority report had carried touched off the most enthusiastic
demonstration of the convention.
To whom did the victory belong? To a small segment of
extreme antifusionists like Corning, Henderson, Otis, and Lease
who were psychoneurotically prohibitionist, at times nativistic,1 2
and above all anti-Democratic? Or did it belong to that greater
number who supported woman suffrage simply because it was a
progressive measure, without relating it to any particular prejudice, who may or may not have been antifusionists but, if so, were
such primarily because they believed the Democratic party much
too backward in its economic policies for fusion to be of any bene-
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fit? The answer to that question is that both groups shared in the
victory; Populist-Democratic coalition was the immediate loser,
and both elements were satisfied principle had triumphed over
political expediency. It remained to be seen whether woman suffrage or fusion would be the ultimate loser.
Compared to the struggle over the suffrage plank, the remainder of the convention was anticlimactic. Before the convention several Populist leaders had spoken out in opposition to the
renomination of Governor Lewelling (Noah Allen and W. F.
Rightmire had even attempted to resuscitate the Citizens' Alliance
to oppose the administration), but this opposition failed to materialize in any significant form in the convention, and Governor
Lewelling was renominated without difficulty. 13 Secretary of State
Russell Osborn declined to run again, and Lieutenant Governor
Percy Daniels was not renominated because he had conditioned
his candidacy on the convention's adoption of his graduated tax
reform; the rest of the ticket was renamed.
The symbolic woman-suffrage struggle held center stage,
even to the closing moments when the noted writer Hamlin Garland addressed the convention and said, in part: "If you had not
put that suffrage plank in your platform I would not have been
here this afternoon, because it would have taken all the heart out
of me. I want the people of this great party in Kansas to stand by
their great principle of equal rights to all." He assured the convention "that every humanity loving man in the East expects you
to support that principle. It does not matter what the Eastern
papers say of you. I know that the thinking people of the East
look to Kansas as the great battleground of all these great reforms."14
Kansas had indeed become a battleground of reform, and
the stage was set for one of the most vitriolic campaigns the state
had yet experienced. The principal combatants, of course, were
Republicans and Populists, but there was to be a third party. As
expected, the state's Democrats, represented rather heavily by the
patronage element, met three weeks after the Populist convention
and nominated their own slate of candidates and adopted a strictconstructionist platform that praised President Grover Cleveland,
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called for re-submission of the prohibitory amendment, and op-posed woman suffrage. 111
There was no waiting to commence the campaign; each
faction was engaged in a holy war that would brook no delay. On
the Populist side, Governor Lewelling delivered a major address
in Kansas City on July 26 which served notice that the administration was not backing away from the major issues it had already
emphasized. Among other things, the governor said:
It is my opinion that if you are an honest and industrious
citizen; if you are frugal, if you are careful of what you
earn, that you have a right to enough to eat and drink, and
clothe yourself and family, and if you do not have it, it is
because somebody else has got more than his share. Now,
that is anarchy-Talking treason now. But, if that is anarchy my Republican fellow citizens, put it in your pipe
and smoke it . . ..
If that be treason, when I state a citizen is entitled
to enough to eat and decently clothe himself- If that is
treason, my Republican fellow citizen, "Make the most of
it." What is government to me if it do not [sic] make
it possible for me to live! and provide for my family! The
trouble has been, we have so much regard for the rights of
property that we have forgotten the liberties of the individual. ... I claim it is the business of the Government to
make it possible for me to live and sustain the life of my
family. If the Government don't [sic] do that, what better
is the Government to me than a state of barbarism ....
That my fellow citizens is the law of natural selection [,]
the servival [sic] of the fittest-Not the survival of the fittest, but the survival of the strongest. It is time that man
should rise abive [above] it.

The governor concluded his address by stating that there was no
"greater crime breeder in the world than poverty." His purpose in
coming to Kansas City, he said, was to ask if its citizens would
join him in "the organization of a great anti-poverty society." 16
The governor's speech was no isolated phenomenon; it contained a message that a number of Populist leaders attempted to
put across to the Kansas electorate during that campaign. None
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were more effective in that endeavor than Frank Doster. In a
Labor Day speech delivered in Topeka, Doster declared, "There
is a fatal mental inability in both Democratic and Republican
parties to comprehend the new and strange conditions of our
modern industrial and social life, an utter inability to cope with
the new and vexing problems which have arisen out of the vacillation of this latter day." After commenting on the magnitude of
"the revolution in our ways of working," Doster stated:
The failure to adapt the legislation of the country to the
strange conditions which this new life has forced upon us
is the cause in greater part of our industrial ills. A recognition of this fact I make the supreme test of intelligence
in the discernment of causes and cures. . . . The Populist
party proposes as the only means to the desired end to utilize the power of the social mass to bear upon the rebellious
individuals who thus menace the peace and safety of the
state. It says that the subjects of those monopolies and
trusts are public in their nature, and that the powers exercised through them are in reality the functions and agencies
of government itself.
He went on to say that Populists would have the government,
which was, after all, only the people in their organized capacity,
"assert their rightful dominion" in this new situation. And as a
basis for such action, they advanced two political propositions:
first of all, "it is the business of the government to do that for the
individual which he cannot successfully do for himself, and which
other individuals will not do for him upon just or equitable terms;
the other, that the industrial system of a nation, like its political
system, should be a government of and for and by the people
alone." 17
Other Populist leaders battled to make a discussion of
society's problems the major topic of the campaign, but with little
success. Republicans were convinced that what ailed society was
the Populist party; they therefore made the charge of corruption
and immorality in the Lewelling administration the major point
of their attack. They were aided in that task by several widely
publicized desertions from the Populist camp. Early in August
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Ben Clover released a letter to the press charging that the party
had "FALLEN INTO THE HANDS OF A DICTATOR ...."
Then, after listing numerous ways in which he believed the party
had been corrupted, the former Populist congressman announced
his return to the Republican party by emphasizing: "We don't
want anarchy; we don't want socialism." 18 A few weeks later,
Ben Henderson, who as temporary chairman of the Populist convention had made such a fuss to help get the woman-suffrage
plank included in the platform, announced that he could not
support the Lewelling administration because of its alleged
corruption.19
Needless to say, Republicans were pleased with developments. The Clover-Henderson disclosures dovetailed exactly with
the party line, stated rather succinctly in the Topeka Capital as
follows: "The administration is the friend of tramps, saloon keepers, lottery gamblers, anarchists, defiers of law and order and
government. Its record is a festering conglomeration of crimes
and blunders." 20
Republicans were also assisted by Corning's New Era,
which had immediately pronounced the Populist convention a
"fusion convention" and called for the defeat of the party. 21 The
Corning line, repeated continuously until after the election, was
that "Kansas Populism stands for unrestricted operation of saloons," "gambling dens and policy shops," "more bawdy houses
and more prostitution," and for "moral, financial and material
ruin."22
Most Populist leaders had at first written Corning off as a
spiteful crank intent upon putting an end to any kind of Democratic-Populist cooperation; but when he intensified his attack
upon the administration, despite the obvious rebuke of fusion at
the convention, they began to wonder if there were not more to
his attack than met the eye. By late August they were all the more
convinced when it was discovered that the Republican state central
committee was distributing Corning's New Era to Republican
candidates to use as campaign material. 23 Then, on October 4,
midway through the campaign, Cy Corning and other so-called
"middle-of-the-road" Populists filed a separate "Populist State
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Ticket" headed by Corning himself. If the scheme had not been
concocted by Republican manager Cy Leland, it certainly had his
support, and Leland, at the very least, was prepared to provide the
Corning group with railroad passes during the remainder of the
campaign.24 That was the clincher; Populists generally were
ready to agree with one of their major papers when it declared
about "the Corning gang":
We always knew they were not Populists but a lot
of rotten boodlers, but were unable to prove it until now,
when we are able to hold them up to the light and prove
to the world that they are not Populists at all, but a lot of
sneaking cowardly Republicans [sic] character assassins,
working in the interests of the Santa Fe railroad corporation, under the ... direction of the Republican state central
committee, for boodle. 25

Populist State Chairman Breidenthal wasted no time in
filing a protest against the Corning ticket as an obvious attempt
to mislead and to divide the Populist vote. Later, less than three
weeks before the November election, a hearing was held on the
matter with Secretary of State Russell Osborn and Attorney General John Little serving as the board of certification; the Corning
slate would not appear on the ballot.26
After the Corning diversion was foiled, the thoroughly
vicious campaign-the tone of which was largely determined by
Cy Leland's direction-came to an inglorious conclusion with
charges and countercharges being fabricated almost entirely out of
whole cloth. 27 Only the most partisan voter could have avoided
being utterly bewildered as he headed to the polls that November.
There was no mistaking the outcome though-Kansas was "redeemed."
The entire Republican state ticket was elected by a substantial margin; the lower house of the legislature was taken by
the Republicans by an overwhelming majority; in the congressional races, only William Baker out in the sixth district managed
to survive the Republican landslide, and he only by less than two
hundred votes; Jerry Simpson, John Davis, William Harris, and
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Jeremiah Botkin28 were defeated. Woman suffrage, too, since it
had become a partisan issue, was turned down in referendum by
a decisive 130,139 to 95,302 vote. 29 The outcome, it would appear,
demonstrated that Populism, on its own resources, had gone just
about as far as it could go; the party had started with roughly
108,000 (36.8 percent) of 290,000 votes for its gubernatorial candidate in 1890 and had climbed to just over 118,000 (39.4 percent) of
300,000 votes in 1894.30 Populism had begun with only a minority
of the voters behind it, and it was still a minority party four
years later.
Governor Lewelling ran four to five thousand votes ahead
of the rest of the ticket, so his renomination appears not to have
hurt the party. Populist support for woman suffrage, on the other
hand, may have been a decisive factor. Lewelling carried twentynine counties; fourteen of these also voted favorably for woman
suffrage-all fourteen were overwhelmingly rural, agricultural
counties. Only three of the twenty-nine could even be said to have
had any significant urban industry-Crawford, Cherokee, and
Osage. These three were strong Populist counties which contained
important mining industries as well as a large farm vote. Because
of the mines, these three counties also contained a significant
foreign-born vote. In Crawford County, Lewelling defeated Morrill by a vote of 3,388 to 3,250; woman suffrage was defeated there
by a 2,797 to 2,722 vote. Osage County voted for Lewelling 2,846
to 2,640; woman suffrage failed by a vote of 2,443 to 2,121. In
Cherokee County, the vote was 2,982 for Lewelling and 2,864 for
Morrill; woman suffrage lost by 2,508 to 2,124. In the urban areas
throughout the state, where the foreign-born, Democratic vote
was concentrated, woman suffrage was rejected rather soundly. It
would of course be impossible to measure the effect of the Populist
suffrage stand with precision, but the issue unquestionably had
cost the party badly needed votes.31
The defeat was devastating, and as its full impact began to
work its effect upon the reform camp, Populism's foes gloated
over their redeeming triumph. Cy Corning dashed off an editorial
line that expressed his mood with characteristic style: "Pimps,
thugs and prostitutes will not be permitted to longer administer
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the government of the people," said Corning.32 The New Era
then became a semimonthly and shortly thereafter ceased publication; Corning's parting words advised, "The republican party of
Kansas has the opportunity of a life time. Will it be wise enough
to use it?"33 Republicans were perhaps less slanderous than Corning in their triumph but certainly more ostentatious. On the
night of November 13, they held an elaborate public funeral in
Topeka to celebrate the death of Populism.34 It was a devastating
gesture, for only the most impractical Populist could fail to see
that Populism in its original form was indeed dead; it might rise
again to fight another day but never again in the same form.
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s their Populist opponents
retreated to reexamine their position, Republican redeemers, obviously invigorated by their triumph, set about putting the ship of
state back on its accustomed course. In his inaugural address on
January 14, 1895, Governor Edmund Morrill struck a Republican
keynote in this undertaking: "We have had withering droughts
and devastating insects; 'booms' of prosperity and phenomenal
speculation, followed by 'boomerangs' of adversity and stagnation." Admittedly, Kansas had suffered some great afflictions,
"But from the worst, or all of these, we have suffered far less than
from the virus of unrest, discontent, and disloyalty, injected into
our blood by the hand of an evil genius to poison manly courage
arid self-reliant energy at the fountain of its source." In recent
years, "We have been tempted to despise the methods and look
with contempt upon the legitimate fruits of honest industry and
individual enterprise; to lean upon the Government and demand
from it that which can alone be obtained through personal industry and rigid economy." It would seem that "The lesson taught in
the framing of our non-paternal government, that 'A people governed least is governed best,' remains yet to be learned." 1
The following day in his message to the legislature, Governor Morrill served notice that he was "not aware" that there was
"any demand from the people for a radical change in the law."
And as for legislation he advised the legislature that there were
"laws of trade which will control business and which cannot be
repealed by any statute of any legislative body." The role of the
legislature, according to the governor, was to assist this invisible
hand in its work of promoting "industry and economy"; while
they should avoid legislation that "may disturb and restrict trade."2
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Numerous statements by fellow Republicans were forthcoming which praised and seconded the governor's appraisal of
the situation.3 From the vantage point of their decisive triumph,
Republicans were also prone to deal with their opponents in the
past tense, as they attempted to demonstrate why the Populists
had been subjected to defeat-revealing, by the way, much of their
own political philosophy in the process. A prime example was the
work of B. B. M'Call, a Republican chieftain from Lawrence. In
a speech before the Kansas Day Club, not long after the inauguration, M'Call told his audience of prominent Republicans that the
Populist party had come into existence "upon false theories of
government." It was a party founded upon two primary cornerstones-"Class prejudice and the intensified misfortunes of mankind." Populists had forgotten that "a great political party must
possess well-defined and fundamental principles of government,
broad enough in their conception for the grouping of all classes,
regardless of social conditions or professions ...." In recent years,
Populists have "told" us that "the theory of all government in the
past has been wrong, and a new dispensation is preached unto
us .. . ." They have said that "the great competitive system is an
evil, and that monopolies and all branches of public industry must
be absorbed by the General Government; that paternalism is the
only safety to the future Republic." They are wrong; if one attempts to get at an explanation for "past progress," it will be
clearly seen "that nations have become great by the exertion of the
individual citizen." By all means, "I am not yet ready nor willing
to sink all identity and individuality in the common cesspool of
paternalism, and thus allow all society to fall from its present high
pinnacle to one low level of common mediocrity." 4
Not all Republicans would have subscribed to M'Call's
theory of government, nor would all Republicans have agreed
with the governor's contention that there was no demand from the
people for "a radical change in the laws." But the outcome of the
1894 election was generally translated into a holding action with
the Republican party calling the shots.
The twists and turns of Kansas politics had again created a
situation with a built-in deadlock. The holdover senate was still
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controlled by a Populist majority; the house was recaptured by the
G.O.P. Republican representation in the house was in fact increased to eighty-nine. The redeemer Republicans varied only
slightly from their colleagues of the previous legislatures. The resurgence of regular party leaders, however, may have been reflected in their number. Less than one-half (twenty-nine) of the
Republican veterans of the legislative imbroglio of 1893 were
returned to the legislature. All but twenty-two had been active for
years within the party organization. Compositely, the Republican
representative was forty-five years old ( slightly more than one out
of three were fifty or older). He was a business or professional
man (sixty-two out of eighty-seven) who was most likely born in
Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Pennsylvania, or New York, and had lived
in Kansas since 1874 or 1875 (eleven had arrived prior to 1861).
The majority had only a common-school education, although one
in three was college educated. One in four was also a Union
veteran. 5
Thirty-four Populist representatives claimed seats in the
house. These men were five years younger at forty, and, compositely, farmers or stock raisers, who had moved out to Kansas
three or four years later in 1878 or 1879 from the same native
states. Only eight of the thirty-four were veterans of the legislative
war, although one out of three had previous legislative experience.
More than one out of four were college graduates, but the majority
had only a common-school education. In their previous political
affiliations, Republicans, Democrats, and third-party men were
represented by the ratio of five, three, and two respectively.6
With the important exception of the Populist representative's comparative youthfulness, the most significant contrast between the two parties was still one of occupation. The line was
clearly drawn between the political and economic interests of business and agriculture, town and country, factory and farm, professional men and farmers, entrepreneurship and husbandry.7
This cleavage was even sharper in the holdover, Populistcontrolled senate.8 Considering, then, the depth of this cleavage
in the legislature, the governor's interpretation of the role of gov-
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ernment,9 and the intensity of partisan rancor, it was not surprising that the 1895 legislature enacted few reform laws.
While the new house had been occupied with the business
of organization and the selection of a United States senator and a
state printer, the senate had concerned itself with legislation. By
the time the house turned its attention to legislation the senate had
already passed a number of bills for house consideration. The
Republican majority of the house, jealous of its power and at odds
with the Populist senate majority, gave scant consideration to
measures that originated in the upper house. As one contemporary
legislative analyst put it, "A bill, no matter how meritorious, that
passed the senate, when messaged to the house was scarcely considered worthy of notice, and usually died in the hands of the
committee to whom it was referred ...." 10 Among these bills
passed by the senate were measures designed to increase the duties
of the board of railroad commissioners, to regulate and establish
"reasonable maximum charges" for railroad freight, to fix passenger rates on railroads and to prevent rebates and passes ( except
under certain prescribed conditions), and another to regulate telegraph charges (passed by a vote of thirty to nothing), but all were
turned down in the house.11 A house-sponsored railroad bill was
not even brought to a vote in the house of origin.12
Four measures originating in the house were passed and
subsequently enacted into law which received the indorsement of
reformers. One provided for the health and safety of persons
employed in the mines, another provided for the purchase of seed
grain to be distributed "to the needy farmers of Western Kansas,"
and a similar measure appropriated $2000 to be used by the Board
of Railroad Commissioners to purchase coal for distribution to
"the needy people of Western Kansas." The most important legislative enactment, however, was that which created a board of
irrigation with powers to conduct experiments and to coordinate
efforts in promoting irrigation projects. 13
Populists could find little solace in these few enactments.
The performance of the 1895 legislature, in fact, simply emphasized all the more the necessity of gaining full control of the state
government. But how were they to accomplish that task? Their
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resounding defeat of 1894 had complicated the problem to a
seemingly hopeless degree. Perhaps the answer was contained in
M'Call's vituperative speech before the Kansas Day Club. Populists, said M'Call, had forgotten that "a great political party"
must champion principles "broad enough in their conception for
the grouping of all classes ...." To put it another way, a party
should not challenge the consensus so directly; it should narrow
its platform, deal less with particulars and more with generalities
or issues that find support among a wider segment of the voters.
Perhaps the fervor then being generated in behalf of "free silver"
pointed the way to an issue that could command the needed
support?
As a political issue, free coinage of silver had formidable
roots, going back at least twenty-two years, when congress, as
silver partisans liked to say, perpetrated the dastardly "crime of
'73" and demonetized silver. The issue began to assume greater
importance, however, when President Cleveland, in an effort to
deal with the panic and depression that began in 1893, summoned
a special session of congress to repeal the Sherman Silver Purchase
Act of 1890. The measure was repealed, but the effort accentuated
feeling on the issue, contributed immensely to the division of
Democratic and Republican parties along sectional lines, and gave
an importance to the issue of silver vastly out of proportion to its
true merits. 14
Kansas Populists in congress figured prominently in the
fight against repeal. But they did not allow their opposition to
distort their analysis of the causes of the depression, nor were they
inclined to indorse free silver as a panacea. For example, as part
of his effort against repeal Jerry Simpson stated:
To my mind, Mr. Speaker, the causes of the condition of our people to-day are numerous; and they did not
begin yesterday or the day before, or last year or the year
before. This condition had its rise in the bad institutions
of government with which we started out. We began
wrong. We have failed to secure to human society and to
individuals the rights that belong to them. This great nation in the course of its progress has created enormous
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powers, and instead of fortifying the rights of the people,
has granted these vast powers to a privileged class ....
To my mind, Mr. Speaker, while the money question is a great question, and one that demands immediate
attention and settlement, one that calls for the best efforts
of the statesmanship of this country to give this nation a
permanent system of finance, yet the lack of this is not the
only evil that has produced the present lamentable condition of the country. 15

As an antidepression measure the repeal of the Sherman
Act was a monumental failure. Repeal failed even to save the
monetary system, for the House of Morgan was called upon to
manage that feat. 16 The net effect of it all was to exacerbate the
money question; and, especially in the West and in the South
where bimetallism had long enjoyed wide support, the cause of
silver engendered the kind of accord not available on other issues.
Prominent Populist leaders exerted every effort to prevent
the silver issue from pushing aside other Populist reforms. In November, 1893, Dr. Stephen McLallin had faced the problem in
The Advocate by writing: "While the demand for free coinage
of silver is one of the planks of the Omaha platform, it is the one
of least importance among them all." Events, he noted, had
brought it into prominence "recently," thereby creating "an excellent opportunity for a general discussion of the whole subject of
American finance; but it can never be permitted to sidetrack the
more important questions expressed and implied in the new declaration of independence adopted at Omaha on July 4, 1892."
McLallin warned, in that same article, "Free coinage of silver if
accomplished and other things left as they are would do the
people no good."17
Interestingly enough, it was at this time, when the issue of
silver was coming to the front, that Dr. McLallin and other radical
Populists took up the subject of socialism, not only to defend
themselves against the onslaught of their opponents but also to
obtain support for more fundamental reforms. To the extent,
then, that the "cow-bird" label conveys the idea of reform taking
on an importance not held in the beginning of the movement,
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silver and the "socialistic" measures of the Populist program both
qualify as "cow-bird" issues in Kansas Populism. 18 But it was
silver that finally qualified as the "cow-bird" in the full sense of
the phrase as coined by Henry Demarest Lloyd, for it was the
issue of free silver that relegated other Populist reforms in Kansas
to a secondary position.
On February 6, 1894, the president of the state Alliance told
that organization's annual meeting, "We have had much advice
of late looking towards reducing the number of our demands to
one. I am utterly opposed to the elimination of a single demand.
To make a contest on the one plank of 'free coinage of silver'
would be entirely too narrow for a progressive organization." 19
Dr. McLallin kept up his opposition to the same trend on through
that election year. The party generally, in its platform of 1894 and
through its spokesman during the campaign that year, in no
measurable sense retreated from its broad program of reform
in favor of the single issue of free silver.20 After all, even that
conservative Republican platform of 1894 had demanded "the use
of both gold and silver as standard money." 21 Then came that
decisive and shattering defeat of 1894. Antifusionists, rational and
irrational types, were greatly discredited. To win control of the
machinery of government the party needed to win a majority of
the people to its support. It was reasoned that this could be accomplished by narrowing the platform. The national committee soon
after the election, as represented in the expressions of Chairman
H. E. Taubeneck, pointed up this new thinking.2 2 It found an
expression in Kansas Populist circles as well. On December 12,
The Advocate published an article by state Senator Michael Senn
which emphasized the need for broadening Populist support.
Senator Senn advised that this should be attempted by dealing
with only one reform at a time, and as a beginning he suggested
the single issue of free silver.23
Dr. Stephen McLallin considered Senn's suggestion "the
height of absurdity."24 On into 1895 The Advocate continued to
oppose the tendency to make silver the primary issue.25 It was a
losing battle. Gradually, McLallin gave in to the demand. On
May 29, 1895, he wrote: "If free coinage of silver will relieve the
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industrial people of the country until they learn more about the
science of money, let's have free coinage."
It was at this time that W. H. Harvey's Coin's Financial
School, the great silver classic, and Kansas treatises, as well, were
taken up by the reform press for publication.26 Irrepressibly, it
seemed, the subject monopolized the field. But not all Populist
leaders were willing to concede all to the issue-not even for the
sake of expediency; it was a terribly divisive issue.
With fusion lurking in the background, Republicans were
quick to sense an opportunity to divide the enemy by driving a
wedge between the crack thus opened in Populist ranks. Early in
June, 1895, the new, young, Republican editor of the Emporia
Gazette, William Allen White by name, demonstrated his sagacity
on this point. White singled out for special abuse those Populists
who were attempting to rally Republican opposition around the
issue of free silver. "There is nothing of the old alliance Puritan
cry for reform in these men," wrote White. "Has not the whole
fabric of the reform party," he asked, "its heroes, its aspirations,
its ambitions, its lofty desires fallen among thieves on the
Jericho road?" "Where is the Alliance man with the courage to
deny that his party that was going to reform the world has made
a 'deal' that would have been hissed out of the first farmers convention in the year of our Lord 1890."27 In a July issue of the
Gazette, White took the occasion of a meeting of the Populist
state committee as the opportunity to heap more ridicule upon the
opposition. Just a "handful of schemers sitting around a box full
of saw dust," he wrote, was all that was left of a movement that
"was to reform the world, make life run smoothly on the grooves
of change, and give every man a living in comfort and idleness."
Here it was now,
a fizzle,-and not even a glorious fizzle, just a dreary [,]
soggy, fagged out, limber-kneed, red-eyed fizzle. The party
that was going to pay off all the debts of the people by
legislation, that was going to even up the inequalities of
life that come from inequalities of brain, the party that was
going to stop the smart man from getting the best of the
stupid chump, the party that was going to do what God
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himself couldn't do-make men equal .... And all that is
left of this great nightmare is a roomful of sad visages,
seedy citizens and a terrible past. 28
With or without Republican abuse on the point, the emphasis on free silver was bound to create dissension. The state
Alliance was firmly in the hands of representatives of the party's
antifusion wing, men who would "compromise nothing with
evil," and who would oppose all concession or retreat from their
original program. 29 Late in September, 1895, moreover, the antifusionist Kansas Populist League met in Topeka and adopted a
resolution stating that they were "unalterably opposed to making
the free-silver plank the dominant issue in the coming campaign,"
for them it was "the Omaha platform in its entirety" and nothing
less. 30 Antifusion sentiment had a good deal more going for it
than it had in 1894; the turn towards free silver undeniably represented a moderation of the party's stand, and on this account
antifusionist ranks were bound to grow.
The situation was decidedly altered. Early in October, 1895,
The Advocate announced that Senator Peffer had obtained a controlling interest in the paper, and that thereafter its editorial policies would be under his "general direction." McLallin remained
on the staff four months longer, retiring officially on February 3,
1896.31 Under the senator's direction, the paper again took issue
with the emphasis on free silver; it also took a stand against the
amalgamation of all reform elements in the upcoming campaign.32
Both positions were of course interwoven; both were contrary to
the drift of Kansas politics.
The same issue of The Advocate announcing Dr. Stephen
McLallin's retirement (a significant event in itself) published another letter from state Senator Michael Senn which took issue
with the paper's position. "Why a single issue-free coinage?"
asked Senn. "Not because it is the most important question; not
because it would benefit the people more than any other reform
measure, but because it is the only question that the great majority
of the people are really interested in." 33 It was difficult to deny the
logic of Senn's answer, but there was another haunting question
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facing the party. Late in April, 1896, The Advocate asked it in an
article entitled: "If the Democrat National Convention Declares
for Free Silver Coinage, Then What of the People's Party ?"34
Most Populists gave little thought to this possibility, or if
they did they convinced themselves the Grover Cleveland, goldstandard wing of the party would maintain its control. The
unifying qualities of the free-silver issue overshadowed other
considerations; in it there was hope of rejuvenating a weakening
and badly discordant reform cause. The turn towards free silver,
moreover, was not just dictated by circumstances and the undeniable predicament of the party as a state and national organization; on the county level five years of vigorous discussion and
sustained organization, success and failure, had wrought some
significant changes at the base.
These changes were well illustrated in the case of Osage
County. Situated about midway across the state from north to
south and about fifty miles from its eastern boundary, Osage had
become one of Populism's greatest strongholds. First organized
in 1859, the county's growth and development after that date was
typical of her sister counties in the Kansas mid-section. Only her
standing as one of the state's leading coal producers set her apart
significantly from the vast majority of Kansas counties, but agriculture was her primary source of wealth.35
After 1887, when the boom and bust cycle had completed its
work, Osage was among the first to join in the Alliance movement
in its rural and urban forms, and the county was in the forefront
of the move which led to the creation of the People's party. Following the leadership of a group of men drawn almost without
exception from the ranks of farmers, teachers, and lawyers (many
of whom had been active in third-party reform politics for years),
discontented Osage County citizens were channelled into a political organization which made its appeal on the basis of a dualistic
interpretation of social struggles-"productive labor" (farm, factory, and mine) against the "non-producers" (capitalists). The
party's leaders unquestionably identified the cause of the farmer
with labor; whether the laborer identified his cause with the
farmer was another question.36
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The election results in Osage County soon provided the
answer-the labor vote was not drawn en masse to the People's
party; in fact, the backbone of party strength in the county readily
revealed itself to be dependent on an alliance between farmers and
their middle-class cousins of the towns (the very groups that had
been organized in the Farmers' and Citizens' Alliance) .37 This
was best illustrated in the voting patterns of Osage City, which
was the county's largest town (population 4,243 in 1895). The
town was the center of the coal-mining industry, and the labor
vote enjoyed a sizable majority. This majority cast its vote with a
high degree of consistency for the Republican party throughout
the 1890s, rather than for the Populist party or the Democratic
party. For voting purposes the city was divided into four wards.
Two of these were overwhelmingly labor wards; the other two
contained a significant, although numerically smaller, segment of
business or professional elements who voted along with their
laboring-class neighbors. Significantly, when the Populist ticket
was successful in Osage City, it was successful in the two wards
that contained the middle-class vote and not in the two predominantly labor wards. 38
Recognition that the party had failed to win significant
support from the ranks of labor could not help but effect a significant change in Populist attitudes, for its middle-class orientation
was all the more emphasized. Add to this a natural tendency toward moderation encouraged by the passage of time, the responsibility of political office, and the bitter attack of opponents upon
the party leadership as a group of misfits, who not only had committed the unpardonable sin of attacking the success myth but
who were adjudged to be the failures of society, it was not surprising that the movement had altered considerably by 1895.
Within a few months of the 1894 election, Populist leadership in Osage County had undergone noticeable change. Although
control had shifted to new hands, the change was more one of
tone and emphasis than a shift to men of a different background;
throughout the decade the party's leadership came largely from
farmer-teacher-lawyer circles (in the balance it could be said that
the urban wing outweighed the rural after 1894) . The men of
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1895 were more compromising and decidedly less class-conscious
than the party's original leaders had been. This transition was
well illustrated by the kind of campaign that was launched early
in 1895. The official Populist paper of the county was The Peoples
Herald, which was published in Lyndon. From 1890 to 1898 the
paper's editorial management changed hands frequently; usually,
the editor of the paper also held the position of county chairman.
Such was the case when S. H. Gill took over as editor in February,
1895. On assuming editorship, Gill announced that he had not
taken over the paper "to set the world on fire," and he immediately shifted the emphasis of the paper.39 "The financial question
is the fundamental issue," he wrote. 40 All other issues in his view
were of "minor consideration." 41 By April, he contended that it
was "acknowledged on all hands that financial reform [ would]
... be the main issue in the next campaign." 42 This contention
was vigorously challenged, however, by the Farmers' Alliance of
Osage County, which insisted that their "trinity of principles"
(land, finance, and transportation) was indivisible. 43
Gill continued nonetheless to use The Peoples Herald to
popularize the silver issue. Beginning in May he began to run a
column on Coin's Financial School. By August, the emphasis on
silver had produced results. The county convention was held that
month to select candidates for six county offices. The delegates
reaffirmed their allegiance to the Omaha Platform, but in their
resolutions they stressed their demand for the coinage of silver
with that of gold at a ratio of sixteen to one without restating their
demands pertaining to land and transportation.44
The manner in which The Peoples Herald presented Populist candidates to the voters that fall also revealed much about
the movement. The county convention selected four farmers, a
doctor, and the proprietor of a brick-manufacturing firm to represent the party. Charles F. Mitchell, the party's candidate for
county commissioner, was introduced to the voters by Gill as a
man who had "as tidy and neat a home and as good a farm as
there is in Arvonia township, and all without a cent of debt whatever." J. I. Sweezey, their candidate for coroner, was presented as
a young doctor who "is now enjoying a lucrative practice at Lyn-
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don ...." Thomas Cain, the nominee for county treasurer, was
portrayed as a "successful and well-to-do farmer of Burlingame
township." The candidate for sheriff, Woolford Wyatt, was said
to be "a man of shrewd, keen and splendid business ability ...." 45
Times certainly had changed since the party's candidates were
first presented to the voters in 1890.46 A keen business sense and
affiuence, instead of a working man's perspective and a mortgaged
farm, apparently had become the hallmark of suitable candidacy.47
As a county organization, the election that November saw
the Osage County Populists suffer their first defeat since they had
taken the field in 1890 (actually the party lost only three of the six
contests) .48 All the more reason, it was felt, for the party to endeavor to broaden its support by emphasizing its stand on free
silver.
Certainly, that was the position of The Peoples Herald
following the 1895 election. The editor of the paper was much
disturbed to learn at about the same time that the Topeka Advocate under Senator Peffer's direction was opposing fusion and
writing that "If Populism means nothing more than free coinage
of silver, there is no excuse for the existence of such a party." 49
The editor of The Peoples Herald responded in time by insisting
that "if Senator Peffer will come home and talk with the people
he will find them heartily in favor of union of all forces on the
money question." 50
To fuse or not to fuse? free silver or a more fundamental
reform of American society? these were the vital questions agitating reform ranks as the crucial election of 1896 approached.
Perhaps there was a logical dilemma underlying it all. Could it
be that Populists were doomed to defeat with or without fusion,
with or without a union of forces on the silver issue?
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SILVER, FUSION, AND SUCCESS?

If they dare to come out in the open field and defend the
gold standard as a good thing, we will fight them to the
uttermost. Having behind us the producing masses of this
nation and the world, supported by the commercial interests, the laboring interests and the toilers everywhere, we
will answer their demand for a gold standard by saying to
them: You shall not press down upon the brow of labor
this crown of thorns, you shall not crucify mankind upon a
cross of gold.

M}I
~ i t h these words William Jennings Bryan concluded his speech before the 1896 Democratic
national convention held in Chicago early in July. The young
Nebraska Democrat became at once the man of the hour, the
champion of the silverites, and in due course the presidential nominee of his party. The convention also did what more cautious
Populists had feared most: it had embraced the cause of free silver.
Populist strategy was at that point completely bankrupt. The national committee had purposely delayed its convention until both
major parties had committed themselves. The hope was that the
Republican and Democratic conventions would both be controlled
by the "gold-bugs," thus enabling the Populists to gather in their
bolting silverites. At St. Louis in June, Republicans obliged with
William McKinley and a gold platform; but Populists obviously
had reckoned without William Jennings Bryan and the great
appeal of silver within Democracy.1
Needless to say, Bryan's nomination seriously complicated
Populist politics. In Kansas, the immediate reaction to the Democracy's Chicago conversion was quite favorable. Abe Steinberger, Populist editor of the Girard World and president of the
Kansas Reform Press Association, registered his dissent, however,
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by raising some pertinent questions: "Is the Populist party ready
to be dumped into the lap of Democracy? Are the men who have
been fighting the battle of humanity in this country for twenty
years willing to acknowledge all they wanted was a change in
basic money? Are we ready to sacrifice all the demands of the
Omaha platform on the cross of silver?"2
What choice did they have? Kansas Populists were vulnerable to the appeal, duly fostered by the Democrats, that there
should be only one silver leader in the campaign. Even the Topeka
Advocate, which until then had advised caution, was moved by
the nomination of the Nebraska silverite, and within a short time
it became clear that the Populist press of the state was all but
unanimously behind Bryan's nomination at the party's upcoming
national convention.3
But could Populists support Bryan and still maintain party
integrity? To a small segment of ultra-antifusionists the answer
was an unqualified no; to another, larger segment of antifusionists
there were doubts but recognition that the party had little choice;
to the fusionists of the party, and to those who had conceded
everything to the silver issue, the question was of no particular
importance.
Ex-Governor Lewelling and Frank Doster advised that the
party indorse rather than nominate Bryan. Said Doster, "If we
nominate Bryan ... we must trim our platform. We must pitch
our tune to suit his voice. I am not in favor of this. Let us make
our own platform a Populist platform and then indorse the candidacy of Mr. Bryan. That would obviate the danger which surely
will come if we adopt any other course." 4
The position of Lewelling and Doster required of course
that the Populists desist from naming men to head their national
ticket. This proposition was opposed by two significant stumbling
blocks: first, there was the determination of extreme antifusionists
to carry on without paying the slightest heed to other considerations; secondly, there was the Democratic party's vice-presidential
nominee, Arthur Sewall. As a shipbuilder, national banker, and
railway director, Sewall had nothing in common with Populists,
except free silver, and was a bit more than most Populists could
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swallow. As Ignatius Donnelly so aptly put it, Populists were
"willing to swallow Democracy gilded with the genius of a
Bryan" but were quite unwilling to "stomach plutocracy in the
body of Sewall."5
Given this situation, the decision of the St. Louis convention was understandable although not especially logical. After
much maneuvering and excitement, the delegates first nominated
Tom Watson of Georgia, as fervid a mid-road Populist as existed
in their camp, for vice-president, and then they nominated Bryan
for president.6
It was the kind of arrangement that few Populists were
entirely satisfied with; it in fact created new problems that would
have to be dealt with to manage a successful campaign. But most
Kansas Populists easily reconciled themselves to the outcome,
sensing a real possibility of raising the banner of silver over the
White House that November. With the Topeka Advocate they
could agree that Populists should go all out in their support of
Bryan while maintaining their independence and principles.7
It was a difficult, if not impossible, assignment; fusion was
the order of the day, and fusion, rather than coalition as it had
been before 1896, was a proper word for what occurred in that
campaign. On August 4, Kansas Democrats assembled in convention at Hutchinson, and the Populist convention met in Abilene
the following day. Communication between the two conventions
resulted in an arrangement whereby the Democrats, who were
given two places on the ticket, agreed to name man for man the
same candidates the Populists selected for state officers. Populists,
in turn, agreed to name the same presidential electors as the
Democrats selected, although it was understood that the Populist
ticket would be headed by Bryan-Watson and the Democratic
ticket by Bryan-Sewall. The decision as to whom these electors
would support for vice-president was, according to the Populist
state central committee, to depend upon which candidate-Watson or Sewall-received the larger number of electoral votes outside of Kansas.8
In the Populist convention, fusion and antifusion sentiment
was not sharply drawn but it existed. It was in fact reflected in the
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selection of a gubernatorial candidate. The principal contenders
were William A. Harris, ex-Governor Lewelling, and State Senator John W. Leedy. Harris represented the hope of fusionists and
Lewelling the antifusionists. Leedy was comparatively a nonentity, and therefore the man both sides could turn to as least
objectionable. State Chairman Breidenthal apparently favored
Harris. The state chairman certainly objected to Lewelling's renomination and had worked against the former governor before
the convention.9 On the first ballot Harris received the larger
number of votes, followed by Lewelling and Leedy. Finally, on
the fourth ballot the nomination went to John W. Leedy.10
Senator Leedy's background was as ordinary as his personality was mediocre. The forty-six-year-old farmer from Le Roy in
Coffey County had distinguished himself chiefly as a staunch
advocate of a maximum freight bill in the senate. He was a native
Ohioan who had settled on a farm in Kansas in 1881. He had
only a rudimentary common-school education, but that had not
proved too great a handicap to many a successful farmer and businessman. Apparently things went along reasonably well for the
Leedy family for the first few years. Then the picture altered
drastically; before long Leedy was forced to turn over his properties to his creditors. His politics changed as well. He entered the
state a Republican. In 1884, however, he threw in his lot with the
Democrats. He left that party in 1890 to join the Populists, and in
the contest of 1892 he was elected to the state senate. His nomination for governor at Abilene, as indicated, was due mainly to
the party's inability to unite on any one outstanding leader.
Leedy's nomination was a way out of the deadlock, but he was not
the kind of individual who could unite the party under his personal leadership.11
Actually, Senator Leedy was among the lesser qualified
men on the Populist ticket. At the top of the list was Frank
Doster, nominated for chief justice of the state supreme court.
Doster's nomination was considered a "bitter pill" for the Democrats and the worst kind of perfidy by Republicans. The remainder
of the ticket consisted of relatively unknown but capable nominees. For lieutenant governor the convention selected Alexander
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M. Harvey from Topeka, a thirty-year-old lawyer and teacher
who had won distinction as one of the party's youngest county
chairmen; for attorney general, Louis C. Boyle from Fort Scott, a
thirty-year-old law graduate from the University of Michigan who
had served as county attorney for two terms in Bourbon County
as a Democrat; for secretary of state, W. E. Bush, a long-time
third-party man and editor of the Western Advocate in Jewell
County; for state treasurer, David Heflebower, a rather well-to-do
farmer (he was said to own "2,400 acres of well-improved, wellstocked land") and long-time third-party worker from Miami
County; for superintendent of public instruction, William Stryker,
a thirty-year-old educator and college president who had been
with the party since 1890; and for state auditor, W. H. Morris, a
lawyer and former Democratic county attorney from Pittsburg.12
For Republicans, the performances at Hutchinson and Abilene were quite disheartening. The G.O.P. was confronted with
a difficult situation. Fusion of its opponents was not its only
problem, but fusion was the most formidable and the most exasperating of all. Some Republican leaders like Sol Miller were
prone to spew out pure vitriol in the face of the forces that were
lining up against them. In reporting the outcome of the Populist
national convention, Miller had dashed off these lines:
The Calamity Convention at St. Louis last week,
pretending to represent a great national party, was the
most disgraceful aggregation that ever got together in
America. Anarchists, howlers, tramps, highwaymen, burglars, crazy men, wild-eyed men, men with unkempt and
matted hair, men with long beards matted together with
filth from their noses, men reeking with lice, men whose
feet stank, and the odor from under whose arms would
have knocked down a bull, brazen women, women with
beards, women with voices like a gong, women with
scrawny necks and dirty fingernails, women with their
stockings out at the heels, women with snaggle-teeth,
strumpets, rips, and women possessed of devils, gathered
there, and sweltered and stank for a whole week, making
speeches, quarrelling, and fighting like cats in a back yard.
Gray-haired, scrawny, yellow-skinned women appeared
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upon the stage, dressed in hideous or indecent costumes,
and gave performances that disgusted the most hardened
Calamityites, until even Jerry Simpson gagged, and protested that the Convention was too much of a circus ....
The gathering was so outlandish that each delegate imagined that the others were burlesquing him. To wind up
the whole thing, delegates were bought up like the hogs
theywere.13

Trapped by the gold plank of the Republican national platform and painfully aware that free silver appealed as strongly to
a broad segment of Kansas Republicans as it did to Populists or
Democrats, ridicule was just about all Republicans had left in their
armory. As James Malin has written, "Many if not most Republicans in Kansas, who had remained with the party through Populist days, had accepted the silver philosophy with a pentacostal
fervor that admitted of little compromise . . . . For most Kansas
Republicans the necessity of accepting the gold plank was a shattering experience." 14 In addition to this, Governor Morrill, like
Governor Lewelling before him, had bogged down in the administration of the metropolitan police law and in his handling of the
liquor question so as to alienate both the liquor and prohibition
interests. By 1896 Governor Morrill, in his bid for renomination,
had even lost the support of party boss Cy Leland. 15 The Republican malaise was therefore no mystery.
On August 12, Governor Morrill won his renomination
nonetheless, and Republicans set out to make the best of a bad
situation. It was the Republican party against the fusion forces of
Populists, Democrats, and Silver Republicans.
Down in Emporia, young Bill White sensed the hopelessness of developments. A month before McKinley's nomination
White wrote an editorial stating that as the next president William McKinley had "a great opportunity before him." The question confronting the next president, wrote White, is "Shall we
have a new deal, or lose the deck one of these days?" Earlier in
the editorial, White wrote: "The West has lots of labor; the East
has lots of capital. . . . Heretofore the capital end of the bargain
has been given the best of it by the courts. It is time for the West
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to get a cinch. The farmer and his friends have paid the fiddler
long enough to have a right to dance some."16
That editorial was not at all typical of the kind of campaign
White waged in his Emporia Gazette that year. In fact, he waged
precisely the same kind of battle against the Populists that Republicans had been waging for years. The usual bill of fare was
ridicule, the cry of "anarchy," and a social-Darwinian framework
designed to depict Populist leaders, or farmers generally by inference, as the mis.fits of society. On August 6, White declared: "The
man who supports the Populists in this election whether for road
overseer or for President, is lending his vote and his influence to
the cause of anarchy." 17 A week later White wrote:" 'Every man
for himself and the devil take the hindermost,' is a fair statement
of the idea of American government as it exists today. But during
recent years, there has grown up in the West the un-American
doctrine of state pateranilism [sic]." Obviously, he said, "These
two theories are violently antagonistic-one is American, Democratic, Saxon; the other is European, Socialistic; Celtic."18 On
October 29, he wrote: "From time to time during this campaign
the Gazette has charged that, while the rank and file of the Populists were honest, sincere but deluded men and women, the leaders are the failures, the incompetent, the riffraff, the ragtag and
bobtail of the community-in short the scum of the earth."19
With editorials like these, small wonder the pudgy little
editor was jostled about by aroused Populists on the streets of
Emporia, prompting the young editor to compose a more extensive, although not especially new, attack on the Populist party that
he entitled "What's the Matter with Kansas?" His answer:
We all know; yet here we are at it again. We have
an old mossback Jacksonian who snorts and howls because
there is a bathtub in the state house; we are running that
old jay for Governor. We have another, shabby, wild-eyed,
rattle-brained fanatic who has said openly in a dozen
speeches that "the rights of the user are paramount to the
rights of the owner"; we are running him for Chief Justice,
so that capital will come tumbling over itself to get into the
state. We have raked the old ash heap of failure in the
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state and found an old human hoop-skirt who has failed as
a preacher, and we are going to run him for Congressmanat-Large.... Then we have discovered a kid without a
law practice and have decided to run him for Attorney
General. Then, for fear some hint that the state had become respectable might percolate through the civilized portions of the nation, we have decided to send three or four
harpies out lecturing, telling the people that Kansas is raising hell and letting the corn go to weeds.
There was more of the same. The article's only claim to originality was its pertinence to that political campaign and the clever
manner in which White had written it. The same kind of arguments had been used over and over since 1890. White's satirical
prose imperatives ("Whoop it up for the ragged trousers; put the
lazy, greasy fizzle, who can't pay his debts, on an altar and bow
down and worship him. Let the state ideal be high. What we
need is not the respect of our fellow men, but the chance to get
something for nothing ....") had been worked countless times
before. 20 Why then was the article picked up and copied by nearly
every Republican paper in Kansas and by nearly every Republican
paper in cities of more than 50,000 population outside of Kansas,
and why was the article used as campaign material by the Republican national committee? Indeed, why? Because it aptly represented the feelings of Republicans in their campaign (not to
mention the railroad companies which apparently distributed
numerous reprints) against Bryan and his allies? Indeed, that was
the case. Beyond that, however, White's was a view that struck a
sympathetic or nagging chord at that precise moment throughout
American society, a response that was all the more devastating
because Populism-in its move towards free silver and fusionhad been stripped of much of its protective ideological shield. The
Populists of 1890-1894 had not been greatly disturbed by their
opponents' use of the success myth and social Darwinism against
them; many, perhaps most, of the Populists of 1896 were sensitive
to that attack.
A few Populist spokesmen sensed the party's weakness on
this account and pointed up the futility of waging a campaign
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that treated the silver issue as a panacea. G. C. Clemens, for one,
hit out at the fusion managers by writing:
These traitors to the holy cause of the people would
have us abandon, as they have already abandoned, every
aim of our party, in order that we may secure the accession
of old-party politicians, who, we are cooly informed, are
too ignorant or too capitalistic to endure even the mention
of postal savings banks, the public ownership of public utilities, a national currency issued directly to the people without the intervention of banks, the extinction of the monopoly of the earth, or the paring of the rather dangerous
claws of the federal courts.
In that protest, Clemens emphasized: "We can put silver
back where it was in 1873, but we cannot put the world back
there. And, in the world of to-day, with its gigantic trusts and
combinations-none of which will our proposed allies permit us
to touch-would free silver restore the conditions of twenty-three
years ago? What folly to even dream!" "The whole trouble is
and has been," wrote Clemens, "our national chairman has lacked
a whole Napoleon of being a great leader or any leader at all." If
he had "not deliberately stifled all agitation of everything but the
money question, other parts of our platform would be just as
popular as free silver to-day; and under capable leadership we can
rally for our most radical demand a greater host than any 'singleissue,' free silver party can hope to inspire." Make no mistake
about it, "Not a Populist in the land is hostile to free silver. Our
objection is to preaching that free silver alone can work any great
economic change."21
G. C. Clemens' contention that the "radical" demands of
the Populist program would have been just as popular as free
silver if party managers had not pushed the silver issue to the
exclusion of all else was probably just wishful thinking on his part.
There was much merit to his protest nevertheless, and it must be
conceded that the emphasis on free silver tended to undermine
other Populist reforms.
Although Clemens ( and undoubtedly many other Populists) felt this way, he chose not to support the movement then
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under way to create a "middle-of-the-road" Populist electoral ticket
in Kansas.22 The middle-of-the-road effort was led by Abe Steinberger, John F. Willits, Cy Corning, W. F. Rightmire, and W. H.
Bennington. Claiming to be interested only in real reform and in
securing the election of Tom Watson, these men set up a party
headquarters, obtained a place on the ballot for middle-of-the-road
electors in behalf of Bryan-Watson,23 and launched an attack on
the fusion leaders. The mid-roaders declared that "the only people
willing to follow the commands of these treacherous leaders are
the hungry leaders of the People's party who are so anxious for
office that they would follow a garbage cart." All producers of
Kansas, they said, desired relief from "corporate greed and the
oppressions of the gold standard," but could that relief be obtained
by working with "putrid Democracy, the co-worker with the
Republican machine under the dictates of the money gamblers
and corruption boodlers of the Hanna stripe?" Obviously these
men thought not, and they warned:
Honest farmer, while you are toiling by day and puzzling
your brain by night, assembled in the capital city of Kansas
is a coterie of political manipulators, headed by Chairman
McLove of the Democratic party, Chairman Breidenthal,
Cy Leland, Chairman Webb McNall of the Free Silver Republicans, assisted and in consultation with other proteges
of the Hanna-Sewall-Cleveland conspirators, planning,
through the assistance of a plutocratic Supreme Court, to
deceive you and secure your vote for their schemes, under
the deception that you are supporting Watson ....24

In spite of all the attention they attracted, the mid-road
element consisted of a mere handful of intransigents who were
assisted all too openly by the Republicans.25 The regular Populist
organization insisted that "Hanna's money" and support from the
Republican state central committee was all that kept the midroaders afloat. This, it was charged, explained their gaining control of the Weekly Co-Operator and Topeka Press to air their
views.26
Midway through the campaign The Advocate, which until
then had been skeptical about the charges of collaboration between
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mid-roaders and Republicans, wrote that it seemed a little "peculiar" that such a weak organization without any visible means of
financial support could obtain a headquarters banner that exceeded
anything ever before displayed in Topeka. It was even more
peculiar, said The Advocate, that "this banner should be anchored
to the building owned and occupied by the leading State bank of
the city, which bank is largely owned by the owner of the goldbug Capital." The Advocate also professed to be somewhat
perplexed by the fact that the mid-roaders had secured "almost
unlimited free transportation," as well as the encouragement and
assistance of Republican papers. 27
The most troublesome problem for the fusion managers,
however, was not the indigenous mid-road attack but the appearance of Tom Watson. The Georgian carried his campaign to
Kansas early in September, much to the dismay of Chairman
Breidenthal, who above all wanted to avoid any dispute that
might upset the "arrangement" concerning the Watson-Sewall
electors. Breidenthal met with Watson behind closed doors and
pleaded with him to avoid conflict on that issue for the sake of the
Populist party. Watson refused; and, in one of several speeches,
he declared: "Somebody else must be asked to kill that Party; I
will not. I sat by its cradle; I have fought its battles; I have supported its principles since organization ... and don't ask me after
all my service with the People's party to kill it now. I am going
to stand by it till it dies . . . . " Sewall must be cast off, said
Watson. Kansas Populists, he pleaded, ought to realize "I took
my political life in my hands when I extended the hand of fellowship to your Simpsons, your Peffers, and your Davises in Georgia.
The Georgia Democrats murdered me politically for that act. I
stood by your men in Congress when others failed. I have some
rights at the hands of Kansas. I have counted on your support.
Can I get it?" 28
The middle-of-the-road, Bryan-Watson electoral ticket was
devised after Watson's visit, and Watson undeniably won the
sympathy of many rank-and-file Populists momentarily; but the
regular Populist organization was not about to alter its fusion
course. Abe Steinberger, the leader of the mid-roaders, subse-
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quently arranged a second Kansas tour for Watson, but the trip
never came off. 29 Watson wrote Steinberger that an "ulcerated
throat" would force him to cancel his previous commitment.
Added Watson: "I greatly regret this. The middle-of-the-road
Populists all over the Union have my sympathy and admiration.
They have been sold out and their party made a foot mat for
Democratic politicians to wipe their feet on . . . . The fusionists
have abandoned principle and gone into a mad scramble at the
pie counter." 30 Needless to say, Watson's decision relieved the
regular Populist organization of a potentially disruptive and embarrassing situation.
For the rest, the campaign went forward with a great
hurrah. Kansas had seen nothing like it since that incomparable
campaign of 1890. Few eligible Kansas voters, indeed, failed to go
to the polls that November; whether they backed gold or silver,
McKinley or Bryan, all were equally convinced that the election
was crucial.
In Kansas, the Populist-Democratic-Silver Republican combination emerged victorious. The state's electoral votes belonged
to Bryan, six of eight congressional seats were captured, and for
the first time in the state's history Republicans lost control of all
three branches of the state government. The victory was marred
nationally, however, by the decisive defeat of Bryan and an impressive victory for the Republican party.
It was a time for political assessment. William Allen White
summed up what he believed the election had settled: "The fight
came squarely," he wrote. "Mr. Bryan arrayed class against class.
He appealed to the misery of the poor; he indexed the luxurious
appointments of the rich. He attempted to draw to his side all of
those of the debet [sic] side of the ledger." Republicans, on the
other hand, "fought out their fight on the principle of individual
responsibility for individual failure or success." The G.O.P. position was that of "laissez faire" or "hands off." They "stood
squarely for 'vested rights.' They said, in effect, you cannot cut
off the rich man's wealth without curtailing the poor man's income." Free silver was just a "dummy" issue, wrote White. "The
issue went deeper. It permeated the political structure of the
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Nation. A change was a resolution-a resolution to a mild yet
dangerous form of socialism." White believed the issue had been
"settled for this generation."31
Nationally, White's assessment was not too far off target.
On the state level, at least as far as Kansas was concerned, the
issue was yet to be decided. The allies of 18% were defeated in
the nation but victorious in the state. They thus took themselves
to Topeka eager to do the will of the people who had supported
them. But what was their will? The silver issue had served as a
catalyst, bringing Populists, Democrats, and Silver Republicans
together; it was the only issue upon which they were in total
agreement. But free silver was totally beyond the power of the
state. What then would the allies of 1896 do with the power they
possessed? Much depended, of course, on how the administration
and the legislature translated a rather vague directive into political
action.
The installation of the Leedy administration was a festive
occasion. According to the Topeka Capital, a "larger crowd" had
"probably" never before "witnessed the induction of new state
officers in Kansas ...." The mood of the participants, however,
was strikingly different from that of 1893. In a few words, the
sense of mission and righteous determination, which had characterized Governor Lewelling's inauguration, was conspicuously
absent. Populists, it was reported, even "interrupted" Governor
Morrill's departing address "with hearty applause" when he spoke
of the state's "great prosperity and marvelous progress" and castigated those who would besiege her with "calumnies."32
The word for Governor John Leedy's inaugural address
was bland.33 Republican editor Harold Chase of the Capital made
the inevitable comparison: "The contrast between the inauguration of Gov. Leedy ... and the scenes four years ago [,] when
Gov. Lewelling made his famous stump speech . . . , could not
fail to be noticed by all witnesses . . . . The address of the new
Governor was well chosen in words and sentiment, and met the
approval of his audience without regard to political affiliation."
Editor Chase was especially pleased to report that the speech was
devoid of that "sickly balderdash" of old.34
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In spite of the uninspiring note sounded by their leader, the
legislators of 1897 had reason for giving encouragement to their
own expectations; nominally, at least, the legislature was in reform hands. Senate membership counted twenty-seven Populists,
eleven Republicans, and two Democrat-Populists (Popocrats).
The house counted sixty-two Populists, forty-eight Republicans,
eight Popocrats, four Democrats, and three Silver Republicans.
Perhaps the only significant change in the kinds of men the
parties elected to office was reflected in a slight increase in the
number of nonfarmer, middle-class personalities in reformer
ranks-especially in the Popocrat category. Compositely, the Populist senator was a forty-eight-year-old farmer or stock raiser; eight
of the group, however, were engaged in some other business
occupation along with farming, or to the exclusion of farming
altogether. The Republican senator was four years younger, at
forty-four, and a business or professional man by occupation.
Populists and Republicans in the senate were both natives, in
greater numbers, of states like Ohio, New York, Illinois, or Pennsylvania, and the average senator of both parties had moved to
Kansas in 1872. The Republicans were better educated, but both
Populists and Republicans could claim about half their number as
experienced legislators.35
In the house, the Populist representative was a forty-fouryear-old farmer or stock raiser, who claimed Ohio, Illinois, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Iowa, or Missouri as his native state, and
Kansas as his residence since 1877. Roughly one of three Populists,
however, were not farmers. Thirty-eight of fifty-six (67.8 percent)
Populist representatives, for whom the information was available,
were engaged strictly in farming; compare this with the 1891
legislature which claimed seventy of eighty-eight (79 percent).
Taking the percentage of representatives who were associated
with farming in some capacity, the figures were eighty-four of
eighty-eight (95 percent) for 1891; forty-four of fifty-six (78 percent) for 1897. The Populist representative's Popocrat and Silver
Republican allies, moreover, were business or professional men.
The Republican representative, in contrast, was four years older,
at forty-eight, and a business or professional man (only eight of
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forty-two, for whom the information was available, were engaged
exclusively in farming) who had moved out to Kansas in 1878
from essentially the same native states as his Populist counterpart.
As was the case in the senate, the house Republican was better
educated-one of every two Republican representatives were college graduates as compared to less than one of every five Populists.
In the case of the house, however, legislative experience was not a
saving factor; the representatives of the 1897 house, in both parties,
were unusually inexperienced.36
One of the first tasks facing this legislature was the selection
of a United States senator to fill the vacancy soon to be created by
the expiration of Senator William Peffer's term. This assignment
really agitated the legislative ranks, for it was a political plum
long coveted by a number of Populist leaders. Senator Peffer was
in the running; five months earlier he had announced that he
would accept another term if it were offered.37 There was talk
that the senator was too old and that the party needed to send a
younger man up in his place. The Advocate, which was then
under Peffer's general direction, was quick to demonstrate that
the average age of the senators was sixty-five-exactly the age of
Senator William Peffer.38 The senator was misrepresented on
various positions he had taken, especially on the tariff, and The
Advocate worked to set the record straight.39 It made no difference; the senator had no determined support. On January 6, 1897,
The Advocate quoted an anti-Peffer article from the Le Roy
Reporter, which was replete with contradiction, and which, incidentally, revealed much about the state of the reform party at that
point. It read: "Peffer is rather antiquated in his ideas and not in
full sympathy with the vigorous and progressive element of his
party. He did very well for a figure-head when the party was new
and its members comparative strangers to one another." But the
situation had changed. "Strong men have come to the front.
Weak men have dropped to the rear. Black sheep have been
weeded out. Crazy and impracticable notions have been dropped
out of the profession and faith. Victory and a sense of responsibility have made the party more conservative and imbued its
leaders with broader and deeper ideas of statesmanship." Little
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wonder, the editorial concluded, that men like Peffer had "gradually" lost "their grip and young, vigorous men come to the front."
William Peffer's major failing, however, had been his cool
disposition regarding fusion and his nonsupport of the Leedy
faction at the Abilene convention. Certainly, few Populists had
championed Populist principles more consistently or more persistently than had he. His performance may have been unspectacular and excessively loaded with a cargo of facts, but there was
no denying the effort. His first resolution in the senate had called
for an inquiry into the business of loaning money; his last resolution, almost six years later, called for the establishment of a
national monetary commission. The first important bill he introduced in the senate aimed at creating a national bureau of loans,
and his last provided for a system of public banking.40 There was
indeed a certain irony in the fact that opposition to Peffer in 1891
had been based primarily on the fear that he would fuse with
Republicans once he went to the senate, and that he was opposed
in 1897 primarily because he had resisted fusion with Democrats.
When the legislature voted that January, not a single vote
was cast for William Peffer in the final count. William A. Harris,
the party's fusionist par excellence, won the legislature's vote of
confidence on the thirty-third ballot.41 But Peffer had not remained untouched by the considerable changes that had come
over his party. On assuming active editorship of The Advocate,
March 17, 1897, the ex-senator stated that the paper would remain
a Populist paper and it would continue to support the party's principles as enunciated in its national platforms, but he emphasized
that he saw the need for "applying them along conservative lines."
"This world is too big," he said, "for men to recreate it. Too many
things are now established to make it possible or even desirable
that all needed changes should be immediately and at once completely wrought." 42
The same sentiment, no doubt, was shared by many of the
party's new legislators, but there was a variety of other sentiment
as well. Certainly the degree of unity and zeal that had characterized the party's legislators in earlier sessions was gone; it had been
replaced, in the main, by contention and indecision, aided and
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abetted by lobbying pressures unknown to the Populists of earlier
legislatures. Until 1897 interested and powerful groups had had
at their disposal a check against undesirable Populist legislation,
inherent in the fact that Populism's antagonists had always controlled at least one element of the legislative process. Because of
this, the champions of reform, whose voices, incidentally, were
even less harmonious than in the past, were about to be tested in
their fidelity to the reform creed as they had never been tested
before.
The legislature managed to pass a number of reform measures nonetheless. It placed in the statutes a law forbidding the
blacklisting of workingmen by employers, it provided for the
regulation of stockyards, it passed another measure "defining and
prohibiting trusts," and it added additional laws to the books
pertaining to the health and safety of miners and to the regulation
of banking. It also created a department for the inspection and
weighing of grain, as well as a school-textbook commission. 43
Notable accomplishments all; but the party's supporters had a
right to expect greater things.
Legislation to reduce the legal maximum rate of interest in
the state had long been a favored Populist measure. A bill introduced in the senate to reduce the legal and contract rate from six
and ten percent to five and eight percent failed to gain the support
of enough Populist senators for passage. Every Republican senator
opposed the interest bill, to no one's surprise, but it was the Populist majority's nonfarmer, middle-class element that defeated the
bill. Talk of betrayal to Populist principles and purchased votes
was soon forthcoming. 44
An initiative and referendum amendment passed the senate
but was defeated in the house, primarily because Republican
opposition made it impossible to obtain the needed two-thirds vote.
A few Populists, however, were counted among the opposition.
Representative U. T. Tapscott, a Popocratic lawyer from Coolidge, called the measure, strangely enough, a "Populist whisky
measure," which he insisted was "wrong" because it favored "the
bum element of our state," and because it was "contrary to democratic principle."45 Republican opposition to the measure was
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more severe, but that there was any Populist opposition was decidedly the most inconsistent. 46 It was the vote on this measure
and on others like the interest bill that prompted The Advocate to
state that "Populists of certain districts in Kansas have sent men to
the legislature who are more nearly Republicans than Populists." 47
The most important measure to get caught up in the legislative snarl was the perennial railroad bill. It was the measure
nearest to Governor John Leedy's heart. In his message to the
legislature the governor had recommended a maximum-freight
law that would vest the railroad commission "with the judicial
powers of a court." He also had recommended that the commission be "given the power to adjust fares and freights within the
state" as it deemed just within the limits of a maximum rate.
The powers of this body, said the governor, should "be made
definite and certain, but subject to appeal" to the state supreme
court.48
A variety of railroad bills were introduced in the legislature.
The final decision on the matter, however, came to rest within the
senate railroad committee. Two different plans found support
among committee members: one, sponsored by Senator Moses
Householder from Cherokee, who apparently was Governor
Leedy's man on the committee, included the maximum-rate feature; the other, drafted by Senator William A. Harris, chairman
of the committee, proposed to assign the rate-fixing task to a
strengthened railroad commission. After reaching an impasse
over the two bills, the committee voted out a compromise measure, which was essentially a weakened version of Senator Harris'
bill with Householder's maximum-rate feature tacked on. This
brought the struggle out into the open. The night before the bill
was to be acted upon by the senate, Populist-Democratic senators
met in caucus to decide whether to support the measure as reported or to strike out the section containing the maximum-rate
schedule. Senators Harris, H. G. Jumper, and George Hanna led
in the move to strike out the rate schedule; Senator Householder
led in the effort to retain it. The opponents of a maximum-rate
schedule won by a vote of fifteen to ten. 49
The next day, when the measure came up for full senate
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consideration, the struggle was renewed. Senators Harris and
Jumper again figured prominently in the effort to strike out the
maximum-rate schedule. In his remarks before the senate, Harris
stated: "I have always been opposed to a maximum rate, because
I do not think it practicable. The commissioners have all the data
necessary to fix a rate and I do not believe that any committee or
Legislative body can fix a rate and arrive at a result as well as the
commissioners." He went on to say that the maximum-rate feature
enacted "would entail endless litigation, that would last for years,
and we would never be able to give the people the relief they are
demanding." Senator Householder pleaded with the senate to
give "the people a maximum rate, give them relief at present, and
lay the burden of proof on the railroads and let them go into the
courts and show that the rate is unjust, instead of compelling the
shippers to go into the courts and fight against the large corporations, as at present." After defeating several attempts to amend
and to substitute, however, the maximum-rate section was eliminated from the bill by a vote of twenty-four to fourteen. 50 The
bill, minus its maximum-rate provisions, then passed the senate by
a surprisingly unanimous vote.51
With sentiment running strongly in favor of a maximum
rate in the house, many observers predicted that the legislature
had lost its chance at railroad reform. But the house passed the
measure by an equally remarkable vote of 121 to 1; however, the
legislative surface was not nearly as placid as the votes indicated.
In the house, forty-four Populists signed a formal protest against
the bill because, as they put it, "it is not the measure we have
promised the people." These men also stated that they opposed
the bill because it "met with the full approval of the railroad lobby,
and because we believe it was drawn at the suggestion of the railroad attorneys of this state, and despite the fact that this bill has
met the sanction and approval of men high in the councils of our
party, we feel it is a makeshift and an evasion, a compromise, and
we are convinced ... that a compromise is nothing more nor less
than a defeat." One Populist representative even suggested that
the simple fact that Republicans had supported the bill was
enough reason for Populists to oppose it. Another Populist, a
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friend of the bill, told his colleagues that they had best learn that
"a half loaf is better than none" or their constituents would send
someone up in their place who understood that proposition. Obviously, the protesters were not eager to assume responsibility for
killing the bill, for they voted aye in spite of themselves.112
Governor John Leedy had no such reservations; he vetoed
the measure. He gave as his main reason his contention the bill
provided "no way by which an aggrieved shipper can secure relief." "The penalties named," he stated, "are so hedged about that
they will neither compel obedience to the terms of the law, nor
enforce subjection to the order of the commission." Most important, "the bill makes of the railroad commission a mere justice of
the peace court from which litigants pass to the district courts to
begin anew the trial of their cause, but fails to give to this tribunal
even the power to compel attendance and to enforce its decrees
with which that less august functionary is gifted." 53 But Governor
Leedy was not being completely candid, for it was the lack of a
maximum-rate schedule that decided his position.
Perhaps Governor Leedy did not see the measure as "half a
loaf," or perhaps he did not sympathize with that proposition at
all when it came to railroad legislation, but whatever the reason
the measure was vetoed. The whole affair was then subjected to
a wide range of subjective interpretation that did the party no
good. Walter J. Costigan, the Populist leader from Ottawa, maintained that the "veto is simply one feature of a game of politics
between Mr. Leedy and several other ambitious Populist statesmen." The problem was that these gentlemen were fighting over
the "exclusive glory" to come from passing "such a law." Costigan
stated, "There has been and is now no end of rivalry and jealousy
on this matter. No man in the party has this weakness more than
Leedy. I regard it the sole cause of his veto .... No matter what
bill would have passed, I feel certain it was his intention to veto
it, and to say it was not good."s. Other Populists felt that whatever else he may have been guilty of Governor Leedy had blundered badly in vetoing the railroad bill without making any effort
to secure a substitute measure while the legislature still had time
to act upon it.55 Partly because he failed to do this, the legislature
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adjourned that March discredited and confused to a degree that
was neither necessary nor deserved, and many a Kansas reformer
had cause to wonder whether their victory of 1896 had not been
a Pyrrhic victory.
Not long after the legislature adjourned, the Populist cause
was dealt another blow as a result of actions initiated by the
Populist-dominated board of regents of Kansas State Agricultural
College in Manhattan, actions that ultimately resulted in the disruption or termination of the tenure of the entire faculty and staff.
George T. Fairchild, president of the college and an outspoken
conservative-Republican opponent of Populism, resigned in the
face of the board's determination to alter the curriculum and faculty for the purpose of infusing the college with liberal ideas.
President Fairchild was replaced by Thomas E. Will, an independent in politics but an advocate of economic policies quite
acceptable to the Populist board members, who had been appointed to the chair of political economy during Governor Lewelling's administration at the insistence of the Populist members
of that earlier board. Following Fairchild's resignation, three
professors resigned and ten others (professors and assistants) were
notified that they would not be reemployed. Fourteen other faculty members, twelve of whom were known to be Republicans,
as well as ten of sixteen staff members, were reemployed. 56
Apparently the crucial test of whether individual faculty
members were to be retained hinged not on political affiliation so
much as on indorsement or at least tolerance of the "new political
economy," which in the polarized atmosphere of the mid-nineties
was practically tantamount to political affiliation. 51 In any case,
the board had not demonstrated adequate cause for its actions, and
the anti-Populist press of the state seized upon the affair to heap
abuse upon the perpetrators of the deed. The Newton Kansan
stated that Thomas Will, the new president, "knows nothing of
managing a college, but he is a ranting alarmist and will be much
better able to teach the young men attending the college how 'to
raise less corn and more hell' . . .. "58 The Iola News concluded
that the board had "shown themselves to be the most industrious,
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ambitious, picturesque, and variegated sort of idiots that the
'Agrarian uprising' has produced."69
In point of fact, however, the actions of the board of regents
did infuse new life into the college. Constructive changes were
introduced into the curriculum, some outstanding academicians
were appointed to the faculty, and the institution, with its Populist board of regents and new faculty, fared better financially at
the hands of the Populist state administration than would probably
have been the case had no alterations taken place. But the politics
of the affair was not without its price, for several years later, with
the board of regents back in Republican hands, the college underwent another changeover in personnel similar to that of 1897. As
if to prove that it was Populist means and not ends that were
objectionable, the continuity of the course of instruction introduced by Populist influence was maintained in the less frenzied
political atmosphere of the post-1900 period.60
For the time being, controversy deriving from the reconstitution of the state agricultural college and the performance of
the Populist-Democratic legislature sufficed to launch the Leedy
administration on a stormy course that gave little promise of future
tranquility. The ship of reform, fashioned in 1896, was, after all,
a flimsy structure put together with incompatible materials, and it
was destined to be torn to pieces by the rocks of adversity and the
capricious currents of political change.

THE DETERMINED AND THE DISGRUNTLED

pulist dissension during
John Leedy's administration was perhaps not as sensational as that
under Governor Lewelling, but it was decidedly more widespread and persistent. Criticism came almost at the outset, when
Governor Leedy began administrating patronage according to the
political alignment that had elected him. Disillusioned Populists
immediately raiied the cry of bribery and sellout. One such attack
on Leedy prompted Wesley Bennington, one of the extreme antifusionists, to write a rather cavalier defense of the governor. Said
Bennington, "Governor Leedy may be wrong in many things, but
he is consistent. In matters of 'patronage' and 'policy,' so far as we
are able to discover, he is simply trying to maintain and perpetuate
that fusion which you 'marble hearts' ... persisted in making in
the face of ... all our protests and admonitions." Bennington's
advice for the disenchanted was "go behind the barn and kick
yourself into Missouri for not having intelligence enough to know
the legitimate and inevitable consequences of political prosti.
tuuon
...."1
The critical eye seemed to turn upon itself with full force.
Attention focused primarily upon a special investigating committee organized by the legislature, apparently at the instigation of
Governor Leedy, to look into the charges of corruption that were
raised in the wake of the legislative session. Thanks to this committee, which continued its work, on and off, from April to June,
1897, the opposition press feasted on sensational copy provided by
the quarrelling partisans of reform.2
State Senator Andrew Jackson Titus, Populist from Anthony, became the principal figure in the expose attempt. Senator
Titus, allied with two other prominent seventh congressional
district Populists, George Washington McKay and Harry S.
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Landis, was already at war with a wing of the state organization
-that which was controlled by Jerry Simpson in the seventh
congressional district. 3 Peevish personality issues played an important part in creating the dissension, especially in the case of the
long-standing Barber County feud between Simpson and McKay,
but it had its political side. Titus and Land.is were both former
Republicans who were thoroughly dismayed with Simpson's pragmatic fusion performance.4
The affair began to unfold early in the legislative session.
D. 0. McCray, the same Republican newspaper correspondent
who was, unknown to everyone, implicated in Mary Elizabeth
Lease's war against the Lewelling administration in 1894, wrote
an article for the Leavenworth Times, published on January 17,
which hinted that three senators on the educational committee
had been "fixed" and therefore no legislation contrary to the interests of the book trusts would be passed. Apparently McCray wrote
the article out of spite, after having been refused a position as
lobbyist for the American Book Company. Senator Titus, chairman of the committee, responded by attempting to get the senate
to pass a resolution denying McCray access to the floor of the
senate until he retracted his "libelous" story.5 The matter was
then dropped. Later, in his testimony before the investigating
committee, Senator Titus stated that former-Governor Lewelling
had "taken him to a room" in a Topeka hotel for the purpose of
persuading him "to introduce a substitute for the text book bill
...." By doing so, alleged Titus, it was intimated that he would
be "financially rewarded." 6 Senator Lewelling quickly denied the
charge. He said that Senator Titus was a "stupendous liar, and a
dense, stupid and ambitious puppet who has not sense enough to
know that a few conspirators are making a tool of him in their
own interest." It was all a "conspiracy," said Lewelling, concocted
by Harry Landis, Senator Titus, and "others," for the purpose of
destroying him politically.7
Several days before Senator Titus made his statement about
Lewelling's alleged bribery attempt, the Topeka Capital stated
that Jerry Simpson, during the legislative session, had been "the
busiest lobbyist on the floor, bringing every influence to bear to
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defeat maximum railroad bills, mortgage taxation bills and every
other hold-up Populistic scheme against corporations and people
who loan money ...." The Capital asked: "Which is the real
Simpson, the sockless ranter in Congress, or the conservative lobbyist in Topeka? "8 Senator Titus did not mention the name of
Jerry Simpson in his testimony before the committee, but several
months later he also charged that Simpson had lobbied against the
stockyards bill. Other Simpson opponents in his district linked
his name with lobbying efforts made against the maximum-rate
railroad bill.9
Jerry Simpson denied the charges, and nothing credible
came out of the investigation. 10 It is, of course, conceivable that a
number of Populists succumbed to the lure of the lobbyists, but
there is no real evidence to place before the bar of history. In the
absence of such, the whole episode must be credited to lack of
cohesion in the reform camp. The struggle over the railroad bill
proved most conducive to the creation of discord. An honest difference of opinion concerning whether it was desirable to enact a
maximum-rate schedule or to leave the matter in the handi of a
railroad commission became a test of whether one had sold himself to corporate interests.11 Rumors fed on rumors, and persisted
despite the facts, noted unexpectedly by the Topeka Capital itself,
which indicated that "With all the testimony in the boodle investigation there has not been a syllable of evidence to show that any
man or corporation attempted to bribe any member of the Legislature for any purpose." 12 An editorial remark by the Capital also
provided an apt partisan conclusion for the whole episode: "There
is a homely old adage to the effect that when a certain class of
people fall out, honest men get their dues, and it applies to parties
as well as individuals." 13 To paraphrase the statement differently,
it might be said that when a group of reformers become aware of
their incompatibility and part company, honest and dishonest men,
alike, are likely to be tarred with the same brush.
The discord certainly did not augur well for the future of
the fusion forces. All indications pointed to a waning cause. The
party's influential state paper in the capital was itself a good example. In April, 1897, The Advocate, under William Peffer's
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direction, was designated "the official state paper"; it nevertheless
became increasingly less partisan. In November, 1897, the paper
came under new ownership and new editorial management.
Peffer stayed on the staff for a time, and by mid-December the
"official state paper," which was now called The Advocate and
News, had disassociated itself completely from the Populist
party.14
Governor Leedy, like Lewelling and Morrill before him,
also came under attack in his handling of the metropolitan police
law and prohibition enforcement. Ben S. Henderson made the
headlines early in 1898 with an attack on the governor on this
account. Henderson, then living in Kansas City, Kansas, charged
that Governor Leedy had made a deal with the liquor interests.15
The governor, neither a prohibitionist nor a resubmissionist, 16
minced no words in telling his critics that he had not joined the
Populist party "to hunt joints nor to fight resubmission." "If there
are violations of the prohibitory law," he said, "citizens who know
the facts should complain to the [local] magistrates and have the
violators prosecuted."17 However realistic, such a stand failed to
endear the administration to the extreme fringe of prohibitionminded Populists. By 1897 prohibition was just about the only
ideological commitment that some of these people had left, which
as much as anything revealed the vulnerable side of the progressive mind in its efforts to affix blame for the ills of a society increasingly perplexed by the onward march of industrialism.18
This prohibition-minded element was strongly represented
within the antifusion wing which had maintained its state committee after the contest of 1896; and in the aftermath of William
Jennings Bryan's defeat and the eclipse of free silver as an effective
issue, the mid-roaders grew bolder, more extreme in their attack
on Governor Leedy's fusion administration. On January 1, 1898,
as their barrage reached a certain crescendo, the mid-road chairman, Wesley Bennington, addressed an open letter to Taylor
Riddle, who had been chairman of the regular Populist organization since the preceding August.19 Chairman Riddle was working diligently to assure the continuation of the combination that
had won in 1896. Bennington decried that effort, of course, and

THE DETERMINED AND THE DISGRUNTLED

211
reminded Riddle that both of them had participated in the 1894
national convention which had assigned to both old parties the
blame for the nation's plight. He asked, "Who lied? When did
the ballot box stuffing nigger killing Democrats of the south get
good enough to become a fit associate for you? When did the
Tammany ring boodlers of New York and the east become your
brothers, and by what process? "20
For Governor John Leedy, the explosion that sank the
American battleship Maine in Havana harbor on February 15,
1898, was rather a mixed blessing. The diversion thus created
took the administration out of the spotlight of public attack, yet
the war enthusiasm and subsequent mobilization also resuscitated
the Republican party, monopolized the energies of the administration, and, with an important assist from returning prosperity,
relegated reform issues even further to the background.21
American intervention against Spain in Cuba was a popular outcry among all manner of Kansans. The initial reaction of
Kansas Populist leaders to the "crisis" in Cuba was mixed, though
far from unfavorable to intervention. Annie Diggs, state librarian
at the time, indicated that she "would not have the United States
stand imposition, but before going into actual bloody war, the
awful results should be carefully [considered] from the standpoint
of humanity." 22 G. C. Clemens cautioned, "It is quite possible
that somebody on the insurgent side blew up the Maine for the
very purpose of compelling this country to intervene." Caution
aside, Clemens stated, "The Cubans would not be a great deal
better off under a sugar king, with a federal court attachment,
than an heriditary baby monarch; but Spain is an excrescence and
should be mopped off the map in order to give civilization a
chance to spread." The Spanish "government belongs to the
middle ages and ought to be kicked back into harmony with
history."23
In congress, Jerry Simpson, after having earlier supported the
demand for war, courageously raised his voice against intervention, but the rest of the Kansas Populist delegation clamored
for quick retaliation. 24 On April 12, Jeremiah Botkin stated,
"Every consideration of humanity requires the United States to
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issue, without an hour's delay, an imperative command to the
oppressors to quit at once and forever the Western Hemisphere
25
• • • •"
Congressman Botkin's sentiments represented Kansas
Populist feeling precisely. A war for humanity was enjoined. "The
Benedict Arnolds of this period," said Botkin, "are those who ...
would sacrifice national honor, the cause of freedom, and humanity itself upon the altar of a heartless commercialism."26
No politician was more nai:ve in his demand for war than
Jeremiah Botkin, but it seemed to be a national affiiction. Americans, generally, had committed themselves to the Cuban crusade
without giving due consideration to the long-run consequences.
Governor John Leedy was no exception. He was an avid sup-porter of intervention almost from the moment the news of the
Maine disaster was spread across the nation; and when the decision for war came on April 25, he was more than ready to direct
the Kansas effort. 27
As a war governor, John Leedy pleasantly surprised Republicans when he selected Colonel Frederick Funston to command
the first of three volunteer regiments to be organized. Funston,
the young son of a prominent Republican family, was without
question the best possible choice; he had just returned to Kansas
shortly before the Maine disaster, after a well-publicized period of
service as an officer in the Cuban insurgent army. 28
In the first few weeks of the war, rumors circulated to the
effect that Governor Leedy would resign to assume command of
one of the volunteer regiments; however, if he had visions of himself at the head of a charging column, which seems probable, he
suppressed them. On the other hand, the young lieutenant governor, A. M. Harvey, had no reservations about relinquishing his
thankless duties for the visions of laurels to be won as a major of
the volunteers. Quite likely, though, given the state of disorganization and delay that was soon to be the fate of the Kansas units,
Major Harvey found occasion to relish his former position.29
Criticism of the governor, abated by the war enthusiasm
and the appointment of Colonel Funston, was soon renewed by
Republicans. The governor's decision to fill Kansas' troop commitment by volunteer units, while ignoring the state's three na-
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tional guard regiments, was seen as a bungling political move,
especially when the outfitting and training of these volunteers
literally and figuratively bogged down in the mud. Criticism of
John Leedy's performance as a war governor in that election year
was to be expected, but the many new appointments opened to the
governor by the organization of three regiments was a political
blessing too great to be disguised. And from all indications, Governor Leedy used this opportunity rather effectively to heal some
of the wounds in his strife-ridden party .30
Although the war may have solved some of the party's problems, it just as quickly created new ones. There was no denying
at the outset that most Kansas Populists joined hands with Republicans and Democrats in supporting the objective of throwing
Spain out of the Western Hemisphere and freeing Cuba. They
were not long in discovering, however, that the undertaking was
far more complicated than they could possibly have dreamed.
Populist state Representative Isom Wright would win no
prizes for writing, but in a letter of August 11, 1898, he put into
words exactly what was troubling many Populists at that stage in
the Cuba Libre movement: the war, he wrote, was leading to
"some complications that were but little thought of at the begining [sic] .. . ." "I am opposed to our Government extending her
Sovereign power over any colonial possession in the high seas [.]
I was opposed to the annexation of the Hawaii [sic] Islands.
While I do not wish the Phillipine [sic] Island returned to Spain
I have no desire for them to become a part of our possessions. I do
not even wish Cuba or Portorico [sic]." He went on to write,
"This expansion policy means that we are to unnessarily [sic]
convert ourselves into a strong military nation which never savors
of any good for the masses of the people." Moreover, it was "not
in safekeeping with a Republic and our free institutions but means
a grinding taxation which under the pernicious policy of the
Republican party will fall on the class of people who are the least
able to bear it." 31
There were among Kansas Populists leading advocates of
expansion and the "big policy."32 The most characteristic position,
however, was anti-imperialism. In a speech before the house on
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January 30, 1899, Congressman Jeremiah Botkin deprecated the
argument that "The Stars and Stripes must forever float over
every land wet with the blood of an American soldier." It was
criminal aggression, he maintained, for the United States to annex
either the Philippines or Cuba. Botkin, as a former minister, had
also listened intently to the argument of retaining the Philippines
in order to "civilize, christianize, and uplift" the natives. His
answer was: "American soldiers must not be used to forcibly
establish any religion or any church anywhere in this world ....
You can not shoot the religion of Jesus into the Filipinos with
13-inch guns, nor punch it into them with American bayonets."33
While Americans had engaged in the "splendid little war"
and the debate over American policy had begun to take shape, the
parties held their state conventions that June and prepared for the
campaign of 1898. Republicans, it was plain to see, were greatly
invigorated by the post-1896 developments and confident their
party would return to power in the state. Their optimism was
explained in their platform where they "heartily" approved the
war effort and insisted that with the national government in Republican hands "every promise has been kept and every prediction
has been verified." 34
At the Populist convention there were a few leading figures
who preferred to dump Governor Leedy, but there was no other
leader among them whose appeal was great enough to overcome
the political stigma of a no-confidence maneuver of that kind. 35
Leedy was therefore renominated, as were all the other incumbents, to run on a platform that was as radical as any before
constructed by the party. The convention's demands included
initiative and referendum, "the public ownership and operation of
stockyards," and "insurance protection against fire, lightning and
tornadoes as a state function, at cost." The convention also went
on record in favor of proportional representation and "the public
ownership of all public utilities." Far down the list was the
waning issue of free silver.36
From the point of view of the opposition, it was a platform
devised simply to catch votes; extravagant promises the People's
party had no intention of fulfilling, or, better yet, promises it
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would never have a chance to fulfill. Several Populist leaders,
well in advance of the election, prominent among whom were
former-Governor Lewelling and former-Lieutenant Governor
Daniels, even conceded that the reform cause was lost. 37
So it was. Even though fusion did not break down that
year as it had in previous off-year contests, the combined PopulistDemocratic ticket was soundly defeated. Republicans won seven
of eight congressional seats, the lower house of the state legislature
by a commanding margin of ninety-three to twenty-eight,38 and
their state ticket, headed by William E. Stanley, an attorney from
Wichita, defeated the Leedy slate by just over 15,000 votes. 39
Despite his and his party's repudiation, however, Governor
Leedy summoned a special legislative session to enact reform. The
session, which ran from December 21 to January 9, managed to
carry out two of the party's 1898 pledges: it repealed the Railroad
Commission Act and substituted in its place a court of visitation
with ample power to perform the tasks that its proponents deemed
necessary; the legislature also did away with the troublesome
metropolitan police law. 40 The merits of this undertaking were
highly questionable. It had the mark of desperation and defiance
stamped all too plainly upon it. In doing away with the police law
the legislature performed a service that practically all factions
were willing to recognize at that point, but the repeal of the Railroad Commission Act turned out to be a rather futile gesture. The
court of visitation was shortly thereafter invalidated by the state
supreme court, which had been restored to Republican domination, and the state was left without any regulatory body.41
Populism's denouement obviously was at hand. The cement
of economic discontent had crumbled. Ideological conflicts that
had existed within reform ranks from the very beginning in more
or less subdued tones were now magnified to fatal proportions.
Actually, the failure of the great silver crusade had signaled the
beginning of the end; with Bryan's defeat the partisans of reform
had reached the parting of the ways, and the parting created an
even more interesting dialogue than that which had characterized
their union.
One significant part of that dialogue involved the relation-
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ship between Populism and "Bryanism." In September, 1897,
A. C. Shinn insisted in a letter to William Peffer in The Advocate
that the two were "synonymous terms" that had grown "out of
the same cause" and which aimed "at the same object." A. C.
Shinn had been the party's unsuccessful candidate for lieutenant
governor in 1890; he had been president of the state Bi-Metallic
League for some time; and in 1895-96 he had been the acknowledged leader of the Silver Republicans. Though back in the party,
he could hardly be classified as a radical Populist; silver was his
obsession. In his letter, Shinn challenged a speech Peffer had delivered expounding undiluted Populist doctrine.42 According to
Shinn, it showed that Peffer had "wandered far from the fold ."
The discrepancy, wrote Shinn, between the ex-senator's and his
own interpretation of the meaning of Populism was "fundamental. It appears that your version of Populism means the
nationalization of all the essentials of existence-land, labor, transportation and money, while my idea of Populism is that we demand a return to just laws, or 'equal rights to all and special
privileges to none,' so that as in the early days of the republic the
individual . .. may go on enjoying his ... right to life, liberty and
the pursuit of happiness [italics added]." 43 Shortly thereafter,
Shinn's views occasioned a reply by former-Speaker John M.
Dunsmore, which perhaps came as close to capturing the essence
of Kansas Populism as anything that had been written. Dunsmore wrote:
It cannot be affirmed with truth that Bryan stands for anything more than the free coinage of silver and the ascendancy of the Democratic party . . . . Populism, however,
stands for something more. It demands the enactment of
new laws based on the natural rights of men, and not
limited by precedents and accepted theories in relation to
property, when such precedents and theories do not meet
the requirements of modern life. Populism does not necessarily mean "to nationalize all the essentials of existence,
land, labor, transportation and money." It does mean,
however, that the power of law shall control and prohibit
the centralization of land titles. That labor shall be pro-
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vided with all necessary legal machinery to protect itself
against the unjust demands of aggregated wealth. That
not only the means of transportation, but all public utilities,
shall be subject to public control, and when necessary, public ownership. That money of all kinds shall be issued
direct by the government, and its legal tender value regulated by law, and not by foreign bankers and moneylenders.44

The gulf between Shinn and Dunsmore had existed all
along; it was now simply more apparent and more imposing.
Dunsmore represented the party's progressive side; Shinn, the
retrogressive. Fusion having complicated the picture, it would be
difficult to say with certainty which side was dominant in 1897;
but the Populist-Democratic platform of 1898 would seem to indicate that the tenor of Populism in Kansas, at least rhetorically,
was on the whole still decidedly progressive.
The period 1897-98 was a time of critical decision for Populists. It was clear that fusion was to be a permanent arrangement.
Many Populist leaders managed to make their peace with that
situation; the futility of a go-it-alone approach was all too obvious.
There were those, too, like Annie Diggs, who halfway convinced
themselves that the Democratic party had undergone a significant
conversion since the advent of Bryanism.45 Others, for a variety
of reasons, simply could not reconcile themselves to that alliance.
A few of the more radical leaders at this point severed their
connections with the party and joined the socialist movement that
was just getting under way in Kansas. The Socialist Labor party
of Kansas was organized at Pittsburg, Kansas, on November 14,
1897. In September, 1897, G. C. Clemens, clerk of the state
supreme court at the time, began the work of organizing the
Kansas Union of Social Democrats, which was launched early
in 1898.46
In his personal journal, Clemens stated his rationale for
leaving the party. He was convinced that Populists had been sold
out by silver advocates and "led" into an "ambuscade" with malice
aforethought. Since the defeat of 1896, these same leaders had
"never ceased to conspire to destroy the People's party and to make
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it a mere feeder for the Democratic party." But that was not for
him. "To--day, the Republican and the Democratic party are alike
controlled by those who tenaciously and selfishly cling to the old
social system which is passing away before their eyes." The Socialist party, he wrote, was the only party that would "stand for the
new social order which capitalism itself has made indispensible
if the world is to go on." It was "a sign of latter-day capitalism's
imbecility" to behold "how the old party leaders flounder when
the people demand some means of escape from the tyranny of the
trusts." It was clear to him that "Socialists alone, of all mankind,
have a political philosophy which can explain modern economic
phenomena and suggest a rational cure for modern economic ills."
Socialists recognized "that trusts are not evil in themselves. They
are among the most important labor-saving machines ever invented by the cunning brain of men. In themselves they are good.
They cannot be destroyed, for heaven has sent them to provide the
way for compelling a reluctant world to be happy." Controlled
by "selfish and greedy" owners they could indeed do great harm.
"But let society own the machine and it becomes a blessing and
not a curse. Let society operate the trusts, and the wails of a
suffering people will give way to songs of joy."47
As G. C. Clemens wrote these words, Kansas was entering
a new period of ferment and awakened social consciousness. By
February, 1898, the circulation of the socialist Girard weekly Appeal to Reason had risen to a reported 40,000 copies. 48 A few months
later, midway through the campaign of 1898, Charles M. Sheldon's
social gospel novel, In His Steps, was selling at the rate of more
than a thousand copies a day. 49 At the same time, the Topeka
Advocate and News announced that it was "avowedly a Socialistic
paper." As such, so it maintained, it was merely following in the
steps of the late Dr. Stephen McLallin.50 The same paper was
convinced that the reception given to Eugene V. Debs when he
spoke to a gathering in Topeka early in February, 1898, "illustrated sharply the recent growth of socialistic tendencies." Just a
few years back the socialists "would have been allowed to hold
meetings only under police surveillance; last week Topeka's chief
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of police donated $5 towards defraying the expenses of Mr. Debs'
address." 51
The trend was of course not universally proclaimed. Many
Populists, men who were neither enthusiastic about the prospects
of a Socialist party nor a Fusion party, were momentarily without
any political home. William Peffer, for one, argued that Populism's undoing resulted from an affliction of "anaemia" which
resulted from taking in "too much Democracy ." 52 In June, 1898,
Peffer consented to head the Prohibition ticket in Kansas; 53 by
1900 he had returned to the Republican fold. 54 Undoubtedly there
were numerous other former Republicans among the Populists
who simply could not reconcile themselves to close cooperation
with the Democratic party; loyalties and antipathies born of as
great an ordeal as the Civil War were not easily erased, as the
record of the reform movement had demonstrated on numerous
occasions. Many of these individuals soon made their way back to
their original political home.
William Peffer would have much preferred a new party if
that were possible; that was Percy Daniels' preference as well. In
April, 1898, the ex-lieutenant governor published an open letter
stating his resignation in Populist defeat and his refusal to work
with a Fusion party. The Populist party, he wrote, had had "a
grand opportunity, but it is gone. It has been frittered away in
petty quarrels and recriminations; in senseless jealousies, and in
the success of wire pullers in fastening on the new party the
methods and practices of the parties we have abandoned in search
of something better."
Daniels' reform zeal was undiminished though. After
noting some facts and figures demonstrating the alarming rate at
which the distribution of the nation's wealth was widening the
gulf between the rich and the poor, he stated: "What idle balderdash-what kindergarden nonsense for any one to talk of free
silver as a remedy for such a wrong; or any financial legislation
except such as will appropriate some of these fabulous piles of
treasure for the employment of the idle, and thereby raising the
wages of all who labor." But how was this to be accomplished,
he asked? Lincoln Republicans had championed "noble princi-
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pies," but "the party that promulgated and sustained them is dead
and the cadaver stinketh." And those who wear its "purple"
lacked sense enough to realize that they have not "inherited its
virtues." Jeffersonian Democracy had been "a grand creed"; but
the party that had given life to its principles had "been among the
mummies of political history for years ...." He who "wears its
toga," said Daniels, "has been feted and duped by the Borgias,
dosed by the Bourbons and drugged by the beasts and money
changers of Tammany till he is too dumb to distinguish money
except by the jingle." And what of the Populist party and its
mantle, asked Daniels? Well, "the child was precocious"; however, it "got bow-legged and wobbled," and tripped "on his mantle" and "fell down stairs." In falling, he acquired "some bad rents
in his mantle of promise; and his guardians, with a variety of
patches, have tried to conceal even from themselves its true
condition."
As Daniels saw it, Populism's "great weakness" had been
its "failure" to advance measures to accomplish its proclaimed
purposes. He then made his usual plea for a graduated tax and
called for the creation of a new reform party .55
There was of course no chance that the various reform
elements would respond to the call; their incompatibility had been
abundantly demonstrated. In an interview reported in September,
1898, ex-Governor Lewelling acknowledged the party's plight but
expressed his belief that success would eventually come to the
reform movement. It takes time, he said, to introduce "great
changes." The various reform factions among Populists, Socialists, and others, were not now sufficiently united for successful
national action. But that would "come some day. It may not be
as Populists, the name may be changed; but it will come and the
principles involved will be identically the same."56
The defeat of the fusion forces in the 1898 campaign accelerated the dismantlement of an already debilitated reform machine.
Much soul-searching took place. John Breidenthal, who obviously
entertained thoughts of salvaging the leadership for himself from
the wreck, reasoned that the defeat indicated the need for getting
back to "first principles." He pointed to the "large vote" cast for

THE DETERMINED AND THE DISGRUNTLED

221
Mayor Samuel M. "Golden Rule" Jones in the Ohio gubernatorial
contest as an independent candidate on a "public ownership platform" as clear indication that "the people are ready for the change
from corporate to public ownership of public utilities." He was
convinced that the "party which will not only declare in favor of
this policy, but [which] will show its good faith by making a
vigorous campaign on the issue, will ... secure the support of the
laboring classes of all the large cities." Said Breidenthal, "The idea
of public against corporate ownership of public utilities and natural monopolies has been a fundamental principle of the Populist
party, but of late years it has ceased to agitate for this principle,
and just in proportion to its lack of agitation has it failed to meet
with success at the polls."57
John Breidenthal was forgetting that Kansas was rather
short on large cities. He was also discounting the fact that a
general decline in reform fervor had taken place-despite an undeniable awakening in the urban centers, as represented by a
small but growing socialist movement. Economic and social issues
were now apparently secondary to the majority of her citizens. In
May, 1899, the Topeka Mail and Breeze asked the Republican
members of the 1899 legislature what they thought would be "the
most important issue" in the 1900 campaign. The only issue upon
which there was substantial agreement was "expansion"--or, as
their opponents would have phrased it, imperialism and antiimperialism. Forty-five of one hundred and two Republican legislators rated expansion as the most imporant issue; significantly,
only three members listed "sound money," or free silver, as the
primary issue.58
A remarkable increase in the number of trusts, nationally,
intensified interest in that issue; actually, the trust question was
ranked second in importance among the Republican legislators
(six ranked that issue first; twelve ranked it second). In November, 1899, ex-Governor Lewelling, state senator at the time, was
asked if he believed it were possible to control the trusts by legislation. His reply was representative of one significant segment of
Populist opinion on that question. "Probably not," he said. "We
can destroy them by taxation, but it is not the trust itself that is
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harmful, but the abuse of the power derived from organization."
Lewelling went on to say that it was his candid opinion that "no
political party acting under our present form of government will
ever be able to cope with the trusts. Relief may come through a
change in the methods of trade, but I can conceive of nothing
except some form of co-operation between producers and consumers, which means some sort of socialism, though it will be
called by some other name ...." 59
Perhaps the most talented Kansas Populist critic of the
trusts, at this point, was a young man by the name of Carl Schurz
Vrooman. By 1898 this twenty-six-year-old Harvard- and Oxfordeducated farmer-economist, who was a member of a most prominent family of reformers, had made quite a reputation for himself
in the Populist camp.60 Governor John Leedy had appointed him
to the board of regents which had brought about the reconstitution
of Kansas State Agricultural College in Manhattan. Vrooman had
had considerable to do there with the fight to introduce into the
curriculum the "new political economy," for that had been his
specialty while a student at Oxford. He was, in fact, an excellent
representative of the group of Populists who had made their peace
with fusion and who were endeavoring to convert the Democratic
party to Populist principles.61
Late in 1899 Carl Vrooman gave expression to his politicoeconomic thought in a widely circulated pamphlet which he entitled Taming the Trusts. Drawing upon the background of
Populist experience and thought and a wide familiarity with noted
economists of the new school of thought, V rooman's work was, in
a sense, a summation of at least one element of Populist thought,
blended with some original insight that one would expect of a
gifted and highly educated young man.
At one point in his discussion, Vrooman referred to the
work of an economist friend, with whom he agreed, to make a
distinction between "natural" and "unnatural" monopolies. Government ownership, he stated, was not the proper remedy for
"unnatural" monopolies; they should and could be dealt with
through government action that would "'remove the special privileges, which alone sustain their life.' " The "natural" monopolies
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could be dealt with in one way only," 'they must be democratized,
transformed into government monopolies.' " As for the bogy of
paternalism, he insisted, as Populists had done before on many
occasions, "The people are the government, and the government
is the people in their united or corporate capacity. Therefore,
whatever the government does for the people they are really doing
for themselves, this makes all such help 'self-help,' not 'paternalism.' "62
Vrooman's observations in the pamphlet regarding what he
thought was the important distinction between the Populist party
and the Democratic party also provided a significant insight into
the motives of individuals, like himself, who had elected to pursue
Populist ends by means of the fusion course. "The Populist party,''
he wrote, "did nothing more nor less than take good old Simonpure Democratic principles, as enunciated by Jefferson and Jackson, apply them to present-day conditions, and carry them to their
logical conclusions. Populism is nothing more nor less than
Democracy up to date." As soon as the Democratic party comes to
a "full" understanding of the "problems" of modern society, and
begins to devote "all its energy and brains to their solution" along
lines that are in harmony with "the fundamental principles" of
Jefferson and Jackson, "the Populist party will have accomplished
its destiny as a distinct and separate political organization, and
willingly will become an aggressive wing of the victorious hosts
of the rejuvenated Democracy." 03
By 1900 it was clear that the trusts, if reformers could make
them so, would be a major campaign issue; it remained to be seen
whether the Democratic party would consent to being brought
"up to date.''
Although he professed a desire to retire from politics, John
Breidenthal was "persuaded,'' as he put it, to head the Fusion
ticket in 1900.64 The campaign that followed had many curiosities. G. C. Clemens headed the Socialist ticket, and ex-Governor
Lewelling, who, interestingly enough, was at that time a land
agent for the Atchison, Topeka, and Santa Fe Railway Company,
came out in support of Clemens, after charging Breidenthal with
a history of treachery. 65 At a Wichita rally in July, Lewelling
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introduced Clemens by saying: "Mr. Clemens is an old friend of
mine and I am glad to say that I am very much interested in the
cause of which he is the principal champion in Kansas. The
Socialist principles are much superior in many respects to those of
the Populists."66 After he had made his testimonial, the press
pursued the former governor, seeking to confirm rumors that he
had abandoned the Fusion party for the Socialist. A few days
before he was stricken with a heart attack and died while on a trip
to Arkansas City on September 3, 1900, Lewelling stated: "I have
always had socialistic tendencies. So have we all. We must all
come to it. I am not particularly affiliating with them [Socialists],
though I admire many of their tenets." 67
Another one-time Wichita Populist of note, Mary Elizabeth
Lease, entered the picture again during that campaign in a new
role. Early in 1896 the tempestuous lady had gone back East to
lecture. Apparently she had not meant to make the move permanent, but New York gradually became her home. Her reputation
was such in the East that she had an appeal which, without too
much exaggeration, might be compared to that of "Buffalo Bill"
Cody of an earlier time. By April, 1897, according to her, she was
working for Joseph Pulitzer, on special assignment for the New
York World. She had made several visits to Kansas since her
departure, and these Lease visits were a reporter's delight. Visits
of March and April, 1897, provided some colorful copy. When
asked what she thought of the Kansas situation, she said she feared
"there is no hope for Kansas and her farmers. This state is hopelessly in the grasp of the railroads and under the heel of the eastern
money lenders." As for her own beliefs, she stated quite emphatically, "I am a full-fledged Socialist! Any person who honestly
accepts the teachings of the Divine Master must be a Socialist. In
other words, socialism is the practice of christianity." She also
revealed that she had taken up theosophy since becoming a New
Yorker. 68
During the 1900 campaign the ever-changeable Mrs. Lease
was "sent," as she put it, to Nebraska by Mark Hanna in behalf of
the Republican party to fight William Jennings Bryan and her old
Democratic enemies. She touched Kansas briefly. In one interview
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she explained that she was with the Republicans now because "as
I take it the issue has resolved itself into the old issue of copperheadism versus Republicanism, and as the daughter of an old
Union soldier I feel that my place is with the Republican party."
Mrs. Lease also stated that the "anti-expansion or alleged imperialism policy" of the Democratic party represented, to her mind, the
"most unpatriotic, un-American, unwise issue" that has ever come
before the American public, with the exception of the issue of
secession.69
G. C. Clemens was no threat to anyone, but he had his
answer for the kind of campaign the Democratic and Republican
parties were waging that year. In one of his speeches, he told
his audience to get out the Omaha platform and they would see
where it accused "the two old parties of fighting a perpetual 'sham
battle' to drown the cry of misery. Has that charge proved false?
It was never truer than in this very campaign. What is all this
pretended fight over 'imperialism' and 'militarism' and 'hauling
down the flag' and the Constitution following the flag ... ?"70
But John Breidenthal's campaign was not a sham; he faced
the issues squarely. Privately he even sympathized with the Social
Democrats. In one letter, written not long after the election, he
wrote that he had learned much from his association with them.
The "end they desire to attain is the ideal and in time will become
a permanent system in this country ...." He wanted no abrupt
changes, however, for that would be "disastrous." His object was
"to see the machinery set on the right combination and the engines
started in the right direction," but he wanted to "progress slowly
to the end that each step taken should be one in advance." 71
Before launching his campaign, Breidenthal stated that the
principal issues to be discussed would revolve around the questions of money, transportation, antimonopoly, public ownership,
imperialism, and militarism. These issues were discussed, and
there was no hedging. On the transportation question, for example, Breidenthal stated that the Populist position had "always
been that government ownership [ of the railroads] is the only
solution of this great problem ...." The government, he argued,
was the only agency that could or would "establish and maintain
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just and equitable rates." Populists had been "disposed to try the
expedient of regulation," but it was now "apparent" that that was
a failure and "government ownership is the remedy." The same
conclusion, he said, "applies with equal force to the telegraph,
telephone and express business."72 In a speech at Emporia on
September 22, Breidenthal reemphasized his contention that regulation was insufficient in dealing with the trusts. "You might as
well try to regulate a coyote or a rattlesnake," he said. "You cannot
supervise them and you cannot control them. My remedy is to
allow the people to run these businesses themselves, but you say
this is socialism. Well, maybe it is." 73
On the issue of socialism, apparently a number of Populist
leaders spoke out unequivocally in that campaign. Annie Diggs,
who was then being referred to by the opposition press as the
"Lady Boss" of the Fusion forces, stated in an interview that she
was a socialist, but not a socialist "of the old world"; not a socialist
of the school of Karl Marx or Ferdinand Lassalle. She described
herself as "an opportunist socialist" and explained that by this she
meant that she "would apply socialistic principles to everyday
conditions as fast as the conditions would warrant; taking a little
today, adding a little more tomorrow and so on." 74
Perhaps the most notable feature of the whole campaign
was the degree of tolerance that existed relative to such pronouncements. It was here that Populism's influence was most discernible.
Less than a decade earlier, this Breidenthal campaign would have
been besieged in the most caustic way imaginable; in 1900, the
Populist-Democratic case was given a generally fair hearing. If
they had accomplished nothing else-and they indeed had accomplished more-Populists had contributed mightily to an expansion
of the conventional wisdom such as was conducive to a much
more creative social dialogue.
Perhaps John Breidenthal's success in polling forty-seven
percent of the vote was just as remarkable. It was a losing percentage, to be sure, but significant, considering the kind of campaign that was waged. Breidenthal even ran two thousand votes
ahead of William Jennings Bryan, the Democratic presidential

THE DETERMINED AND THE DISGRUNTLED

227
nominee, but it was the end of the line, and all but the most
self-seeking or dogmatic could plainly see it as such.75
Privately, in a letter to his friend J. C. Rupenthal, Breidenthal claimed to be "neither surprised nor disappointed" in the outcome; merely disgusted to think that "a goodly number of alleged
Populists and Democrats could be influenced by the full stomach
argument." He said he had "always realized that there was a
considerable percentage of Populists who were influenced by
temporary condition and who would be disposed to return to the
Republican party wherever [whenever] the general conditions
were more favorable." It was obvious to him that "Only a limited
number of people will take the time to solve to their own satisfaction the public questions that have been before the people for a
quarter of a century."
Looking to the future, Breidenthal then commented:
"While the work of education will go on indefinitely, I am skeptical as to whether any permanent results will be secured in the
near future. People will probably continue the present system
until they are powerless to overthrow incorporated wealth, except
by revolution." The election, he felt, had "demonstrated two
things conclusively-one is that the Populist party has outlived its
usefulness as a political organization and another is that the
Democratic party cannot be used as an instrumentality through
which to accomplish any great reform." The Democratic party
had its progressive wing, he admitted; but it would not unite in
a new movement. The Social Democratic party would be practically worthless except as a "propaganda organization" because it
was intent on "accomplishing everything at once." He then offered
this bit of political advice: "While I am a socialist, I am convinced
that socialism must be a growth . . . [ or an] evolution or a
development, that is to say, that we cannot inaugurate a complete
socialistic system at once, but that we must gradually become possessed of the different public utilities and natural monopolies." It
was his belief that "a party occupying middle ground between the
extreme socialist and Bryan Democracy would stand a much
better show of success and would present far more practical measures than any other."76
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By 1900, professions to the contrary, John Breidenthal was
more progressive than socialist; after 1900 that was even more the
case. Soon after his defeat he announced his retirement from
politics. The former bank commissioner then applied his considerable abilities to the work of organizing a banking trust company
that was destined to become a profitable enterprise.77
As for the Populist party itself-or what was left of it-it
struggled on for a few more campaigns. Under the chairmanship
of Grant Wood Harrington, as a matter of fact, the fusion wing
of the party was even more highly organized than it had been
under earlier chairmen, including John Breidenthal; but organization was no substitute for enthusiasm.78 The Republican legislature of 1901 administered the coup de grace by passing a law
denying Kansas parties the right to nominate corresponding or
fusion tickets.
Dismantlement of the party continued for some time thereafter. Most of the Populists who were destined to return to the
Republican party or the Prohibitionist party probably had already
done so by 1900; after that date, Populists either went over to the
Democratic party or became Socialists or Independents. The Populist party therefore admirably fulfilled the role of a transitional
medium which assisted in the creation of new and more effective
political alignments.
The personal story of two brothers, Grant Wood Harrington and Wynne Powers Harrington, reveals much about this final
act of Populism in Kansas. Both were relatively young; when
they left the Democratic party to join the Populists in 1894, Grant
was twenty-nine and Wynne was twenty-four. They had both
risen to prominence in the declining years of Populism, and in
1902 Grant was chairman of the Populist-Democratic state central
committee, W. P. Harrington was chairman of his district's congressional committee and also of the Gove County Populist organization-this particular story takes on added interest by noting
that W. P. Harrington was destined, some twenty years later, to
write one of the first scholarly accounts of Kansas Populism in a
master's thesis at the University of Kansas.79
By 1902 both saw the futility of prolonging the life of the
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party, but they disagreed on how their individual efforts in behalf
of reform could best be employed in the future. In September of
that year W. P. Harrington wrote brother Grant that he had done
all he could do as chairman of his county organization "to kill the
party and clear the rubbish out of the way" for the Democratic
party. W. P. Harrington indicated, however, that he could not
himself affiliate with the Democratic party as Grant had elected
to do, preferring instead affiliation with the Social Democrats.
He added:
I can see that the Socialist movement is not being taken
seriously, but it never will be taken seriously if it has to
await the pleasure of those who like yourself ... have
hastened to flop into the Democratic party and are hustling
for front seats in the band wagon. It will never be taken
seriously till it grows, which is all the more reason why I
and others should get to work to make it grow. There is
nothing about the Democratic party to make me feel at
home there. Sometime, maybe, it may get right but I am
not going to waste the best years of my life voting for it in
hopes that it will get right in the end. . . . It never will
get to sound doctrine till it is forced by the growing Socialist party. I know the Democratic party has it in its power
to knock the props out from [under] any third party
organization whenever it chooses and the time may come
when it will absorb the Socialist party; but when it takes
up with Socialist ideas it will have need for the men who
have been trained in the advocacy of those ideas and I'll
have a chance to get into the party then if I want to.
W. P. Harrington went on to tell his brother that his party's
candidate for governor was a "false alarm"; that the "whole campaign" was "a hollow sham and you are going to get licked so
badly that you won't know yourselves after election." He ended
by advising: "The Good Book says that 'he who would save his
life shall lose it' and this text I commend to the careful consideration of those who try to discourage Socialism and tie up with ...
[ unreformed Democrats] for 'practical reasons.' "80
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VINDICATION? THE POPULIST LEADER
IN THE PROGRESSIVE ERA

~

n that unrivaled mann« of

his, Jerry Simpson once remarked:

Did you ever see a summer storm in the country?
First there comes a wind-gust, which raises the dust and
sets it whirling round and round, carrying with it the
leaves and husks and bits of stick that come into its path,
and making a tremendous stir among inanimate things
generally. Everybody cries out: "Whew, what a storm!"
But that isn't the storm. After the dust is scattered over all
the piazzas and roofs, and the sticks and straws and leaves
and chips of dried husk have been blown into the hedgerows and fence corners out of sight, the thunder rolls and
the lightning fl.ashes and the rain descends, and barns are
struck and burned and rivers are swollen and bridges
swept away. That's the storm; the wind-gust was only a
preliminary.
It's the same with a great political movement. The
little fellows, the human chips and straws, are whirled and
tossed about in the wind and dust of their own agitation
and then are laid out of sight in the dark places where no
man goes. It's the fellows in command of the thunder and
lightning and rain who come after and do the big work,
and get the credit of it. 1

As Simpson told it, the Populists were in "command of the
thunder and lightning and rain," but the observation was not
inappropriate as applied to the relationship between Populism and
progressivism in the broad sense of how they found expression in
and affected American society. The Populist movement was followed by a progressive movement, and the progressives succeeded
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in enacting several of the state and national reforms earlier championed by the Populists. It would be foolish, however, to reason
that progressivism would not have come about without the previous occurrence of Populism, but it would be even more foolish to
assume that the successes of the progressives owed nothing to the
Populists.
Populism in Kansas, at any rate, first of all merits an
appraisal on its own account. Too often it has been adjudged a
failure without serious reflection. How does one measure success
or failure? Is this done by weighing the number of legislative
accomplishments? If so, what may be said for the Populists? As
for labor legislation, they had given Kansas an antiblacklisting
law, provided an eight-hour day for all work associated with the
state's various governmental units, required the regulation and
weighing of coal at the mines, enacted legislation requiring the
weekly payment of wages in lawful money, and passed several
measures relating to the health and safety of the state's mine
workers. For her agricultural interests, they had placed restrictions upon the alien ownership of land, provided for the regulation
of warehouses and the inspection, grading, weighing, and handling of grain, placed among the statutes a one-year real-estate
redemption law, adopted a measure aimed at prohibiting combinations designed to prevent competition in the buying and selling
of livestock, provided for the regulation of stockyards, and established a department for the inspection and weighing of grain, as
well as a board of irrigation. As for legislation in the general
interest, they had created the office of bank commissioner with
power to regulate the activities of the state's banking institutions,
created a school-textbook commission, adopted the Australian ballot and had taken steps to minimize corrupt practices in elections,
created a court of visitation to regulate railroads operating within
the state, and they had written antitrust legislation into the books.
True, several of these measures owed as much to Republicans as Populists, and some of the legislation, the antitrust and
alien-land ownership measures for example, also proved ineffective, or, like the court of visitation, were invalidated by the courts.
If one minimizes the odds that were stacked against them, the
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record may seem less than outstanding, but who is to say that even
these measures would have been adopted within the same time
period had there been no Populist movement? How does one
measure the party's impact, moreover, on the administration of
state and local government? Unquestionably, the party provided
a necessary outlet which enabled an aroused discontent to be
channeled in a constructive manner, while at the same time providing a distraught people with hope and a new sense of identity
with their government.
When it is recalled that Populists never, at any point,
constituted a majority of the Kansas electorate, even their few
legislative accomplishments seem remarkable; but this was not
the whole of their accomplishment, probably not even their most
significant contribution. Populism's greatest bequest, on the national and state levels, was a positive educational experience,
which can no more readily be measured nor denied than the influence of a great teacher.
This was the conclusion of many of the Populists themselves. As early as 1895 Annie Diggs made that observation regarding the work of the Populist congressional delegations. She stated
that Populism could not have "achieved such widespread and
enormous success" in its effort "to educate the people" in any
"other capacity." "Had it not been for the ubiquitous Populist in
the house and the senate, ready to interject questions, ready to
puncture pompous bubbles, ready to tersely and clearly state his
common-sense solution of national problems-had it not been for
four years of persistent, patient effort of this sort, the country
would be in far darker, denser ignorance than it now is." She
went on to write that it was "most amazing how dense was the
ignorance of congressmen on all theories and all facts pertaining
to the newer political economy. But few members of congress had
any inkling of economics later than Adam Smith, and their acquaintance with that out-of-date writer was overlapped with ...
traditions and moss-backed fallacies." 2
In 1901 Annie Diggs insisted that Populism's achievements
had been "tremendous and potential." They were "vitalizing
influences which ramify throughout the entire national structure."
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The party, she added, had "hooted the tariff off the stage"; it had
brought the money question to the front; and it had "furnished
the country the story of the formation of trusts and combines,"
helping to focus attention on that vital issue.3
Annie Diggs certainly had figured prominently in that
undertaking, and she persisted in that effort until her death in
1916. In a 1907 interview she conceded that the Populist party was
a thing of the past but stated that she was not sure she was "sorry."
"It wasn't the name particularly that I cared about. It was the
principles ... we fought for. 'Clodhoppers' or anything would
have served the purpose just as well. But have you noticed ... the
things we asked for and ... the policies we advocated are not in
the least bit dead? "4 The following year she was interviewed
again just before moving from Kansas to New York. She was
going East to live with her son and to engage in "the old line of
work." The reporter asked if this meant her efforts would again
have a political outlet? She replied, rather emphatically: "Indeed
no! I am done with party politics forever." She insisted that
"Real reform must come now through the education of the people.
Partisan organizations are always cowardly .... But once a strong
public sentiment is created for any reform both the old parties will
jump at the chance to work them out in legislation. Well, I am
going to New York to help create sentiment that will demand
these reforms." The reporter then observed that Populist principles were apparently becoming respectable, to which Annie Diggs
responded: "And don't you remember how the press denounced
us as traitors and rebel sympathizers and Anarchists? How they
twitted us with Judge Doster's expression that 'the right of the
user is paramount to the right of the owner?' and declared that
we wanted to confiscate everybody's property." Just as quickly
she stated that it was "worth all that to know now that we were
right and that this good old world regards us in a different light
as it comes to understand that many of the issues so crudely advocated were really safe and sane progressive measures."
Asked what had become of her co-workers in the reform
cause, Mrs. Diggs remarked that "death had taken many" but
some were still active in politics. "So far as I know all of them
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are just as firm in their Populist convictions as in former days,
although they are now members of some other party."5
Old age was indeed overtaking the former leaders of Kansas Populism. The major leadership's median age of forty-six in
1890 meant a median age of sixty-six in 1910, the point at which
the progressive movement had blossomed throughout the nation.
Those who survived into the progressive era and beyond were, on
the whole, "firm in their Populist convictions," as Annie Diggs
observed, but there was as much diversity in interpretation and
application of those convictions as there had been from the
beginning.
After his defeat in 1898, Jerry Simpson had published a
newspaper for a brief period, appropriately entitled Jerry Simpson's Bayonet. This verbal sword was used most effectively by
Simpson and his editorial assistants to revenge the scurrilous
attack that had been waged against the congressman for eight
years; it was also used, but much less effectively, to keep the issue
of reform before the people and to prepare the way for Simpson's
anticipated return to politics.6
But that day never came. Soon after attempting, unsuccessfully, to obtain a senatorial indorsement from the Fusion convention of 1900, Jerry Simpson signed on as a railroad land agent and
moved to the territory of New Mexico, where he also renewed
his ranching activities. He returned to Kansas in 1905, just a few
months before his death in Wichita in October of that year, and
momentarily became something of an attraction to the press. One
reporter noted that he was the "same old Jerry. The years have
mellowed him somewhat, have dimmed the fire, but he is still
possessed of that wonderful vein of sardonic humor, and still enjoys keenly the discomfiture of his old-time rivals." 7 Another
recorded the following Simpson commentary: "I met some of my
old Republican opponents to-day and they said to me: 'Oh, Jerry,
you ought to be in Kansas now. Kansas is all Populist now.' Yes,
I said to them, you are the conservative business men of the state,
and doubtless all wisdom is lodged with you, but you are just
learning now what the farmers of the state knew fourteen years
ago."8 Several months later he was quoted as saying: "Talk about
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the Populist party being dead, when we have converted Roosevelt
and Taft! If Roosevelt had made the speeches he is making now
four years ago he could not have been elected constable in the
most ignorant precinct on Long Island. They are all coming our
way. They do not call themselves Populists, but a rose by any
other name smells as sweet."9
Two months after having uttered these words Jerry Simpson was dead. The young and progressive Victor Murdock, the
Republican incumbent of Simpson's Big Seventh congressional
seat, who would soon make a name for himself as an Insurgent,
delivered Jerry Simpson's funeral oration in Wichita on October
25, 1905.10 The symbolic relationship between Populism and
Republican ln:mrgency, thus implied, was more than just coincidental.
John Davis had died four years earlier; G. C. Clemens
survived Simpson by only one year. Both were active to the end.
John Leedy took up mining for a short time in southeastern
Kansas, then he moved to Canada where he worked and participated in politics until his death in 1935. Former Congressman
William Baker was completely withdrawn from politics after
1897; before his death in 1910, however, he acknowledged the
similarities between the doctrines of the Rooseveltian Insurgents
and the Populists, although he stated that "Roosevelt is more
radical than I." John Grant Otis founded a cooperative colony
out in Washington state named Equality and apparently associated with the Socialists until his death in 1916. John F. Willits
also joined the Socialist party, waging several campaigns as its
nominee for congress in Kansas after 1900. Percy Daniels, with
great consistency of ideas, kept up his fight, writing letters and
pamphlets and involving himself in newspaper debates almost up
to the time of his death in 1916.
For others only a glimpse emerges from existing records:
S. M. Scott, the boy wonder of the early organization period, went
off to Texas and struck it rich in oil. S. H. Snider found a gold
mine in New Mexico. Carl Vrooman subsequently served as
assistant secretary of agriculture in President Wilson's administration. Grant Wood Harrington became private secretary to
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Democratic Governor George Hodges in 1913 and remained fairly
active in Democratic politics until his death in 1952. P. P. Elder
also remained active as a Democrat until poor health overtook
him in 1908; the old campaigner held on though until 1914. Jerry
Botkin, always a crusader, was the Democratic party's unsuccessful
candidate for governor in 1908. In 1912 the ex-congressman also
waged a personal campaign against Republican Arthur Capper in
the latter's bid for the governorship of Kansas. "Overwork in a
revival meeting" in 1921 was said to have led to his death in that
year. A few, like John Dunsmore, managed to obtain leadership
positions within the Republican party on the local level; an even
smaller number, like Wesley Bennington, demonstrated more
clearly than ever their qualifications for membership in the lunatic
fringe. Bennington persisted in his advocacy of lost causes: in
1928 he was the vice-presidential nominee of the National party,
which was "devoted to free money and the single tax, with its
chief aim to have 'money at cost' issued to the people by the
government just as postage stamps are now issued to the people." 11
Several years before his term had expired in 1903, Senator
William A. Harris had appealed for progressive bipartisan support in his bid for reelection; this he failed to obtain. 12 In 1906,
however, the ex-senator was the Democratic and reform nominee
for governor. Harris was, as ever, a popular figure. He had
demonstrated, beyond question, his attachment to progressive
principles, and he publicly confessed to considerable "admiration
for President Roosevelt," who, according to Harris, had "adopted
a great many" of the Democratic party's "best ideas." "In fact,"
said Harris, "there is a good deal of Democracy permeating
through the ranks of the Republican party." 13 Harris came close
to winning that election-a mere 2,123 votes was the difference.a
Afterward, Harris resided in Chicago where he served as president of the American Shorthorn Breeders' Association until his
death in 1909. He retained his interest in Kansas politics as before.
Not long before his death he was advising fellow Democrats to
support Insurgent Republicans who had taken up the cause of
reform.15
In his campaign for governor, W. A. Harris had had no
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more loyal supporter than John Breidenthal, now a successful
Kansas City businessman. Certainly, Breidenthal qualified as a
progressive. By 1906 the former Populist chairman was calling
himself an independent and was an enthusiastic supporter of
President Theodore Roosevelt. It seems likely that Breidenthal,
still relatively young, would have been drawn back into the political arena had it not been for his untimely death in 1910.16
John Breidenthal had viewed the course of events after 1900
as vindication for the Populist struggle of the previous decade.
This was probably the feeling of all surviving Populist leaders.
For certain it was William A. Peffer's attitude. In 1903 Peffer
stated: "Day by day I see our principles growing in both old
parties." He commended the leadership of Bryan and Roosevelt,
but he believed the president had "shown a better capacity for
applying the principles of Populism ...."17 In 1907 he was quoted
as saying: "The country now hotly demands legislation it abused
me for advocating." 18 With each passing year he was even more
pleased with events. When he returned to Topeka from Washington, D.C., in April, 1911, after an absence of nine years, during
which time he had been concerned mainly with the preparation of
an index for the Congressional Record, Peffer stated that he could
"derive great entertainment from the present trend of political
ideals and policies." Before his death in 1912, the ex-senator
proudly classified himself as an "insurgent" and said it was "refreshing to hear the leaders in Congress going over the very things
we were discussing years ago." 19
Predictably, perhaps, Mary Elizabeth Lease hopped aboard
the progressive bandwagon in New York as it gained momentum.
She had been looking for a Napoleon "to liberate" the "industrial
world" ever since 1895.20 In 1904 she seemed to have found him.
In an interview she indicated that she saw Theodore Roosevelt as
a "man of destiny, an instrument in God's hands, to send the gift
of human liberty to the far off islands of the sea and to give
America the proud place of the foremost of the nations that
inhabit the face of the earth." 21 Obviously, it was President
Roosevelt's aggressive foreign policy that had won Mrs. Lease's
admiration; she had long since abandoned any real commitment
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to social reform. 22 But by 1914 the impulse had become irresistible; she had to speak out. Progressives, she stated, have "adopted
our platform, clause by clause, plank by plank." To prove it,
"Note the list of reforms which we advocated which are coming
into reality. Direct election of senators is assured. Public utilities
are gradually being removed from the hands of the few and placed
under control of the people who use them. Woman suffrage is
now almost a national issue. Prohibition, thank God, is spreading
across the country like wildfire." Then, in that unmistakable
Lease style, she said: "Brother, the times are propitious. The seed
we sowed out in Kansas did not fall on barren ground."23
Whether the former Kansas spellbinder took to the hustings
again is not clear. She did live on to 1933. During that period of
time, with few other former Kansas Populist leaders around to
contradict her, she made several rather bold claims concerning
her role in the Populist movement. 24
By surviving until 1933, Mary Elizabeth Lease ranked with
Frank Doster; but in practically all other categories the judge left
the famous lady way behind. Right up to the very end Frank
Doster reveled in playing the role of gadfly. As always, he was
the seeker of new ideas; eager to puncture pompous bubbles;
intent on solutions he believed would induce to the betterment of
humanity.
Judge Doster's opponents (with not a little help from the
judge himself) had created such a distorted and unrealistic image
of him before he became chief justice that they were unjustifiably
shocked and impressed by the sensible manner in which he performed his duties from 1897 to 1903-so much so in fact that there
was some Republican support for his reelection in 1902. Not
enough for victory, however, and the judge left the court in 1903
to become an assistant attorney for the Missouri Pacific Railroad.25
Undoubtedly, Frank Doster moderated his views while on
the court, but the change he experienced was not nearly as great
as that in the public acceptance or tolerance of the point of view
which his position represented. This was best demonstrated in the
reception given an address he delivered to the Washburn College
graduating class in Topeka in 1901. Among other things, the

KANSAS POPULISM

240
judge stated that he would concede that "the animating spirit of
many of the promoters and managers of the enterprises of the age
is selfish, brutal, tyrannical in the extreme, and unchecked, it
would speedily involve us in industrial serfdom, but the methods
of combination, organization and system which it must of necessity adopt are the methods of social integration which will inevitably widen and strengthen into the legalized state called
collectivism." He went on to say that he had "no fear of the
permanency of trusts and combinations. The most valuable and
comforting lesson that has been taught us was that they were
heterogeneous elements which would presently coalesce into the
perfect state." The editor of the Topeka Capital liked the tone of
Doster's address but deplored its "socialistic implications." As the
Capital saw it, Doster had taken "high ground." In this address,
it continued, "There is no appeal to meanness, selfishness, prejudice, passion or any of the lower class of sensibilities."26 Frank
Doster had never employed the "lower class of sensibilities"; the
tone was basically the same; the public ear had simply become
more attuned to the particular note he had sounded.
Frank Doster affiliated with the Democratic party after he
left the state supreme court.27 Unlike many of his former Populist
colleagues, the judge remained for some time quite skeptical about
the extent of the G.O.P.'s conversion to reform. In a letter written
in 1908, he stated that "the Republican Party has not broken its
alliance with the predatory wealth of the country. Its pretensions
in that respect are a mere lip proclamation. Among all the influential leaders of the Republican Party, those who have declared
their independence of the special interests may be counted on the
fingers of one hand." Only "one conspicuous Republican," President Theodore Roosevelt, had "even made the pretense of throwing down the gauntlet to the buccaneers of industrial life ... .''
Beyond that, only "one other man of more than local or secondary
prominence and influence has volunteered for a tilt in the tournament with the knights of commercial outlawry-Senator LaFollette." All the others who affected "a desire to be arrayed in their
class" were merely "timid" imitators. "With the two exceptions
named there is not one of them who for effectiveness of warfare
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has armed himself with more than a squirt-gun and who is not
peering furtively around the corner to assure himself of safety." 28
By 1910 Doster's views on this subject had changed.
Take the present day insurgent Republican, or as he likes
to style himself, "progressive" Republican. I should think
he would be ashamed to look an old-time Populist in the
face. Excepting some of the Populist propositions for currency reform, and those are not now matters in issue, and
excepting public ownership of the railroads, there isn't a
plank in the Populist platforms of the 90s but has been
bodily and braz~nly appropriated as cardinal tenets of faith
by the Kansas insurgent Republicans ....
The truth of the matter is, said Doster, "We have been sandbagged" and by "men who for twenty years had been professing
lofty scorn of our political possessions."
He hastened to add that he did not want anyone to misinterpret his meaning. "I am not condemning this tardy acceptance of Populistic doctrine by Republican leaders and platform
makers. On the contrary, I rejoice in it."
Doster went on to state that he observed "an occasional,
though grudging, acknowledgment that the Populist party was a
sort of John the Baptist to the new faith, but it is generally coupled
with some animadversion tending in the whole to discredit rather
than praise." In particular, said Doster, the new champions of
reform were saying that Populist leaders had not been sincere and
had not made an honest effort to enact these reforms. His answer
to that was: "it is a lie, put forth to break the force of the fact that
every article in the [Insurgent] Republican creed of today is of
Populist origin, and would have been enacted into law but for that
campaign of ridicule, vilification and abuse without parallel in the
political history of the state, that was waged by many of the very
men who now profess belief in the same principles."29
Doster overstated his case, but he made a valid and meaningful observation regarding Populism's misfortunes. The ridicule, vilification, and abuse he mentioned did occur, and it was
devastating. Why it occurred and why it was effective cannot of
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course be explained in a few sentences. The answer really includes
the whole of this study and more. The primary obstacle to Populist success, however, in Kansas and probably even more so
throughout the nation, had been what for lack of better terms
must be called a negative climate of opinion. The most antagonistic part of that prevailing attitude would have to be that complex of ideas designated as social Darwinism, which applied the
"kiss of death" to this agrarian movement from the beginning by
enabling or causing it to be stigmatized as retrogressive.
It was all but axiomatic among the influential, businessminded segment of late nineteenth-century society that nothing
progressive could possibly emanate from the laboring classes of
the farm or factory. The Populist party leadership in Kansas was
severely handicapped by that attitude, despite the rather extraordinary quality and predominantly middle-class origins and
associations of that leadership.
But of course Kansas Populism's difficulties cannot all be
attributed to this one factor. Although by no means unrelated,
there were formidable problems deriving from the character of
the leadership and the followship itself. The greatest handicaps
affiicting the rank and file stem from its third-party minority status
and the spasmodic motivation of economic discontent. As for the
leadership, it rated high by most tests of leadership characteristics.
Exceptions have been noted, but as a group the Populist leaders in
Kansas demonstrated a high degree of sensitivity to the direction of social and industrial tendencies of their society; they were
acutely perceptive in gauging the possible courses of community
action; and they were unsurpassed in their ability to give dramatic
expression to the sentiments or interests of a significant segment
of the Kansas populace. Their greatest shortcoming would have
to be their inability to reconcile divergent groups in pursuit of
common goals. In all fairness, though, it must be said that these
leaders were laboring under extraordinarily difficult circumstances.
As political innovators the leaders could make no great
claims for themselves. But for them there was innovation aplently
in the implementation of the nation's unfulfilled democratic ideals
in the new industrial age of the late nineteenth century. These
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leaders did indeed concern themselves with this problem, and in
the dialogue which they conducted, in the program which they
advanced, they assisted in launching a progressive quest that continues into the twentieth century.
In the context of their period of origin, it was not Populist
principles that were retrogressive-merely the fact that they were
championed by and in the name of farmers and laborers. The path
to reform could be made much smoother almost overnight if these
same principles were embraced by urban, middle-class spokesmen
and championed in the name of the middle class. That this
change did indeed occur was never more aptly demonstrated
within the context of Kansas politics than by this William Allen
White editorial that appeared in the December 14, 1906, edition of
the Emporia Gazette:
Ten years ago this great organ of reform wrote a
piece entitled "What is the Matter with Kansas?" In it
great sport was made of a perfectly honest gentleman of
unusual legal ability who happened to be running for chief
justice of the Supreme Court of this state, because he said
in effect that "the rights of the user are paramount to the
rights of the owner." Those were paleozoic times; how far
the world has moved since then. This paper was wrong in
those days and Judge Doster was right; but he was too
early in the season and his views got frost bitten. This is a
funny world. About all we can do is to move with it.
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76. Vrooman, Carl S.-Topeka fournal, April 8, 1915.
77. Wait, Mrs. Anna C.-Diggs, "The
Women in the Alliance Move-

78.

79.

80.

81.

ment," Arena, VI (July, 1892),
178; Topeka Daily Capital, March
21, 1901; Manuscript autobiographical sketch, K.S.H .S.
Waterbury, Edwin Stevens--Uncatalogued biographical sketch contained in K.S.H.S.
Willits, John F.-McLouth Times
(Souvenir Edition), November 25,
1898, 63-64.
Wood, Samuel N.-William E.
Connelley, A Standard History of
Kansas and Kansans, In, 1268-69.
Zercher, D. C.-The Advocate, Topeka, September 3, 1890.

II
Composite Comparison of the Major Kansas Populist Leadership
for the Years 1890 and 1896•
1890 (63 individuals)
46 Median Age
1870 Median Year to Kansas
Ohio, New York, Pennsylvania,
and Virginia most common
native states
65¼ Non-farmers
35% Farmers and/or stock raisers,
or associated with farming
in some capacity
26 Former Third-Party Men
1 Former Democrat
9 Former Republicans
20 College Graduates

1896 (54 individuals)
47 Median Age
1871 Median Year to Kansas
Same breakdown here

71% Non-farmers
29% Farmers and/or stock raisers,
or associated with farming
in some capacity
24 Former Third-Party Men
10 Former Democrats
2 Former Republicans
26 College Graduates

III
Members of the 1893 House for Whom Information Was Obtained
by Individual Reference and the Sources of that Informationt
1. Chappel, Thomas--Who's Who in
Topeka (Topeka: Adams Brothers

Publishing Company, 1905), 19.
Populist.

• The original charts from which these statistics were compiled are housed
in the Regional History Division of the Kenneth Spencer Research Library, The
University of Kansas.
t The K .SR.S. Library also contains a collection , in four volumes, of press
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2. Chrisman, M. B.-History of the
State of Kansas, Vol. II, (Chicago:
A. T. Andreas, 1883), 1224. Republican.
3. Clarke, J. W. (M?)-A Biographical History of Central Kansas, I
(New York and Chicago: Lewis
Publishing Co., 1902), 8. Populist.
4. Clouter, J. F.-Weekly State Journal, Topeka, February 12, 1885.
Republican.
5. Drew, A. H.-Hugoton Hermes,
August, 1961 (75th Anniversary
Historical Edition). Populist.
6. Dunsmore, J. M.-History of Neosho and Wilson Counties, Kansas
(Fort Scott: Monitor Printing Co.,
1902), 438-41. Populist.
7. Eastman, D. W.-The Chronical
Monthly Magazine, I (June, 1894),
12-13. Published in Burlingame,
Kansas. Republican.
8. Elting, Richard O.--Connelley, ed.,
Kansas and Kansans, V, 2083-84.
Republican.
9. Glenn, William M.--Connelley,
ed., Kansas and Kansans, IV, 1688.
Republican.
10. Graham, James-Topeka Daily
Capital, February 12, 1909. Populist.
11. Green, Edward F.-Handbook of
the Kansas Legislature, 1901 (Topeka: Crane and Co., 1900), 116.
Populist.
12. Hale, Samuel !.--Connelley, ed.,
Kansas and Kansans, V, 2156-57.
Republican.
13. Hoch, E. W.-The Chronicle
Monthly Magazine, I (June, 1894),
14-19. Republican.
14. Humphrey, J. L.-History of Labette County, Kansas and Repre-

15.

16.

17.

18.

19.

20.

21.

22.

23.

24.

sentative Citizens (Chicago : Biographical Publishing Co., 1901),
797-98. Populist.
Kerr, Walter L.-The History of
the Early Settlement of Norton
County Kansas (Kansas Norton
Champion, 1894), 163. Populist.
Pomeroy, John F.-Kansas: A Cyclopaedia of State History, Embracing Events, Institutions, Indus tries, Counties, Cities, Towns,
Prominent Persons, etc., III (Chicago: Standard Publishing Co.,
n.d.). Republican.
Price, W. W.-Brown County
World, Hiawatha, March 2, 1894.
Republican.
Rosenthal, Joseph-Kansas City
Star, November 22, 1925. Democrat.
Shaw, James S.-Kansas Democrat,
Topeka, February 14, 1893. Republican.
Swan, William B.-First Biennial
Report of tlze State Board of Healtlz
of tlze State of Kansas from /an. 1,
1901, to Dec. 31, 1902 (Topeka:
W. Y. Morgan, 1902) , 8-9. Republican.
Treu, Joseph-Early History of
Wabaunsee County, Kansas (Alma,
Kansas: 1901) , 287-88. Populist.
Troutman, James A.-Kansas, Part
I (Chicago: Standard Publishing
Co., 1912), 718-20. Republican.
Willits, Ledru J.--Connelley, ed.,
Kansas and Kansans, IV, 2053.
Republican.
Woodworth, C. A.-Directory of
State Government, Kansas, 18771878 (Kansas Publishing House,
I 877). Populist.

clippings relating to the 1893 house; volume three of these has an unidentified
newspaper clipping which provides a sketchy and insufficient account of the background of tlze Republican house members.
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IV

Composite Comparison of the Kansas Legislatures of
1891, 1893, 1895, 1897, and 1899•
Legislative

Median
Age

Body

1891 Senate
Republicans
45
1891 House
Populists
46
Republicans ................ 45
1893-97 Senate
Populists ------·············· 44
Republicans ---------------- 48
1893 House
Populists ---·------·········· 45
Republicans -------········· 46
1895 House
Populists -----··············· 40
Republicans
45
1897-1901 Senate
Populists ·············-······ 48
Republicans ................ 44
1897 House
Populists .................... 44
Republicans ................ 48
1899 House
Populists .................... 43
Republicans ................ 44
•••u•--••••••••••••

uoo••••••o••o

Occupation

Removed to
Kansas

College
Graduates

89.0% non-farmers

1868

20.6%

21.0 % non-farmers
63.0% non-farmers

1878
1877

22.4%
23.8%

20.1 % non-farmers
73.3 % non-farmers

1871
1872

6.6%
28.5%

31.2% non-farmers
60.0% non-farmers

1878
1871

25.9%
34.1%

25.9 % non-farmers
57.4% non-farmers

1878-79
1874-75

29.1%
29.1%

37.5% non-farmers
77.7% non-farmers

1872
1872

29.4 %
36.0%

32.2% non-farmers
73.8% non-farmers

1877
1878

21.0%
48.7%

34.7% non-farmers
65.1 % non-farmers

1878-79
1877

31.2¼
39.1¼

•The original charts from which these statistics were compiled are housed
in the Regional History Division of the Kenneth Spencer Research Library, The
University of Kansas.
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NOTES

Preface
I. "The Populist Heritage and the Intellectual," American Scholar, XXIX
(Winter, 1959-1960), 58.
2. Actually, the first scholarly account of Populism was Frank L. McVey's "The
Populist Movement," in Economic Studies (American Economic Association,
1896), I, 133-209, which did not employ the Turner thesis and which viewed
the movement as a truly radical departure. Solon J. Buck's The Agrarian
Crusade: A Chronicle of the Farmer in Politics (New Haven, 1921) and John
D. Hicks' The Populist Revolt: A History of the Farmers' Alliance and the
People's Party (Minneapolis, 1931) are two general studies that represented
the frontier interpretation most influentially.
3. See Thomas H. Greer's American Social Reform Movements: Their Pattern
Since 1865 (New York, 1949); Eric F. Goldman's Rendezvous with Destiny:
A History of Modern American Reform (New York, 1952); and Richard
Hofstadter's The Age of Reform: From Bryan to F.D.R. (New York, 1955).
4. See especially C. Vann Woodward's "The Populist Heritage and the Intellectual," American Scholar, XXIX (Winter, 1959-1960), 55-72, and Norman
Pollack's The Populist Response to Industrial America (New York, 1962).
5. See especially George E. Mowry's The California Progressives (Berkdey,
1951); Alfred D. Chandler's "The Origins of the Progressive Leadership," in
Elting Morison, ed., The Letters of Theodore Roosevelt, VIII (Cambridge,
1954), 1462-65; and Otis L. Graham's An Encore for Reform : The Old Progressives and the New Deal (New York, 1967).
6. Raymond C. Miller, "The Populist Party in Kansas," unpublished doctor's
dissertation (University of Chicago, 1928). Walter T. K. Nugent's dissertation
was published as The Tolerant Populists: Kansas, Populism, and Nativism
( Chicago, 1963).

Chapter I
l. The Advocate, Topeka, May 14, 1890.
2. Vernon Lewis Parrington, Main Currents in American Thought (3 vols., New
York, 1958), I, 11.
3. Ibid., 3.
4. Arthur W. Thompson, "The Gilded Age," in Howard W. Quint and others,
eds., Main Problems in American History (2 vols., Homewood, 1964), II,
53-54. See also Richard Hofstadter, The American Political Tradition and the
Men Who Made lt (New York, 1961), 45-67, and Sidney Fine, Laissez Faire
and the General-Welfare State: A Study of Conflict in American Thought,
1865-1901 (Ann Arbor, 1957), 3-25.
5. Thompson, in Quint and others, eds., Main Problems, II, 54.
6. John Tipple, "The Robber Baron in the Gilded Age: Entrepreneur or Iconoclast?" in H . Wayne Morgan, ed., The Gilded Age: A Reappraisal (Syracuse,
1963), 19. Thurman W. Arnold, perhaps better than anyone else, has chopped
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7.
8.

9.
10.
11.
12.

13.
14.

15.
16.

17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.

through the national mythology to demonstrate how and why American attitudes were affected when the modern corporate structure was grafted onto
American society. See The Folklore of Capitalism (New Haven, 1937) , especially chapter IX on "The Effect of the Antitrust Laws in Encouraging Large
Combinations."
Tipple, in Morgan, ed., The Gilded Age, 19-20.
See Lee Benson, Tl,e Concept of facksonian Democracy: New Y ork as a Test
Case (Atheneum, 1964) , especially the chapter entitled "Positive versus Negative Liberalism."
Arnold, Folklore of Capitalism (New Haven, 1961), 12.
Fine, Laissez Faire and the General-Welfare State, 4-5.
Thomas C. Cochran and William Miller, The Age of Enterprise: A Social
History of Industrial America, revised edition (New York, 1961), 91 ff .
Charles Francis Adams, "An Erie Raid," North American Review, CXII (April,
1871), 241. Edward Chase Kirkland's Business in the Gilded Age: The Conservatives' Balance Sheet (Madison, 1952) and Dream and Thought in the
Business Community, 1860-1900 (Ithaca, 1956) demonstrate the adaptability
and flexibility of the business mind in the period.
Cochran and Miller, Age of Enterprise, 111.
Tipple, in Morgan, ed., The Gilded Age, 16-17. It is not my contention that
post-Civil War economic history was the result of a struggle between "monolithic economic groups." Stanley Coben's "Northeastern Business and Radical
Reconstruction: A Re-examination," Mississippi Valley Historical Review,
XLVI (June, 1959), 67-90, demonstrates conclusively that "northeastern
businessmen had no unified economic program to promote. " This view has
been substantiated further by Robert P. Sharkey's Money, Class, and Party : An
Economic Study of Civil War and Reconstructio n (The Johns H opkins University Studies in Historical and Political Science, Series LXXVII, 1959), and
Irwin Unger's The Greenback Era: A Social and Political History of American
Finance, 1865-1879 (Princeton, 1964).
Edward C. Kirkland, "Divide and Ruin," Mississippi Valley Historical Review, XLIII (June, 1956) , 11.
See C. Vann Woodward, Reunion and Reaction: The Compromise of 1877
and the End of Reconstruction (Garden City, 1956) , especially the chapter
entitled "The Rejuvenation of Whiggery. "
Tipple, in Morgan, ed., The Gilded Age, 17.
Vincent P. De Santis, "The Republican Party Revisited, 1877-1897," in ibid.,
93-94.
Ibid., 94-95.
Ralph Henry Gabriel, The Course of American Dem ocratic Thought: An
Intellectual History Since 1815 (New York, 1940), 146.
Ibid., 147.
Ibid., 146 ff.
Ibid., 145.
It may seem a paradox to say that political democracy was expanding since
many observers, Henry Adams for instance, felt democracy was weakening,
contracting, decaying. This obviously was the case socially and economically,
but in form, at least, political democracy was expanding-the addition of new
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25.

26.

27.
28.
29.

30.
31.

32.

33.
34.
35.

states, the extension of political rights to Negroes, and the expansion of the
franchise to include women on the municipal level and, later in the period, in
some states full participation of women, were, however superficial they may
have been, examples of expanding political democracy. In addition, the idea
of the sovereign people was kept alive in the period to emerge stronger than
ever at the close of the century. In a sense, politics of the era reflected well the
aspirations of the majority of the populace who were thoroughly permeated
with the materialism and rugged individualism of the age.
Kirkland, Dream and Thought in the Business Community, 14. Irvin G.
Wyllie, in The Self-Made Man in America: The Myths of Rags to Riches (New
Brunswick, 1954), 83, indicates that the exponents of self-help drew their
"texts from the Bible, not from the writings of Darwin and Spencer." Sidney
Fine contends, "Businessmen . . . did employ social-Darwinist arguments to
justify both competition and consolidation and to combat demands for government regulation." See Laissez Faire and the General-Welfare State, n. 100.
Spencer's ideas were presented in a number of works. Social Statics (New
York, 1864); The Man Versus the State, ed., Truxton Beale (New York,
1916); The Principles of Sociology (3 vols., New York, 1876-97); and The
Study of Sociology (New York, 1874) are the major works. See also Richard
Hofstadter, Social Darwinism in American Thought, revised edition (Boston,
1964), especially the chapters entitled "The Vogue of Spencer" and "William
Graham Sumner: Social Darwinist." Stow Persons' American Minds: A
History of Ideas (New York, 1958), 225-29, and Fine's Laissez Faire and the
General-Welfare State, chapters II-IV, are also useful in assessing the ideas and
influence of Spencer.
Hofstadter, Social Darwinism, 31-32.
See Crane Brinton, English Political Thought in the 19th Century (New
York, 1962).
Hofstadter, Social Darwinism, 31-35; Persons, American Minds, 225-26;
Parrington, Main Currents, III, 198; Eric F. Goldman, Rendezvous with Destiny: A History of Modern American Reform, revised edition (New York,
1956), 68-76; Fine, Laissez Faire and the General-Welfare State, 32-33.
Hofstadter, Social Darwinism, 32.
Goldman, Rendewous with Destiny, 71-73; Hofstadter, Social Darwinism,
especiall y see chapters entitled "Lester Ward: Critic" and "The Dissenters";
Fine, Laissez Faire and the General-Welfare State, chapters VI-IX.
George Rogers Taylor and Irene D. Neu, The American Railroad Network,
1861-1890 (Cambridge, 1956), l; Samuel P. Hays, The Response to Industrialism: 1885-1914 (Chicago, 1957), 15-17.
Ibid.
U.S. Bureau of the Census, Historical Statistics of the United States, 17891945, 200, 202.
See Edward C. Kirkland's Men, Cities and Transportation: A Study of New
England History 1820-1900 (2 vols., Cambridge, 1948) on the region's transportation problems and the manner in which they were handled. Lee Benson's
Merchants, Farmers, and Railroads: Railroad Regulation and New York
Politics, 1850-1887 (Cambridge, 1955) and John F. Stover's The Railroads of
the South, 1865-1900: A Study of Finance and Control (Chapel Hill, 1955)
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36.

37.

38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.

44.

45.

both shed light on the special problems ansrng from railroad transportation.
George Rogers Taylor and Irene D. Neu have put together perhaps the most
satisfactory account of the physical integration side of the nation's railroads in
their The American Railroad Network, 1861-1890. Thomas C. Cochran's
Railroad Leaders, 1845-1890: The Business Mind in Action (Cambridge,
1953), which reviews the careers of sixty-one railroad leaders and supplies
almost three hundred pages of biographical data and correspondence, provides
invaluable insights into the relationship of the railroads and their spokesmen
to American society. Paul W. Gates' Fifty Miltion Acres: Conflicts ot1er
Kansas Land Policy, 1854-1890 (Ithaca, 1954) is also quite useful in revealing
a special phase of the railroad problem in conjunction with land distribution.
See especially his discussion of "Railroad Purchase of Indian Reserves." Leslie
E. Decker's Railroads, Lands, and Politics: The Taxation of the Railroad Land
Grants, 1864-1897 (Providence, 1964) fulfills a similar need. Two recent
studies, Albert Fishlow's American Rai1roads and the Transformation of the
Ante-Bellum Economy (Cambridge, 1965) and Robert Fogel's Railroads and
American Growth: Essays in Econometrics (Baltimore, 1964), although arriving at somewhat conflicting conclusions, are both useful and stimulating
econometric analyses.
Paul W. Gates, The Farmer's Age: Agriculture 1815-1860 (New York, 1960),
212, 416; Hays, Response to Industrialism, 13-15; Cochran and Miller, Age
of Enterprise, 211-12.
Hays, Response to Industrialism, 13-15, 27; Tipple, in Morgan, ed., The
Gilded Age, 24-25. Undoubtedly, James C. Malin has made the single greatest
contribution to explaining the exacting demands required of those who undertook to farm the plains country. See Malin's Winter Wheat in the Golden
Belt of Kansas (Lawrence, 1944), especially 102-37. Allan G. Bogue's Money
at Interest: The Farm Mortgage on the Middle Border (Ithaca, 1955), 1-6,
provides a useful summary statement on the special pecuniary requirements
for farming on the "Middle Border."
Hays, Response to Industrialism, 15.
Ibid., 17-19; Cochran and Miller, Age of Enterprise, 47, 67-68; Stover,
American Railroads (Chicago, 1965), 88.
Hays, Response to Industrialism, 20.
Arthur Bestor, "The Ferment of Reform," in Richard W. Leopold and Arthur
S. Link, eds., Problems in American History (Englewood Cliffs, 1958), 266.
Hofstadter, Social Darwinism , 47.
The writer has in mind particularly the development of substantive due
process in application to property rights. See Alfred H. Kelly and Winfred A.
Harbison, The American Constitution: Its Origin and Det1elopment (New
York, 1963), especially chapter nineteen. See also Fine's Laissez Faire and
the General-Welfare State, especially the chapter entitled "Laissez Faire Becomes the Law of the Land."
Wilfred E. Binkley, American Political Parties: Their Natural History, revised
edition (New York, 1958), 278-320; Matthew Josephson, The Politicos, 18651896 (New York, 1938).
Paul W. Gates has written that "few would dispute today that it was 'insatiable land-hunger,' rather than any idealistic notion of making Kansas a free
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or a slave state, that drew the bulk of the 100,000 people who rushed across
the Missouri line in the period from 1854 to 1860." Fifty Million Acres, 1. See
also pages 1-4, and 109, for Gates' comments on the nature of Kansas settlement. Roy Franklin Nichols' The Disruption of American Democracy (New
York, 1~62), especially the chapter entitled "Territorial Nightmares," is also
useful for this period of Kansas settlemenL
46. A. Bower Sageser, "The Rails Go Westward," in John D. Bright, ed., Kansas:
The First Century ( 4 vols., New York, 1956), I, 223.
47. Ibid., 228.
48. U.S. Department of Commerce, Sixteenth Census of the United States, 1940,
Population, Kansas (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1941); and
John D. Bright, "At the Turn of the Century," in Bright, ed., Kansas, I, 533.
49. The decade of the 1850s saw sixty-one percent of the working-force engaged
in farming in some capacity; the 1860s, fifty-nine percent; the 1870s, eightyone percent; and the 1880s fifty-five percent. U.S. Department of Commerce,
Fifteenth Census of the U.S., 1930, Population, Kansas, I, 339.
50. William Frank Zornow, "The Basis of Agrarian Unrest in Kansas, 18701890," in Bright, ed., Kansas, I, 463.
51. James C. Carey, "People, Problems, Prohibition, Politicos and Politics-18701890," in Bright, ed., Kansas, I, passim.
52. Burton E. Lyman, "Voting Behavior of Kansas Counties, 1862-1936: As
Measured by Pluralities for Governor and Secretary of State," unpublished
master's thesis (University of Kansas, 1937), 142-43.
53. The actual percentages were these: 1864, 78.6; 1868, 68.8; 1872, 66.6; 1876,
63.1.; 1880, 60.4; 1884, 58.1; 1888, 55.3. Svend Peterson, A Statistical History
of the American Presidential Elections (New York, 1963), 40-56.
54. James C. Carey, "People, Problems, Prohibition, Politicos and Politics-18701890," in Bright, ed., Kansas, I, 392; and William Frank Zornow, Kansas:
A History of the fayhawk State (Norman, 1957), passim.
55. E. L. Godkin, "Aristocratic Opinions of Democracy," North American Review, C (July, 1865), 209-10.
56. Carey, "People and Politics," in Bright, ed., Kansas, I, 371.
57. Ibid., 372-74. For a treatment of the fraudulent activities in Barber County
see Myron C. Scott's "A Congressman and His Constituents, Jerry Simpson
and the Big Seventh," unpublished master's thesis (Fort Hays Kansas State
College, 1959), 28-29.
58. Paul Gates, in Fifty Million Acres, has covered the story of the scramble for
lands by settlers and railroad officials as well as anyone.
59. Zornow, Kansas, 119-30. See also Ernest B. Bader, "Kansas: The First
Decade of Statehood, 1861-1871," in Bright, ed., Kansas, I, 210-11, and Carey,
"People and Politics," in ibid., 394. See Gates, Fifty Million Acres, 143-46,
for one treatment of Senator Pomeroy's activities. In a recent article, James C.
Malin challenges the "purity of the 'Purifiers' " who defeated Pomeroy, and
suggests that the senator was the victim of his own kind of devious tactics.
See "Some Reconsiderations of the Defeat of Senator Pomeroy of Kansas,
1873," Mid-America: An Historical Review, XLVIII (January, 1966), 47-57.
60. Carey, "People and Politics," in Bright, ed., Kansas, I, 395.
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61. Raymond C. Miller, '"The Populist Party in Kan sas," unpublished doctor's
dissertation (University of Chicago, 1928), 4-5.
62. Pittsburg Kansan, November 6, 1889. The editor of this paper subsequently
became a Populist, and the Kansan became the leading Populist paper in
Crawford County.
63. See Henry Nash Smith's Virgin Land: The American West as Symbol and
Myth (Cambridge, 1950), especially chapter sixteen, for an excellent treatment
of the role played by myths in the settlement of the West.
64. Zornow, "The Basis of Agrarian Unrest in Kansas," in Bright, ed., Kansas,
I, 473-75.
65. Some important exceptions were these: in 18 74 the Republican party demanded
in its platform legislation regulating railroad rates within the state (Topeka
Commonwealth, August 30, 1874); in 1882 the Democratic party platform
led the way in a call for direct election of president and vice-president and
U.S. senators; the Democrats of the state also proposed in that year that
elections of all federal officers be placed under the control of the national
government (Topeka Daily Capital, September 1, 1882).
66. Among these proposals were a call for an income tax, a postal money-deposit
system , laws protecting the health and safety of miners and factory workers,
government ownership of railroads and telegraphs, direct election of United
States senators, national laws for the arbitration of labor-management disputes,
woman suffrage, and support for greenbacks as full legal tender (State party
platforms for the 1872-1888 period may be found in Topeka Commonwealth,
June 13, 1872; August 28, 1872 ; September 6, 1872; September 12, 1872;
August 7 and 30, 1874; May 20, 1876; Jul y 30, 1876; August 16, 1876;
Topeka Daily Capital, September 24, 1877 ; July 7, 1878; August 28, 1878;
September 6, 1878; Jul y 30, 1880; August 9 and 24, 1882; September 1, 1882;
July 18, 1884; June 15, 1886; August 12, 1887 ; July 7 and 28, 1888; and
August 30, 1888).
67. James C. Malin, A Concern About Humanity: Notes on Reform, 1872-1912
at the National and Kansas Levels of Thought (Lawrence, 1964), see especially 19 ff.
68. In 1878 the Republican party denounced "the issue of an irredeemable 'absolute money,' legal-tender scrip, as a species of repudiation,'' but it endorsed
the "withdrawal of the National Bank notes, substituting therefor greenback
currency issued directly by the Government, as the sole paper currency of the
country." The 1878 Republican platform endorsed, in addition, "a doublecoin standard of values" as "preferable to a single standard . . . . " Neither of
these proposals appeared again from 1878 to 1888. The 1882 Republican
platform called for laws to "prevent unjust discrimination by railroad companies .... " The Republican platform of 1884 demanded that the board of
railroad commissioners, established by the 1883 legislature, be given the
powers necessary to accomplish its purpose. The 1888 platform denounced
"all great trusts as oppressive to the people,'' and called for " stringent laws to
protect ... workingmen against contract, pauper or Chinese immigrants .... "
The Republican platform that year also advocated a reduction in the legal
rate of interest on money to six percent and a reduction in the maximum
contract rate to ten percent (Topeka Daily Capital, August 28, 1878; August
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69.
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77.

78.
79.
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9, 1882; July 18, 1884; July 28, 1888). Platform statements hardly guarantee
the enactment of appropriate legislation even when endorsed by a party as
dominant as was the Republican party in Kansas. All the parties contending
in the 1878 campaign proclaimed their sympathy for regulation of railroad
rates but the issue remained to be debated in the Populist decade. The 1884
call for strengthening the powers of the board of railroad commissioners by the
Republican party was likewise not attended to and the issue carried over into
the 1890s. The 1889 Republican legislature did make the change in interest
rates the party had supported in 1888.
Zornow, "The Basis of Agrarian Unrest in Kansas," in Bright, ed., Kansas,
I, 474.
James E. Boyle, The Financial History of Kansas (Economic and Political
Science Series [Madison, 1908)), V, 57, 71, 76.
Miller, "The Populist Party in Kansas," 18-19.
Zornow, "The Basis of Agrarian Unrest in Kansas," in Bright, ed., Kansas,
I, 456; Zornow, Kansas, 143.
Miller, "The Populist Party in Kansas," 27; Malin, Winter Wheat, 102-37;
Zornow, "The Basis of Agrarian Unrest in Kansas," in Bright, ed., Kansas,
I, 474.
U.S. Department of Commerce, Eleventh Census of the United States, Report
on the Public Debt, 77.
Miller, "The Populist Party in Kansas," 27.
Zornow, "The Basis of Agrarian Unrest in Kansas," in Bright, ed., Kansas,
I, 464.
The trend of settlement had been largely from northeast to southwest. See
James C. Malin, "The Turnover of Farm Population in Kansas," Kansas
Historical Quarterly, IV, 339.
Miller, "The Populist Party in Kansas," 29.
Raymond Miller concluded that the "Interest rate on this debt, and on chattel
mortgages which were even more common, was excessive. The state law set
12 % as the maximum interest, and in 1889 reduced it to 10%, but the law
was more honored in the breach than in the observance. To the face interest
charge must be added agents' commissions, bonus, costs, and the like, all of
which were deducted from the amount received by the debtor" (ibid., 33).
Allan Bogue's Money at Interest traces the activities of two large and reputable
loan companies doing business in the area. His study proves that these two
companies conducted their business in an ethical manner. At the same time,
Bogue points out that actual profits were hard to determine (p. 19), that loan
rates were higher in the new counties (pp. 114-24), that "local agents functioned with too little supervision and gouged commissions from the settlers,
which they did not report to the companies" (p. 275). Bogue also notes,
"Charlatan companies were allowed to survive and by their competition force
sounder companies into reckless practices" (p. 276).
Miller, "The Populist Party in Kansas," 35.
For a discussion of this question see Leslie E. Decker's Railroads, Lands, and
Politics. Decker's study illustrates that the railroads had "important advantages" in their struggle with the settlers, but he also points out that this conflict "cannot be correctly counted as a struggle between the forces of private
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monopoly, exploitation, and injustice on the one side and the forces of public
welfare, conservation, and fair play on the other" (p. 250).
82. Zornow, "The Basis of Agrarian Unrest in Kansas," in Bright, ed., Kansas, l,
458. Sol Miller, a prominent Republican leader throughout the period in question, wrote in 1896: "It was for a long time too plain that Republican Legislatures of Kansas simply obeyed the orders of the railroad companies. The
Railroad and other committees were made up largely of railroad attorneys.
Nothing could be done without the consent of the railroad companies. The
Railroad Commissioner law, that is supposed to be for the purpose of maintaining justice between the people and railroads, was really got up by the
attorneys of railroad companies, in order to ward off the enactment of laws
regulating freight rates" (From an article entitled "Republican Shortcomings,"
The Weekly Kansas Chief, Troy, December 31, 1896).
83. Zornow, "The Basis of Agrarian Unrest in Kansas," in Bright, ed., Kansas,
I, 465-71.

Chapter II
I. Hill P. Wilson, A Biographical History of Eminent Men of the State of Kansas
with Portraits Engraved Expressly for this Work (Topeka, 1901), 449-51.
2. W. D. Vincent, Government Loans to the People, no publisher, place, or date
given, People's Party Pamphlets ( 6 vols., Kansas State Historical Society), I.
Cited hereafter as K.S.H.S.
3. Jennie Small Owen (annalist), The Annals of Kansas 1886-1925 (2 vols.,
Topeka, no date), I, 6-8.
4. Topeka Daily Capital, September 16, 1886.
5. Article by William D. Vincent, Clay Center Dispatch, August 22, 1901;
John Davis Scrapbooks (13 vols., A-M [J missing], K.S.H.S.). The Nebraska
State Historical Society contains a portion of John Davis' library. Three boxes
of pamphlets, speeches, and miscellaneous items, thirty-one volumes in all,
constitute the John Davis collection there. No manuscript material is included,
few marginal notes appear, and the K.S.H.S. does have copies of almost all
the items that are contained in this collection.
6. Address by John Davis at the Lyon County Fair on September 19, 1873,
Kansas Biographical Scrapbook (K.S.H.S.), K, 27, 48, 85.
7. Clay Center Dispatch, August 22, 1901.
8. Kansas Farmer, Topeka, February 16, 1887.
9. Ibid., March 17, 1887.
10. Ibid., April 21, 1887.
1 I. Hortense Marie Harrison, "The Populist Delegation in the Fifty-Second Congress, 1891-1893," master's thesis (University of Kansas, 1933), 10-12.
12. Ibid.
13. Ibid.
14. Kansas Farmer, Topeka, June 21, 1882. The novel ran serially between March
1, 1882, and July 5, 1882.
15. Ibid., July 5, 1882.
16. Regarding the anarchist question, in September he wrote that "the people
sometimes need to be aroused, but peaceable means must be employed.
Anarchists are our enemies, and we must suppress them by legal methods"
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32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.

41.
42.

(ibid., September 22, I 887). In October he stressed that the paper was "not
an organ of any party, sect or order" (ibid., October 27, 1887). In November
he defended the tariff in several issues against attacks by its opponents. He
made it clear, however, that he favored a reduction of the tariff where that
reduction would assist the nation's consumers in obtaining the necessities of
life at a lower price (ibid., November 3 and 10, 1887). In December he
attacked trusts and advocated the issuance of money by the general government
and called for a separation of the government from all banking institutions
(ibid., December I, 1887).
Ibid., April 30, 1890.
Charles A. Magaw, Bulletin of tlie Shawnee County Historical Society, Number Fifteen (December, 1951), 10-11.
Ibid., and Topeka Daily Capital, October 8, 1906.
Magaw, Bulletin, Number Fifteen (December, 1951), 10-11.
Topeka Commonwealth, April 15, 1885.
Magaw, Bulletin, Number Fifteen (December, 1951), 10-11.
G. C. Clemens, The Labor Problem, Stated for the Busy and the Tired (Enterprise, 1887), 4, People's Party Pamphlets (K.S.H.S.), I.
Ibid., 5.
Ibid., 8.
Wilson, Eminent Men, 371-72.
Ibid., and Portrait and Biographical Record of Southeastern Kansas, Containing
Biographical Sketches of Prominent and Representative Citizens of the Counties, Together with Biographies and Portraits of all the Presidents of the
United States and Governors of the State of Kansas (Chicago, 1894), 234-37.
Letter dated July 18, 1888, published in the Girard Press, August 1, 1888.
Daniels to Ingalls, August 2, 1888, in Percy Daniels, Swollen Fortunes and the
Problem of the Unemployed (no publisher, no place, 1908), 36-38, People's
Party Pamphlets (K.S.H.S.), VI.
Ingalls to Daniels, August 7, 1888, ibid.
Daniels to Ingalls, August 12, 1888, ibid.
Letter published in the Girard Press, August 1, 1888.
Percy Daniels, A Crisis for the H11sbandman (Girard, 1889), 4.
Portrait and Biographical Record of Southeastern Kansas, 236-37.
McLouth Times (Souvenir Edition), November 25, 1898, 63-64.
The Advocate, Meriden, November 22, 1889.
Biographical Circulars (K.S .H.S.), M-Z, II.
The Advocate, Meriden, November 22, 1889.
Ibid., February 27, 1890.
W. V. Marshall, The Industrial Handbook: Embracing a Concise Statement of
the Nature, Cause and Effects of Existing Industrial Ills; with a Practical
Method of Relief (Winfield, 1890), 5-12, People's Party Pamphlets (K.S.H .S.),
11. See also W. V. Marshall, Cum11lative Taxation (Winfield, 1890), People's
Party Pamphlets (K.S.H.S.), II.
The Advocate, Topeka, March 20, 1890.
In particular see J. B. Welburn's Heaven on Earth ; Described and How
Secured (Atchison, 1889). Welburn believed that the institution of private
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property should and would eventually be abandoned, although he opposed the
use of force to accomplish that end (p. 12).
43. Kansas Farmer, Topeka, June 18, 1890.
44. James D. Holden, Free Freight and Got1ernment Railways; A Proposition to
Restore to Society Essential Rights of Which it has been Wrongfully Dit1ested;
and to make Men Generally the Beneficiaries of Got1ernment, Instead of Its
Victims (no date, no publisher), 2, People's Party Pamphlets (K.S.H.S.), I.
45. Ibid., 19.
46. Th e Advocate, Topeka, January 30, 1890.

Chapter III
1. Solon J. Buck's The Granger Mot1ement : A Study of Agricultural Organization
and Its Political, Economic, and Social Manifestations, 1870-1880 (Cambridge,
1913) and The Agrarian Crusade (New Haven, 1920) provide the most

thorough account of this phase of agrarian activities.
2. Elizabeth N. Barr, "The Populist Uprising," in W. E. Connelley, ed., History
of K ansas, State and People (5 vols., 1928), II, 1137-47.
3. John D. Hicks, The Populist Ret1olt: A History of the Farmers' Alliance and
the People's Party (Bison edition, Lincoln, 1961), 96-127.
4. See ibid., 97-98, and 104-13, for a discussion of the origins of the Northern
and Southern Alliances.
5. Exception was made for country ministers, country teachers, and the editors
of farm journals (ibid., 112).

6. Ibid.
7. Ibid., 103, 112-13.
8. The Lyons Republican, August 9, 1888.
9. Topeka Capital-Commonwealth, February 7, 1889.
10. See W. F. Rightmire, "The Alliance Movement in Kansas-Origin of the
People's Party," T ransactions of the Kansas State Historical Society, 19051906, IX, 1-8. Rightmire stated that this State Reform Association was formed
in Wichita on December 19-20, 1888, to replace the Union Labor party state
committee and the National Order of Videttes, the latter of which was a
secret organization of third-party men about which there is little real information and much speculation. See James C. Malin's A Concern About
Humanity : Notes on Reform, 1872-1912 at the National and Kansas Let1els
of Thought (Lawrence, 1964), 159-65, for a discussion of the National Order

of Videttes.
11. Newton Weekly /ournal, August 23, 1889, and Kansas Commoner, Newton,
August 16, 1889.
12. The News, Cambridge, February 8, 1889.
13. The platforms are reprinted in Hicks, The Populist Ret1olt, 427-30.
14. Ibid., 124.
15. Kansas Farmer, Topeka, July 16, 1889.
16. Wichita Daily Eagle, May 3, 1889.
17. Ibid. , August 23, 1889.
18. Annie L. Diggs, Transactions of the Kansas State Historical Society , 18971900, VI, 233-34.
19. The Advocate, Meriden, September 21, 1889.
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20. Ibid., October 5, 1889.
21. Rightmire, "The Alliance Movement in Kansas," Transactions of the Kansas
State Historical Society, IX, 1-8.
22. Kansas Farmer, Topeka, December 25, 1889.
23. Ibid. , February 14, 1889.
24. Topeka Daily Capital, November 5, 10, 1889.
25. Ibid., December 8, 1889.
26. Dr. McLallin had played an active part in the August 14, 1889, Newton
meeting, and was appointed by that convention as the Alliance's press representative. See the Kansas Commoner, Newton, August 16, 1889.
27. Kansas Farmer, Topeka, February 26, 1890.
28. The 1888 Union-Labor platform is contained in the Topeka Daily Capital,
August 30, 1888. John J. Ingalls was, of course, a most extraordinary Kansas
politician. Sec William E. Connelley, Ingalls of Kansas: A Character Study
(Topeka, 1909), and Burton John Williams, "John James Ingalls: A Personal
Portrait of a Public Figure" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of
Kansas, 1965) .
29. On this matter see Rightmire's "The Alliance Movement in Kansas," Transactions of the Kansas State Historical Societ}', IX, 1-8.
30. See Dr. McLallin's discussion of the origins of the Kansas People's party in an
editorial contained in The Advocate, Topeka, August 22, 1894.
31. Only five of the sixty-eight subsequently emerged as significant Populist
leaders. Sec ibid., April 2, 1890.
32. Ibid., August 22, 1894.
33. Rightmire, "The Alliance Movement in Kansas," Transactions of the Kansas
State Historical Society, IX, 1-8.
34. The Advocate, Topeka, August 22, 1894.
35. lhid., May 14, 28, and June 4, 11, 1890.
36. lbid., April 30, 1890.
37. Wichita (Weekly) Eagle, January 13, 1891.
38. Kansas Farmer, Topeka, April 30, 1890.
39. lhid., May 14, 1890.
40. The Advocate, Topeka, May 21, 1890.
41. Biographical Record: This Volume Contains Biographical Sketches of Leading
Citizens of Cowley County, Kansas (Chicago, 1901 ), 309-11.
42. The Advocate, Topeka, May 14, June 18, 25, July 23, 1890, and August 22,
1894.
43. Unfortunately, either a detailed description of this first convention does not
exist or it eluded my search.
44. Topeka Daily Capital, August 14, 1890; The Advocate. Topeka. August 27,
1890; and Rightmire, "The Alliance Movement in Kansas," Transactions of
the Kansas State Historical Society, IX, 1-8.
45. W. F. Rightmire, Autobiographical Sketch dated December 16, 1910, K.S.H.S.
Library.
46. lbid.; Topeka Daily Capital, December 25, 1929.
47. Topeka Daily Capital, August 14, 1890; The Advocate, Topeka, August 27,
1890.
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48. The Proceedings of the Twenty-Ninth Republican State Convention of Kansas
(Topeka, 1890), 64-66.
49. The Advocate, Topeka, January 9, 1890.

Chapter IV
1. Paul W. Glad's McKinley, Bryan, and the People (Philadelphia, 1964), 13-31,
contains a useful discussion of these two patterns of thought. Richard Hofstadter's Age of Refo1-m, however, more than any other work, has utilized the
agrarian myth in interpreting the Populist movement. Assuming that the
Populists were dominated by the agrarian mystique, Hofstadter contended
that "In Populist thought the farmer is not a speculating businessman, victimized by the risk economy of which he is a part, but rather a wounded
yeoman, preyed upon by those who are alien to the life of folkish virtue" (p.
73). This appraisal does not hold true as applied to the leadership of the
Populist party in Kansas; it was the opponents of the Populists who employed
the agrarian myth, not the Populists. Paul Glad has noted this, and makes a
valid point when he writes, "The true realists of 1896 were those who sought
to rid themselves of preconceptions, who tried to examine the realities themselves, and who formulated programs without resort to traditional images"
(McKinley , Bryan, and the People, 50) .
2. See Appendix I for a listing of the various source materials that were consulted in preparing this analysis. See also Appendix II for a composite comparison of the major Kansas Populist leadership for the years 1890 and 1896.
3. The Harvard, Stanford, and Oxford alumni were, respectively, John Grant Otis,
W. P. Harrington, and Carl Vrooman.
4. Oskaloosa Times , July 9, 1891.
5. Kansas Commoner, Wichita, April 28, 1892. Mrs. Lease at one point made
the following statement about religion: "I do not belong to any church. I cut
loose and left the church behind me long ago. I was reared a Catholic, but I
do not think I could be called orthodox, even in my youth. I account to
m yself for my conduct, and to God" (Kansas City Star, April 1, 1891).
6. Voice of True Reform (Topeka, 1891), 42.
7. J. M. Dunsmore, "Epistle to be Read at His Funeral as His Last Message of
Love," special collection, K.S.H.S. Archives.
8. Speech in U.S. senate, May 12, 1892, Kansas Collected Speeches and
Pamphlets (K.S.H.S.), XV, 9.
9. For Jerry Botkin's statement see the Topeka Daily Capital, September 2, 1894.
For an especially good insight into Mrs. Diggs' ,iews, see her penciled note to
G. C. Clemens on the inside cover of a social gospel treatise written by George
D. Herron entitled The New Redemption (New York, 1893), which is contained in the K.S.H .S.
10. The Advocate, Topeka, December 30, 1891. For an especially precise statement in opposition to social Darwinism see Governor L. D. Lewelling's
"Speech at Huron Place," July 26, 1894, typed manuscript, K.S.H .S. Archives.
1 I. W. D. Vincent, "Government Loans to the People," People's Party Pamphlets
(K.S.H.S.) , I.
12. Unsigned letter to the editor, The Advocate, Topeka, September 26, 1894.
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13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.

20.
21.

Numerous references could be made to statements by Populist leaders on
paternalism. Some especially good examples are those of William Alfred
Peffer, Kansas Farmer, Topeka, January 1, 1890, and "The Mission of the
Populist Party," The North American Review, CLVII (December, 1893), 666;
Frank Doster, "What is Government For?" The Agora, II (October, 1892),
120-26; and R. A. Sanky in the Kansas Commoner, Wichita, March 1, 1894.
Unsigned letter to editor, The Advocate, Topeka, September 2, 1891.
Kansas City /ournal, November 20, 1902, quoting a Kansas City Star interview of 1897.
lbid.
The Advocate, Topeka, September 5, 1894.
From an address before the Shawnee County Farmers' Institute delivered in
Topeka in February, 1890. Kansas Farmer, Topeka, March 5, 1890.
Chester McArthur Destler, American Radicalism 1865-1901: Essays and Documents (New York, 1963), 20.
See Arthur S. Link's Woodrow Wilson and the Progressive Era, 1910-1917
(New York, 1963), 18-22, for a discussion and contrast of Theodore Roosevelt's New Nationalism and Woodrow Wilson's New Freedom.
The Advocate, Topeka, February 27, 1890.
Link, Woodrow Wilson and the Progressive Era, 20-22.

Chapter V
I. Barr, "The Populist Uprising," in Connelley, ed., Kansas and Kansans, II,
II 48-49.
2. Mrs. Lease apparently signed herself Mary E. Lease. This led her Republican
opponents to supply the name Ellen, since it rhymed with "Yellin." Mary
Ellen stuck so well that some historians yet today mistakenly use it. One
prominent example is Eric F. Goldman in his Rendezvous with Destiny.
3. Harry Levinson, "Mary Elizabeth Lease: Prairie Radical," Kansas Magazine,
1948, 18-24; James C. Malin, "Mary Elizabeth Clyens Lease," Dictionary of
American Biography, XXI (Supplement I), 488 -89; William G. Clugston,
Rascals in Democracy (New York, 1941), an interesting but highly inaccurate
account of Mrs. Lease, 91-95; Wichita Eagle, June 14, 1925. For information
concerning Lease's activities in behalf of the Union-Labor party in 1888 see
Kansas Commoner, Newton, October 5, 1888.
4. William Allen White, Autobiography (New York, 1946), 218-19. One's impression of Mrs. Lease was decidedly affected by political persuasion; White's
account was no exception. Compare it with the following: "Mrs. Lease is a
tall woman-fully five feet ten inches, and rather slender. Her face is strong,
good, not pretty, and very feminine. There is no mark of masculinity about
her. She is woman all over. Her hair is a dark brown and evenly parted in
the center and smoothed down at the sides with neat care. Her nose, chin and
cheek bones announce themselves strongly. However, they give no sense of
harshness to her face." Kansas City Star, April l, 1891.
5. Kansas City Star, April I, 1891.
6. [bid., October 25, 1914.
7. The Monitor, Wellington, October 3, 1890.
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8. Kansas City Star, April 1, 1891. Apparently Mrs. Lease had made the above
remarks about Senator John J. Ingalls several weeks earlier in a speech she
delivered in Albaugh's opera house in Washington, D.C. Senator Ingalls had
of course already been defeated at that point. It was this situation that created
a rather humorous incident: Mrs. Lease and a woman friend, while visiting on
capitol hill, encountered the lame-duck senator on his way to a committee
meeting. Mrs. Lease's friend spotted him first and hurried on ahead to ask if
he would like to meet one of his constituents-Mrs. Mary E. Lease. On hearing
that name, Senator Ingalls replied quite definitely: "I do not care to meet
that woman; only Indians and women will scalp a man after he is dead." See
a letter by Charlotte Smith, The Advocate, Topeka, April 15, 1891.
9. Mrs. Lease later denied having originated the statement, but she said she let
it stand because she thought "it was a right good bit of advice." See Topeka
State Jottrnal, May 25, 1896; Kansas City Star, October 26, 1914.
10. Unidentified newspaper clipping contained in Kansas Biographical Scrapbook
(K.S.H.S.), D, II, 26-29.
11. Kansas City Star, August 5, 1900; Topeka Daily Capital, September 17, 1908.
Mrs. Diggs was apparently influenced by Mrs. Helen E. Sterritt, owner of the
music store and also an energetic and strong-minded individual, who subsequently went to Chicago herself to participate actively in journalism. See
Topeka Daily Capital, September 17, 1908.
12. See the Daily Journal, Lawrence, March 2, and November 3, 1882.
13. Kansas City Star, August 5, 1900.
14. Ibid.
15. Ibid.
16. Her speech at Osborne on October 25, 1890, was representative : she began by
repeating the words "Financial conspiracies," "Great revolutions." She then
paused for a moment to assess the effect of her pronouncement. She then explained: the Topeka Capital labeled her an "Anarchist" and she had quoted
those "dangerous words to see if the people were afraid of her." The words
were not her own, she said; they belonged to Senator Plumb (Kansas' junior
Republican senator) , who had said on the floor of congress, "'Financial con spiracies breed great revolutions.' " ''We have had our financial conspiracies
for many years," she said, "and today we see an example of the revolution ."
Following an interruption of great applause and cheers, she proceeded with
her account of what ailed society, using Senator Plumb as an authority. She
then turned her attention to the labor problem, asking "Wh y there are so
many poor men out of employment, even in the sound of the factory whistle ;
why women and children are forced into the workshop to earn their dail y
bread, so that even Sitting Bull says he 'Don't see how white men can treat
their squaws so.' " She then drew a vivid picture of luxury and squalor,
progress and poverty in Washington , D.C., as she had witnessed it only a few
blocks from the White House. She quoted Senator Ingalls as having said, in
1878, "The poor arc growing poorer and the rich richer, and by the end of
this century the middle cl ass will have entirely disappeared.'' She then spent
some time on the question: "Why has he done nothing to prevent this? " See
County News, Osborne, October 30, 1890.
17. Biographical Record, Cowley County. 309-11.
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18. John Davis, "The New Slavery," Select Pamphlets (K.S.H.S.).
19. Kansas People, Osage City, November 5, 1890.
20. Otis to Clover, Tht! Advocate, Topeka, January 9, 1890. Otis later made two
attempts at establishing cooperative settlements: one in l 897 in Colorado at
Pinon, and another in 1898 in the state of Washington at a place called
Equality. See Kansas Biographical Scrapbook (K.S.H.S.) , D, II, 13-14, and
Topeka Daily Capital, December 14, 1900.
21. Peoplt!s Ht!rald, Lyndon, September 29, 1890.
22. Wilson, Eminent Mt!n of Kansas, 513-15; Lincoln County St!ntinel, February
10, 1910; Tht! Advocate, Topeka, June 25, 1890.
23 . Holton Weekly Recorder, July 25, 1890.
24. Victor Murdock, Folks (New York, 1921), 55-56.
25. Harrison, "The Populist Delegation in the Fifty-Second Congress, 1891-1893,"
14-18; Myron C. Scott, "A Congressman and His Constituents, Jerry Simpson
and the Big Seventh"' (unpublished master's thesis, Fort Hays Kansas State
College, 1959), passim .
26. Wichita Eagle, July 19, 1934; see also the three short letters by Jerry Simpson
in the K.S .H .S Archives. Homer E. Socolofsky's Arthur Capper: Publisher,
Politician , Philanthropist (Lawrence, 1962) , p. 37, contains some lively
anecdotal material on Simpson's spelling.
27. White, Autobiography, 217-18.
28. While a member of congress, Simpson and fi ve others introduced George's
book into the Congressional Record so they could make copies of it available to constituents throughout the country. There was also a report that
Henry George himself was willing to campaign for Simpson in 1894. See The
Advocate, Topeka, June 13, 1894.
29. Hamlin Garland, "The Alliance Wedge in Congress," Tlie Arena, V (March,
1891), 451.
30. See the Wichita Weekly Eagle, October 17, 1890, for an especially bitter attack
against Simpson on religious grounds.
3 I. Alliance Bulletin , Harper, September 26, 1890.
32. It has been stated that Jerry Simpson dubbed Hallowell "Prince Hal" (for
example, John Hicks' The Populist Revolt) . Actually, Republicans had developed the "illusion" of Hallowell's royalty at least as early as 1888. See
Wichita Eagle, October 14, 1888, and September 23, 1890.
33. Topeka Daily Capital, October 26, 1890.
34. Grant Wood H arrington, "As Jerry Told It," typed manuscript dated June 30,
1938, K.S.H.S. Archives. G. W . Harrington was one of the leaders of Kansas
Populism, serving as party chairman in 1901-02. This story he relates was
reportedly told to him some ten years after the event.
35. Jerry Simpson credited Victor Murdock of the Wichita Eagle with having
"hung the name onto" him (G. W. Harrington, "As Jerry Told It"). Actually,
there is some doubt as to who originally applied the label. It was either
Murdock of the Eagle or Ralph Easley of the Hutchinson News. M. C. Scott
has researched this matter thoroughly in his master's thesis on Simpson, and
concludes that the News rather than Murdock was responsible. Both Easley
and Murdock cl aimed the honor. For their respective claims sec the Hutchinson News, July 25, 189 1, and the Wichita Eagle, July 24, 1891.
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36.
37.
38.
39.

40.
41.

42.
43.
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In a speech delivered in New Hampshire in April, I 891, the then Congressman Simpson made the following remark: "A red-headed editor out in
Kansas [Murdock] told his readers that I went sockless. That's a lie, but there
are lots of farmers in Kansas to-day who are stockingless and almost clothingless, they and their wives and children. They don't go that way because they
want to, I assure you. They would be pleased to wear white shirts and silk
socks and broadcloth, and if they ever get one-half of the privileges from this
government that the capitalists have got they will be able to. . . . Those men
are going to be heard in the next few years and don't you forget it." See the
clipping from the Mirror and Farmer, Manchester, April 2, 1891, People's
Party Clippings (K.S.H.S.), I, 30-34.
The editor was 0. E. Learnard of the Lawrence /011rnal, quoted in the Topeka
Advocate, November 19, 1890.
See the issues of the Topeka Daily Capital for September to November, especially October I, 3, 10, and 18, 1890.
Ibid., October 11, 1890.
One Populist noted, "In the south, people are told that this movement is of
northern origin, a Republican device to disrupt the Democratic party of the
south, strike down white rule, and establish black supremacy instead, while in
the north, politicians tell us the movement is a southern institution, devised
by southern Democrats ... and designed to destroy the Republican party of
the north ... and thereby abrogate all the results of the war." Letter to editor,
The Advocate, Topeka, February 25, 1891.
Topeka Daily Capital, November 6, 1890.
Governor Humphrey polled 39 .0 percent of the votes and his margin of victory
was 6,845 votes. Willits polled 36.8 percent of the vote, while ex-Governor
Charles Robinson, the Democratic nominee, polled 24.2 percent. Robinson's
candidacy definitely hurt Willits' chances. Robinson, in addition to having
been Kansas' first governor as a Republican, had run as the Greenback-Labor
candidate for governor in 1882. For the voting statistics see Clarence J. Hein
and Charles A. Sullivant, Kansas Votes: G11bernatorial Elections, 1859-1956
(Lawrence, 1958), 26-27.
The Advocate, Topeka, September 29, 1897.
Topeka Daily Capital, November 11, 1890.
Forty-six was the median age. The oldest Populist was seventy-two and the
youngest thirty-two; thirty-seven (including delegates) were fifty or more,
fifty-five were forty-nine or less. Actually, eighty-four of eighty-eight (96.5
percent), for whom information was available, were associated with farming
in some capacity, although 26.1 percent of tho, e engaged in farming had been
connected with some other occupation or profession before they became
farmers. Sixty-six of ninety-five (69.5 percent) were born in Ohio, Indiana,
New York, Illinois, Virginia, or Kentucky. The breakdown on the foreign
born was as follows: Ireland, four; England, three; Wales, two; Switzerland,
one; and Canada, one. Forty-one of eighty-seven ( 47.1 percent) had affiliated with the Republican party until 1890; seventeen of eighty-seven had
affiliated with the Democratic party until 1890. Actually, twenty-nine of
eighty-seven (33.4 percent) had been active in third-party politics, and the
most common political route traveled had carried them from the Republican
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45.

46.

47.
48.

49.

party to the Greenback party and then to the Union-Labor party. Educational
background material was available for fifty-eight; of these, thirteen (22.4 percent) had graduated from college; another eight ( 13.7 percent) had attended
college; sixteen (27.5 percent) had an academy education, and twenty-one
(36.2 percent) had only a common-school education. Compiled from W . W.
Admire, Legislative Handbook (Topeka, 1891) .
Again, forty-five was the median age for thirty-two Republican representatives
(includes delegates); the oldest was sixty-six and the youngest twenty-nine.
Twelve were fifty or older and twenty were forty-nine or younger. Actually,
twenty-three of thirty-four (67.6 percent) were born in Pennsylvania, Ohio,
Indiana, or New York. Occupational information was available on nineteen
house Republicans, and twelve of these (63.1 percent) could be classified as
business or professional men; seven (36.8 percent) were farmers or stock
raisers. Also five of the twenty-one for whom information was available had
graduated from college; another had attended college; nine ( 42.2 percent) had
an academy education, and six (28.5 percent) had only a common-school
education.
Forty-five was the median age of thirty-six Republican senators; ten were fifty
er older. Occupational information was available for thirty-five, and thirty-one
(88.5 percent) were business or professional men (seventeen lawyers, seven
business proprietors, and five bankers). While only six of these men had
served in the previous senate, seventeen of thirty-eight ( 48.5 percent) had
previous legislative experience.
A. J. R. Smith in the Populist, Topeka, December 3, 1892.
Smith stated, ''It was agreed unanimously that our proper course, under the
circumstances, was to stand by Peffer until he proved himself fal se to the
principles of the party, a consummation we then expected." See the Populist,
Topeka, December 3, 1892. The Topeka Advocate (February 12 and 18,
1891) was also quite unenthusiastic about the selection of Peffer.
St. Louis Globe-Democrat, quoted in The Advocate, Topeka, February 18,
1891.

Chapter VI
I. The Advocate, Topeka, November 19, 1890.
2. Senate Jot4rnal, 1891, 573,775, and 836; House Jot4rnal, 1891 , 1138.
3. The 1890 Republican platform is contained in Proceedings of the TwentyNinth Republican State Convention of Kansas, 49-59.
4. Senate Jot4rn al, 1891, 806. See also The Advocate, Topeka, March 25, 1891,
for a discussion of this railroad bill. Populist spokesmen maintained that this
measure was "an adaptation of the Iowa schedule of freights and fares which
exceeded the rates of Iowa by nearly twenty per cent but even then still provided a thirteen per cent reduction in Kansas rates."
5. The Advocate, Topeka, March 25, 1891 ; Senate Journal, 1891 , 531.
6. See the statement by the committee chairman on page 531, Senate Journal,
1891.
7. Ibid. , 389, 457, 486, and 574-76.
8. Women already had the right to vote in local elections.
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9.
IO.
11.
12.
13.

14.
15.
16.
I 7.

18.
19.
20.

21.
22.
23.

24.
25.

26.

House /ournal, 1891, 247-48.
Ibid., 490-91.
Ibid., 527.
February 18, 1891.
Elder had written in 1867, at the time woman suffrage was being debated
along with Negro suffrage in Kansas, that his "whole impressions and opinions are most emphatically against it on grounds of propriety." He added,
"nearly every voter in Franklin County [ was J for Negro suffrage had not the
Legislature so unwisely and fooli shly submitted Female Suffrage with it." See
letter from Elder to Sam Wood, dated April 27, 1867, Woman Suffrage Collection, K.S .H.S. Archives.
Wilson, Eminent Men of Kansas, 275-77.
House /ournal, 1891, 526-27.
The Advocate, Topeka, February 25, 1891.
The house vote was as follows: sixty-six Populists for, sixteen against, and
seventeen abstaining; three Republicans for, thirteen against, and eight abstaining; three Democrats voted against the bill, and two abstained. See House
fournal, 1891, 527.
Ibid., 714; The Advocate, Topeka, March JI, 1891.
Hicks, The Populist Revolt, 178-81.
The Kansas Populist state central committee made an official statement indorsing a national political organization on December 17, 1890, which was published in the Topeka Advocate on that date.
W. F. Rightmire, "The Alliance Movement in Kansas," T.K.S.H.S., IX, 1-8.
Hicks, The Populist Revolt, 207-08.
The Kansas delegates to Ocala who supported the call for the Cincinnati conference were S. W. Chase (Populist State Chairman), John Davis, General John
H. Rice, C. Vincent ( editor of the Economic Quarterly), Dr. Stephen McLallin,
Ben Clover, J. V. Randolph , J. F. Willits, Jerry Simpson, Frank Williams,
P. B. Maxson, Thomas H. Butler, W. H. Biddle, Van B. Prather, R. B. Frye,
and H. Vincent (editor of the Winfield Nonconformist). See The Advocate,
Topeka, December 24, 1890.
The Advocate, Topeka, December 25, 1890; Hicks, The Populist Revolt, 209.
Rightmire, "The Alliance Movement in Kansas," T.K.S.H.S ., IX, 1-8, and
Hicks, The Populist Revolt, 208-09. Rightmire stated that the "Kansas delegates, to preserve harmony in the Alliance, suppressed and withdrew the eall,
and as a reward were given two of the national offices." Except for his choice
of words to say "suppressed and withdrew" instead of postponed, Rightrnire's
account rings true, although as indicated above corroborating evidence was
not uncovered.
About 250 "self-appointed delegates" were said to have been present for the
meeting, which ran from January 13 to January 17. Among those in attendance were Ben Clover, Mary E. Lease, General John H . Rice (temporary
chairman), John Willits, Sam N . Wood , Annie L. Diggs, Carl Vrooman, Wesley Bennington, Mrs. M. H . McLallin, D. C. Zercher, Van B. Prather, James
Lathrop, W. F. Rightmire, T . W . Gilruth, S. H. Snider (Union-Labor candidate for congress in the seventh district in 1888), W. N. Allen, and Noah
Allen. See the Declaration of Principles, Platform , Constitution and By-Laws
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of the National Citizens' Industrial Alliance and Proceedings of the National
Assembly (Topeka, 1891), and Rightmire, "The Farmers Alliance in Kansas,"
T.K.S.H.S., IX, 1-8. It is interesting to note that Ben Clover and John Willits
were active in this organization; since Clover was no longer president of the
state Alliance, and both Clover and Willits had moved on up to national
Alliance activities, it may be an indication that the state Alliance had practically outlived its usefulness in Kansas. It would also lend support to the
belief that state Alliance leaders had earlier worked closely with the Reform
Association. Frank McGrath of Beloit had been elected president of the Alliance in October, 1890, and McGrath did not indorse the call for the Cincinnati
conference at Ocala. See The Advocate, Topeka, December 24, 1890.
27. Thomas W. Gilruth was elected president; Noah Allen (Wichita), vicepresident; W. N. Allen, treasurer; and S. H . Snider, national lecturer.
28. Rightmire, "The Alliance Movement in Kansas," T .K .S.H .S., IX, 1-8.
29. Hicks, The Populist Revolt, 210.
30. Rightmire was unquestionably intimately involved in the activities that culminated in the Cincinnati conference. He stated that he secured "by correspondence the call issued at Ocala, Fla., in the previous December, with all
the signatures attached . . .. " After "securing the signatures of the officers
and many of the members of the Kansas house of representatives to this call,
. .. [I} attached thereto the signatures that had been attached to the Ocala . ..
call, and gave it to the . . . press .. . ." As far as can be ascertained, Rightmire also arranged to change the time of the meeting until May because the
original date con8icted with the Kansas legislative session. See The Advocate,
Topeka, May 6, 189 1, for confirmation on the role of Rightmire.
3 I. Without undertaking a systematic search of local newspapers throughout the
state it would be impossible to say with certainty exactly how the Cincinnati
delegations were determined, but a number of the Kansas participants were
duly elected delegates from their particular orders.
32 . Nonconformist, Winfield, May 24, 1891 , and Topeka Advocate, May 27, 1891.
See also Hicks' The Populist Revolt, 212-13, and Rightmire, "The Alliance
Movement in Kansas," T.K.S.H.S., IX, 1-8.
33. Hicks, The Populist Revolt, 213-14; Rightmire, "The Alliance Movement in
Kansas," T .K.S.H.S., IX, 1-8.
34. Rightmire stated that, if it looked as though those who opposed the formation
of a third party were going to have the upper hand, third-party advocates were
prepared to gain control of the platform committee and "delay the report until
the delegates had returned home in disgust; then to recommend that all action
be postponed until the . .. meeting at St. Louis on February 22, 1892." See
Rightmire, "The Alliance Movement in Kansas," T.K.S.H.S., IX, 1-8.
35. Ibid.
36. The Union-Labor party's candidate for vice-president in 1888, an old Greenbacker by the name of Cunningham, served as temporary chairman. See The
Advocate, May 27, 1891.
37. On this matter, Rightmire stated: "Upon the temporary organization of the
conference, the members of this caucus were given control of the committee
on platform. A committee on permanent organization was appointed, every
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member of which was an old-time Greenbacker." See Rightmire, "The Alliance Movement in Kansas," T.K .S.H.S., IX, 1-8.
38. Donnelly had attempted, unsuccessfully, to get the convention to commit itself
to third-party action during this afternoon session; his effort created quite a
furor, highlighted by an animated and stinging protest from General James B.
Weaver. See Hicks, The Populist Revolt, 213.
39. Rightmire, "The Alliance Movement in Kansas," T .K..S.H.S., IX, 1-8. Rightmire maintained that he and the three gentlemen named above prevailed upon
the secretary of the committee and persuaded him to add the crucial clause.
40. The conference selected H . E. Taubeneck of Illinois for its national chairman.
Kansas' representatives on the committee were P. P. Elder, Levi Dumbauld
(State Chairman), and R. S. Osborn. See The Advocate, Topeka, May 27,
1891.
41. Ibid.
42. Ibid., September 16, 1891. Platform contained in Hicks' The Populist Revolt,
433-35.
43. There was a note of ambiguity in the action of the convention, however, which
enabled both its radical and cautious participants to go away pleased. Those
who had counseled delay could point to the language of the platform which
had declared merely that "we believe that the time has arrived for a crystallization of the political reform forces of the country and the formation of what
should be known as the People's Party of the United States of America." The
radicals could point to the obvious fact that a National People's party executive
committee already existed. Certainly, Kansas leaders regarded this Cincinnati
conference as having established a national party. See for example the discussion of Annie Diggs in The Advocate, Topeka, June IO, 1891. Sec also
ibid., September 16, 1891.
44. According to St. John, "the only thing that distinguished it from the old party
conventions was its visionary Sub-treasury scheme, which has no foundation
either in justice or common sense . . . . The idea of making the government
a public pawnbroker is idiocy." See the Wichita Weekly Beacon, May 29, 1891.
45. The Advocate, Topeka, June 10, 1891.
46. Thomas E. Watson, "The Negro Question in the South," The Arena, VI
(October, 1892), 541-42.
47. Senn was a fifty-year-old native of Switzerland who came to Kansas in 1858
by way of Wisconsin. He had fought in the Civil War for the North and had
voted Republican until the early eighties. In 1887, he had been a delegate to
the national Union-Labor convention in Cincinnati. See Admire's Political and
Legislative Handbook for Kansas in 1891.
48. The Advocate, Topeka, December IO, 1890.
49. This is true only as a generality; there was a tendency in certain areas for those
Alliance members who opposed third-party action to disassociate themselves
from the Alliance, leaving the order even more in the hands of the opposite
persuasion.
50. The Advocate, Topeka, December 24, 1890.
51. Ibid., February 18, 1891.
52. Ibid., April 22, 1891.
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53. Dumbauld, a state representative from Lyon County, replaced S. W. Chase as
chairman early in February, 1891. See ibid., February 18, 1891.
54. Ibid., April 22, 1891. See also ibid., June 24, 1891, on the McGrath controversy.
55. At the meeting there was no clash between McGrath and anti-McGrath forces.
W. H. Biddle of Butler County, who was active in the leadership of the Citizens' Alliance also, was elected president. McGrath did not drop out of the
Alliance entirely; in December he was appointed by the executive committee
of the state Alliance as a delegate to the St. Louis conference. Six months after
the St. Louis conference he returned to the Republican party. See ibid., October
28 and December 16, 1891, and August 10, 1892.
56. Malin, A Concern About Humanity, 195.
57. The Advocate, Topeka, January 30, 1890; Kansas Farmer, Topeka, September
10 and October 22, 1890.
58. See especially the issues of April 9, 1890, and June 15, 1892.
59. Letter to editor, The Advocate, September 23, 1891.
60. Malin, A Concern About Humanity, 37 and 203; Kansas Farmer, Topeka,
September 10, 1890.
61. See for example Jerry Simpson's "The Political Rebellion in Kansas," The
Farmers' Alliance History and Agricultural Digest (Washington, D.C., 1891);
B. H. Clover, "Sectionalism," ibid.; James D. Holden, Metallic Money and
Hard Times : Why They are Inseparable (Emporia, 1891); S. N. Wood,
"Wood's Manifesto: An Address to the People of Kansas," delivered at Herington, Kansas, April 20, 1891 (Topeka, 1891); Rev. Dr. James H. Lathrop,
Voice of True Reform (Topeka, 1891).
62. The Advocate, Topeka, May 27, 1891.
63 . Article by John Grant Otis, The People's Herald, Lyndon (Osage County),
June 25, 1891.
64. Quoted in The Advocate, Topeka, April 15, 1891.
65. Two examples are those of The People's Herald, Lyndon, April 23, 1891, and
The Advocate, Topeka, April 15, 1891.
66. Wilson, Eminent Men of Kansas, 581-82; Topeka Daily Capital, February 26,
1933; Malin, A Concern About Humanity, 132-52. See also Michael J. Brodhead's recently completed study entitled "Judge Frank Doster: Kansas Populist
and Reform Ideologue" (unpublished doctoral dissertation, University of
Minnesota, 1967).
67. The four writers mentioned by Doster were William Graham Sumner, Edward
Atkinson, David A. Wells, and Francis A. Walker.
68. Central Advocate, Marion, May 29, 1891. See also James C. Malin's discussion
of Doster and this speech in A Concern About Humanity, 132-52.
69. Malin, A Concern About Humanity, 146-49.
70. See the Topeka Daily Capital, April 1, 1891, for John J. Ingalls' stand and a
compilation of Republican press reaction. See the Wichita Weekly Eagle,
January 23, 1891, al so, and the letter of Ingalls presented at a meeting of
Republican editors of the seventh congressional district published in the Topeka
Advocate, June 3, 1891.
71. The Weekly Troy Chief, February 26, 1891. Sol Miller edited this paper which
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72.
73.
74.
75.
76.

77.

78.
79.

was recognized as the mouthpiece of Cy Leland, the leading Republican "boss"
in Kansas.
Quoted in The Advocate, Topeka, June 3, 1891.
Ibid.
Quoted in S. S. King, Bondholders and Bread Winners (n.p., 1892), People's
Party Pamphlets (K.S.H.S.), IV.
In Kansas, throughout the 1890s, and before, there was an election each and
every year; in the odd years a portion of the local offices were contested.
S. M. Scott, assistant state lecturer of the Alliance, was given the special task
of promoting the subtreasury plan (Kansas City Star, July 22, 1891). See
Scott's work entitled The Sub-Treasury Plan and the Land and Loan System
(Topeka, 1891). A number of other Populist leaders joined Scott in promoting the plan. It should be noted, however, that there was opposition, even
within the Alliance, to pushing the subtreasury plan to the front. William A.
Harris, who subsequently was elected to congress and later still to the U.S.
senate, opposed the plan in 1891 on the grounds that it violated the Populist
principle of "Equal rights to all and special privileges to none" (Kansas
Farmer, Topeka, August 5, 1891). A. C. Shinn, Populist nominee for lieutenant governor in 1890, joined Harris in speaking out against it and wrote a
letter to the Topeka Advocate, August 19, 1891 , entitled: "Protest against
Giving the Sub-Treasury Scheme the Right of Way." Another Populist leader,
H. F. True, delivered a speech at Valley Falls, Kansas, toward the end of
August, 1891, opposing the plan on the ground that it would cost the party
the support of labor (Topeka Advocate, September 9, 1891).
According to the Topeka Advocate, November 18, 1891, Democrats and Republicans worked together in some manner in thirty-eight counties. See also
ibid., December 2, 1891, on this subject.
Ibid., December 9, 1891.
Ibid., December 2, 1891. As James C. Malin has noted, "A part of the success
of the Republican party in the off-year elections ... (1891) is to be explained
by the return of Farmers' Alliance men to the old party rather than submitting
to be Jed into the People's party." See A Concern About Humanity, 194.

Chapter VII
I.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

St. Louis platform contained in Hicks, The Populist Revolt, 435-39.
Quoted in ibid., 228.
Ibid., 225-29.
The Advocate, Topeka, February 17, 1892.
Letter to editor dated March 17, 1892, ibid., March 23, 1892.
Ibid. , July 15, 1891.
Letter to editor, ibid., April 20, 1892.
No corroborating evidence was found to support the Overmeyer disclosure;
however, the story was not denied, which is one indication of its validity. See
Overmeyer's open letter dated July 16, 1892, Kansas Democrat, Topeka, July
18, 1892.
9. Otis had been elected in 1890 without Democratic opposition. He therefore
owed something to the party indirectly, but Otis was not the kind of man to
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11.

12.
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14.

15.
16.

116-117

compromise his principles-defeat rather than victory by fraternizing with
Democrats was always the better choice for him.
Harris was a fifty-year-old native of Virginia. He was a graduate of Columbian College, Washington, D.C., in 1859 and of the Virginia Military Institute
in 1861. He was trained as a civil engineer, and after serving in the Confederate Army in a staff position, he removed to Kansas to assist in the construction
of the Union Pacific Railroad. He had also served as agent in the distribution
of the Delaware Indian Reservation. After 1876 he had devoted his time to
stock raising on his farm in Linwood. Once the Alliance was organized he
became active in it and served as chairman of the delegation from the state
Alliance to the St. Louis conference of February, 1892. See Wilson, Eminent
Men of Kansas, 287-89, and The Advocate, Topeka, December 16, 1891.
Fred Close was a forty-three-year-old native of Pennsylvania who had resided
in Kansas since 1866. He had lost one arm in the Civil War and had worked
in Kansas as a druggist and farmer. He was a Republican until the mideighties, and had held the position of clerk of the district court from 1878 to
1884. He had left the Republican party to work for the Greenback-Labor and
Union-Labor parties before joining the Populists in 1890. Following his defeat
in 1892, he became Governor Lewelling's private secretary. See Topeka Daily
Capital, November 30, 1892, and History of the State of Kansas ( Chicago,
1883), I, 481.
King was the author of a popular pamphlet entitled Bondholders and Bread
Winners, published early in 1892.
Clover became involved with a woman in Washington, and his wife charged
that she was the kind who "would wear red slippers"; the "red slippers"
charge, plus his slovenly performance in congress (he slept through sessions
or appeared infrequently), was the undoing of the Cowley County farmer.
McLallin wrote, on learning that Clover's wife was seeking a divorce on the
grounds of extreme cruelty, that "there may be something in it, but the idea
of Benjamin being extremely cruel or extremely anything, except sleepy, is
preposterous." Not long after this debacle Clover returned to the Republican
party, and in 1899 he committed suicide. See The Advocate, Topeka, December 7, 1892, and Biographical Record of Cowley County, 309-11.
A native of Indiana, Hudson was forty-eight years old and a graduate of
Wabash College. He had been elected three times as mayor of Fredonia, Kansas, once to the state legislature, and was twice a delegate to the Democratic
national convention ( 1884 and 1888) before joining the Populists in 1890. See
Herringshaw's American Statesmen (Chicago, 1906), 278.
Cabe and Sullivant, Kansas Votes: National Elections, 211.
The Advocate, Topeka, June 22, 1892, and Ottawa Journal, March 22, 1894.
It has been often emphasized that Lewelling was a nonentity before this speech;
it is true only in a strictly relative sense. He was not much known beyond the
boundaries of Wichita ( except for his home state of Iowa where he was well
known) and Sedgwick County, true, but he was well known within his own
domain and had appeared on the rostrum on numerous occasions with the big
names of Kansas Populism. See for example the Wichita Daily Beacon , October
24, 1890; Wichita Weekly Beacon, October 31, 1890; Wichita Kansas Commoner, October 30, 1890, and February 18, 1892.
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17. W. J. Costigan, In Memorial of Lorenzo D . Lewelling (Chicago, 1902), 1518; Topeka State Journal, November 11 , 1892 ; Wichita Daily Beacon, June JS,
1892; The Advocate, Topeka, June 22, 1892.
18. The Advocate, Topeka, June 8, 1892.
19. Ibid., April 13, 1892.
20. Ibid., June 22, 1892.
21. Ibid.; see also August 24 and October 26, 1892; and Kansas Democrat, Topeka,
June 16, 17, 22, and 30, 1892 . Overmeyer stated that he was to have the
nomination for congressman at large. "'Yet upon the eve of their convention,"
he wrote, "they (Populist leaders) insisted that I should change my politics
and they utterly ignored the Midland Hotel agreement. I in turn declared
myself a democrat, and declared that I would not be a candidate except upon
condition of such recognition of the democratic party as was contemplated by
the Midland agreement. I thereupon declined to allow my name to go before
the convention." See Kansas Democrat, Topeka, July 18, 1892.
22. Little was elected on the Greenback ticket as prosecuting attorney of Johnson
County in 1882 and 1884. He replaced John Ives, the only successful man on
the ticket in 1890; Ives, as attorney general, had been a member of the board
of railroad assessors that had reduced the railroad assessment and therefore had
lost the support of his party.
23. Biographical Circulars (K.S.H.S.), M-Z, II; William Ansel Mitchell, Linn
County , Kansas: A History (La Cygne, 1928) , 186-87; Atchison Globe, October 30, 1893 ; History of Wyandotte County (Chicago, 1911), 519-21; The
Advocate, Topeka, September 13, 1890. It is interesting to note that eight out
of fifteen of the Populist nominees in I 892 (including congressional candidates) were mentioned in the Topeka Advocate for the place they eventually
received on the ticket.
24. Harris was in England at the time of his nomination. He had quite a reputation as a cattle breeder in Kansas, and had gone abroad, apparently, for the
purpose of obtaining special breeding stock. See The Advocate, Topeka, July
20, 1892.
25 . Letter to editor by T. J. Smith, McPherson, dated June 28, 1892, ibid., July
8, 1892.
26. People's Party Clippings (K.S.H.S.), I, 38-39.
27. It was said that the Topolobampo lands comprised "millions of acres of the
richest agricultural, timber and mineral lands in Mexico, but it was far removed from lines of communication and difficult of access." See Wilson,
Eminent Men of Kansas, 625-27.
28. Ibid.
29. In 1896 Smith wrote that he would have won in 1892 had it not been for the
fact that Cy Leland "sulked." See Weekly Kansas Chief, Troy, October 22,
1896, and Malin, A Concern About Humanity, 38-39.
30. For the Republican platform see the Topeka Daily Capital, July 3, 1892.
31. Kansas Democrat, Topeka, July 7 and August 6, 1892. See also The Advocate,
Topeka, February I, 1893.
32. Davis and Baker had stalwart Democratic opponents who accounted for I .4
percent and 3.3 percent of the vote in their districts. See Cabe and Sullivant,
Kansas Votes : National Elections.
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33. The Advocate, Topeka, August 24, 1892.
34. Ibid., November 3, 1892. Carroll's name stayed on the ballot, but the effectiveness of his withdrawal was shown by the fact that he polled only 161 votes in
a district where the Democratic nominee in 1890 polled 13,250 votes. Close
had refused to step down even though Populists of the Brown-Doniphan district nominated him for the state senate in hopes of encouraging his withdrawal. This unsystematic process of fusion resulted in poor strategy: in 1890
the Populists had run a poor third to the Democrats of the first district; the
Democrats of the second district had run a poor third to the Populists. By running a Populist in the first and a Democrat in the second their ticket was
weakened. See Cabe and Sullivant, Kansas Votes: National Elections, 122
and 124.
35. Hicks, The Populist Revolt, 231-33 ; platform contained in ibid., 439-44.
36. Among other offices, Gresham had served as postmaster general (1883-84) and
as secretary of the treasury (18 84) under President Arthur. In 1892 he was
serving as federal circuit judge with court in Chicago. He subsequently served
as President Cleveland's secretary of state (1893).
37. The Advocate, Topeka, July 8, 1892.
38. Hicks, The Populist Revolt, 234.
39. Ibid., 234-37. The Kansas delegation named W . D . Vincent, S. H. Snyder,
and J. W. Laybourn as its representatives on the national committee; all three
were well-known and long-time third-party men. See the Topeka Advocate,
July 8, 1892.
40. The Advocate, Topeka, July 22, 1892.
4 I. Letter to editor from Lind sborg, Kansas, dated August 2, 1892, ibid. , August
I 7, 1892.
42. Letter to editor, dated August 6, 1892, Kansas Democrat, August 6, 1892.
43. The Lawrence Daily Journal and the Topeka Daily Capital were two of the
leading Republican newspapers and two prime examples of Republican strategy
in the campaign.
44. See the issues of the Weekly Kansas Chief, Troy, from July to November,
especially that of September 22, 1892. Miller was still referring to the governor
as "Lorraine" in November, 1894. See ibid., November 8, 1894.
45. Topeka Daily Capital, October 9, l 892. See also the issues of October 28, 30,
and November 8, 1892. Hudson's attack was not just the argument of the old
guard. See the speech of E.W. Hoch in his campaign for a seat in the house,
reported in The Advocate, Topeka, September 21, 1892. Hoch was one of the
"young crowd," and he took the position that the People's party was "a socialistic party" and "a professional calamity party."
46. Th e Advocate, Topeka, September 28, 1892.
47. Floyd B. Streeter, The Kaw (New York, 1949), 31 I.
48. Breidenthal demanded an immediate trial and was acquitted. Populists got
their revenge a few months later when Governor Lewelling made Breidenthal
state bank commissioner. See The Advocate, Topeka, October 12, 1892.
49. The Lawrence Daily Journal, October 20, 1892, quoted Simpson but gave no
source.
50. Editor Hudson maintained a constant personal campaign against Simpson.
Apparentl y, in Hudson's mind Simpson was Populism personified. Incidentally,
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51.
52.
53.
54.

55.

the Capital used the term "Sockless Socrates" in its issue of June 21, 1891.
There has been some debate as to who was to have the honor of originating
that variation on the sockless theme. W. A. White has been awarded the credit
but did not personally claim the honor. J. K. Hudson's claim is hereby
registered.
Simpson was almost invariably caricatured as a sockless tramp. Apparently this had an effect upo·n his manner of dress, which was, of course,
originally not out of the ordinary; so much so that in his effort to compensate
he opened himself up to attack as a "dude." The Topeka Daily Capital's
Washington correspondent published this report on May 15, 1892: "Jerry
Simpson's new spring outfit makes the Washington dudes green with envy.
He came out last Sunday with kid gloves, a dazzling necktie, striped trousers
and a very pretty walking stick. Jerry is known in Washington as one of the
neatest and best dressers in Congress."
Ibid ., October 28, 1892.
Topeka Advocate, November 9, 1892.
Cabe and Sullivant, Kansas Votes: National Elections, 124-25.
Ibid., 120-27, and Hein and Sullivant, Kansas Votes: Gubernatorial Elections,
26-29. H. L. Moore won over the Republican incumbent Funston only after
he had successfully contested the election.
House /ournal, 1893, 3-5.

Chapter VIII
1. Lewelling was born into a Quaker family. His father, a noted antislavery
lecturer, died when Lorenzo was two, and his mother was killed in a fire when
he was nine, leaving the boy in the care of an older sister. After serving
briefly with an Iowa regiment in the Civil War (his family had demanded
and obtained his release since he was under age), Lewelling had been a bridgeconstruction worker in Tennessee, a teacher in a Negro school in Missouri in
the employ of the Freedman's Aid Society, a student and graduate of Eastman's Business College in Poughkeepsie, New York, a towpath boy on the
Erie Canal, a carpenter in Toledo, a railroad section hand, a student-instructor
and graduate of Whittier College in his home town, all before he was twentythree years old. From 1868 to 1880, with the exception of two years ( 187072) when he managed a farm and edited a small weekly paper in Salem,
Lewelling had worked in Iowa's reformatory system, serving as superintendent
of Iowa Women's Reform School most of that time. From 1880 to 1882, he
had edited the Des Moines Capital, an "antiring" Republican paper founded
by himself; and, at the time he came to Kansas, he was serving as president of
the board of directors of the State Normal School. See Wilson, Eminent Men
of Kansas, 37-41; Dawn Daniels, "Lorenzo D. Lewelling-A Leader of the
Kansas Populists," unpublished master's thesis, Northwestern University, 1931;
William M . Bliss, "Kansas-The Sunflower State," Carter's Monthly, XII
(November, 1897), 565-98; The Advocate, Topeka, August 10, 1892.
2. Kansas State Governor Messages (K.S.H.S.), II. The address is quoted by
Barr, in Kansas and Kansans, II, 1168-69, and then by Hicks in The Populist
Revolt, 275, in a loosely edited form.
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3.
4.
5.
6.

7.

8.

9.
10.
1 I.
12.

13.

See the issues of January 10 and March 14, 1893.
Topeka State Journal, February 18, 1893.
See Governor Lewelling's statement in the Topeka Advocate, January 25, 1893.
A. W. Stubbs, a Republican from Haskell County, was awarded the certificate
from district 121 as a result of a transposition of votes. The state board of
canvassers was aware of this but refused to correct the county clerk's error.
Republicans organized without Stubbs and awarded the seat to the actual
winner, Democrat Joseph Rosenthal, on the opening day. Rosenthal joined the
Republican house on January 11, as did the other two Democrats. See House
Journal, 1893, 7.
A tie vote was certified between 0 . M. Rice (Populist) and T. C. Ballinger
(Republican) in Coffey County. According to law it then became the duty of
the Republican-dominated state board of canvassers, upon notice to the candidates, to cast lots to determine who would be awarded the certificate. Populists
maintained that "without notice to Mr. Rice, or any one representing him the
state board of canvassers went into secret session and came out in a few minutes, claiming to have performed their duty, and claiming that Mr. Ballinger
... had drawn the lucky number." On further investigation of the Coffey
County election results, Populists claimed to have proved "that there was no
tie, as the Populist had a majority of the votes, and the officer made a fraudulent return."
Altogether, Populists challenged ten Republican-held seats-that of Ballinger, plus several on the ground that illegal votes, miscount of ballots, and
bribery had contributed to their certification; in one case it was claimed that
the Republican representative was a resident of Oklahoma, and in one or two
other cases it was maintained that the certified Republican representatives had
been postmasters at the time of their election. Populists, of course, were not
successful in unseating a single one of these men. Republicans, on the other
hand, eventually unseated four Populists-two in a recount; two more who
were declared ineligible because they allegedly held the office of postmaster at
the time they claimed their certificates of election. See The Advocate, Topeka,
January 18, 1893; House Journal, 1893, 69, 82, 125, 127, and 175.
See the statement by George Douglass and E. W. Hoch in the House fournal,
1893 (Republican), 60-63, for a concise and convincing statement of the
Republican position.
Ibid., 20-22, 60-63; House fournal, 1893 (Populist) , 7-8.
Topeka Daily Capital, January 11, 12, 1893; House fournal , 1893 (Republican) , 23-27.
House fournal, 1893 (Republican), 27-28; The Advocate, Topeka, January 25,
1893.
The Advocate, Topeka, January 12 and 25, February I, 7, and 15, 1893; Topeka State fournal, January 10, 11 , 20, 26, and 27 ; Topeka Daily Capital,
January 11, 12, 18, 27, 31; Kansas Democrat, Topeka, January 26 and 31.
On the first vote in the senate there was no majority for Martin, and seven
Populists in the house refused to vote for the Democrat. Actually Populists had
enough votes to elect a Populist. There were fifty-seven duly elected Populist
representatives present and twenty-four Populist senators. These eighty-one
votes would have been a majority of the 160 members present at the joint
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session. Populists were unable to agree on one man, however, and there was
the added possibility that a Democratic majority in the U.S. senate would
refuse a seat to a Populist about whose election there was the slightest doubt.
See The Advocate, Topeka, February 1, 1893; Ho11te Journal, 1893 (Republican), !12-16.
Haute Journal, 1893 (Republican) , 112-16.
See the letters of John Dunsmore and George Douglass addressed to each
other on January 30 and 31, in ibid., 132-35.
Ibid., 213-33 .
Ibid. , 224-30.
Ibid., 232-41; The Advocate, Topeka, January 15 and 22, 1893 ; Topeka Daily
Capital, February 15, 16, and 17, 1893.
Haute Journal, 1893 (Republican), 241-51; Topeka Daily Capital, February
16, 1893. It is quite possible that Governor Lewelling had no intention of
using the militia to clear the hall , and that he gave the colonel the order
because the latter had rather foolishly publicized his intentions.
Kansas City Mail, February 16, 1893; Wichita Daily Eagle, February 16, 1893;
Marion Times, February 16, 1893; and Kansas City Gazette, February 16,
1893.
Apparently George R. Peck, attorney for the Santa Fe Railroad and a prominent Republican leader, acted as the go-between. The Kansas State Historical
Society Archives has both copies of the original agreement. The copy retained
by George Douglass appears to be the first copy. It is said that Douglass' copy
is in the handwriting of Peck, but it appears to be the handwriting of Governor Lewelling. Lewelling's copy is quite probably the handwriting of Peck.
Perhaps this is why Lewelling did not release it until May, 1900. See Hottse
Journal, 1893 (Republican), 248-50, for Lewelling's proposition to the Douglass house, and for the Republican proposal it prompted.
The complete record of the decision (Gunn Habeas Corpus case), including
testimony, argument, the majority opinion of Chief Justice Horton, and the
dissenting opinion of Populist Justice Allen, is contained in ibid., 764-914.
In addition to the Australian ballot law, the senate sponsored a law providing
a one-year time period for the redemption of real estate, and another requiring
the "weekly payment of wages in lawful money of the United States." The
act against corrupt practices in elections was the pet reform of Speaker George
Douglass. This measure had been defeated by the Republican senate in 1891 ,
and Douglass had publicly criticized senate Republicans for defeating a bill
that had received every vote but one in the house. Another house measure
provided for the regulation of "the weighing of coal at the mine." See The
Advocate, Topeka, April 8, 1891, quoting the Wichita Daily Eagle on the
Douglass election measure. See also Howe Journal, 1893, 762; Senate /ournal,
1893, 853.
House Journal, 1893, 492 , 964-74; Senate Journal, 1893, 677, 598-685.
Apparently because of the legislative war no biographical record was compiled
on the 1893 legislature. The senate, which served from 1893 to 1897, was
included in the sketches of the 1895 legislature, but the house of 1893 was
missed. Information on sixty-eigh t of 125 of the house members is available
since this number served in an earlier or later legislature, and by individual
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reference biographical material was obtained on twenty-four of the remaining
fifty-seven members. See Appendix III for a listing of the sources consulted in
that endeavor.
Forty-four was a median age based on thirty-three of fifty-eight determinations.
Actually, eighteen of thirty-five were natives of the states named above, and
five of thirty-five ( I 4.2 percent) were born on foreign soil. Twenty-four of
thirty-five (68.8 percent) were farmers or stock raisers; only five of thirty-five
were strictly business or professional men.
Eight lawyers, six merchants, five bankers, three physicians, two real estate
men, one manufacturer, one surveyor, and one editor-publisher ( twenty-eight
of forty-six or 60 percent) made up the group of business or professional men.
Fourteen farmer s or stock raisers (fourteen of forty-six or 30.4 percent) were
included in the Republican ranks. Thirty of forty-seven (63 .8 percent) were
natives of the states named, and four of forty-seven were foreign born.
Seven of the fifteen Republican senators were lawyers, one was in the electric
railway and light business, one was a mill-owner, one was a physician, two
were editor-publishers, and three were farmers and/ or stock raisers. Only one
Populist senator out of fifteen for whom the information was available was a
college graduate, whereas four Republicans were college graduates. Five of
twenty-four Populists and seven of fifteen Republicans had had previous legislative experience. Former party affiliations among Populist senators were
approximatel y the same as among the Populists of the 1893 house. Compiled
mainly from Hand Book of the Kansas Legislature of 1895 (Topeka, 1895).
The Modern Light (Columbus) was the major Populist paper in Cherokee
County, and it was a good example of the turmoil in Populist ranks caused by
the Artz controversy. The paper published the charges on January 26, 1893,
quoting the Leavenworth Times which, in turn, had quoted the Colorado
Springs Telegraph. The Populist paper called for an investigation, and stated
that "the People's party cannot afford to start out with this kind of reform."
Apparently the charges were true (perhaps with mitigating circumstances) or
the Lewelling administration would have denied them in vigorous fashion.
Formally Artz had resigned, but at the request of the governor. See the Topeka Advocate, February 28, 1894.
Letter from Legate to the editor of the Capital, dated March 4, 1893, and
published in the Topeka Advocate, March 15, 1893. James F. Legate was
widely known in Kansas politics long before the Populist era as "Slippery Jim,"
the man who "arranged the deals and handled the money" in the Republican
party (Topeka Daily Capital, August 3, 1902) . Legate said he used the money
attempting to get a number of Republican and Democratic representatives to
go into the Dunsmore house, and according to his account he failed in this
because the railroad companies had their own fund to see that these men stayed
"fixed." Sec The Advocate, March 29, 1893.
The Advocate, Topeka, March 22, 29, 1893; May 17, 1893; September 19,
1894. See also a letter by Fred J. Close to Professor William Stryker, dated
August 24, 1894, Governor Lewelling's Letters (K.S.H.S. Archives) .
Corning's paper was first called The People, and he moved it from Paola,
Kansas, to Topeka and began publication on March 25, 1893. It became the
New Era when he consolidated it with the paper of that name published by
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two sons formerly in Council Grove. First issue as the New Era was on June
10, 1893. The paper continued until shortly after the Populist administration
was defeated in 1894. A. J. R. Smith's The Populist began publication earlier,
first edition May 7, 1892, and terminated at about the same time as the New
Era.
Kansa; Commoner, Wichita, September 28, 1893.
New Era, Topeka, March 25, and April 8, 1893. E. Z. Ernst, the originator of
the Labor Exchange, quickly denied any connection with Corning.
Ibid., April 8, 1893.
Ibid., May 20, 1893.
Ibid., October 21, 1893.
The Populist, Topeka, April 22, 29, and May 19, 1893.
Kansas City Star, quoted in the New Era, Topeka, June 7, 1893.
The Advocate, Topeka, April 4, 1894; see also May 23, 1894.
Topeka Daily Capital, November 11, 1893. Much of the above material relating to Mrs. Lease was previously published in an article entitled "Intolerant
Populist? The Disaffection of Mary Elizabeth Lease," The Kansas Histo,·ical
Quarterly, XXXIV (Summer, 1968), 189-200.
Wichita Beacon, November 14, 1893.
See letters of April 15, May 25, and December 28, 1893, from Governor
Lewelling to M. E. Lease, Governor Lewelling's Letters (K.S.H.S.). Apparently
fellow board member M. A. Householder (state senator from Columbus) had
more influence in determining appointments. See a letter from Lewelling to
Dr. J. D. Van Nuys, April 22, 1893, ibid.
The Advocate, Topeka, July 27, 1892. The editor published a statement by
Mrs. Lease and a letter from the New York adjutant general's office, dated
July 21 , 1892, that confirmed the death of her father as she claimed.
[bid. In 1904 Mrs. Lease remarked: "My father and brothers died on the field
of battle defending the flag and the Union that the Democratic party, represented by [William Jennings] Bryan and [ Adlai E. J Stevenson, sought to destroy." Newspaper clipping dated September 27, 1904, in Kansas Biographical
Scrapbook (K.S.H.S.), L, I, 130-31. See also the Leavenworth Times , S~ptember 22, 1900.
Kansas City Star, January 2, 1894.
The Herald, Pleasanton, January 12, 26, 1894; The Advocate, Topeka, January
3, and March 14, 1894; New Era, Topeka, January 6, 1894.
The Herald, Pleasanton, January 26, 1894.
Kansas City Star, January 27, 1894.
The Advocate, Topeka, January 31, 1894.
Manuscript Biography of M. E. Lease by James Arnold, K.S.H .S. Archives. In
the appended note Mrs. Lease asked Mr. McCray to send her "Herald or tell
me when to get it." This would seem to indicate she desired a copy of The
Herald which contained her letter attacking the administration. Since it was
published in Pleasanton on January 26, 1894, this would indicate that this
sketch was written immediately before or after th at date. Mrs. Lease was
clearly James Arnold ; internal evidence demonstrates this convincingly. In
addition, the signature of Mrs. Lease from a letter to Judge H . Kelley contained
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in the Historical Society and the handwriting on the manuscript biography are
the same.
Transactions of the Kansas State Historical Society, 1905-1906 (Topeka,
1906), IX, n. 414; Topeka Daily Capital, June 2, 1889.
For D. 0. McCray's finished product, which ignored everything Mrs. Lease had
provided, see "The Farmers' Alliance and the Populist Party," in Transactions
of the Kansas State Historical Society , 1905-1906, 425-26.
Manuscript Biography of M. E. Lease, K.S.H.S.
Mary E. Lease v. J. W. Freeborn, The Advocate, Topeka, February 14, 1894.
Governor Lewelling was aware that he could not remove Governor Humphrey's holdovers on the board of charities without cause (see Lewelling to
A. P. Elder, April 11, 1893, Letters, K.S.H.S.) , but he believed he could
remove his own appointees at will ; a Republican court did not agree.
A strong commitment to woman suffrage and prohibition, two causes she felt
were threatened by fusion with Democrats, could explain Mrs. Lease's action in
the controversy were it not for the fact that she abandoned the cause of equal
suffrage during the summer of 1894, and by 1896 she renounced prohibition
(Topeka Daily Capital, September 15, 1894; Topeka State fottrnal, May 25,
1896) . Her actions were unbelievably erratic. Early in the campaign of 1894
she even attempted to win back the good graces of the Populist organization;
in doing so she put herself in a hopelessly contradictory position. She announced th at she was going to enter the campaign to defend Governor Lewelling. She said that "the governor is innocent of every ch arge brought against
him by the character assassins who are hounding him. I cannot stand silently
by and see this campaign of slander proceed against one whom I know to be
innocent" (Topeka Daily Capital, September 14, 1894) . For a discussion of
Mrs. Lease's political thought see Malin, A Concern Abottt Httmanity , 84-87.
See especially Edward Wallis Hoch's article in The Agora (April, 1893) , 28083, and The Last War (Topeka, 1893); C. S. Gleed, The Agora (April, 1893),
292; J. G. Water's speech in the Topeka Daily Capital, November 5, 1893. In
his Agora article E. W. Hoch wrote: "If the Governor had an adviser who
believes either in God or in our form of government, his name should be given
to an anxious public. I do not know him. All , so far as I know, were either
Socialists or anarchists, with the possible exception of Judge Webb .... "
See especially the Topeka Advocate, April 19, November 22 , 1893; The Kansan , Pittsburg, March 30, November 9, 30, 1893. The editor of the Pittsburg
Kansan recommended Lawrence Groulund's The Co-operative Commonwealth
in his effort to promote a better understanding of socialism. G. C. Clemens
and a number of other Populist leaders were in touch with Groulund (see a
letter from Groulund to Clemens dated November 13, 1893, K.S.H.S. Archives), and the noted socialist leader was in Topeka for several weeks in
December, 1893, to establish a " headquarters" there and to lecture on socialism. See T/ze Advocate, Topeka, December 20, 1893.
The Advocate, Topeka, November 22, 1893.
Topeka Daily Capital, November 5, 1893.
Hoch, The Last War, 1.
Troutman was one of the leading conservative members of the Douglass house.
Speech entitled "The First (And Last) People's Party Government on Earth,"
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delivered on January 29, 1894, as part of Tl,e Kansas Day Club Addresses
(Hutchinson, 1901).
Topeka State /ournal, December 4, 1893 .
For a compilation of Kansas and national press reaction to the Lewelling
circular, see the Topeka Daily Capital, December 10, 13, 1893 .
For a special insight into the concluct of Governor Lewelling see his official
correspondence during the miners' strike in southeast Kansas, especially his
letter to Percy Daniels (in Girard) , July 17; to a Captain 0 . S. Casad (in
Pittsburg), July 18 ; to Sheriff Arnold (in Weir City) , July 24 ; to L. Walters
(in Weir City), July 24; and to Frank P. McLennan, July 26, 1893. In the
last letter, Lewelling stated : "I admit, without equivocation , that the sympathy
of the present administration is with the striking miners. I believe they are
being wronged by the mine owners in the present controversy . . . but while
this is true the interests of the state, of this very administration and the interests of all workingmen in general require that the strikers shall remain within
the requirements of the law." See also Lieutenant Governor Daniels' report on
the strike in A. G. Lucas' manuscript "Biography of Maj. Gen. Percy Daniels"
(K.S.H .S. Archives), 36.
Governor Lewelling answered an appeal for aid to the western counties by
writing: "I . . . agree with you that 'Sympathy with suffering humanity is the
fundamental principle with all genuine Populists.' After all we are compelled
to be practical and adopt methods which are business like, which is another
name for heartlessness, in dealing with each other." See Lewelling to G. G.
Allen (Meade, Kansas) , July 15, 1890, Letters, K.S.H .S. Archives.

Chapter IX
1. From a speech by Charles E. Harbaugh delivered on January 29, 189 4, as part
of The Kansas Day Clttb Addresses, 123 .
2. Leland, like many a political boss of his time, was a shadowy figure, about
whom there is much speculation but little documentation. He was, however,
a native of Wisconsin, where he was born in 184 1. After moving out to Troy,
Kansas, in 185 8, he had been quite successful in the mercantile business. The
November 23, 1893, Weekly Troy Chief noted th at Leland was rather affluent.
It reported: "He has two general stores, deals in grain , lumber and coal, runs
an elevator, operates a pork packing establishment, carries on a meat market,
and keeps an eye on the operation of a number of farms. Besides the farm s
under cultivation, he has two or three stock farms, where besides feeding cattle
and raising mules, he breeds first-class horses .. .. " The only elective office
that Leland had ever held was th at of county commissioner; his talents were
applied through the mechanism of the local, state, and national Republican
organizations. For an interesting but slightly exaggerated account of Cy
Leland 's role in the 1894 campaign, see Walter T . K. Nugent's "How the
Populists Lost in 189 4," Kansas Historical Quarterly, XXXI (Autumn, 1965),
245-55.
3. Topeka Daily Capital, June 8, 1894; Nugent, "How the Populists Lost in
1894," Kansas Historical Quarterly, XXXI (Autumn, 1965 ), 250-51.
4. Ottawa / ottrnal and Triumph , June 21, 1894.
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5. (bid.; Topeka Daily Capital, June 13, 1894.
6. Ottawa /011rnal and Triumph, June 21, 1894; Topeka Daily Capital, June 13,
14, 1894.
7. Ottawa /ourn al and Triumph , June 21, 1894. F. G. Adams of the State Historical Society was convinced that this prayer was of some historic consequence, for he requested a copy from the minister who was identified only as
Reverend Goodner. The minister reconstructed the prayer from memory and
sent a copy to Adams in a letter dated June 22, 1894. The segment that
brought the response from the convention, as he reconstructed it, reads like
this: "The morals of our people waning, the pulpit and the press prostituted
to the base ends of plutocratic greed; free speech and free assembly denied, a
slavery coming upon us, unsurpassed by America's former chattel system, and
alt this sought to be made perpetual!! In view of this, we, in unspeakable
grief, lift our hearts to Thee O God of Ages!! With a deep sense of the
grievous wrongs done us, by him, we, nevertheless, ask thine infinite mercy
upon the chief executive of this nation-when he shall repent of his sins, and
turn away from his monstrous evils. May he, his cabinet, and a boodling
congress, be led by such means as Thou, the Infinite alone canst ordain, to fear
further encroachment upon the rights of an outraged people!!" The rem ainder
of the prayer called for support of woman suffrage and the victory of the party
at the polls. Reverend Goodner to F. G. Adams, June 22, 1894, special collection, K.S .H .S. Archives.
8. Nugent, "How the Populists Lost in 1894," Kansas Historical Q11arterly, XXXI
(Autumn, 1965) , 250 -51.
9. Breidenthal and Lewelling were severely handicapped in any effort to pack the
committee, since there was a desire to call the convention under the "Omaha
Ordinance for the Purification of Politics," according to which all officeholders
were forbidden to participate in any convention of the party. See the manifesto
of the Shawnee County People's party committee to that effect, published in
The Advocate, Topeka, March 28, 1894. Also, since extreme antifusionists had
charged that Lewelling and Breidenthal were preparing "to surrender the
principles of the reform cause in this state to the British financial Hessians, the
Democrats of Kansas," it was necessary for the Populist organization to avoid
all appearances of a desire to influence the convention's decisions. Sec the
"secret circular" issued by Noah Allen and W. F. Rightmire in behalf of the
National Citizen's Alliance, in the Kansas Commoner, Wichita, June 7, 1894.
10. Ottawa /011rnal and Triumph , June 21 , 1894. The reporter representing this
paper compiled a record of the convention which was complete enough to have
been an official record. Except where otherwise indicated, the author has relied
upon this report for material concerning convention happenings.
11. New Era, Topeka, June 16, 1894.
12. Lest there be any misunderstanding, it must be noted that this clement of
nativism was restricted almost without exception to this extreme antifusion
group. It would be wholly erroneous to assume that Populism was generally
nativistic. As a party, the nativism within Populism was negligible compared
to that in the Republican party. Walter Nugent noted in his study of Kansas
Populism that "the Republican party was the home of immigration restriction
on racist grounds ... , whether in the East or in Kansas." See The Tolerant
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Populists: Kansas, Populism and Nativism (Chicago, 1963), 101. Numerous
references to Republican nativism could be cited to document this statement;
indeed, just a casual examination of the Topeka Daily Capital throughout the
1890s will demonstrate it without question. See also The Kansas Day Club
Addresses for a compilation of Republican leadership statements, a number of
which are replete with nativism. It is perhaps significant that those few
Populists who did have a nativistic strain were generally anti-Democratic;
most of them, as a matter of fact, came to the Populist party from the Republican party. It should also be noted that the convention adopted a resolution
denouncing the anti-Catholic and nativistic American Protective Association.
Kansas Commoner , Wichita, June 7, 1894, and the Topeka Advocate, June 6,
1894.
Populist Party Clippings (K.S.H.S.), I, 118-19.
The Advocate, Topeka, July 1, 1894; W. P. Harrington, "Populist Party in
Kansas," Collections of the Kansas Historical Society, XVI, 434-35.
Typed manuscript, "Speech at Huron Place," K.S .H.S. Archives; Topeka
Daily Capital, July 27, 1894. This speech in manuscript form is thirty-one
typed pages in length, and is obviously a very rough draft.
The Advocate, Topeka, September 19, 1894; see also an article by G. C.
Clemens entitled "The Philosophy of the Omaha Platform: Not Paternalism
but Fraternalism," ibid., September 5, 1894.
Topeka Daily Capital, August 3, 1894; The Advocate, Topeka, August 8, 1894.
Clover's reward, according to the Topeka Advocate (May 22, 1895), was that
of farmer for the boy's reform school in Topeka at $29.75 a week.
Letter to John W. Breidenthal, dated August 28, 1894, Topeka Daily Capital,
September 2, 1894.
lbid., August 21, 1894. Republican gubernatorial candidate Morrill employed
essentially the same argument in his campaign; see his speech at Fredonia,
reported in the Topeka Daily Capital, September 6, 1894.
New Era, Topeka, June 16, 30, 1894.
See especially ibid., July 21 , 1894.
The Advocate, Topeka, August 29, 1894.
Kansas Commoner, Wichita, October 25, 1894; The Advocate, Topeka, October 24, 1894; The Weekly World, Girard, October 25, 1894. Other than
Corning, Wesley Henry Bennington, named for associate justice of the supreme court, was the only one on the ticket whose name was known to Populist
politics either before or after the election. Bennington was then president of
the Commonweal Army of Kansas. See Topeka New Era, July 21, 1894.
Kansas Commoner, Wichita, October 25, 1894.
Ben Henderson argued the cause of the Corning ticket, which raises the question of whether both Henderson and Corning were Cy Leland's agents. Walter
Nugent believes that to be the case but, as he has written, "No one will ever
know to what extent the destruction of fusion by means of those useful toolsCy Corning, Ben Henderson, and the woman's suffrage issue-was a matter of
conscious planning by Leland. It is entirely possible that the whole plan was
laid before the Republican convention which met in early June, before the
Populist convention, many months before the election." The course pursued
by Corning's New Era, in itself, is practically enough evidence to prove his
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implication, but until more conclusive evidence is uncovered indicating that
Henderson made his fight for woman suffrage at the instigation of Leland
(which appears unlikely), this writer must see Henderson as an unstable, antiDemocrat prohibitionist who played into Cy Leland's hand. See Nugent, "How
the Populists Lost in 1894," Kansas Historical Quarterly, XXXI (Autumn,
1965), 255.
Perhaps the most exploited charge was the Republican story that fiendish
Populist doctors had performed brutal and mutilating operations on the patients of the institution for the feebleminded.
In the third congressional district the incumbent Populist, T. J. Hudson, decided not to run again because of personal financial difficulties, and J. D.
Botkin was a late replacement. See The Advocate, Topeka, September 19,
1894.
The woman-suffrage vote as reported in ibid., December 19, 1894.
Hein and Sullivant, Kansas Votes: Gubernatorial Elections, 27, 31; Cabe and
Sullivant, Kansas Votes: National Elections, 128-31.
Woman suffrage was probably more effective in driving Democratic votes away
from the Populist ticket than was the breakdown of fu sion itself. The Democratic candidate, Overmeyer, received only 26,709 votes. Compare this with
the 71,357 votes for the Democratic candidate in 1890 and 107,528 in 1888.
See The Advocate, Topeka, December 19, 1894; Hein and Sullivant, Kansas
Votes, 25, 27.
New Era, Topeka, November 10, 1894.
Ibid., February 3, I 895.
The Kansas State Historical Society has a copy of the formal program Republicans printed for the affair.

Chapter X
1. Kansas State Governor Messages (K.S.H.S.), II.
2. Full text of the message is contained in The Advocate, Topeka, January 16,
1895.
3. For an excellent example see the speech of Charles A. Sheldon (secretary of
the Republican League and a banker from Burlingame), January 29, 1895,
contained in The Kansas Day Club Addresses.
4. B. B. M'Call, "Why I Am Not a Populist," January 29, 1895, ibid.
5. Twenty-five of eighty-seven (28.7 percent) were identified as farmers or stock
raisers; nine more ( 16.3 percent) were engaged in farming in association with
banking, real estate, merchandizing, engineering, and surveying. Actually,
fifty-three out of eighty-nine (58.2 percent) were born in the states named.
Two were natives of Kansas; eleven ( 12 percent) were born on foreign soil.
Information compiled from George W. Crane's Advance Sheets of the Hand
Book of the Kamas Legislature (Topeka, 1895).
6. Based on twenty-eight cases where age information was provided, seven (24.l
percent) Populist representatives were fifty or older. The youngest was thirtyone and the oldest sixty-two. Twenty-five of thirty-one (80.6 percent) Populist
representatives were born in the states indicated above. None were native
Kansa ns; three (9.6 percent) were born on foreign soil. Five of thirty-two
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Populists were Union veterans. Religious affiliations were available for Populists and Republicans but were so mixed as to seem irrelevant. It is perhaps
worth noting, however, that sixty-three of eighty-nine (70.7 percent) Republicans expressed their church affiliation, while only thirteen of thirty-two
Populists ( 40.6 percent) so committed themselves.
7. Among the Republicans of the house there were twenty-eight lawyers (three
of whom were also engaged as a banker, loan agent, and a railroad advertising
agent), thirteen merchants, two bankers, one merchant-banker, one realtorbanker-farmer, three realtor-farmers, one real estate broker, one manufacturer,
one "railroad builder" and mine owner, one merchant-farmer, one mill owner,
one contractor, two physicians, three editor-publishers, two farmer-ministers,
one clerical worker, one surveyor, one surveyor-farmer, one farmer who was
also a civil engineer, one carpenter, and one blacksmith. Their number was
completed by twenty-five farmers and/ or stock raisers. Among the Populists
were nineteen farmers and/ or stock raisers, two teacher-farmers, one lawyerfarmer, one farmer who was also a mill operator, one editor-farmer, one
banker-farmer, one physician, and one miner.
8. See the analysis of the senate on page 137.
9. Two measures passed by the legislature authorized Arlington and Sylvia townships in Reno County to issue bonds for the construction of flour mills; both
were vetoed by Governor Morrill. In his veto of one of these the governor
stated: "It seems to be the intention of the bill to enable a municipal township
to go into the milling business. Counties, townships and other political subdivisions of the state were not organized, nor was it ever intended they should
be organized for such purposes. I regard such legislation as vicious and a step
in the wrong direction. If a township or city is to go into the milling business,
I sec no reason why municipal organizations cannot engage in divers kinds of
enterprises coming into direct competition with individual enterprises and all
tending in the direction of the state owning and controlling all manner of
private business. It is contrary to the very spirit of our constitutions and a
direct step toward paternalism and against good government." The governor's
veto message prompted The Advocate (March 13, 1895) to state, "Had the
citizens of these townships asked the privilege to issue their bonds to be presented as a bonus to some milling corporation as an inducement to erect a
flouring mill to be operated for the private gain of said corporation, it is not
likely their bill would have been vetoed. That would not be paternalism in
the eyes of Governor Morrill; but when they ask the privilege of issuing their
own bonds for their own benefit and to relieve themselves from the extortions
of an arbitrary and avaricious milling trust, such paternalism . . . is not to be
thought of." This issue docs indeed point up a valid and basic difference
between many Populists and Republicans-and Democrats too, for that matter.
An obvious contradiction, which Governor Morrill did not attempt to reconcile, was the continuing sanction of the legislature and the executive for the
purchase of gas, water, and electric plants by municipalities from private
companies.
10. R. H. Semple, "The Legislature of 1895," The Agora, IV (April, 1895),
261-67.
11. Senate Journal, 1895, 489-90, 605 -06. Senate bills 41, 47, 95, and 285.
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12. House /ournal, 1895, 1661.
13. Ibid. See house bills 335, 541, 768, and 862 on pages 1609, 1628, 1649, and
1659. The platforms of both parties had indorsed the irrigation measure. See
Topeka Daily Capital, July 15, 1894, and Populist Party Clippings (K.S.H.S.),
I, 84-86.
14. Harold U. Faulkner, Politics, Reform and Expansion (New York, 1959),
141-51.
15. Speech in the house delivered August 18, 1893, Kansas Collected Speeches, IX
(K.S.H.S.). Senator Peifer and Congressman Thomas J. Hudson also went on
record with similar efforts.
16. Faulkner, Politics, Reform and Expansion, 151.
17. November 22, 1893.
18. In a recent article, Robert F. Durden has written that "to most Populists of
the period socialism was the real, late-coming 'cow-bird' that tried to capture
the nest." Interpreting Henry D. Lloyd to have meant that free silver was not
an initial part of the Populist program, Durden then proceeds to his satisfaction to demonstrate that free silver was not the "cow-bird" of the reform
movement. Leaving aside the fact that the article was made possible by a
clever interpretation of Lloyd's famous statement, Mr. Durden's article fails to
deal adequately with the Populist position on the money question. As late as
1896, Senator Peifer defined that position adequately when he declared: "the
money that the People's party demand is gold, silver, and paper. Populists
believe in the unlimited and free coinage of both the metals, and if there is not
enough of coin money in the country, supplement it with paper money. The
difference between the Populists and the Democrats and the Republicans is
this : That we do not believe in private notes of any kind to circulate as money;
we do not believe in the Government of the United States or the Congress ...
delegating its authority 'to coin money and to regulate the value thereof' to
any class of people under heaven. We believe it is a function of government,
and a sovereign function, to prepare and to issue its own money-its own gold
money, its own silver money, its own paper money . . . ." (Congressional
Record, 54th Cong., 1st. sess., p. 2479). Mr. Durden's article, "The 'Cow-bird'
Grounded: The Populist Nomination of Bryan and Tom Watson in 1896,"
The Mississippi Valley Historical Review: A /ournal of American History, L
(December, 1963), 397-423, may have some general validity as applied to
southern Populism, from which his material is largely drawn, but it must be
seriously qualified when applied to Kansas Populism.
19. The Advocate, Topeka, February 14, 1894.
20. The Populist platform of I 894 is contained in Populist Party Clippings
(K.S.H.S.), I, 84-86.
21. Topeka Dail}' Capital, July 15, 1894.
22. Taubeneck's proposals were noted in The Advocate, Topeka, December 12,
1894.
23. Letter to editor, ibid.
24. Ibid.
25. Ibid., February 6, March 6, and March 27, 1895.
26. One significant Kansas publication was that of J. M. Waterman entitled Siltier
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Threads Among the Gold: A Plea for the free Coinage of Silver (Delphos,
1895), People Party Pamphlets (K.S.H.S.), JI.
June 18, 1895.
July 9, 1895.
J. F. Willits was president of the state Alliance again in 1895, J.B. French was
secretary, and John Otis was lecturer. See The Advocate, Topeka, February 6,
1895.
Ibid., October 2, 1895.
Ibid., October 9, 1895, and February 5, 1895.
Ibid., December 18, 1895, and January I, 1896.
Letter to editor, ibid. , February 5, 1896.
Ibid., April 29, 1896.
Before undertaking this state study the writer researched and studied the
Populist movement in Osage County. This county was selected because it was
strongly Populist and Progressive, and, because of its coal-mining industry, the
existence of a significant labor element afforded an opportunity to arrive at
some conclusions regarding the cooperation between the farmer and the laborer.
Most of the material for the study was drawn from The Peoples Herald (a
Populist weekly published in Lyndon) and the Kansas People (a Republican
weekly published in Osage City).
For material concerning the background of the leadership of the party in
Osage County and their approaeh to reform, see The Peoples Herald, Lyndon,
especially the issues of September 12, October 31, 1890; December 15, 1892;
and October 10, 31, 1895; Kansas People, Osage City, November 5, 1890.
Norman Pollack has stated that labor was the conservative, "retarding influ ence" of the farmer-labor coalition. The voting patterns of Osage County, at
least, would support that contention. See Pollack, Populist Response to Industrial America, 61.
Utilizing the census of 1895 the writer discovered that there were around 824
of 1180 heads of families residing in the city who were classified as laborers
(mostly miners), 50 as farmers, and 306 as business or professional. The occupational breakdown for the city's four wards was: first ward, 273 laborers, 206
business and professional, and 25 farmers; second ward, 341 laborers, 94 business and professional, and 18 farmers; third ward, 98 laborers, 3 business or
professional, and 3 farmers; fourth ward, 112 laborers, 3 business or professional, and 4 farmers. See Kansas State Census, 1895, Osage Co., CCLXXII
(K.S.H.S.).
The votes for governor in the city by ward for the elections of 1890,
1892, 1894, and 1896 were as follows (The Peoples Herald, Lyndon, November 12, 1890; November 17, 1892 ; November 15, 1894; November 13, 1896) :

1st 49/
2nd 65/
3rd 91/
4th 74/

P.P.
134/
69/
57/
25/

D
42
15
14
21

P.P. D
R
12 8/ 229/ 2
112/
75/ 5
lll/ 76/ 11
100/
61/ 1

1896

1894

1892

1890
R

R
141/
107 I

115/
106/

P.P. D
134/ 27
78/
8
77/ 17
30/ 15

R

P.P.

135/ 171
127/
98/
91/

70
99
49

D
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40.
4 I.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.

48.
49.
50.

The analysis of Osage City voting is complicated by several factors: the city
contained a significant foreign-born element (510 heads of families out of
1180) and 91 Negro families resided in the city. It is likely that a number of
the former had no vote (an average for the number of votes cast at any one
election would be about 650), and that most of the latter remained with the
Republican party.
The writer also applied a similar treatment to the town of Burlingame
which supported the Republican ticket in every election throughout the decade.
Burlingame was second in size but first in affiuence. The census revealed that
there were 208 heads of families who were classified as business or professional
by occupation, 48 as farmers, and 164 as laborers. The Republican margin of
victory in the elections roughly approximated the ratio of three to two. Since
the town cast its vote as a unit, the writer has no way of determining how
these groups voted, but based on the findings in Osage City, it seems likely
that the Republican ticket was supported by a substantial percentage of the
labor vote.
The Peoples Herald, Lyndon, February 14, 1895.
Ibid., March 21, 1895.
Ibid. , March 28, 1895.
Ibid., April 25 and May 30, 1895.
Ibid., May 30, 1895.
Ibid., August 29, 1895.
Ibid., October 24, 1895.
See ibid. for September 12 and October 31, 1890, for the presentation of the
party's candidates to the voters in that first campaign.
For the record, this trend continued in Osage County. While the party's
leaders kept the emphasis on the "solid-citizen" types, pushed fusion, and increasingly focused the party's efforts on the towns rather than the countryside,
the Farmers' Alliance, which remained in the hands of an element of the
original leadership, attacked the party's new spokesmen for having sold out
party principles and leading the party to defeat behind William J. Bryan.
The Peoples Herald, Lyndon, November 7, 1895.
The Advocate, Topeka, April 29, 1896.
The Peoples Herald, Lyndon, July 2, 1896. Norman Pollack has concluded
that "Populism was not deceived on silver; it remained radical to the end." As
applied to the leadership of the Kansas Populists this conclusion has general
validity, although there was a minority segment which looked to silver as a
panacea. The issue appears to have had a more deceptive appeal for the rankand-file Populist. See Pollack, The Populist Response to lndwtrial Amet·ica,
143.

Chapter XI
1. John D. Hicks, The Populist Revolt, 349-67. The literature of the 1896 cam-

paign is extensive; among the works that aid considerably in understanding
that crucial election are: Paul Glad, McKinley, Bryan and the People, and The
Trumpet Soundeth, William fennings Bryan and His Democracy, 1896-1912
(Lincoln, 1960); H. Wayne Morgan, William McKinley and His America
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(Syracuse, 1963); James A. Barnes, "Myths of the Bryan Campaign," Miuissippi Valley Historical Review, XXXIV (December, 1947), 367-404; and William Diamond, "Urban and Rural Voting in 1896," American Historical Review, XLVI (January, 1941), 281-305. Two recent studies, Stanley L. Jones'
The Presidential Election of 1896 (Madison, 1964) and Robert F. Durden's
The Climax of Populism: The Election of 1896 (Lexington, 1965), both contribute invaluably to this discussion.
Girard World (Weekly), July 16, 1896.
The Advocate, Topeka, July 22, 1896, compiled a list of newspapers supporting Bryan's indorsement. For The Advocate's reaction to the Bryan nomination see the July 15, 1896, edition.
Newspaper clipping, dated July 22, 1896, from St. Louis, contained in the
Kansas Biographical Scrapbook (K.S.H.S.) , B, III, 302.
Quoted in Hicks, The Populist Revolt, 365.
Ibid., 357-67.
The Advocate, Topeka, July 29, 1896.
The central committee statement was elated October 31, 1896, and published
in ibid., October 28, 1896.
W. J. Costigan led an unsuccessful fight within the convention to prevent
Breidenthal's reelection as state chairman. It was charged that among other
things Breidenthal had "spent money amounting to thousands of dollars ...
to defeat the nomination of ex-Governor Lewelling at the Abilene convention .. .. " The charge was deniecl. Lewelling later stated that Breidenthal
had also done "his best to defeat" his "renomination" in 1894. See ibid.,
August 12, 26, and September 9, I 896; Kansas Scrapbook Biography
(K.S.H.S.), B, III, 308.
The Advocate, Topeka, August 12, 1896.
The biographical record of John W. Leedy is quite incomplete. See George W.
Crane's Advance Sheets of Hand Book of the Kansas Legislature, 1895, and
Wilson's Eminent Men, 45-47. Later, while visiting Kansas in April, 1897,
Mary Elizabeth Lease maintained that she, "with a few trusty friends, was instrumental in breaking the Topeka slate ["Harris for Governor and Breidenthal for the Senate") that had been fixed for the Abilene convention . . . ."
She maintained that "by bringing up Lewelling as a candidate for Governor,
which I did at every point in the state, I dividecl the forces and they were
compelled to drop Harris and compromise on Leedy." No corroborating evidence was found to support this claim. See the Topeka Daily Capital, April
27, 1897.
The Kansas Blue Book (Topeka, 1897).
The Weekly Kansas Chief, Troy, July 30, 1896.
Malin, A Concern About Humanity, 203.
Ibid.
Emporia Gazette (Weekly), May 14, 1896.
Ibid., August 6, 1896.
Ibid., August 13, 1896.
Ibid., October 29, 1896.
The "What's the Matter with Kansas" editorial appeared in the weekly on
October I, 1896. Too often, this article had been dealt with as an aberration
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of sorts; as if White wrote the article in a moment of anger resulting from his
having been "ganged" by Populist partisans. This no doubt happened, as
White noted in his Autobiography, but the philosophy and argument of the
article was not as much out of the ordinary as the progressive William Allen
White of later years wanted his posterity to believe.
G. C. Clemens, An Appeal to True Populists, People's Party Pamphlets
(K.S.H.S.), VI.
Clemens went before the board of certification arguing the case of the Populists against certification of the middle-of-the-road ticket for a place on the
ballot. See the statement by Clemens on this matter in The Advocate, Topeka,
October 28, 1896.
It was of course a Republican board of certification that approved the middleof-the-road electoral ticket. The mid-road faction was represented in argument
before that board and later before the state supreme court by Republican counsel-before the state supreme court it was former Chief Justice Horton, a
Republican, who argued their case. See ibid.
"Final Address to Populists," Populist State Central Committee (Anti-Fusion),
People's Party Pamphlets (K.S.H.S.), VII.
Abe Steinberger was the leader of the mid-roaders. He was president of the
Kansas Reform Press Association at the time. This organization met in October, however, and adopted a resolution censoring Steinberger's actions. In the
election, the mid-road ticket polled onl y a fraction of the votes. In Girard,
Steinberger's home town, only five votes were cast for the mid-road ticket;
only seventy votes were cast in all of Crawford County, in which Girard is
located. See The Advocate, Topeka, October 28, 1896; Girard World (Daily),
November 12, 1896.
The Advocate, Topeka, October 21, 1896; The Weekly Co -Operator and Topeka Press, October 2, 1896.
The Advocate, Topeka, October 14, 1896.
Kansas City Star, September 10, 1896; Kansas City Times, September 11, 1896.
G. C. Clemens challenged Willits and Steinberger to deny that in preparation
for this tour, "the Republican Mayor of Topeka and another Republican hired
the opera house for his first speech." He asked if they would deny in his
"presence that they were not to pay a dollar for that special train in which
Watson was to have toured Kansas? That no Populist on earth was to pay a
dollar? That it was 'tendered' to them by the obliging railroad company
which has not been so kind to the wicked 'fusionists' of Abilene?" See The
Advocate, Topeka, October 28, 1896.
Letter to editor Steinberger, Girard World (Weekly), October 28, 1896.
Emporia Gazette, November 5, 1896.
January 12, 1897.
The explanation for Governor Leedy's vapid oratory may well be explained by
the following commentary that appeared in the Topeka Daily Capital: "John
W. Leedy made a reputation as a stump speaker while a member of the State
Senate. He had a gift of gab . . . . He had a style of his own, which was
entertaining, and the galleries always were crowded when it became known
that he would have something to say. His quick wit offset his rough manners,
and the vigor of his attack ... made his butchery of the English language
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less apparent." It was felt that he had been advised to be careful in his use of
English, and consequently had developed a fear of criticism on this account.
In the Capital's estimation, the last time Leedy had delivered a speech "with
fire in it" was at the Abilene convention; since then, throughout the campaign
of I 896 and later, his speeches had been edited by Ed Little, who became
Governor Leedy's private secretary. See the issue of February 20, 1898.
Ibid., January 12, 1897.
Statistics compiled largely from The Kansas Blue Book. The previous party
affiliations of Populists in the senate had not altered significantly. Former Republicans, Democrats, and third-party men were represented by the ratio of
five, two, and three respectively.
Among the eight Popocrats were two physicians, and one each of the following: banker, merchant, farmer, lawyer, livestock dealer, and real estate and
lumber dealer. There were no former third-party men among the Popocrats;
all were Democrats, although four had only joined that party in 1890, after
leaving the Republican party. As far as could be determined, former Republicans, Democrats, and third-party men were represented among the house
Populists by the ratio of five, three, and two respectively. Altogether, there
were ninety-six inexperienced legislators in the house. Only thirteen Populists
and twelve Republicans had served in a previous legislature. Taking all factions together, there were twenty-nine experienced legislators; only twenty-five
of these had served in the preceding house. This ranked the house of 1897 as
the least experienced house since that of 1891.
The Advocate, Topeka, August 5, 1896.
Ibid., December 2, 1896.
Ibid., and December 9, 1896.
Wilson, Eminent Men, 203-05.
Topeka Daily Capital, January 21, 1897. Peffer's services were not entirely
unappreciated; as a matter of fact praise was forthcoming from some unexpected sources: the Capital (February 12, 1897) quoted an article from the
Philadelphia Press which said that Senator Peffer had won "the respect of all
the members of the Senate." The Press noted that he had come "to Washington six years ago, in company with Jerry Simpson, the 'sockless statesman of
Medicine Lodge,' and of the two he was considered the greater freak. Six
years in the Senate has, however, changed the common opinion with regard
to him. Instead of being a blatant demagogue and Populist fire-eater, he has
turned out to be a very mild-mannered gentleman indeed, who has, of course,
the crazy notions of the Populists, but whose presentation of these notions has
been made in the prosiest, least sensational manner imaginable."
Coincidentally, the last edition of The Advocate published before Peffer assumed editorship (March 10, 1897) announced the death of Dr. Stephen
McLallin. McLallin died on March 4. The Advocate spoke highly of his work,
and well it might, for McLallin and his paper had been for five years the
conscience and inspiration of Kansas Populism.
House fournal, 1897, 1262, 1302; Senate fournal, 1897, 1091, 1203.
Populist-Democrat-Silver Republican senators opposing the bill were: John
Armstrong, engineer-farmer, Great Bend ; W. B. Crossan, lawyer and Silver
Republican nominated by the Populists, from Paola; Hugh Farrelly, a Demo-
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cratic lawyer from Chanute; Frank Field, cattle and grain shipper from Pretty
Prairie; George Hanna, Clay Center creamery merchant; W. A. Harris, engineer-surveyor-farmer from Linwood; W. H . Ryan, merchant and cattle and
grain shipper from Brazilton; E. T. Shaffer, farmer and stock raiser from Fulton ; and Henry Zimmer, from Kansas City, whose occupation was market
gardening. See The Kansas Blue Book, 1897, and the Topeka Advocate,
March 31, 1897.
House Journal, 1897, 1170-71.
Ibid.
March 3, 1897.
House Journal, 1897, 33-34.
Ibid. , 908,911; Senate Journal, 1897, 680; Topeka Daily Capital, February 24,
1897. Grant Wood Harrington, who had been Harris' private secretary for a
time, stated in an editorial, "The Harris bill did not contain a maximum rate,
but it gave the commissioners full authority to fix rates and then power to
enforce them." Harrington contended that this bill "was shot to pieces in the
Senate committee on railroads . .. ." See Harrington's editorial, first published
in the Hiawatha Democrat, in the Topeka Daily Capital, November 3, 1897.
Topeka Daily Capital, February 25, 1897.
Senate Journal, 1897, 680.
House Journal, 1897, 911.
Topeka Daily Capital, March 10, 1897.
Costigan's statement from an undated Topeka Daily Capital clipping, Kansas
Biographical Scrapbook (K.S.H.S.), C, IV, 255.
See John Dunsmore's letter to W. H. Scars, July 28, 1898, Sears Collection,
K.S.H .S. Archives.
Virginia Noah Gibson, "The Effect of the Populist Movement on Kansas State
Agricultural College," unpublished master's thesis, Kansas State College of
Agriculture and Applied Science, 1932, passim. See also the lengthy letter by
George T. Fairchild giving a full and objective account of what had transpired
at the college, which is contained in Topeka Daily Capital, September 10, 1897.
In defense of its actions the board made the following statement regarding
academic freedom: "We hold the principle of freedom of science equal in rank
and importance with the principles of freedom of thought, of speech, of the
press, and of the ballot. \Ve note with deep concern the menace to this and
other form s of true freedom through the steady aggrandizement of power in
the hands of organized wealth. We find alleged economists in cases prostituting their science to the service of their masters, while men of unquestioned
attainments, who refuse to distort and conceal important truth, and to sell
their manhood for bread, are tried for economic heresy, or dismissed on
spurious pretexts, and practically blacklisted; a subservient press concealing,
condoning, or applauding the act." Minutes of the Board of Regents, Kansas
State Agricultural College, Vol. B, 160-63, as quoted in the appendix of ibid.
93-102.
April 12, 1897.
April 13, 1897.
Gibson, "The Effect of the Populist Movement on Kansas State Agricultural
College," 83-85.
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Chapter XII
I. Letter from W. H. Bennington to J. S. Ensminger, Topeka Daily Capital,
February 9, 1897. See also J. S. Ensminger's letter to Governor John Leedy,
ibid., February 7, 1897.
2. Anticipating an endless barrage of attacks on the governor, the Topeka Capital
began numbering its disclosures. On February 14, 1897, that paper ran an
article entitled "Second Shot at Governor Leedy," in which Populist Railroad
Commissioner Joseph G. Lowe took the governor to task for his selection of
William Rogers for appointment to the board of regents of the state agricultural college. On February 16 the same paper published a protest from
Washington County Populists which accused Rogers of being "loud mouthed,
indecent, and vulgar," "obscene in his remarks," "wholly unfit," "addicted to
the use of liquors," a "blasphemer and an infidel," and an "outcast socially."
The appointment of Rogers was confirmed despite the attack.
3. See Scott, "A Congressman and His Constituents," passim.
4. Simpson and McKay both held shares in the Barber County Index. Soon after
the campaign of 1896, the rivalry between the two culminated in a struggle,
initiated by Simpson, to gain control of the paper. The McKay faction won
the fight and the war was on in earnest. Ibid. ; see also Medicine Lodge
Cresset, March 19, 1897; Barber County Index, March 17, 1897.
5. Topeka Daily Capital, January 26, 1897.
6. Ibid., April 10, 1897. While visiting Kansas in April and July, 1897, Mary
Elizabeth Lease stated on both occasions that she believed the former governor
was "the victim of a Breidenthal conspiracy" aimed at destroying "Lewelling's
political future." See ibid., April 27, 1897, and July 15, 1897.
7. lbid., April 11, 1897.
8. Ibid., April 6, 1897.
9. Medicine Lodge Cresset, July 30, 1897; Barber County Index , May 19, 1897.
Despite an intensive search, no material was found to support the accusation
that Jerry Simpson engaged in such extensive lobbying activities. Although it
is of course possible that Simpson was guilty as charged, it seems more likely
that he used his influence to obtain passage of the senate railroad bill in the
house, fearing its defeat would mean no railroad legislation. Simply to advise
for or against a particular matter would be interpreted as lobbying. On the
other hand , the record does reveal that in one appearance before the legislature
Simpson advised the legislators to maintain "a place in the skirmish line of all
reforms," as well as to "sec that the eternal agitation is kept up . . . ." See
the Topeka Daily Capital, January 30, 1897.
10. The investigating committee's proceedings are reported in the April-May-June
1897 issues of ibid.
I I. Senator Householder later remarked in a speech delivered in Baxter Springs
(quoted in ibid., October 12, 1897), "Thirteen Populist Senators besides Harris
voted for the Harris freight rate bill. The others could not be bought." Several
Populist senators, L. D. Lewelling, Frank Fields, and George Hanna for example, were subsequently called before their county committees to explain
their votes. As a matter of fact, the Populist central committee of Dickinson
County called upon Senator George Hanna to submit his resignation. See The
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Advocate, Topeka, June 9, 1897; Topeka Daily Capital, April 7, 1897, and
May 16, 1897.
Topeka Daily Capital, April 21, 1897.
Ibid., April 11, 1897.
The Advocate, Topeka, April 7, November 24, and December 15, 1897.
Topeka Daily Capital, February 3, 1898.
Clipping dated December, 1896, in Kansas Biographical Scrapbook (K.S.H.S.)
L, I, 189.
The Advocate and News, Topeka, February 9, 1898.
Governor Leedy came in for a good deal of criticism from temperance elements after he delivered a noncommittal address before the State Temperance
Union which met in Topeka on May 18, 1897. See the Topeka Daily Capital,
May 19, 1897.
Taylor Riddle was Frank Doster's brother-in-law. Breidenthal, who was then
rather quietly exerting his efforts in opposition to Governor Leedy's renomination, resigned and the central committee selected Riddle. Taylor Riddle was
elected to the position in June, 1898. Breidenthal's actions at this point are
not clear as revealed in accessible documents. The Leedy administration, however, had sponsored and obtained salary cuts almost across the board. Breidenthal's salary as bank commissioner was dropped from $2500 to $2000; this
may have been at the root of the matter. Breidenthal's only comment at the
time was: "This knocks me out." G. C. Clemens protested the cut rather
vigorously, and apparently a number of the individuals affected felt that
favoritism had been shown in the matter. See the Topeka Daily Capital,
February 19, 21 , 23, 1897.
Ibid., January 1, 1898.
The official correspondence of the Leedy administration is quite skimpy and
badly kept; after the outbreak of the Spanish-American War, matters relating
to the mobilization, in some fashion or another, practically pushed everything
else aside.
Newspaper clipping dated February 18, 1898, which is contained in Kansas
Biographical Scrapbook (K.S.H.S .), D, II, 20.
Ibid.
Topeka Daily Capital, March 30, and July 2, 1898; Kansas Collected Speeches
and Pamphlets (K.S.H.S.), XV; Senator Harris to John P. St. John, State
/ournal, Topeka, July 8, 1898.
Kansas Collected Speeches and Pamphlets (K.S.H.S .), XV, I.
Ibid., 3. Richard Hofstadter has written that Populists "distinguished between
wars for humanity and wars of conquest. The first of these they considered
legitimate, but naturally they had difficulty in discriminating between the
two . . .." Hofstadter has also written that the Populists were "profoundly
nationalistic and bellicose," and that the jingoism of the 1890s was nowhere
"stronger than among the Populists." The literature of Kansas Populism does
demonstrate that many Populists did indeed distinguish between "wars for
humanity and wars of conquest"; however, the record also demonstrates that
most of them had very little difficulty in "discriminating between the two."
They recognized imperialism and militarism when they saw it. There were
leaders among the Kansas Populists whose attitudes concerning the actions of
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Spain in Cuba verged on the jingoistic, but to say that this sentiment was
stronger among the Populists than among other elements, Republicans for example, would be an overbold estimate of the situation if not a complete distortion of the facts. See Hofstadter, Age of Reform (New York, 1955), 85-88.
Topeka Daily Capital, February 18, 1898.
Apparently Ed Little, Leedy's secretary and a recent recruit from Republican
ranks, urged the appointment of Funston . William H . Sears, Senator W. A.
Harris' secretary, was slated for the appointment until a "false" newspaper
story from Washington, D.C., under the name of Senator W. A. Harris, was
published criticizing Governor Leedy's handling of the mobilization. Frederick
Funston went on of course to compile an outstanding military record. On this
matter see, in particular, a letter by W. A. Sears to Richard J. Oulahan, February 27, 1917, Sears Collection, K.S.H .S. Archives.
Topeka Daily Capital, April 28, 1898.
Ibid., issues of May 1897; in particular that of May 15, 1897.
Wright to W. H. Sears, August 11, 1898, Sears Collection, K.S.H.S. Archives.
For the record, Isom Wright was a college graduate and former -teacher-turnedfarmer from Great Bend.
Ex -Senator William Peffer was a prominent example. See Peffer's Americanism
and the Philippines (Topeka, 1900). Peffer had actually left the Populist party
by the summer of 1898 when he became the Prohibition party candidate for
governor. E. R. Ridgely was perhaps the outstanding "big policy" advocate
among the party's leaders in 1898-1900. See especially his speech in the house
on June 15, 1898, Kansas Collected Speeches and Pamphlets (K.S .H .S.), XV,
13; Ridgely to W. H. Sears, October 20, 1899, Sears Collection, K.S .H.S.
Archives.
Kansas Collected Speeches and Pamphlets (K.S.H.S.), XV, 11, and 16. See
also the newspaper clipping dated February 3, 1899, by John Davis, in his
Scrapbook (K.S.H.S.), K, 54-55, and the Topeka Daily Capital, January 21,
1899, for Senator Harris' position on the Philippines; also a letter from W. A.
Harris to Annie Diggs in the Topeka Daily Capital, July 2, I 898. See the
anti-imperialistic poem by Mrs. Diggs entitled "Little Brown Brothers," which
a newspaper of September 9, 1898, said had created "much comment, favorable and unfavorable," in Kansas Biographical Scrapbook (K .S.H.S.), D, III,
14. See also the Leavenworth Standard, August I , 1900, Kansas Biographical
Scrapbook (K.S.H.S.), H, II, 102-03, for the views of Senator W. A. Harris.
For substantial evidence demonstrating Republican support for an imperialistic
and militaristic foreign policy see the speeches of Scott Hopkins, E. W. Hoch,
and John Dawson in The Kansas Day Club Addresses for January 29, 1900.
Dawson's, entitled "The White Man's Burden" (pp. 448-53) , is especially
revealing.
Topeka Daily Capital , June 17, 1898.
Ibid. , June 14, 1898; Kansas Scrapbook Biography (K.S.H.S.), L, III, 303.
People's Party Campaign Handbook (Hiawatha, 1898). See also Malin, A
Concern Abotlt Humanity, 45 -6.
Daniels to ex-Senator William A. Peffer, Independent Net11s, Girard, April 24,
I 898; Topeka Daily Capital, September 8, 1898.
A comparison of this 1899 house re'.'ealed nothing especially different from
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46.

that of 1897. Forty-four was the median age for the Republicans; forty-three
for the Populists. Thirty-six of eighty-nine ( 40. 4 percent) Republicans were
fifty or more years old; only six of twenty-two (22.2 percent) Populists were
fifty or older. The oldest Republican in the house was seventy-three and the
youngest twenty-one; the oldest Populist was sixty-five and the youngest
thirty-two. Populists and Republicans, in greater numbers, claimed states like
Ohio, Indiana, Pennsylvania, Illinois, and New York as their place of birth,
although the Populists included more natives from Kentucky, Missouri, and
Iowa. The median year of entry of the Republicans into the state was 1877;
for the Populists it was 1878-79. Most of the Republicans were business or
professional men (65 percent) , while only twenty-three of eighty-nine were
engaged strictly in farming and/ or stock raising. The typical Populist was a
farmer and/or stock raiser (fourteen of twenty-three) , although one out of
three was a business or professional man. Four out of every ten Republicans
were college graduates; whereas three of every ten Populists were college
graduates. There were fewer former third-party men among the Populists of
this house : only one of twelve was listed as such; while eight of twelve had
been Republicans until 1890 and th ree of twelve had been Democrats. Compiled primarily from The Kansas Blue Book (Topeka, 1899 ). For a composite
comparison of the legislatures of 1891, 1893, 1895, 1897, and 1899, in chart
form, see Appendix IV.
Hein and Sullivant, Kansas Votes: Gubernatorial Elections; and Cabe and
Sullivant, Kansas Votes: National Elections.
House /ournal, 1898-99 (Special Session ), 45 , and 175; Senate /ournal,
1898-99 (Special Session), 125.
Malin, A Concern About Humanity , 210.
See The Advocate, Topeka, August 25, 1897, for the text of Peffer's speech .
See also his article entitled "The Passing of the People's Party," The North
American Review, CLXVI (January, 1898) , 12 -23, for additional proof that
Peffer was expounding undiluted Populist doctrine.
Letter dated September 6, 1897, The Advocate, Topeka, September 15, 1897.
Letter dated September 22, 1897, ibid., September 29, 1897.
For material relative to Annie Diggs' position see the Topeka Advocate, October 6, 1897, and the Topeka State /ournal, January 6, 1898. Two years later
Mrs. Diggs was asked by a reporter if she thought the Democrats were "sincere
in their advocacy of so many of the principles originally enunciated by the
Populists?" She replied : "Oh, my! no, I don't think' a great majority of them
are. But the spirit is spreading and they may come around to it after awhile."
See the Kansas City /ournal, August 1, 1900.
·
Malin, A Concern About Humanity, 44; The Advocate and News, Topeka,
January 12, 1898; Clemens' Notebooks, K.S.H .S. Archives. These notebooks
were undated and uncatalogued and , apparently, undiscovered before the
writer came upon them. One of these contains this remark: "So numerous and
so urgent have become the requests from Populist comrades that I shall take
the initiative in organizing a socialist party with which true Populists may
unite and once more find a congenial political home that I can no longer resist.
I must forsake the fusioni sts or the Socialists-it is no longer possible for them
to remain together."
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Clemens' Notebooks, K.S.H.S. Archives.
The Advocate and News, Topeka, February 23, 1898.
Ibid., October 19, 1898.
Ibid., October 12, 1898.
Eugene V. Debs spoke in Topeka on February 4, 1898, to a crowd estimated
to be 2,000. Ibid., February 9, 1898.
Ibid., January 12, 1898; "The Passing of the People's Party," North American
Review, CLXVI (January, 1898). Peffer's antipathy toward the Democratic
party had its roots deep in the sectional conflict, roots that were nurtured by
strong prohibitionist feeling and, later, by opposition to the Democratic party's
stand on imperialism. He maintained, however, that it was based primarily
upon the allegation that the party was a state's rights party and foe of centralized power which was antithetic to the aims of the reform movement.
The Advocate and News, Topeka, June 15, 1898.
Kansas City Star, May 3, 1901.
Letter to ex-Senator William A. Peffer, Independent News, Girard, April 24,
1898.
Topeka Daily Capital, September 8, 1898.
Newspaper clipping dated November 11, 1898, Kansas Biographical Scrapbook
(K.S.H .S.), B, II, 305-06. Breidenthal had contributed as much as anyone to
the eclipse of the very principle he was now lamenting. Professor James C.
Malin has written that Breidenthal "might be characterized as a contradictory
multiple personality-a curious blend of idealism and the crude realism of the
1890's." See A Concern About Humanity, 212. Certainly his actions are difficult to comprehend. A contemporary opponent of Breidenthal noted what he
called the "curious contradiction of the man's nature" in the following commentary: "Believing in the most extreme forms of socialism, Breidenthal has
in his official relations stood steadfastly for the property rights and privileges
of the individual. He has made a bank commissioner acceptable to the state
banks which come under his supervision . . . . The truth is that Mr. Breidenthal has enforced the state supervision of banks, very closely following the
rigid regulations of the government. He has made the state banks as nearly
like the national banks as the state laws would warrant. And yet in theory he
believes the national banks arc all wrong, and if he had his way he would
wipe them out." The explanation for Breidenthal's actions, according to this
observer, was that he was "most radical in his socialistic beliefs and most
conservative in his application of them." See the Topeka Mail and Breeze,
February 10, 1899.
Topeka Mail and Breeze, May 5, 1899.
Topeka State fournal, November 15, 1899.
Sec Ross E. Paulson's forthcoming study entitled Radicalism and Reform: The
Vrooman Family and American Social Thouglzt, 1837-1937 (Lexington,
1968?).
Topeka State fournal, April 8, 1915.
Carl S. Vrooman , Taming the Trusts (Topeka, 1900), 23 -24, 69.
Ibid., 75.
Breidenthal to J. C. Rupenthal , February 9, 1900, Rupenthal Collection,
K.S.H .S. Archives.
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65. Lewelling to W. H. Sears, March 27, 1900, Sears Collection, K.S.H.S. Archives.
The stationery upon which this letter was written identified Lewelling as
manager of the Hurd Land Company in Wichita, which was serving as "immigration agents" for the railroad named above. Sears had written Lewelling
seeking support for his bid for the nomination as lieutenant governor. Lewelling declined the support by stating: "I am taking very little interest in politics
this year, as I am too much occupied with business." See also a newspaper
clipping contained in Kansas Biographical Scrapbook (K.S.H.S.), L, III, 308.
66. Kansas City Journal, July 10, 1900; Kansas Biographical Scrapbook (K.S.H.S.),
L, II, 40.
67. Kansas Biographical Scrapbook (K.S.H.S.), L, II, 50. Actually Lewelling's
turn toward socialism was no sudden departure. As early as October, 1897,
the former governor readily admitted that he was a socialist. He had said
then, however, that he doubted "the advisability of going as fast as the extreme
socialists want to go." "The people are not yet ready to accept socialism. They
must be educated. I know that socialism will triumph some time in this
country, but it must come by degrees." See the Topeka Daily Capital, October
20, 1897.
68. Topeka Daily Capital, March 18, Aprill, 9, 27, July 15, 1897.
69. Leavenworth Times , September 22, 1900; newspaper clipping dated September
27, 1904, in Kansas Biographical Scrapbook (K.S.H.S.) , I, 130-31.
70. Clemens' Notebooks, K.S.H .S. Archives.
71. Breidenthal to J. C. Rupenthal, January 3, 1901, Rupenthal Collection,
K.S.H .S. Archives.
72. Newspaper clipping, Kansas Biographical Scrapbook (K.S.H.S.), B, III, 309.
73. Topeka Daily Capital, September 24, 1900.
74. Newspaper clipping in Kansas Biographical Scrapbook (K.S.H.S.), D, II, 2629. See also the editorials of the Farmers Advocate, Topeka, which was edited
by Annie Diggs from September 13, 1901 , to about February 21, 1902.
75. Breidenthal's vote was 164,793; Republican W. E. Stanley's vote was 181,897
(51.9 percent), Hein and Sullivant, Kansas Votes: Gubernatorial Elections ;
Cabe and Sullivant, Kansas Votes: National Elections.
76. Breidenthal to J. C. Rupenthal, January 3, 1901 , Rupenthal Collection,
K.S.H.S. Archives. Regarding Breidenthal's remark that the Socialists wanted
to accomplish "everything at once," the following commentary by G. C.
Clemens is most revealing: "While socialism is the end they keep always in
view, Socialists recognize that until that end be attained they must live in the
world as it is, changed by such means as they can use to make it more bearable
in the meantime. A good Christmas dinner is a delicious thing to look forward
to, but the breakfast of this morning must be such as we can get. I shall not
refuse to eat ham and eggs to-day to have turkey with dressing sometime next
year." Clemens' Notebooks, K.S.H.S. Archives.
77. The Rupenthal Collection in the K.S.H.S. Archives contains a number of letters relative to Breidenthal 's business venture.
78. Sec, for example, the correspondence and material of the party's Legislative
Bureau relative to the 1902 campaign, which is contained in the K.S.H.S.
Archives.
79. Ottawa fournal and Triumph, July 19, 1894. W. P. Harrington's thesis was
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published in the Collections of the Kansas State Historical Society, XVI, 40350, as "The Populist Party in Kansas."
80. W. P. Harrington to Grant Wood Harrington, September 24, 1902, Correspondence of the Democratic and People's Party Legislative Bureau, K.S.H.S.
Archives.

Chapter XIII
1. Jerry Simpson, "The Plain People," The Illustrated American (September 11,
1897), 332.
2. The Advocate, Topeka, February 16, 1895.
3. Kansas City Star, June 2, 1901. See also the Farmers Advocate, Topeka,
December 20, 190 I.
4. Topeka Daily Capital, May 3, 1907. See also Kansas Biographical Scrapbook
(K.S.H.S.), D, V, 141. Mrs. Diggs warmed very slowly to President Roosevelt; she serious!}' questioned his basic instincts. In 1902, she made this revealing appraisal of the president: "More and more as the days go by I am
impressed by an apparent hardness of character in Mr. Roosevelt; a lack of fine
sensibility, an absence of warm, human sympathy, without which even the
sturdiest, bravest man falls short of greatness." See the Farmers Advocate,
Topeka, January 10, 1902.
5. Topeka Daily Capital, January ?, 1906 [1908?], Kansas Biographical Scrapbook (K.S.H.S.), D, V, 138. Mrs. Diggs edited the Farmers Advocate from
1901 to 1902; from 1902 to 1904 she toured Europe. In 1912 she published a
work entitled Bedrock: Education and Employment, the Foundation of the Republic (Detroit, 1912) in which her main concern was the creation of a bureau
of employment. A typical passage reads: "The republic is not safe with an
ignorant citizenship. Likewise, the republic is not safe with an unemployed
citizenship. It will not do to leave education to the uncertainties or the fluctuations of private enterprise. . . . Likewise, an employed citizenship is so
vital to national health and national progress that there should speedily be set
in motion the machinery of organization to rescue industrialism from the disastrous Auctuations and dehumanizing uncertainty of our private, personal and
· unscientific regime." See also Topeka Daily Capital, April 13, 1904; ibid.,
clipping in Kansas Biographical Scrapbook (K.S.H.S.), D, V, 138.
6. Myron C. Scott, "A Congressman and His Constituents," 176-78. In a recent
article, actually published after this work was on its way to the editor, Karel
Denis Bicha ("Jerry Simpson: Populist Without Principle," Tl,e fournal of
American History, LIV [September, 1967], 291-306) presents a most unfavorable portrait of this Populist congressman. Even though the interpretation
were one he had heard on numerous occasions from 1886 to 1900, it seems
certain that Jerry Simpson would have been most exasperated to learn that he
"became a Populist without principle"; or, better yet, that "he rarely possessed
the courage of his convictions." Simpson most likely would not even be
willing to grant the interpretation of himself as a pragmatic political type-as
this critic of Bicha's interpretation would see his actions-but to say that he
was or "became a Populist without principle" who "rarely possessed the courage of his convictions" is saying something quite different, even if we ignore
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the apparent contradiction (italics added). It is an interpretation that the historical record will not support. If Professor Bicha were to remove Simpson's
activities from the historical vacuum within which they are considered in this
article, his alleged deviation from alleged or assumed Populist dogma or doctrine would fade away. In the final analysis, the Populist leadership and
movement was notable for a great variety of thought and personality, and the
personality of Jerry Simpson probably revealed this Populist trait more clearly
than any other. By all means, Jerry Simpson should not be taken to task for
his alleged betrayal of something that never existed-a fixed Populist ideology.
Interview in Chanute, Kansas, Kansas City Star, May 9, 1905.
Kansas City Times, May 2, 1905.
Kansas City Star, August 4, 1905.
Topeka Daily Capital, October 4, 1905; Kansas Biographical Scrapbook
(K.S.H.S.), S, IX, 227.
The numerous volumes of the Kansas Biographical Scrapbook contained in the
K.S.H.S. Library served as the chief source for this information.
Topeka Daily Capital, December 13, 1901.
Ibid., May 11, 1906.
Hein and Sullivant, Kansas Votes: Gubernatorial Elections.
Kansas City Star, August 12, 1909.
Topeka State Jottrnal, November 2, 1906.
Kansas City Star, September 6, 1903; Kansas Biographical Scrapbook
(K.S.H.S.), P, XI, 106.
Topeka State Journal, June 27, 1907; Kansas Biographical Scrapbook
(K.S.H.S.), P, XII, 197.
Topeka Daily Capital, April 11 , 1911; Kansas Biographical Scrapbook
(K.S.H.S.), P, XIV, 26.
See her book entitled The Problem of Civilization Solved.
Newspaper clipping dated September 27, 1904, Kansas Biographical Scrapbook
(K.S.H.S.), L, I, 131.
In a 1905 article she was quoted as saying that she no longer was interested
in woman suffrage. She said, "You know I never went in much for that sort
of thing. Women have enough to be thankful for that they are Americans."
See the newspaper clipping dated September 6, 1905, Kansas Biographical
Scrapbook (K.S.H.S.) , L, VI, 197. In 1915 Mrs. Lease stated: "Only a few
people in each state have risen to normal civilization. The many are endowed
with citizenship which they are not capable of, or which they do not use
intelligently." See a letter to editor, August 31, 1915; Topeka Daily Capital,
September 5, 1915.
Kansas City Star, October 25, 1914; Kansas Biographical Scrapbook
(K.S.H.S.) , L, VI, 202.
See especially her claim relative to the naming of the People's party, Kansas
City Star, October 25, 1914. Perhaps she was not too far off in her analysis of
the quality of Kansas Populist leaders: she rated Frank Doster as the most
outstanding of them all. "He was head and shoulders above the rest of us,"
she said. "Unfortunately we did not understand him or appreciate him at his
full value then." Jerry Simpson "was overrated. There was not a great deal
of depth to him. He possessed a combination of Canadian and Irish humor
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and it was with this that he moved his audiences, and he understood the tricks
of politics and was quick enough to make the most of his opportunities."
William A. Peffer "was a good man and an honest man, but utterly lacking in
brilliancy and without the first suggestion of magnetism." She had rather
special praise for John W. Leedy. His name, recalled, brought forth this response: "Ah, there was a sterling honest man. He was not with us at the start,
but ... he made good. John Leedy was a man who could not be tempted by
money or office. He was tried and stood the test." See ibid.
Topeka Daily Capital, November 19, I 902.
Ibid., June 13, 1901; see also Kansas City /ournal, June 14, 1901, and Kansas
Biographical Scrapbook (K.S.H.S.), D, II, 232.
Doster retained his interest in politics throughout. In 1914 he made an unsuccessful bid to obtain the Democratic nomination for U.S. senator. Still later
he served as legal advisor to Democratic Governor Jonathan Davis. See Topeka
Daily Capital, February 26, 1933; Michael Brodhead, "Judge Frank Doster,"
unpublished doctoral dissertation (University of Minnesota, 1967).
Doster to H . S. Martin ( chairman of the Democratic state committee), September 21 , 1908, Special Collection, K.S.H.S. Archives.
Kansas City /ournal, September 10, 1910; Republican Party Clippings
(K.S.H.S.), VII, 295-96.
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move to make silver the issue, 17 6;
retires as editor, 179; mentioned, 54,
93, 104, ll4, 118, 177, 218, 270n,
275n, 294n
McLallin, Mrs. M. H., 270n
Malin, James C., comment of relative to
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242-43
Power, C. A., 96
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Sears, W. H., 298n
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to laissez-faire thought, 3
Thompson, T. J., 158
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True, H. F., 274n
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issue before the 1894 state conventions, 172 ff.; referendum vote on,
168; mentioned, 143, 166
Wood, Samuel, comment of, 65; mentioned , 104, 270n
Wright, Isom, remarks on the SpanishAmerican War, 213
Wyatt, Woolford, 183
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